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Preface
Taking a critical and nuanced position on the phenomenon of globalization has
become increasingly difficult in our time. Only recently, it seemed the positions
were clear.When the opening up of the world market and the emergence of new
digital networks palpably increased the pace of globalization in the 1970s, and
when this process again accelerated to breathtaking speed after the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989, advocates and opponents of globalization made their respec-
tive cases in clearly contrasting terms.
On one side were the proponents of globalization, who saw free trade and
cross-border communication as a gain for the development of humankind.
After the notion of the ‘global village’ had made the rounds, ‘one world’ gained
currency as a slogan for the promotion of worldwide cooperation. However, what
drove this was, above all, the marketing of global corporations in opposition to
trade restrictions. Politically, this corresponded to radical neoliberalism celebrat-
ing thirty years of victories. Its message was that the process of ‘deregulation’
ought to be carried on into the future.
In opposition to this apologia for globalization, the so-called ‘anti-globalists’
soon made their voices heard with the help of their own, in part globally active,
organizations. These critics pointed out the negative consequences of unbound-
ed capitalism: the mounting inequality between the wealthy industrial nations of
the north and the poor countries of the south; the emergence of new kinds of
wars and globalized terrorism, with their resulting migrations; the exploitation
of natural resources; and, not least, the catastrophic effects on the global cli-
mate. Under the new umbrella term ‘global governance’, transnational organiza-
tions would serve to mitigate such damages.
Recently, however, the fronts between the apologists and the opponents of
globalization have shifted dramatically. At least since the resurgence of populist
parties and Great Britain’s exit from the European Union, as well as the election
of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States of America, a novel re-
pudiation of globalization has emerged. The critique comes no longer exclusively
from the left in its opposition to capitalism; it comes, rather, from the far right,
which sees the open world market as a threat to its domestic economies and
longs for a return to the old nation states. The irony here is that such nostalgia
is obviously an unintended and undesired side effect of globalization itself.
How are we to respond to this? If the new opponents of globalization are na-
tionalists, racists and fascists, the constellations have shifted. Neoliberals be-
lieve they can and should simply cling to the idea of free trade. But this is to
overlook the fact that the objections to particular effects of globalization will
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not resolve themselves simply because they are raised by the ‘wrong’ side. Pre-
cisely because globalization has begun to provoke dangerous reactions, the anxi-
eties to which such reactions give expression must be taken seriously. This pres-
ents the old critics of globalization with a twofold task: one the one hand, it is
essential that they not give up on their critique of neoliberalism and continue
decrying the exploitation of human beings and nature. On the other hand,
they must clearly distinguish themselves from the new resistance by showing
how a critical alternative to nationalism can be developed on the basis of the
theoretical conception and practical advancement of alternative forms of global-
ization.
As we aim to demonstrate in this volume, this is a project to which philos-
ophy too can contribute. The goal is to present a critical concept of globalization
that is as comprehensive as possible, by taking into account economic, political,
ethical, social and cultural aspects, according to a methodology of philosophi-
cally grounded reflection. The historical dimension receives special emphasis,
including the history of globalization, the topic of globalization in the history
of philosophy, and the philosophy of history’s contribution to a systematic theo-
ry of globalization. As a collection of contributions from authors from Europe
and Latin America, this volume offers an opportunity to depict the topic from di-
verse perspectives and in an intercultural frame of reference.
The first chapter addresses the process of globalization in the areas of econ-
omy, politics and society. In the course of economic transformation, political in-
stitutions change in such a way that social actors lose influence. It is thus nec-
essary to investigate the remaining conditions of the possibility of intervention
(Griselda Gutiérrez), a question that also bears on the political action of persons
with complicated citizenship status (Alejandro Alba). The complex structures of
action that ultimately arise can be designated as ‘cooperative cognition’ (María
Navarro). Yet such social phenomena can only be sufficiently explained if global-
ization is conceived first and foremost as an expansion of western capitalism
(Franz Heilgendorff). In light of such a conception, it becomes evident that cap-
italistically constituted nation states use the exportation of democracy as a pre-
text to wage wars and expand their power (Constanze Demuth). The bellicose no-
tion of a ‘clash of civilizations’ is contradicted by a ‘soft’ or ‘critical’ universalism
that acknowledges cultural differences while also trying to conciliate them (Mar-
kus Tiedemann, Omar Acha).
The process of globalization leads to social inequalities and thus to demands
for global justice—the topic of the second chapter. This calls for political and eth-
ical standards, which are being deformed in the global age (Concha Roldán).
There is a practical need for global institutions that fight injustices in the
world (Elisabetta Di Castro). Instead of merely demanding the fulfillment of char-
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itable aid obligations, it ought to be considered whether, for instance, the right to
health can be legitimated as a human right (Julia Muñoz). Such ethical challeng-
es give rise to the question of who are the subjects of global justice (Alberto
Ruiz). These include generations whose impact reaches into the future, which in-
vites contemplation of intergenerational justice (Irene Gómez). Nevertheless, the
fact that the injustices in the world were created in the past, and must be com-
pensated in the present, indicates the historical import of the topic (Johannes
Rohbeck).
The history of globalization is also the focus of the third chapter. Examples
range from the colonial history of Latin America (Nicholas Miller)—in particular
the Jesuit mission in Paraguay (Rolando Carrasco) in the eighteenth century—to
the urbanization of Mexico City in the nineteenth century (Sergio Miranda). Case
studies from Turkey include intercultural hiring practices in the Ottoman Em-
pire’s engineering sector (Darina Martykánová and Meltem Kocaman), the car-
tography of the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea (Kaan Üçsu), and contrasting
theories of ‘modernization’ and ‘dependency’ (Rıdvan Turhan). These are fol-
lowed by a contribution on the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Poland
(Agnieszka Pufelska).
As the fourth chapter shows, globalization is also a topic in the history of
philosophy. This begins in the historical Age of Enlightenment, during which
the idea of cosmopolitanism first took on concrete form. In this regard, it can
be shown that Raynal’s and Diderot’s critiques of colonialism influenced Kant
(Ricardo Gutiérrez, Roberto Aramayo), who, with his concepts of hospitality
and world peace, is among the pioneers of a philosophical theory of globaliza-
tion (Efraín Lazos). The debate around such an Enlightenment philosophy per-
sists into the present (Iwan-Michelangelo D’Aprile). The political economy of
Marx is also to be counted among the first theories of globalization (Facundo Na-
huel Martín). The idea of globalization is also contained in Heidegger’s metaphy-
sics, since both are directed at the world in its totality (Marco Kleber). Following
Ernst Cassirer, globalization can be understood as a symbolic form that in con-
temporary discourses functions as a worldview (Lucas von Ramin).
Finally, the fifth chapter investigates how philosophy of history may contrib-
ute to the systematic analysis of the phenomenon of globalization. The interdis-
ciplinary conception of ‘Global History’ is well suited for the establishment of a
post-narrative and post-ethnographic historiography of globalization (Daniel
Brauer). To this end, historians can invoke both Koselleck’s theory of history—
as well as Foucault’s critique thereof (Elías Palti)—without naively upholding
the Enlightenment notion of progress (Adrián Ratto). Following Benjamin, it is
much more a matter of rethinking the historical space of the global (Francisco
Naishtat). In the end, the question of the future also belongs to philosophy of
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history, since historical awareness involves not only experience with the past,
but also expectation directed towards the future (Rosa Belvedresi). These inves-
tigations bring the discussion full circle to the initial descriptions of the econom-
ic and political process of globalization, and the subsequent explorations of the
ethical challenges faced by the utopia of global justice.
The articles presented here form the core output of the confluence of two inter-
national research projects led in the last four years by Concha Roldán: (IFS-CSIC)
“Philosophy of History and Globalisation of Knowledge. Cultural Bridges be-
tween Europe and Latin America” (WORLBRIDGES: F7-PEOPLE-2013-IRSES:
PIRSES-GA-2013-612644); and “The Philosophical-Moral Prisms of Crises. To-
wards a New Socio-Political Pedagogy” (PRISMAS: FFI2013-42935-P, co-directed
with Professor of the Institut of Philosophy of Consejo Superior de Investiga-
ciones Científicas, IFS-CSIC, Roberto R. Aramayo).
All the authors of this volume are members of the project WORLDBRIDGES.¹
In this sense, this book represents the scientific results of this joint project,
which was sponsored by the European Union’s 7th Framework Program on Re-
search, and which has made possible the exchange between more than forty re-
searchers from Europe and Latin America.
The following institutions have participated in the project on the European
side: The Spanish National Research Council (Consejo Superior de Investiga-
ciones Científicas, CSIC: located in Madrid, under the direction of Professor Con-
cha Roldán), the University of Potsdam (Universität Potsdam, UP: under the di-
rection of Professor Iwan-Michelangelo D’Aprile), the University of Dresden
(Technische Universität Dresden, TUD: under the direction of Professor Johannes
Rohbeck) and the University of Istanbul (UI, under the direction of Professor Mel-
tem Kocaman); and on the Latin American side: the Center for Philosophical Re-
search (Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas, CIF: Buenos Aires, Argentina,
under the direction of Professor Daniel Brauer) and the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México: UNAM,
under the direction of Professor Griselda Gutiérrez).
The project PRISMAS, financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Indus-
try and Competitiveness (MINECO), has allowed us to carry out some other meet-
ings and activities necessary for our objectives beyond the financing of the Euro-
pean project.
 The following authors also belong to the PRISMAS project: Roberto R. Aramayo (IFS-CSIC),
Daniel Brauer (UBA), Iwan D’Aprile (UP), Irene Gómez Franco (UP), Griselda Gutiérrez
(UNAM), Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar (IFS-CSIC/UCM), María G. Navarro (USAL), Johannes Rohbeck
(TUD), and Concha Roldán (IFS-CSIC).
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The stereotype of an economic crisis has become a pretext that has permitted
the creation of apocalyptic political designs with a specific ideological bias un-
dermining the welfare state. Our aim in PRISMAS was to analyze the concept of
crisis from several different perspectives: philosophical, sociological, historical,
juridical, political and ethical ones. This is reflected in the title of the project,
‘The Philosophical-Moral Prisms of Crises’—in plural. We base our thinking on
the hypothesis that crises always respond to changes of paradigm, and that
the humanities, being intrinsically interdisciplinary and transversal, permit us
to analyze the crises conceptually, providing a plural diagnosis that is comple-
mentary to the scientific-technical ones, in order to design scientific, education
and labor policies. Therefore, our team brings together conceptual historians,
philologists, historians, sociologists and political scientists coming from differ-
ent cultural traditions. In our opinion, it is necessary to rehabilitate politics
and produce new collective actors, in accordance with concepts such as isogoria
and isonomy, without leaving aside the necessary gender perspectives. This
seems to be a suitable contribution to the Horizon 2020, since the rules of the
democratic system are in jeopardy.
We pursue a multifaceted approach, the methodology of which examines the
more or less hidden axiological backgrounds of every crisis, to show that crises
are not a fateful destiny, but instead depend on many different factors and facil-
itate radical changes. Revising the history of thought in light of this aim can pro-
vide us with keys that can help us understand and face more actively and effi-
ciently the issues of the present—because as Koselleck pointed out in his
Critique and Crisis, concepts can be normative. In this sense, let us remember
the empathy that according to Rousseau was an indispensable pillar of a polit-
ical community, or the Kantian principle of publicity that served to discriminate
injustice.
The analysis of the above-mentioned issues requires a good diagnosis, and
etymology itself is useful for such a complex inquiry. After all, besides separa-
tion and dispute, crisis also means process and even justice in Greek; from divide
(krínein) comes kritikós, the one that distinguishes or passes judgment, and from
there comes the critique or the aptitude to judge. The assertion of the critical spi-
rit and of the values of the Enlightenment can help us to counterbalance the he-
gemonic way of thinking, which is riddled with prejudices that prevent inde-
pendent thinking. To recover the Enlightenment ideal of republican
cosmopolitism could serve to re-direct the dangerous drifts of globalization.
It is here that WORLBRIDGES takes up the torch to develop in detail the eth-
ical-political aspects of globalization, which for a few decades now has ceased to
be a concept with a univocal meaning. We have tried to refine the assumptions
that operate at its base from the history of philosophy itself, but without ignoring
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aporetic aspects of the philosophy of science and philosophy of history. These
are aspects that we have tried to accomplish with an adequate gender perspec-
tive—which flourishes in some of the works presented here (Griselda Gutiérrez,
Irene Gómez, Concha Roldán)—but that also need to be revised in detail in
order to unravel the real depth that feminism brings to an adequate treatment
of the problem of globalization.
The bridges built by globalization enable the interchanging not only of
goods, but also of knowledge, received historical heritage and ethical-political
projects that can complement one another. International cooperation can be
fruitful only if based on real dialogue, interaction and engagement. In our spe-
cific case, this concerns that of Europe, the Euro-Mediterranean and Latin Amer-
ica.
Not only the three editors of this collective volume (Concha Roldán, Daniel
Brauer and Johannes Rohbeck), but also many of its authors have been part of
both projects. In truth, the results here are also an innovative development of
previous results and projects, such as the International Marie Curie Project “En-
lightenment and Global History” (ENGLOBE: Marie Curie Initial Training Net-
work: FP7-PEOPLE-2007-1-1-ITN), or the Spanish Project “Philosophy of history
and Values in Europe of XXI Century” (FFI2008-04279//FISO). In this context,
we would like to devote special mention to remembering Günther Lottes—re-
searcher and professor at Potsdam University, unfortunately deceased in Berlin
on 28 January 2015—who co-directed with Iwan D’Aprile ENGLOBE during
2010–2013, and whose dissertations planted the seed of these new projects
that united a group of researchers who have since worked as a team for almost
a decade.
The cooperation that was initiated mainly between philosophers and histor-
ians has been gaining an increasingly interdisciplinary spirit. As such, we wish
to thank especially Darina Martykánová for the initial impulse given to the re-
quest of these projects and for her invaluable support in organizing them. Scien-
tific cooperation in the humanities—especially in philosophy—is one of the main
goals of this international team, as a way to escape from a conceptual solipsism,
which also leads to an ethical-political stagnation. Following Leibniz’s motto
“Theoria cum praxi”, we strive to use multiple theoretical instruments of the hu-
manities to correct their own erroneous applications; in other words, our projects
aims to use multiple theoretical tools from the humanistic domains to overcome
any misguided practical applications. Therefore, the result of these two projects
(besides having been part of several publications—the perfect end) is that they
are also becoming future projects, since our objective is none other than a gen-
uine and positive globalization of knowledge, which we claim here, demanding
new approaches and disseminating the results at an international level.
VI Preface
In this regard, we are grateful to the project WORLBRIDGES for having fa-
vored the approach of our research and the exchange of ideas—and to the project
PRISMAS for funding the English-language revision of this volume by Greg Gott-
lieb, whom we thank for his work and dedication. Last but not least, we are very
grateful to the Walter de Gruyter publishing house for its invaluable support in
this publication.
December 2017 Concha Roldán
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1 Global Economy and Politics

Griselda Gutiérrez Castañeda
The Political Subject in Globalization:
the Discussion Agency
Abstract: From the defining trends of a globalized world, I expose an analysis of
the systemic effects they produce in different spheres of social life, such as the
guidelines that structure, in a systemic sense, the insertion of social agents, as
well as the way they influence their traditional forms of intervention and partic-
ipation in the course of social processes and decision-making. The trends of in-
creasing complexity and indeterminacy inherent to globalization produce
changes in the economic dynamics of the world market and effects that disrupt
the institutional, legal-political frameworks of states. So, when analyzing such
transformations, I take on the radicalization of the questions about the possibil-
ities of inclusion or exclusion of the social agents, and the density of the frag-
mentary effects on the formation of collective identities (and, therewith, of the
debate on the opportunities or restrictions of political intervention, organization
and mobilization—in other words, the range of probability of their constitution
as political subjects). These social and structural transformations update the
basis of the theoretical, philosophical and sociological debate on the quality
of the agency of social subjects, for which I consider the task of asking whether
the dynamics of globalization block the possibilities of intervention of some rele-
vance or, on the contrary, there is scope for resistance and even ways of influenc-
ing constructively.
An approach to globalization
Sociological research set out to characterize the organizational structures of
modern-contemporary social systems tends to privilege the logic of a growing
differentiation that –beyond the segmentary historical forms, or through forms
of stratification—has the modality of functional differentiation, in which each
subsystem (economic, political, juridical, cultural, scientific, etc.) operates ac-
cording to specific languages, techniques and values, which are not commensu-
rable, and allows for their autonomous specialty (Luhmann / De Giorggi 1993,
pp. 279–339). In line with subsystems differentiation, processes of interdepend-
ence occur through functional couplings that integrate the social system, which
Griselda Gutiérrez Castañeda, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)
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reveal a flexible and diffuse dynamic, which in turn leads to the break in the con-
cert of the specific weight of each functional domain with causal, hierarchic or
centered standards, giving rise instead to a polycentric tendency.
Following this logic, the increasing processes of complexity and indetermi-
nacy in post-industrial societies are explained, and their effects may be noticed
at the level of understanding, disposition, adaptation, organization and practical
control by social agents. Danilo Zolo′s interpretation in this respect (with which I
agree) notes that the plurality of spaces and practices in their differentiation and
semantic specialization, while diversifying and increasing the flexibility of social
behavior, introduces an increase in the number of intervening variables that de-
plete the established intellectual resources operability and makes understanding
more precarious. Likewise, increasing interdependencies, and the contingent
and diffuse nature of interaction between these spaces, obstructs forms of social
intervention when predictions are unlikely, since the known intelligibility and
control schemes (e.g. causal, linear schemes, etc., or criteria such as centraliza-
tion, domination/subordination)—effective until very recently as hierarchical
structures and defined attributions—lose validity; there is an unfolding of the
referents of certainty. Indeed, it is possible to predict why they are considered
regularities, tendencies according to causal schemes; or of a similar nature, if
this possibility is diluted, then, in a reflexive sense, we speak of indeterminacy.
In light of the so-called ‘spheres of social action’ (Weber) that were regulated
by basic criteria and norms or accepted and routine techniques, according to
which defined roles and possible schemes of action were stipulated, in the
now characterized ‘functional domains’, these are replaced by contingent and
flexible criteria. With the displacement of shared and institutionalized beliefs,
or of positive or negative motivation schemes to encourage or discourage behav-
iors, their place is occupied by polyvalent value scales that generate difficulties
of accommodation and location within these spaces. In turn, the ranges of social
mobility are enhanced as a result of the differentiation of experiences that, by
blocking routines or opening new options, can generate insecurity, along with
destabilizing effects.
The repercussion of these tendencies is that diverse experiences tend to be
shaped by the dynamics of functional domains rather than being an expression
of the purposes of social agents, for whom the roles they must play are increas-
ingly unstable, and for whom the diversity of functional needs and expectations
to be met, the possible options of profusion of services, the lack or abundance of
information to be processed, and the urgency to respond are all greater, which
generates uncertain choices regarding opportunities or risks, as opposed to “a
kind of ′selective overload′” (Zolo 1994, pp. 19–21).
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In order to abound in some of these systemic effects on the perception and
practices of the social agents, I will approach those macro trends that account
for the functioning of the social system in a globalized world, which are relevant
for our analysis. Based on the internationalization of exchanges between coun-
tries and regions that has been characteristic of market societies, what today pre-
vails in the intensification and complexity of cross-border and transnational in-
terconnections, is a displacement of the space referent, starting from a
reconfiguration of the temporal referent (Held 1996, pp. 380–381), which takes
on centrality by the impulse of what is justifiably called ‘revolution in commu-
nication’. Techno-scientific developments in communication—which reach the
level of IT, robotics and ‘mass media’—boost the production and processing of
information, the speed and expansion of its distribution and the plasticity in
its forms and in the different levels of use, in such a way that when applied
to the execution of projects and commercial, scientific and technological ex-
changes, they practically erase frontiers and permeate all levels of activity: eco-
nomic, political, technological, military, legal, cultural and environmental areas.
Among the systemic tendencies that globalization entails (such as complex-
ity, indeterminacy, interdependence, mobility), I am interested in highlighting
the flexibility of connections and the widespread effect of deregulation. The ex-
tensive use of new technologies that impels (by intensifying the financial trans-
actions according to trade flows, the investment and the migration) a great dy-
namism and complexity to the markets, requires—while it feeds back—
conditions of flexibility. As a defining criterion of the current capitalist regime,
it displaces traditional forms of production and privileges tertiarization, and
with this, the organization of enterprises is decentralized and merchandized.
This, in the face of greater competition and uncertainty, diversifies organization-
al and transactional modalities, so that this criterion has an impact on the reg-
ulations established for the sake of greater openness and release of restrictions.
Such transformations have a substantial impact on the labor market (as pre-
carious salary conditions prevail), as well as on stability in work, and the con-
ditions under which it develops; tertiarization powers sectors such as services
and maquilas, increases forms of outsourcing and a tendency to “deslaborizar
las relaciones de trabajo” (Yáñez 2004, pp. 85 and 103)—which translates to
say that it dilutes or blurs the labor nature of work relations, as informality in-
creases both in the relationship and in the labor spaces.
Flexibility, beyond the extension of the range of investment and profit oppor-
tunities, and when coming into tension with the established legal routines,
standards and procedures, exerts pressure for a relaxation or open fracture of
the same, which in turn leads to the establishment of highly permissive legal re-
forms (of investment, commercialization and labor) or the imposition of practi-
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ces of open illegality. Certainly, common regulatory and procedural forms oper-
ate with temporalities that short-circuit the potential and speed of new technol-
ogies—but the latter, together with the current modalities of organization and
competition as resources of neoliberal economic policies, produce an effect
that (oxymoronically) ‘institutionalizes’ deregulation, prioritizing the logic of
the market and reducing the policies of intervention and regulation on behalf
of the State.
The combination of global trends and neoliberal adjustment policies, by pri-
oritizing the extraction of benefits for global corporations, accentuates inequal-
ity in the development of entire countries and regions, as well as high costs in
human development, reflected in the increase of unemployment rates, the rising
costs of services and an exponential growth of migratory flows.
Mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion
in a globalized world
The confluence of the aforementioned factors and their consequences explains
why practical and theoretical debates about the effect on the conditions of social
agents’ insertion in these scenarios revolve around the notions of ‘expulsion’
and ‘social exclusion’ (Sassen 2015; Saraví 2009). In my opinion, the interpreta-
tions given to each of them are not in contradiction.With regards to ‘expulsion’,
the problem is analyzed from the logic underlying the organization of functional
domains,which is why a homeostatic dynamics that operates in terms of preserv-
ing the social system’s own equilibria tends to prevail, which filters and expels
the disrupting factors (Zolo 1994). It is a dynamic that would allow us to under-
stand that in the practices of advanced capitalism’s accumulation, its axis is the
procurement of stability, investment and extraction of benefits—even when the
expulsion by way of ‘collateral effects’ implies intensification of unemployment
rates, of extreme poverty and the naturalization of the absence of any link with
educational training and the labor market of broad social sectors; as well as the
displacement of populations derived from the predation of their lands by the ex-
tractive industry, and a trend of mass migration (particularly that which results
in statelessness) and openly illegal practices, such as people trafficking.
Likewise, the theory of ‘social exclusion’ seeks to interpret the diversity of
these extreme cases of deprivation and marginality of some groups, along
with the broad social sectors whose situation is one of ‘unfavorable integration’,
as a result of the accumulation of disadvantages, since they seek forms of inte-
gration in the labor market despite the deficiencies and obstacles. Its theoretical
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performance is of interest because, apart from recording extreme cases of exclu-
sion, it tries to understand the new forms of social configuration based on con-
temporary forms of inequality, differentiation and polarization (Saraví 2009,
p. 24), and allows us to problematize the new forms of integration and social
agents.
I consider that these interpretations are key to appreciating the effects of the
transformations referred to above. In that sense, it is important to point out that
among the criteria that gave support to the integration of the modern western
political-social ordinances was inclusion, in terms of freedoms and protection,
and codified in the formal character of juridical-political membership. Neverthe-
less, inclusion was always materialized in terms of opportunities that may be of
different types, but, relevantly, in economic opportunities. And it is precisely this
that is now diluted or made precarious by prevailing conditions of labor instabil-
ity, forms of outsourcing, low wages, and as a whole, lack of protection and job
insecurity of people as workers. This implies that as a result of the uncertain and
reduced opportunities and poor quality, agents fragmentarily face, derived from
disappointment and restructuring of expectations, their attempts to insert and
adapt to new scenarios. This is intensified by recording those sectors that operate
from the informality or open illegality to those who access social fringes in a
marginal condition, including the masses of undocumented migrants in a signif-
icant proportion.
The subsumption of the political subsystem to the logic of the economy is,
among other reasons, what underlies many of the transformations of its attribu-
tions and competences; it explains the weak presence, and even the absence of
the State in the mediation and interlocution tasks able to set limits to the abuses
of the business sector, as well as in its nature as a demand referent.
Historically, the compliance of government tasks by nation-states required
the construction of a system of attributions and competences according to
legal, authority and control capacity regulations. This implied, in a functional
sense, operating in a centralized and binding manner within defined territorial
frameworks, the faculty for the distribution of resources, along with the creation
and regulation of conditions and opportunities for economic, political and social
exchanges aimed at political integration and, of course, conflict management—
as well as the sovereign attribution with respect to deciding between peace and
war, and determining who should be members of that community and who
should not. The link between the State and members of the political order ac-
cording to the status of citizenship was to determine the levels of responsibility
to provide welfare, protection and scope of rights, and the type and enforceabil-
ity of obligations, their compliance outlining criteria of membership, creating an
institutional framework capable of functionally generating stability and continu-
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ity, and in a relevant way a civil connection that socially and symbolically would
have guided forms of socialization, belonging and the integration of individuals
according to roles.
Today, growing interdependencies tend to dilute territorial boundaries and
centralized operation, given the proliferation of power and decision-making cen-
ters—such as hegemonic states or regions, transnational institutions, and legal
and illegal profitable corporations—according to the influence of functional con-
nections that exert global market sectors such as financial, technological and
service sectors. This, as a whole, produces an inflation of the states’ capacity
for resolution and a tendency to outsource their authority and decision-mak-
ing—in other words, their loss of sovereignty.
As Jacobson points out in his analysis of how the State is taking on new
forms by losing primary qualities of its institutional tasks: “… the state remains
critical as the mediating mechanism, the node, of a variety of international insti-
tutions and global processes” (Jacobson 1997, p. x, my italics). This ‘node’ is one
in which corporate interests and transnational political agreements are crossed,
and whose mediation takes place under conditions of flexibility and deregula-
tion, which impairs its institutional functioning in and on its borders, such as
the loss of control of its borders in relation to migratory flows.
When the State submits to the pressures of agents and global dynamics and
gives rise to the systematic disengagement towards its governed ones (since, far
from dosing the effects of these tendencies, it contributes to the intensification
and cancellation of opportunities), an overload that people face under condi-
tions of lack of protection and uncertainty takes place. The effects of this over-
load are diverse, not only at the level of generating strategies of survival, but
also in the fracture of the citizen-State pact, as the instances of interlocution di-
lute. Typically, productive work as a structuring of existence has led to the polit-
ical codification of mobilization, organization and communication initiatives
aimed at demanding inclusion and redistribution (Garretón 1997). Instead,
there is a growing dispersion of organizational initiatives and the disarticulation
of traditional collective actors—in fact, not only a significant reduction in forms
of union organization, but also a weakening of the labor movement and a culture
of the working class is registered, that at the time could provide some protection
against the corporate interests (Castles / Miller 2003, p. 36).
A political reading of the fracture of the pact leads us in two directions. The
first is one in which, by operating according to a self-referential dynamics, the
party system and the state institution, through prioritizing its self-preservation
and restricting its functions to the mere conservation of stability and the com-
plexity of the social system, causes its programs and decisions to be foreign to
the social requirements of its governed ones, which in turn accentuates the def-
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icits of its representation function. The effect is twofold: from the level of the gov-
erned, it is the loss of the civic bond, given the experience that the channels of
political communication are inoperative and exhausted—that they are affected
and mere observers of the course of political decisions; and from the political
subsystem level, the effect is a ‘deinstitutionalization’ (Santiago 2015; Zolo
1994)—i.e., the loss of its political capacity to structure forms of identity and in-
tegration of political community.
In the other direction, when the states operate under the pressure of the
global economy and the systemic effect of expulsion (in which migratory flows
increase), the tendencies of flexibility and deregulation that manifest in a loss
of control of the borders lead to the application of ambiguous strategies (in
which the economic benefits of these presences are extracted, but the political
integration of the immigrants is reluctant; in practice, forms of insertion are
given due to the need to offer some services, which can be interpreted as rights
for those who do not have membership) that fuel a competitive struggle for ac-
cess to services between citizens and resident migrants. They also lead to a de-
valuation of citizenship for the local ones when facing the displacement of the
bond between membership and rights, as well as for immigrants whose access
to services does not go hand in hand with loyalty to the political institution.
In addition to the resignification of the civic link in the form of a utilitarian
link, if the State proceeds in this way, in relation to border control as well as
to the meaning of migratory policies, it is interpreted by citizens as incapacity
in the exercise of its sovereign power, which puts in question its authority and
legitimacy (Jacobson 1997, p. 6).
We know that the figure of the pact has been, both symbolically and practi-
cally, the guideline for institutionalizing forms of political communication, and
that fictio juris has had a theoretical and practical performance, which allows us
to conceive of the construction of an order as a product of concerted sovereign
wills, and which in turn is concomitant with the conception of the active role
of its members and the practical forms of organization and participation. For
this reason, it is no minor fact, but rather of the greatest transcendence, that
the political frameworks of containment tend to weaken and the political refer-
ents of interlocution are erased—because it leads to the fact that the policy of the
nation-State loses relevance, as well as to the prevailing of a disaffection with
politics.
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The role of the agency under debate
The consequences that these processes generate are very complex, due to the
type of problems, the diversity of reactions and the proliferation of social and
political presences marked by fragmentation and disarticulation—multiple pre-
sences such as:
– actors that in a more conventional way maintain politics as the axis, more as
an expression of survival than for a management or articulation capacity;
– social movements that are by right territorial or ethnic, with different degrees
of articulation;
– large sectors involved in generating strategies of survival, whether politically
passive or whose conjunctural appearance is disorganized and defensive;
– others that are far from the traditional forms of political integration, and
that tend to be guided by symbolic and expressive ways in order to explore
and affirm identity in a self-referential way, or to generate solidarity relations
and groups by affiliation with subjects of the vital or daily sphere, as well as
by ascriptive identity (age, sexual, religious, etc.);
– civil groups such as NGOs and CSOs, with varying degrees of organizational
capacity and expertise, according to thematic agendas such as human
rights, gender, environmentalism and pacifism (among others), exploring
ways of recomposing and reframing intervention and political communica-
tion that are not constrained to the interlocution with the political system;
– groups as transnational actors such as anti-globalization movements; and
– extra-institutional presences such as factual powers.
There is no doubt that complexity, increased differentiation and greater mobility
contribute to this proliferation of presences. At first glance, this can be read as a
symptom of plurality and an expression of new alternatives, but a more in-depth
approach is needed, since they are phenomena that go hand in hand with impor-
tant transformations and the radicality of certain problems that make politics
and the State appear as insufficient or impotent to face them, to the point
where there is an increase of behaviors of detachment from the traditional
forms of socialization and integration that contribute to the dilution of the public
sphere.
In terms of the political system, the problem may be a question of governa-
bility—but in terms of the governed ones, the problematic acquires greater den-
sity because the weakening of binding decisions, the non-adherence to institu-
tional channels, and the transformation/dilution of political communication
all have repercussions on the quality of the protective and binding functions
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that are the responsibility of institutions, and whose consequences affect the var-
ious spheres of social life. Moreover, in a practical sense, justified doubts arise
about the relevance of any initiative of participation, since the current tenden-
cies seem to impose a dynamic in which the action, the initiative, the intention-
ality or the pretensions of control (both practical and political) tend to lack effec-
tiveness or even sense, by neither influencing the agendas (thus translated into
political decisions) nor affecting the dynamics of the system.
These doubts, in a reflexive and political sense, reposition: firstly, the theo-
retical conceptual debates on the role of political agency, on its relation to the
structure or social system, on the validity of subjectivist-mentalist traditions of
action in its instrumentalist and/or normative modality, or on the functionalist
tradition and the weight of the constraint of the structure; secondly (within so-
cieties of great complexity and indeterminacy), the unavoidable questions about
the nature of the individual and collective agency, as a symptom of what the ex-
planation of its occurrence may be; and finally, to decipher the tenor of new col-
lective actors, as well as the potential of their mobilizations.
In order to continue developing the last two problems, in a non-exhaustive
approach, I will address the first one, by contrasting them with some of the the-
ses of Giddens’s structuration theory (in which the author tries to reconcile the
dimension of the action and the system), and with the systems theory in the ver-
sion of Luhmann and Zolo, of whose theses I have developed some throughout
these pages. But first I must refer to a condensed image of the contemporary re-
ality of which, with their variants, both theories give us an account, and that in
Melucci’s words could be called “‘planetarization’ of the system”, by which he
indicates that the system has already found its limits, and that the intervention
of the agents is restricted thereto. Melucci conceives of a planetarization in which
there is no longer space (because the system was transformed into a single
space), nor is there:
… time beyond the system.We know that the great project of industrial capitalism was ori-
ented towards the future, a project for a society that would come, that of the wealth of na-
tions, of the progress or the kingdom of freedom.We now know—and the dramatic remind-
ers of the possible catastrophe contribute to this—that there is no time beyond the internal
time of the system, that there is no longer any society that awaits us beyond that which we
are capable or not of building; better still, in which we are already immersed; only one that
we can make exist from now, within the tensions of the systemic balance. (Melucci 1996,
p. 294)
Indeed, contemporary analyses have transcended the disjunctive as to whether
the heuristic key is the ‘action’ or the ‘agency’ to account for the processes of so-
cialization of the individual and processes of social change—a disjunctive encod-
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ed between subjectivist and objectivist traditions, such as that of a strong indi-
vidualism and a powerful conception of action, for which the dimension of the
context seems to be subsidiary; or those in which the emphasis is placed on the
structure or the system that frames the subjects according to positions and roles,
displacing the autonomous and rational ‘action’ according to ends, by the ‘agen-
cy’ of subjects as carriers (Träger) of structures.
Giddens’s theoretical intervention is an example of this. In his structuration
theory, the constitution of agents and that of structures are not independent phe-
nomena and “do not form a dualism but represent a duality” (Giddens 1995,
p. 61). He seeks to explain that the structure integrates rules (guidelines and
codes of meaning) and resources (of authority and allocation and control) that
intervene recursively in the reproduction of social systems, which are not alien
to human action and its reflexive record, although this may be limited; the cru-
cial argument is that “Structure should not be assimilated to constraint but is
both constrictive and enabling” (Giddens 1995, p. 61).
The core of this argument, in which Marxian echoes are present, is that if
action is associated with intentionality, it is an incontrovertible fact that social
processes are not an intentional product. This does not prevent them from
being the work of practical intervention of men within objective conditions; with-
out ruling out the action in the practical and reflexive sphere of the individual,
Giddens makes a theoretical shift towards the term ‘agency’, understood as the
capacity to do things, as a matter of power, to produce effects, to abstain or to
act otherwise—an interpretation with which he would bet on maintaining the ac-
tive role of social agents. In the spirit of dismissing pretensions of structural cau-
sation that determine social action, while at the same time recording that the re-
sources of the structure generate forms of social reproduction (and thus stabilize
relations in an institutionalized form that give rise to a systemic reproduction, as
well as to the production and reproduction of a social action), Giddens is inter-
ested in highlighting that such properties and structural resources are eventually
used and reproduced by agents in the course of their interactions, which may re-
sult in “processes of selective ‘filtering information’, whereby strategically locat-
ed actors seek to reflexively regulate the general conditions of a systemic repro-
duction, either to maintain things as they are or to change them” (Giddens 1995,
p. 64).
In order to reinforce this proposal, he applies the strategy of refuting some
approaches of the functionalist tradition, in which he encompasses very diverse
perspectives (structuralist, poststructuralist, evolutionist, systemic) with regard
to the emphasis he attributes to them in terms of the constraints produced by
social structure and which, in his opinion, make subjects appear as non-reflexive
constraints, as an undisputed causal force that restricts or cancels options, be-
12 Griselda Gutiérrez Castañeda
fore which action is diluted and at the very least gives rise to mere reactions—a
strategy that, despite the expanded nature of its analysis, is not without simpli-
fying dyes.
I consider that this position does not necessarily strengthen his interpreta-
tive proposal. Certainly, neither do those who support the thesis of the decentral-
ization of the subject (Althusser) omit the reflexive contest of the agents (which
does not exempt them from subjection), nor do the adaptive forms by which the
agents respond to systemic and structural tendencies that overload them, cancel
the reasons and the motifs that agents give themselves to process their ‘options’,
with which the role of structural tendencies are in no case equated with natural
forces. For Giddens, the form of arguing against those formulations that conceive
that systemic reproduction dilutes the place of action (by holding that functional
needs only produce functional consequences), is to hold that “[s]tructural con-
straints do not operate independently of agents’ motifs and reasons to act” (Gid-
dens 1995, p. 211)—an argument that he considers strong enough to restore a
place for the agency to be conceived of as a power, such as the capacity and
the possibility of producing a disruptive, or a novelty effect.
In general terms, I consider that the systemic perspective would be far from
maintaining a dualism between system and agents in their interpretations of the
system integration process. This would agree with Giddens that in this globalized
world, there is a kind of “rupture between systemic integration and social inte-
gration” (Giddens 1995, p. 213), and wouldn’t contest the fact that human action
has contributed to the generation of this scenario. These points of convergence
present no obstacle for this theory to support the line of argument that it is pre-
cisely tendencies of increasing complexity and indetermination (as well as un-
calculated evolutionary pressures) that make complex societies operate accord-
ing to a systemic logic of homeostasis, with the effect that the action appears as
something irrelevant to a self-produced reality (Zolo 1994, p. 148–149). Such an
interpretation, far from omitting the consideration of how social agents are re-
flexively and emotionally involved, and with pretensions to influence, instead re-
frames the questions: what kind of ‘action’ is at stake; what kind of symptom (or
a symptom of what) are these interventions; and, of course, what is the potential
of the agency?
At this point it is important to dwell on the mechanism of ‘adaptation’ and
the use of the term by Luhmann and Zolo, in contrast to Giddens’s questioning of
the application of some of the theories of social change (particularly his debates
with Parsons, to whom he attributes an update of the evolutionary theory), criti-
cisms of which revolve around the empty, illusory and narrow use of the con-
cept, which makes it limited to account for changes in the social plane.
The Political Subject in Globalization: the Discussion Agency 13
Of course there may be cases in which its use lacks precision and explana-
tory value—but it is certainly its commitment to the potential of agency that gives
rise to the categorical tone of his criticisms. It is only plausible if one aspect, or
both, of its meaning is extended: if other societies (i.e., the ‘social environment’)
are included in the term ‘environment’ and/or if any important social process
that seems to increase the chances of maintaining a society in a form that can
be considered stable is virtually considered as ‘adaptation’. But once that step
has been taken, the concept becomes so vague that it is useless as a means to
explain anything (Giddens 1995, p. 262).
From the systemic perspective, although it is emphasized that the function-
ality of the social system as a self-produced reality operates outside our rational
and technical control and our ethical-moral idealizations, this does not mean
that the system can dispense with its ‘environment’, which can be internalized
as system information. The implications of this operation are double: on the
one hand, that it contributes to the stabilization or equilibrium of the system;
and on the other hand, that agents, as part of the environment, generate patterns
of assimilation and accommodation in the form of learning. So, if one considers
the self-referential tendency of the political system and the distortion of the cri-
teria attributed to ‘political action’, such as its reflexive, critical and powerful na-
ture, it is necessary to think about which mechanisms of insertion come into play
—especially if we take into account the fact that social agents systematically deal
with adverse conditions for the possibility of rational choices, to make meaning-
ful interactions at the level of political communication, and to achieve some rel-
evant influence on the control of procedures, as well as generalized possibilities
of forming an informed opinion or developing a reflexive judgment, allowing
them to evaluate the problems and options presented.
This is where the explanatory performance of the adaptation mechanism is
noticeable, leading to the transformation of frustration into learning, and of dis-
appointments into adaptive behaviors, which (although they reserve a certain
place for human agency, as Zolo emphasizes) does not mean that the integration
of the agents is not in accordance with functional tendencies that preselect pos-
sibilities, limit alternatives and over determine social expectation (in terms of
‘opportunities’)—and with that, the nature of ‘decisions’ is shaped.
Examples abound that may seem extreme, but are far from extraordinary in
these times, when precariousness and deregulation lead to the expulsion of mi-
grant masses, and the devaluation of this type of work and the advantages that
can be extracted attract them to certain countries or regions. There is no doubt
that objective factors and systemic tendencies are put at risk to explain these
massive flows, nor is there any doubt with respect to the contest of subjective
factors such as the expectation of the ‘opportunities’ represented by the destina-
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tion, or by fulfilling the purpose of family unification, including cultural and re-
ligious motivations. Therefore, it cannot be argued that agency has a role in this
framework (Castles / Miller 2003, p. 9)—but it is not outside the discussion to re-
solve what kind of ‘decision’ it is.
When the conditions of vulnerability and precariousness in the countries of
destination lead immigrant groups to form alternative networks of solidarity, the
debate arises as to whether these initiatives are an expression of ‘emerging po-
litical subjects’ (Sassen 2003, p.26). This discussion is, of course, inescapable; it
cannot be ignored that in an adverse context these networks are aimed at solving
material and psycho-social needs, such as preserving identity and forms of be-
longing, through which in such networks the nature of survival strategies pre-
vails.
Confronted with expressions of this nature, many questions arise. If we start
from the fact that politics is a type of strategic action aimed at remedying some-
thing more than immediate needs (i.e., that it is guided by more far-reaching ob-
jectives such as recognition, inclusion and rights), then we have to ask ourselves:
what is the political nature of these expressions; what is their political potential;
what is politically possible at these times; or, what are we talking about today,
when we talk about politics?
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Alejandro Roberto Alba Meraz
Complex Citizenship and Globalization
Abstract: This chapter reflects upon the importance the notion of citizenship has
acquired in the context of globalization. I will defend the idea that the citizen
and his or her actions correspond to the political domain; specifically, in a
way that confronts the problem of social order. To accomplish my objective, I
have divided the chapter into three parts: a) I will define the idea of the citizen
inherited from the Enlightenment; b) I will present an idea of complex citizen-
ship and suggest why we should consider it as an alternative; and c) I will
offer an interpretation designed to understand political actions from the perspec-
tive of complex citizenship.
Introduction
This chapter reflects upon the importance the notion of citizenship has acquired
in the context of globalization. I will defend the idea that the citizen and his or
her actions correspond to the political domain; specifically, in a way that con-
fronts the problem of social order. This previous statement may seem unneces-
sary to repeat; however, I will show that it is worthy of close attention. It is a
common idea to consider politics, as enacted by government officials, as a rem-
edy to those conflicts that need a negotiated solution. Within the social aspect,
many conflicts require negotiated solutions, but not all of them are political,
e.g., the conflicts between parents and their descendants, or many bureaucrats’
actions concerning issues of their private lives.
Instead, politics consists of actions directed towards bringing closer those
who differ in their visions of the world or perspectives that coexist in the aspect
defined as public. As Bernard Crick mentions, “politics may be defined as the
activity through which divergent interests reconcile within a determined govern-
ment unit” (2001, p. 22). That said, the origins of politics in societies organized
under the Nation States model has restricted them to the domain of the state. In
this way, a citizen’s actions, whenever they are political, are related to state mat-
ters (Clarke 1996).
Certainly, political actions aim to bring together diverging positions with the
purpose of generating order. Until the 1980s, the State was in charge of this task.
Nevertheless, at the present time order is produced in different bodies other than
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the State. There are various levels of authority under which citizens feel obliged,
such as local, regional, national, or supranational authorities. Additionally,
there are non-state entities that contribute to generating order, such as non-gov-
ernmental organisations like the UN, or civil society organizations. As a result,
we can say that politics no longer determine the State’s figure per se.
Consequently, political actions have been understood in two different ways:
firstly, as goal-oriented intentional actions, with specific objectives (In the case
of state politics, it would be any action that questions the State.); and secondly,
as actions that produce a meaning. Examples of the latter appear in concession
manifestations through non-institutional means, made by the society aiming to
make visible a topic that does not exist for the State. The two need not be incom-
patible—we can instead understand them as complementary:
This means that an action cannot be completely understood if the matrix of such is not
known. But also, that an action cannot be graded as belonging to a certain category if
the intention and meaning associated with it are not acknowledged. In other words, an
event cannot be defined as political, social, musical, sportive or any other kind if the social
matrix, as well as intentional, into which it fits is not known. (Clarke 1999, p. 99)
The notion of citizenship acts in conjunction with seeking goals and generating
significance according to the social order. However, classical interpretations,
such as the Illustrated, restricted their horizons for the sake of consolidating
the goal-oriented perspective. In contrast, the response to this vision was the
meaning-oriented perspective, as evidenced by communitarianism. This chapter
will talk about another possibility, which I think is more complete—that of com-
plex citizenship.
Recent literature has again referred to the topic of citizenship because of the
recurring crisis of the state-political model—considered from the end of Welfare
until the rise of the Workfare. However, there is no consensus, neither between
academics nor political analysts, of which may be the main attributes of the con-
cept of citizenship. On one side, the dominant postures understand citizenship
as a legal status given as a privilege by the State, to which citizens owe loyalty
for the fact that it warrantees certain prerogatives within a delimited space made
by concrete physical frontiers (Carrasco 2009). Politics in this case are preceded
by a relationship with the State (Rawls 2001). On the other side, there are those
who consider the idea of legal citizenship as obsolete. They appeal to substantial
aspects of identity—culture, language, blood, etc.—with the purpose of giving
more importance to the citizen’s identity roots. In this case, politics would be
based on its relationship with the roots of the community (McIntyre 2007).
Regardless of whether one is in favor of the legal formal posture, or the sub-
stantial vision, both sides restrict understanding of citizens’ actions. There are
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two difficulties of the previous approaches that stand out as limitations. The first
is related to the right of assistance given on behalf of the States to illegal mi-
grants groups. The second is the type of social benefit program focused on
guest workers in nations such as Germany or Canada, which originated from
the need to hire workers from other countries temporarily to satisfy labor de-
mand. Given the impossibility of making migrants or guest workers return to
their native countries, there are two suggested main solutions—integration into
the State through naturalization processes or Workfare.
Integrated people lose substantial aspects of their original culture, confer-
ring it to the private domain. This represents one of the main complaints from
minority defender groups, because they consider that forcing the new members
to break away from their language or regional habits (such as dressing or public
religious practice) to adopt the hegemonic culture of the host country violates a
fundamental aspect of identity that nourishes the citizen.
The second solution comes from new work demands, incarnated by the so-
called Workfare. This perspective, with neocommunitarist origins, appeals to a
bottom-up process. In this process, citizenship is determined by the culture, par-
ticularly the one represented by the spirit of ‘civil society’:
Such approaches convey a new hegemonic conception of governance, an instrument for
forging ‘social cohesion’, a distinct ideological and political alternative to the corporative
compacts between the social partners (unions and employers) which were still dominant
in the Western European countries in the 1980s. (Schierup, Hansen, & Castles 2006, p. 58).
The problem with the way of understanding citizenship has to do, then, with
knowing which actions count as political. The protests made by legal or illegal
foreigners are not considered political. Our reflection up to this point tries to
show the difficulties that entail the conceptions of state citizenship—but also,
to expose the problems generated in globalized societies.
Now, to accomplish our objective I have divided the chapter into three parts:
a) I will define the inherited idea of the citizen from the Enlightenment; b) I will
present an idea of complex citizenship and why we should consider it as an al-
ternative; and c) I will offer an interpretation to understand political actions
through the complex citizenship’s perspective.
Citizenship and its enlightenment heritage
The idea of citizenship is, according to Pierre Rosanvallon (1999), one of the
greatest achievements of Enlightenment modernity, something unparalleled
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that did not exist at any other previous time. Rosanvallon’s concept of citizen-
ship is more focused on the importance of human action in politics than on
other kind of extra-human or divine forces. This fact allowed people to transfer
human action to an autonomous domain never before reached. Certainly, in the
political thought of classical Greece and Rome, there were citizenship ideals, but
they were circumscribed to the polis, beyond the borders of which people did not
have any legal rights. Besides, prerogatives were limited to a reduced group—free
men.
Dante (2006) and Machiavelli (1985) exemplify two different ways to under-
stand citizenship and political action. Both showed the need to extend the polit-
ical conception, by separating the agendas of power and secularizing it. They
also stated the possibility of projecting a dual Roman citizenship, which could
be passive (a person with rights) or active (a person who could exercise rights).
Dante discerned citizenship as the joy of exercising the political action, whereas
Machiavelli discerned it only as the response of the subject towards the governor.
When Enlightenment arrived, Hobbes’ citizenship idea—stating that the
mere ownership of rights did not translate into an effective exercise—had ma-
tured. Therefore, only those who fulfilled residency and administrative require-
ments, and who exercised autonomy, could become citizens. Women, for exam-
ple, could not do it (Roldan 2008; Westheimer 2008). Consequently, the
scaffolding of State was required (Skinner 1999).
The requirements to determine what it takes to make politics, how a political
community is formed, and how can one participate in it were elaborated during
the Enlightenment. During this period, politics became independent from social
domains, producing contradictory consequences. On the one hand, political ac-
tions were redefined as different from moral or economical because they are re-
lated to the State. On the other hand, there is the aspect of the fragmentation of
subjectivity because when clarifying who are citizens, a part of humanity is dis-
criminated against. This concept of citizenship is of “[…] a bounded population,
with a specific set of rights and duties, excluding ‘others’ on the grounds of na-
tionality” (Soysal 1994: p. 2).
Once established that the State is the only reference to politics, it was de-
fined at the same time what was important and what counted in the public do-
main (Clarke 1996). In this way, during the Enlightenment a subjectivation mode
emerged, which fractured the man, privileging a universal way of being (Pérez-
Luño 1989, p. 27). The transformation-subject, or the individual’s conversion
into an intelligible subject before a political regime, generated the suppression
of the action’s enjoyment, as Dante would think. The citizen’s condition as a
holder of political participation rights led to exclude important social groups
by definition: women, children, indigenous people and foreigners.
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Citizenship as an abstract unit, ideal for a procedural republic (as defined by
Michael Sandel), reduced a part of the contingency of the conflicts produced by
cultural identity features. But, legal identity increased the complexity in many
other ways (Follesdal 2014).
I will now focus on the cognitive capacity of the Enlightenment ideal (Pettit
1990). This is the citizen’s capacity to generate actions according to specific aims.
The fact that we may choose and know the consequences of that choice, as well
as the corresponding responsibility when acting, is a consideration of principle.
This particular attribute of subjectivity emphasizes the following four points:
1. the citizen has a pattern to recognize the actions orientated to decision-mak-
ing (so that the deliberative function becomes a virtue and damage preven-
tion measure simultaneously);
2. the citizen’s cognitive capacity can generate a codification register that opti-
mizes the information that reaches the electoral subsystem;
3. such a capacity results in accordance with a temporality and speciality of
the political process (Palti 2007); and
4. rationality from the political information channels allow the elimination of
excessive information that may destabilize the system.
The cognitive capacity of the citizen expresses the impartiality principle neces-
sary to making a political election (Allard-Tremblay 2012). Thus, any decision
made shall be fair, as it will go through a depuration system of conversion
from private interest into public opinion. Consequently, the citizen becomes a re-
flective agent, capable of ‘mediating interests and making decisions’ (Melucci
2002, p. 168). Judgment capacity, derived from the cognitive component, is ap-
preciated because it produces choices, deliberation and decision while it reacti-
vates options to link to the system—despite its lack of spontaneity (Pettit 1990).
The epistemic capacity consists of:
[…] favoring the open circulation of relevant information, allowing intersubjective interests
to participate, even with censorship bias. As it is known, they open the alternative option
field that could not be considered under the system’s formal restrictions and mainly, allows
the alternatives that may have negative consequences to be exposed and summited to test.
(Alba-Meraz 2016)
The citizen’s cognitive capacity is a type of cognition placed to elucidate practi-
cal objectives; it is a virtue (Pettit 1990). Now I will move on to the perspective of
complex citizenship.
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Complex citizenship
In the Enlightenment conception, the definition of citizenship was more or less
clear. It was restricted to the legal-political, so its debates were related to privi-
lege concession—the acquisition of freedoms. However, this view omits the com-
plaints of those who submit that there are other actions, which do not pass
through the State and still, have a political value (Cfr. Franco de Sá 2017,
pp. 28–29). As such, political concepts face challenges in the globalization con-
text. Globalization is understood as “the processes of widening and deepening
relations and institutions across space. Increasingly, our actions and practices
systematically and mutually affect others across territorial borders.” (Sterri
2014, p.71). Regarding the relationship between citizenship and global (mainly
economic) forces, it expresses a dispute between real forces for the hegemony
of meaning (Zolo 2007) between the variables: a) a market’s competitive and se-
lective logic; b) corporate logic generated by the political-state structure; and c)
the logic of identity cultural processes. In view of this tension, the dynamics of
the meaning of the political concepts seem to be facing a fragmentation.
In summary, the ground-breaking condition of globalized complex societies
raises contradictions between citizenship conceptions generated from the legal,
economic and political orders. A pertinent definition of citizenship needs to con-
front the tensions between the competitive logic of the global market, the config-
uration of an identity sense and loyalty towards politics, and the need to con-
struct a plural us. In the words of Zolo (2007), the citizenship concept has,
within the individual and the collective, the axis of complexity.
With the new globalized scenarios, politics only develops instrumental sol-
utions that answer to the market’s logic. For example, negotiated solutions
based on the private with universalization pretensions contrast with what is
the proper feature of politics—the creation of a human order or an approach
of them towards common interest (Arendt 2005). The current vision of politics
is unable to generate future possibilities within the contingency context to
which societies are exposed because of globalization (Inneraty 2012; Franco
de Sá 2007). As such, it lacks the possibility of establishing a thrust of social co-
ordination (Huysman 2006: p.10; cfr. Bell & Shaw, 1994). Consequently, the ques-
tion is whether it is possible to motivate citizens with political commitment.
When politics was considered the central articulator of social life, the citi-
zen’s integration commitments were linked to one single authority. Now that
the borders are thin and politics is decentralized, loyalties are weak. This state
of affairs has produced the appearance of a phenomenon called ‘flexible citizen-
ships’ (Ong 1999). In the Asian continent, the Chinese are a noticeable example
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of this phenomenon. As it has been documented, a significant number of (mid-
dle and upper class) Chinese people have more than one nationality and possess
multiple passports accordingly. Such documents become the instruments of their
flexibility. With them, Chinese people can change their residence, nation, and
commitments according to the country’s circumstances. The reasons for seeking
new nationalities are mainly economic and political, but there can be others (re-
ferred to in Ong 1999). Interestingly, even in cases when Chinese people seek
new nationalities, they maintain a sense of cultural belonging that transfers to
their businesses or communities outside of China, making the ‘Chinese’ concept
a truly transnational currency—a local-global product. Another case of flexibility
is that of ‘guest workers’ who, through extraterritorial working programmes, in-
corporate themselves into public life in other nations. These workers are not for-
mal citizens, but generate public structures that recognize them through social,
economic, and legal benefits.
From this cultural deepening of human rights, guest nations have limited ca-
pacities to make those workers return to their countries of origin or to suspend
their benefits (Soysal 1994, pp. 6–7). Flexibility, then, has become another way
of producing subjectivity. It is the result of “the cultural logics of capitalist accu-
mulation, travel and displacement that induce the subject to respond fluidly and
opportunistically to change political-economic conditions.” (Ong 1999, p. 6)
Thus, subjectivation processes (mechanisms expressed through a globalizing
logic that provide intelligibility to the individual) introduce the capital mobility
pattern to practices that give meaning to things; particularly, the ones related to
loyalty, political commitment and obligation towards the authority (Savransky
2011).
The flexible citizen facing structural conditions is supposed to have a clear
understanding of his or her interests. This allows establishing strategically plan-
ned objectives and having support for the advantages offered by the context,
thus conditioning the citizen to express obligations and loyalty to whoever en-
sures his or her particular interests. However, this presents a contradiction, be-
cause it assumes that the aims and advantages that give sense to this identity are
stable and do not require others’ mediation (Wisnewsky 2008).
Asian experience is an example of how interaction ranges (between local
and transnational matters) give unfair privileges, because a guest worker and
a transnational investor do not have the same advantages. This makes public au-
thority sources precarious (Massey 2008, 52). Regarding this, Ong says that the
citizen’s “very flexibility in geographical and social positioning is itself an effect
of novel articulations between the regimes of the family, the state, and capital,
the kinds of practical-technical adjustments that have implications for our un-
derstanding of the late modern subject.” (1999, p. 3)
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Defenders of globalization respond to critics posing a fallacy. They admit as
a premise that the market does not have as an objective the destruction of pol-
itics. The market has as purpose to make available to people a wide variety of
options, and those options are subjected to people’s choice. Then, not admitting
the diversification of the authority sources becomes a bottleneck that uniforms
motivation and therefore impoverishes the decision’s scheme. In this way, only
the market could favor the plurality that enriches politics. The citizen “[…] em-
bodies the split between state-imposed identity and personal identity caused
by political upheavals, migration, and changing global markets.” (Ong 1999, p. 2)
The promoters of flexibility omit the historical and material conditions of
structural context. They assume that they can manipulate citizenship according
to their interests and omit that such abstraction produces simultaneously a va-
riety of forms of exclusion, hidden in the constitution processes of identity (Sav-
ransky 2011). Globalization theorists point out that flexibility improves the no-
tion of citizenship by endowing it with particular features. However, flexibility
also produces fragmentation—it makes identity precarious. While flexibility cer-
tainly multiplies differences, it does not find a way to generate an axis that ar-
ticulates those differences for the sake of public affairs. Putting it simply, flexible
citizenship makes the citizens of poor countries pay for rich citizens’ advantages
facing a ‘differentiated world economy’ (Zolo 2007, p. 49).
In response to the flexible postures, I suggest the perspective of complexity. I
subscribe to Zolo’s definition of complexity as:
[…] the cognitive situation in which agents, whether they are individual or social groups,
find themselves. The relations which agents construct and project on their environment
in their attempts at self-orientation—i.e. at arrangement, prediction, planning, manipula-
tion—will be more or less complex according to circumstance. (Zolo 1992, p. 2)
Citizenship as a complex phenomenon admits the presence of a deep global
logic in identity processes—besides the meanings generated by transnational
and imaginative political practices. Under this approach, politics are not derived
from subordination to the State. It is an affair of strategic ‘practices’ that consist
of:
[…] the exercise and mobilization of social demands through a certain performance. Then,
these can act intramarco and in consequence, reproduce parameters by which the recogni-
tion, distribution and, of course, cultural identity are defined. But it can also be extramarco.
Hence, to (per)form in confrontation with recognition’s own terms, giving rise to even more
radical social and identity transformations and, opening space for intercultural identifica-
tion and the debate about citizenship terms. (Savransky, 2011: p.120)
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The functionality of complexity is to show the areas of uncertainty generated by
the accumulation of information (security, property, prestige, money, power,
time, information, etc.) that nourishes identity, without leaving aside the ‘pre-
scriptive structure of possibilities preselection’ (Zolo 1992, p. 39). This mecha-
nism of selective regulation of social conflicts and value distribution makes it
possible to “operate on the basis of stable behaviour expectations, according
to collective rules” (Zolo 1992, p. 40). The aforementioned focuses on the objec-
tive of political actions—the expectations of the creation of paths to make men
closer in conflict contexts—rather than on administrative criteria of immediate
security. I will now offer an analysis from the perspective of complex citizenship.
The Enlightenment notion of citizenship, seen as a legal status, is insuffi-
cient to address the three variables mentioned in the previous section: market,
state and pertinence. This being the case, neither individuals nor collectives
can act in isolation, without the support of structures and variables. In this
sense, as I have claimed, citizen identity can be explained as the result of agent’s
practices, and within them, the subjects and structures that are integrated into a
relational, reflexive and strategic context. It does not seem excessive to empha-
size that the constitution of the citizen’s identity is not governed only by the
broadening of the conventional political frame. It must include the acquisition
of new freedoms, because, refining the political subsystem does not transform
by itself the nature of our debate. This is why Nancy Fraser has started to rein-
terpret politics from a three-dimensional perspective.
Under our perspective of complexity, the subjectivation process occurs
through the practices in which the subject is. This implies that relevance should
be given to the ‘“subjective” adhesion to an order’ (Savransky 2011, p. 118). Indi-
vidualization—the attribution of a sense to the subject through social action—is
double-edged: if people exist within an organized world, then all aims come
from interaction. There is clearly a presence of social control in this interaction,
which increases according to the different levels of ‘socializing’ pressure. This
social control is then transferred to the motivational and cognitive structures
of individuals (Melucci 2002, p. 171). It is important to consider the asymmetries
that subjects and collectives face when interacting with different authority sys-
tems.
Let us return to the essential component of politics. Such activity has to do
with the conciliation forms of divergent interests within a government unity ori-
entated towards the common good. I will now describe the ways in which this
goal is pretended to be reached.
The case I propose is far from antagonistic postures that we shall name ‘top-
bottom’ or of the ‘bottom-top’ through which citizenship is presented, or rather
as the result of a decision orientated from the elites for the sake of a predeter-
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mined general conception beyond social practices.When citizenship is conceived
as a process directed by social movements—from bottom to top—it encourages
changes directed by homogenizing social forces:





Here citizenship is the result of the ideal construction of an order produced from
the decisions of elites. Social performers are interrelated with power in a perma-
nent way, within a wider social system that demands interaction as a unit be-
yond their internal divisions and generates an orientation towards the inferior
layers. Here the authority is in charge by decree. We can find an example in
the conversion process from subjects to citizens, as in the Spanish colonies, dur-
ing the enactment of the Constitution of Cadiz in 1812.
Bottom-Top Citizenship Scheme (or Rousseau’s ‘General will’)
ELITES
DEMANDSSTRUCTURES
This scheme could be adjusted to the imagination of social revolutions, where an
apparently stable organization system is transformed by the complainants’ de-
mands, in order to secure advantages in a context run by weak rules, maintained
by a general state of injustice. Examples in Latin America are within the Mexican
constitutions of Apatzingán in 1814 or the Constitution of 1857.
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Citizenship of Particularist Interest Scheme




In this scheme, citizenship is in permanent reprocessing and unable to be estab-
lished, due to its lack of unity regarding its objectives. In this scheme, the polit-
ical value of citizenship is usually mistaken for consumable goods of other di-
mensions— economic, legal or cultural. Former Yugoslavia can be considered
a particular case within this scheme, in which the fragmentation of identities











E, I, T, R and L are examples of social demands.
Complex Relational Citizenship Scheme
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In this scheme, the concept of subject lacks a strong denomination for identity
constitution. The conflicts are produced by a formal framing of institutions,
one of which is the political structure. Within this political structure, displace-
ments can be made because there are different relevant aspects to consider—per-
sonal, local, regional or global interests. Additionally, a citizen’s circumstances
are temporally and spatially defined, and his or her knowledge of context and
possibilities are conceivable, but not completely unknown. The demands of a
particular citizen match the objectives of other individuals. In this scheme, the
parties are involved in the constitution of different identities that have differen-
tiated performances. The concept of citizenship is the result of the interaction be-
tween the chain of social demands, the social structure and the elites’ perspec-
tive. This interaction develops a structure, which promotes a demand that can be
more or less integrating. In this moment, the demands could be the supplies for
social structures. These resources are integrated to an imaginary, but the struc-
ture is invaded by the limits of elites. Here there are two moments:
1. In the first moment, the structure of demands is constituted. This structure
links events that are usually antagonistic—for instance, ‘who faces whom’ or
‘who is who’—establishing with it an identifiable polemic, in which the for-
mation of identities is necessary (Laclau & Mouffe 1985).
2. Once these links are established, the identity is then transferred to the con-
texts that created it. This kind of identity can be further broken down into
two moments: a) a definition of citizenship is constituted that usually
seems to be unitary (for example, it can be called liberal citizenship, equal-
itarian citizenship, etc.); and b) the definition then loses its content—free-
dom, equality or inclusion—and becomes a floating concept.
I appeal to the idea of Laclau. The different contexts change the use of concepts
making them more restrictive. For example, during the nineteenth century in
Mexico, the notion of a liberal citizen (driven by the Cadiz Cortes after Ferdinand
VII’s abdication) was interpreted in a negative way by the Mexican indigenous
people. They considered such status harmful for the autochthonous communities
and thought that the implications only benefitted those who adjusted to an indi-
vidualistic ideal. The more European you were, the closer you were to citizen-
ship. This triggered the quest for shelter in domestic networks, in order to be sup-
ported by a collectivist citizenship, even though they did not fulfil the
requirements to be called a citizen.
What can we extract from this scheme? It can be inferred that concrete his-
torical events dispute for the configuration of an identity, not necessarily linked
to a specific context or claim. The identity of a demand can come together from
another event or series of events, which allows the founding of a concept.
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This scheme is an analytical exercise that shows how certain practices aim
to reclaim the identity of citizenship, facing exclusion. It can be modelled from
different demand platforms. The requests for inclusion can be highly diverse.
Some concepts expressed from the interior of the demands chain can be employ-
ment, political recognition, migration conflicts, economical inclusion, etc. One of
these demands may be presented like the flag of a social identity that gets to re-
unify different interests or to make them coexist. This positioning puts a ‘mark’
upon diversity—it ‘enriches the chain’s content’, because it generates a dialectic
effect in which apparently the chain is fulfilled; obtaining more thickness, it ac-
quires a politically relevant sense.
In this way, the social conflict expressed in the struggles for citizenship ac-
quires a fundamentally political aspect, in which it is determined how power is
distributed according to the possible coalitions that can be formed by agents that
pursue their demands. The idea of political power is a relational notion. Every-
thing refers to the obtaining of resources in a wide sense to reduce risks. How-
ever, power is not absolute, but relative. The use of power requires the possibility
to evaluate whether it is more appropriate to perform cost-benefit calculations,
or to construct symbolic resources in order to form the identity.
I find this scheme to be the most adequate way to understand the effect of
power constituting a coalition. The idea is that the elites’ threats do not deter-
mine the chain of demands. However, they introduce an element in this chain,
which is the spectre of ‘the who’. That is, both demands and limits imposed
by elites become supplies for social structures. In this perspective, those ele-
ments conform the social imaginary whose elements orientate the concept of cit-
izenship.
My scheme shows that the structure of demands emerges from complex
practices that constitute and organize social relationships. Within these de-
mands, the concepts are regulated by a principle that does not remain just in ag-
gregation. In this sense, citizenship is an ‘overdetermined’ identity—i.e., it con-
tains a process that cannot become universal, because in a certain sense, it is
formed by fragments. For the same reason, identity cannot become essence.
Finally, following this consideration, it can be accepted that there is nothing
pre-determined in the social aspect: there is no meaning; ‘the’ citizen does not
exist. There are citizenships—or, following Savransky, there are ‘forms of subjec-
tivity and political investiture’ (2011, p. 120) susceptible to revision and critical
reformulation.
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María G. Navarro
A Defense of Cooperative Cognition
Abstract: This article explores the extent to which our deliberative culture deter-
mines our capacity to recognize relevant knowledge, to select and value episte-
mic authority, or to recognize the importance of individual and/or collective epis-
temic achievements in a deliberative context. This investigation is especially
relevant in a moment in which the formation of public opinion no longer de-
pends exclusively on political parties. This leads to a paradoxical situation in
which the diffuse energy issued by the electorate is not easily subjected to the
discipline of party-oriented proposals or by media disputes that, despite their
projection, may be ignored by many people. Thus, it is unclear in which sense
social networks act as an alternative to the traditional system of intermediation
set up by trade unions and pressure groups. By combining the approaches of de-
liberative democracy and social cognition theories, this essay sustains the rele-
vance of what is defined here as ‘cooperative cognition’ in order to face this chal-
lenge.
Introduction
The thematic field of politics (or, at least, its perception) has grown considerably
in recent years, and this trend is not expected to decline. This socio-political phe-
nomenon poses a challenge to public institutions at different levels of govern-
ment (i.e. local, national and supranational or global). In the public space, per-
ception vis-a-vis institutions’ legitimacy depends on the value deriving from their
effective capacity for mediation (Innerarity 2006).When the thematic field of pol-
itics is enlarged and, at the same time, vehiculated in an accelerated manner, the
following phenomena occur: (i) difficulty in channelling not only all the infor-
mation but, above all, the demand for it; (ii) difficulty in determining who are
the agents responsible for taking decisions; and (iii) increasing complexity in ac-
tual levels of government and, consequently, of decision-taking. To these, we
may add another, no less important phenomenon: namely, greater opportunity
and motivation to participate in public life. There is a causal explanation for
this increase experienced by numerous collectives, both in opportunity and mo-
tivation to participate, which can be found in the theoretical framework of the
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research conducted by Putnam (1993) on civic traditions in modern Italy. The
concept of ‘social capital’ is generally accepted as an explanatory factor of the
potential for development in a society and in a nation. Furthermore, society per-
ceives the experience of participation as an instrument for orienting the benefits
(symbolic or otherwise) deriving from the existence and operation of networks,
bonds of confidence, and underlying social norms.
Despite the absence of a theory on risk of participation, the theoretical
framework referred to above allows us to establish that the feasibility of a par-
ticipative experience goes—necessarily—hand in hand with a situation of in-
equality: inequality of access to information, and inequality in the sharing of ca-
pabilities for processing not only such information, but also the diagnoses that
stem from it; inequality in the personal, collective and group resources acquired
during the associative and participative action itself; inequality that, essentially,
likewise affects representability in political themes, as well as the theoretical ar-
ticulation of demands and even the social profile of the groups expressing diag-
noses and demands. Unequal representation derives from the fact that, in every
participatory experience, people and groups appoint themselves as agents for
collective actions. Because of this, the social function that can rightfully be at-
tributed to participation (understood as an instrument for increasing the social
capital of collectives) ultimately causes friction with the principle of representa-
tiveness. Even in cases where this can be understood as an expression of the col-
lective need to increase the social capital, mere participation fails to guarantee
public representativeness of political diagnoses or their frameworks.
‘Frame alignment’ is an example of a means to detect the existence of par-
ticipative bias and to demonstrate the difficulty involved in identifying and
building authoritative voices in the public space. Some political scientists
(Snow et al. 1986) use the expression ‘frame alignment’ to refer to the socio-po-
litical phenomenon by means of which social movements develop a series of
complex mechanisms that allow a progressive number of followers to adopt
the aims of an organized collective or, in more general terms, of an organisation.
Frame alignment exemplifies how, as they unfold within a society, participation
processes give rise to hybrid new forms of participation, to solve legitimacy prob-
lems that derive from the challenge of representativeness. Today, professionals,
groups and sectors from a broad range of society types form part of a frame
alignment phenomenon whose immediate political action is herein linked to
the enlargement of the thematic field of politics. This transnational political phe-
nomenon draws our attention to the need to analyse and propose cooperative
rationality models to solve the normative and practical problems of modern so-
cieties. In my defence of a cooperative cognition model and its rationality, I will
focus on the following questions: (1) what kind of leadership is compatible with
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the mentioned proposal; (2) what does social cognition means and why does it
matter; and (3) in what sense is deliberation a specific kind of cooperative cog-
nition?
Types of leadership
Analysts of deliberative behavior, aiming to measure and automate deliberative
communication in order to programme and design platforms adapted to these
communicative ends, usually establish three levels in defining deliberation.
The first is the macro-level, in which deliberation is linked to deliberative democ-
racy, a type of democracy in which collective decision-making is based to a large
extent on a consensus-oriented discourse and on argumentative discourse rather
than on the rule of majority. At the second or meso-level, we find specific types
of deliberative forum (e.g. public addresses, round tables, citizens’ conferences
or consensus conferences). Deliberative forums of this nature are created to
make a decision on the adoption of a collective norm or the resolution of a
local conflict. The third or micro-level describes a form of political communica-
tion that, for instance, is opposed to the various modes of rhetoric and strategic
communication, and is present at parliamentary forums, political speeches and,
to some extent, at certain moments during political negotiation processes. These
three levels can be distinguished thanks to the assumption of (i) regulatory at-
tributes of the institutional environment, (ii) interpersonal communications
and (iii) the presence of individual deliberative behavior.
Deliberation is not only a form of political communication, but also the ex-
pression of a regulated form of communication on issues of public interest, im-
plying a form of epistemic organization of the spaces for intermediation between
civil society and the governmental structures generally identified with the State.
If deliberative democracy can be understood as a specific model of democracy,
then we must consider that certain initial epistemic assumptions exert an influ-
ence on the environment of deliberation. What are these presuppositions and
what are the grounds for their legitimacy? Why is deliberative democracy a
form of epistemic organization of socio-political environments? Deliberation is
a political communication model open to analysis from an epistemic point of
view because it is a space for the organization of subjects of knowledge, in
which to examine truly epistemic aspects (e.g. epistemic virtues pertaining to
the environment, epistemic values that strengthen and regulate this communica-
tive practice, or epistemic and heuristic biases that, in certain spheres, may
weaken the epistemic values and virtues of deliberation).
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An image that conveys this position is found in the distinction commonly
made in political science between three types of leadership: foundational lead-
ership, moral leadership and creative leadership (Barber 1984, 1988). This image
may seem somewhat paradoxical—after all, the capacity for leadership is usually
attributed firstly to individuals, and, on counted occasions, to groups and
human collectives.
The deliberative model exerts creative leadership in that it applies the prin-
ciple of encouraging and reinforcing the will, the skills and the deliberative be-
havior of citizens in order to prevent them from seeing themselves as mere spec-
tators of the capabilities displayed by those in governing roles. Creative
leadership in the deliberative democracy model is embodied by the set of epis-
temic rules, principles and values used to design the political game in which the
players are engaged. To a certain extent, we can say that leadership, in this sce-
nario, is not only creative but foundational, too. Nevertheless, it can also be stat-
ed that it is creative, strictly speaking, given that it fixes its quasi-therapeutic at-
tention on the citizenry, enhancing the latter’s civic commitment to the task of
examining proposals, weighing the epistemic authority of proposers, opponents
and proposals, and, finally, pondering the decisions to be taken.
In contrast to the foundational and creative leadership associated herein
with the deliberative democracy model, moral leadership describes the skills
of those advocating a specific awareness of the responsibility taken over any
issue, but (seemingly) without becoming involved in the mobilizations and
claims of a given proposal. Generally speaking, the people or collectives exercis-
ing this type of leadership inspire and encourage mobilizations by imbuing citi-
zens’ social and political perception with a moralizing endeavor. Just as deliber-
ative democracy is a vehicle for creative leadership, so is radical democracy for
moral leadership. For instance, in the proposal put forward by Chantal Mouffe
(1993), both the idea of rational consensus and the idea that there is a substan-
tive good on which to found a community display traits of moral leadership. Ac-
cording to this model, the antagonistic character of the political is irreconcilable
with the idea that pre-constitutive individual identities and collective identities
may exist.
In accordance with Mouffe’s model of radical democracy, the identification
and presentation of preferences is exogenous, or stemming from origins that are
external to deliberative practice. This is not the case in the deliberative model,
which is grounded, precisely, in a process—namely deliberation, oriented toward
the identification and readjustment of preferences in an endogenous manner,
which means that adjustments and/or readjustments originate in the interior
of the deliberative process. Mouffe uses the dyad ‘friend/foe’ (Schmitt 1932) to
evoke the impossibility of eliminating the antagonism between ‘we’ and ‘they’
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in construction processes of political identity. In fact, her proposal implies that
‘affective dimensions’ act as a detonator for collective political identities. Indi-
vidual, group and/or collective identification alike are constituted through the
intervention of certain ‘political rivalry emotions’ stemming from a (radical)
sense of belonging to antagonistic social and economic classes. One weakness
that can be observed in Mouffe’s approach is that it does not consider the pos-
sible impact of the dynamism of beliefs, or the processes by which preferences
are adjusted and calibrated, on her model of radical democracy. Her model pro-
vides information regarding the causal relationship existing between the discov-
ery of an agonic identity (e.g. that of each among one’s own and opposed to that
of the others) and its mobilizing effect. Hers is a model that does not accommo-
date spaces for the formation of preferences, but rather spaces for confrontation
understood as vehicles of polarization and politicization, driven by the percep-
tion that the dominant group, i.e. the elites, is identified with non-convergent
antagonistic preferences.
Democracy is told in many ways, and although the radical or radicalized
representative democracy model can be seen—as I propose herein—as a paradig-
matic example of moral leadership, it nevertheless presents a clear deficit in cre-
ative leadership. We may indeed ask, for instance, to what extent this model of
radical democracy encourages a political culture favorable to the emergence of
‘vigilant societies’, an expression that describes the civil society of democracies
such as those of Denmark or Norway, in which people display a higher degree of
intolerance toward political practices that deviate from their function. Neverthe-
less, one of Mouffe’s many merits is that she allows us to establish a relationship
between the antagonism with which each citizen experiences their individual
and collective (political) identity, and their predisposition for protest, denounce-
ment and social vigilance. Experiencing this antagonistic effect is dependent on
individuals’ opportunity to identify the traits of their social and political identity
when participating in collective vindication processes.
Opportunities and challenges
in a deliberative democracy
Bearing in mind the many variables in the crisis currently affecting democratic
institutions, it would seem only fair to recognize the value of moral leadership
in this definition of democracy. However, moral leadership is not enough to
build a political culture tied to a deliberative democracy model. This model
does not share the deliberative notion of the shaping function of personal and
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institutional identity exercised by political culture. Such a scenario, in which
radical and deliberative democracy are counterposed—subject to nuances, no
doubt—may serve to lead us to the epistemic dimensions of a deliberative
model of democracy.
Some of the factors involved in the epistemic dimension of deliberation are
not only factors but also the materials necessary to secure the epistemic organ-
ization of democracy. According to the cognitivist thesis shared by most theo-
rists, deliberation causes (1) problems in the statutes of individual preferences
and opinions, (2) rationalizes preferences and (3) filters them. “Every successful
deliberation impacts on individual opinions and preferences, significantly trans-
forming them or providing an incentive for their deeper justification, and this
epistemic character contributes to the very legitimacy of democracy”.
Research on the epistemic dimension of democracy may be regarded as an
extension of traditional epistemology. Generally, it can be stated that the objects
of such research are the doxastic decision processes in the case of institutional
agents, processes and environments. Furthermore, it is initially assumed that, as
pointed out by Broncano, the demos becomes something greater than a ‘mass’
when it recognizes itself as a ‘distribution’ of voices and capacities, and conse-
quently, when it establishes a principle according to which citizens—on the
strength of their citizenship—acknowledge each other’s authority (Broncano
2003, 2008). Citizens’ epistemic capacities are apportioned, but these capacities
cannot be assessed independently of the environments produced by the (fallible)
design of educational, political, economic or other institutions. It is therefore in
social epistemology that we find the best arguments to understand the relation-
ship between epistemology and democracy.
The existence of epistemic capacities, and of institutional environments as-
sociated with their configuration and confirmation, implies that these capacities
present a public dimension when deployed in deliberative processes. The capaci-
ties to (1) formulate questions genuinely aimed toward safeguarding or repre-
senting public interests, to (2) make proper use of cultural resources, or to (3)
make use of cognitive skills in order to articulate and defend claims in a persua-
sive manner, are samples of the many aspects open to research from the point of
view of social epistemology.
How should we define intersubjective correction criteria that are not based
solely on the (proper) use of argumentative ways of thinking? How should we
distinguish beliefs from personal preferences when engaged in deliberation?
Are the phases in deliberation effective to ensure the correct adjustment for be-
liefs? Does deliberation suffice to detect logical errors and to make use of intel-
lectual virtues? In light of these and other questions, many authors query wheth-
er this model does not impose heavy restrictions and demands, as it involves
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assuming as valid that its citizens possess sophisticated cognitive capabilities
and are endowed with the necessary skills and criteria to make advantageous
use of them. It would be interesting to verify whether this is the case, by assum-
ing at the outset a certain epistemic paternalism with an analytical perspective.
However, it is also reasonable to state that deliberative inequity is related not to
the absence of a capability, but rather to the manner in which it is distributed—
that is, with the institutional design that should guarantee the equilibrium be-
tween, on the one hand, the relational dimension (i.e. the social and democratic
dimension of deliberation) and the logical and dialectic dimension associated
with the consistent use of practical reasoning and argumentative lines of think-
ing. Furthermore, deliberative inequity is also related to the ignorance of reason
shown in accessing the truth in beliefs; for instance, when giving justification for
beliefs exclusively on the grounds of the reasons for holding that something is
true, or to display sufficient skills as argumentative agents when making use
of practical reasoning.
Deliberative and epistemic inequities
One of the greatest difficulties consists in failing to detect deliberative inequities
promoted by institutional designs that inhibit the capacity to recognize the epis-
temic merits of proponents and opponents in a deliberation. Murguía Lores
(2014, 2016) recalls, for example, the thesis of Smith and Semin (2007), accord-
ing to which human cognitive systems produce situated versions of concepts, be-
cause said versions have specific functions within each context. If this is the
case, then to what extent will the influence of our deliberative culture determine
our capacity to recognize the relevant knowledge in a deliberative context, to se-
lect and value epistemic authority, or to recognize the importance of individual
and/or collective epistemic achievements?
Bearing in mind the analyses performed by certain political scientists (Frick-
er 2007; Byung-Chul Han 2014; Subirats / Vallespín 2014; Ausín 2014), we can af-
firm that the crisis areas our political culture is crossing are related to eminently
epistemic spaces, functions and dimensions of democracy. It is fundamental that
we acknowledge this fact, if we accept the theoretical position in which the rec-
ognition of epistemic merits and achievements occurs in a situated manner—for
example, within specific deliberative environments threatened by crises of all
kinds.We can distinguish at least three major crisis areas: (A) the area compris-
ing mediation mechanisms; (B) the communications area; and (C) the area of
representation. These affect the following:
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A) a crisis in the mechanisms for mediation between society and politics,which
can be appreciated in the representation crises of political parties (which ap-
pear to represent themselves);
B) a crisis in the sphere of traditional communication that does not monopolize
the traditional communication channels, but is shared by the new virtual
community in the new debating scenarios (e.g. blogs, social networks); and
C) the difficulty to articulate a party model that satisfies the functions all par-
ties need to fulfill (i.e. relative aperture and closure to gain identity, and to
act as a stable, predictable political agent forming an institutional identity).
Social cognition
The term ‘social cognition’ is used in human and social sciences to refer to the-
ories, categories and principles that explain and interpret issues relating to
human beings’ knowledge of the social world. It also refers to a complex of epis-
temic and neuropsychological processes that are deployed by human beings in
the acquisition, processing and institutionalization of knowledge and informa-
tion in social contexts. While we generally use ‘cognition’ to refer to learning
and processing information in an individual and autonomous manner, the social
perspective of cognition is based on the assumption that the nature and evolu-
tion of the processes of reasoning, memorizing, perception, learning, judgment,
etc. are configured collectively, i.e. through personal interaction, and as a con-
sequence of our exposure to the problem of extracting meaning from the behav-
ior of other human beings.
The distinction between individual and social cognition lies in the fact that,
in the latter, prototypically collective processes intervene (e.g. interaction, com-
munication, social reasoning and inference, social categorization, adoption of
perspectives and interpretations, causal attribution, and also the natural dispo-
sition of human beings to relate to each other and communicate among them-
selves their history). The convergence of all these factors renders social cognition
an area of research in which such different disciplines as social psychology, evo-
lutionary psychology, social epistemology, sociology of institutions, philosophy
of the mind, evolutionary anthropology, social ontology and neuropsychology
necessarily concur.
The field of research concerned with the study of social cognition has devel-
oped over the last 30 years (Higgins / Bargh 1987; Schneider 1991; Higgins 2000;
Fiske et al. 2007; Nichols 2004). There is a degree of consensus regarding certain
important assumptions shared by specialists; for example, that according to one
such assumption, social cognition is presented as an activity that allows people
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to understand other human beings and to interact successfully. We can say that
denial of this presupposition is only partial, and only expressed by those who
consider that social cognition, rather than an activity or an action, constitutes
a methodological perspective whose aim is to study social interaction (Ostrom
1994).
If this is taken as a methodological orientation of social psychology, the aim
is to measure and analyze situated social cognition, i.e. perceptions, judgments
and memories. It is also worth noting that some authors consider that there is
consensus over the two questions central to the debate on social cognition
(Fiske / Marcrae 2012). The first of these is how to establish a distinction between
social and non-social knowledge; the second is whether there is any aspect or
element of cognition that can be presented as fundamental to the acquisition
and configuration of social knowledge. When examining these questions,
some authors consider that action is precisely the determining factor in the re-
sponse to both questions, and that there are two reasons for this: because action
is a property that we assume as exclusive to social cognition agents, to the exclu-
sion of non-social objects; and because action expresses the dynamism and rec-
iprocity generated between the person and the social environment (Ostrom 1984;
Marsh / Richardson / Schmidt 2009).
One of the distinctive features of human cognition is the dynamic participa-
tion in collaborative activities that help the human race to develop a shared in-
tentionality in pursuing objectives in a collective manner. To participate in this
kind of collaborative activity, it is necessary (i) to gain the capacity to guess
the intentions of other members of the species; (ii) to have sufficient prior moti-
vation to share mental states; and (iii) to develop and recognize ways of repre-
senting cognition. As a result, one of the human race’s distinguishing features
is a radically cultural dimension of cognition, which is manifested through the
creation and use of linguistic symbols and material artifacts, the construction
and definition of social rules, and the establishment of social institutions (Tom-
asello et al. 2005; Searle 1995).
A majority of authors find that there is sufficient empirical evidence to affirm
that the capacity to read others’ intentions and sociocultural cognition go hand
in hand. For example, both in the sphere of social psychology and in psychology
and evolutionary anthropology, mention is made of the use of linguistic symbols
in infancy that the child must necessarily understand, engaging with other peo-
ple as agents of their intention, as well as paying attention to entities that exist
in the social world. However, although social cognition specialists maintain the
thesis that an inextricable relationship exists between humans’ capacity for
reading others’ minds and cultural cognition, it is currently assumed that under-
standing intentionality in other agents can neither be presented as the sole fea-
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ture of cultural cognition nor be considered enough to produce skills of cultural
cognition. Instead, the research hypothesis that only human beings are biologi-
cally adapted to participate in collaborative activities involving shared objec-
tives, socially coordinated plans of action (‘we-intentionality’) and dialogic
forms of cognitive representation, seems more feasible (Tomasello et al. 2005,
p. 676).
The above argument is linked to the idea that social phenomena cannot be
reduced to the sum of the wills of individuals. The element of individual inten-
tionality is not sufficient to explain phenomena such as the existence of rules
and social conventions, or the social cognition hypothesis itself. Rather, the re-
verse seems to be true. We find that complex social structures allow human be-
ings to reason and act in collective scenarios. In such scenarios, intentionality is
expressed and structured in a collective manner, and is closely related to repre-
sentations and interpretations of the world. Consequently, social cognition is not
merely a social phenomenon, but is also related to the social expression of other
phenomena.
Of these, one of the most outstanding has been named by John Searle ‘insti-
tutional fact(s)’. Searle claims that social reality is made up not only of raw facts,
i.e. facts constituted solely by physical bodies, but of complex institutional facts,
for the recognition and determination of which the following constitutive rule
must be applied: ‘Given a raw fact P, let us say that P counts as Q in the context
C.’ A commonly used example is money, that can be identified, let us say, with
the raw fact associated with the exclusively physical properties of the paper that
bank notes are made of. Applying the constitutive rule proposed by Searle, we
can state that although P is equivalent to the raw fact associated with money,
when the raw fact P occurs in the context C (equivalent, for example, to the
USA Federal Reserve that issues the currency), it is counted as Q because, in
that case, it represents money as a store of value. Therefore, a social environment
or context exists in which certain raw facts may count as institutional facts, i.e.
facts that are ontologically subjective.
Ontologically subjective facts determine and exhibit a collective dimension
both in intentionality and in cognition. It can likewise be said that as these
are facts whose objectivity, value, consistency, adequacy, etc. can be contextual-
ized and evaluated by human collectives, both institutional facts and the cogni-
tive contexts or environments to which they are associated (and from which they
emerge) have a social dimension, and can be addressed from an epistemic point
of view.
Considering the latter, some authors argue that social cognition in a narrow
sense must be distinguished from its broad sense. Social cognition in a narrow
sense is required to understand the attitudes and intentions of a person in every
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specific context. In a broad sense, however, social cognition is that which takes
place when we need to understand the intention shared by the members of social
groups that in each case constitute determined institutional contexts (Fiebich
2014). These distinctions reinforce one of the fundamental theses in the contem-
porary development of cognitive science: that intelligent behavior depends on
people’s cognitive systems to manipulate, transform and produce information
when they develop in the social environment. Despite all this evidence, it can
be said that all of us are immersed in social environments in which emblematic
models of cooperative rationality are faced with institutional designs that not
only do not favor, but also impede cooperation. Nevertheless, there is enough po-
litical and social evidence to think that there may be a clear opportunity in the
future for the emergence of cooperative cognition.
Cooperative cognition
Political parties are ruled by the imperative for organization, but the formation of
public opinion is no longer dependent exclusively on them. The diffuse energy
issued by the electorate is not easily subjected to the discipline of party-oriented
proposals, or of media disputes that, despite their projection, may be ignored by
many people. Social networks have become a new public space emancipated
from traditional communication media and from the channels open between citi-
zens and those in government. However, it is unclear in which sense social net-
works act as an alternative to the traditional system of intermediation set up by
trade unions and pressure groups. It is early to offer a diagnosis or assessment of
the place that social networks will occupy in democratic practice. Nevertheless,
despite the difficulties experienced today in establishing favorable forecasts, dif-
ferent authors have concluded that the communicative practices within social
networks imply a type of presence that is perhaps excessively chaotic, because it:
– offers a fragmented public in disorganized public spheres;
– favors dispersion and rivalry in a great number of chat-rooms;
– foments centrifugal attitudes, through the absence of filters to screen reliable
information;
– works by reaction, and is liable to be reactionary as it encourages currents of
praise/criticism;
– produces ‘clusters’ that fail to conform to a ‘we’; and
– hinders the cohesion and unification necessary for preferences and propos-
als to reach the political system.
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Facing these challenges, the stance of some authors (e.g. Subirats / Vallespín
2014) is clear, and forebodes that the media have not yet been ousted from
their function as intermediaries of political information. This would explain
how, today, they continue to ‘seek and break news’. Will the media promote
the rehabilitation of political culture and its new operativeness? For Subirats
and Vallespín, the answer to this question may be the affirmative—but to achieve
this, it is necessary to devise an alternative action plan, applied especially to
what I have called ‘ABC crisis areas’ and whose basic program items can be sum-
med up as follows:
A) to increase traffic on networks whose line of political information is more
informative and expressive than deliberative;
B) which might lead to a revival of traditional communication media, given the
need to screen this higher level of noise by means of a return to the division
of tasks; and
C) which might also lead to the appearance of alternatives to Facebook and
Twitter that promote other forms of communicative intermediation at pres-
ent unimagined, and consequently, the reinvention of the press and other as-
pects regarding communicability and expressiveness in political representa-
tion.
Nevertheless, to wield strategic competence on such a complex stage, it is nec-
essary to re-state the aim of politics, that is, on what its rationality depends. For
Innerarity (2011), it is necessary to set in motion forms of ‘cognitive cooperation’
to “optimally combine heterogeneous forms of functional logic, governance
structures and knowledge resources to promote collective learning processes”.
Underlying this notion of politics is a model of rationality that springs from
the diagnosis and prognosis of opportunities and failures in a ‘democracy of
knowledge’. We could call this model ‘cooperative rationality’. According to
this model, one of the factors of configuring the space for opportunities and lim-
itations in any democracy is that societies “must develop certain concepts of de-
mocracy itself” (Innerarity 2011, p. 100). However, it is impossible to put into
practice such an objective in any manner but a cooperative one, through collec-
tive learning processes and self-observation that must be reflected in permanent
advisory processes:
If there is a demand to our societies, it is the need to modify the rules governing collective
learning and to programmatically raise their mechanisms for self-observation and their ca-
pacity for learning. There is a need to institutionalise greater reflexiveness through struc-
tures and procedures. Learning takes place under conditions of great uncertainty, which
is a difficult task not exempt from controversies. The deliberative theory of democracy
points precisely in this direction, in the awareness that, faced with these collective chal-
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lenges, the political discussion process must generate knowledge and not only tactics. (In-
nerarity 2011, p. 102)
Thus far, we have seen that deliberation is an appropriate environment for the
deployment of a model of cooperative rationality with which to enlarge the
field of social and political opportunities for citizens. However, to follow this
model of cooperative rationality, in which ideas of collective learning and of ad-
vice in a democracy of knowledge find inspiration, it is first necessary to over-
come quite a few ‘cognitive complications’ (Rescher 2015), such as those relative
to the standards of suitability and effectiveness that can be established by apply-
ing heuristics to social cognition processes.
Bibliography
Ausín, Txetxu (2014): “Democracia razonable: La información necesaria para la deliberación
ineludible”. In: Bautista, Diego / Ausín, Txetxu (Eds.): Democracia Ética. Una propuesta
para las democracias corruptas. Instituto Electoral de Estado de México: Serie
Investigaciones jurídicas y político-electorales, pp. 61–77.
Barber, Benjamin (1984): Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley,
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
Barber, Benjamin (1988): The Conquest of Politics. Liberal Philosophy in Democractic Times.
Princeton (New Jersey): Princeton University Press.
Broncano, Fernando (2003): Saber en condiciones. Epistemología para escépticos y
materialistas. Madrid: Antonio Machado Libros.
Broncano, Fernando (2008): “Dar la palabra: el lugar de los expertos en la democracia
deliberativa”. In: Estudios en homenaje al profesor Gregorio Peces-Barba. Madrid:
Dykinson, pp. 183–202.
Fiske, Susan T. / Cuddy, Amy J. / Glick, Peter (2007): “Universal dimensions of social
cognition: Warmth and competence”. In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11, pp. 77–83.
Fiebich, Anika (2014): “Perceiving Affordances and Social Cognition”. In: Gallotti, Mattia /
Michael, John (Eds.): Perspectives of social ontology and social cognition. Dordrecht:
Springer, pp. 149–166.
Fricker, Miranda (2007): Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford, New
York: Oxford University Press.
Han, Byung-Chul (2014): En el enjambre. Barcelona: Herder.
Higgins, Edward Tory (2000): “Social cognition: Learning about what matters in the social
world”. In: European Journal of Social Psychology 30, pp. 3–39.
Higgins, Edward Tory / Bargh, John A. (Eds.) (1987): “Social cognition and social perception”.
In: Annual Review of Psychology 38, pp. 369–425.
Innerarity, Daniel (2006): El nuevo espacio público. Madrid: Espasa.
Innerarity, Daniel (2011): La democracia del conocimiento. Por una sociedad inteligente.
Madrid: Paidós.
A Defense of Cooperative Cognition 45
Marsh, Kerry L. / Richardson, Michael J. / Schmidt, R. C. (2009): “Social connection through
joint action and interpersonal coordination”. In: Topics in Cognitive Science 1,
pp. 320–339.
Mouffe, Chantal (1993): The Return of the Political. London, New York: Verso.
Murguía Lores, Adriana (2014): “Epistemología social y democracia deliberativa”. In: Acta
Sociológica 63, pp. 99–121.
Murguía Lores, Adriana (2016): “Injusticias epistémicas y teoría social”. In: Dilémata. Revista
internacional de éticas aplicadas 22, pp. 1–19.
Nichols, Shaun (2004): “Folk concepts and intuitions: From philosophy to cognitive science”.
In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8, pp. 514–518.
Putnam, Robert D. (1993): Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rescher, Nicholas (2015): Cognitive Complications: Epistemology in Pragmatic Perspective.
Lexington Books.
Schmitt, Karl (2007/1923): The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Schneider, David J. (1991): “Social cognition”. In: Annual Review of Psychology 42,
pp. 527–561.
Searle, John (1995): The construction of social reality. New York: Free Press.
Smith, Barry / Searle, John (2003): “The construction of social reality: An exchange”. In: The
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 62(1), pp. 285–309.
Smith, Eliot R. / Semin, Gün R. (2004): “Socially situated cognition: Cognition in its social
context”. In: Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 36, pp. 53–117.
Snow, David A. / Rochford, Burke / Worden, Steven K. / Benford, Robert D. (1986): “Frame
Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation”. In: American
Sociological Review 51, pp. 464–481.
Subirats, Joan / Vallespín, Fernando (2014): España/reset: herramientas para un cambio de
sistema. Madrid: Ariel.
Fiske, Susan T. / Macrae, C. Neil (Eds.) (2012): The SAGE Handbook of Social Cognition. Los
Angeles: Sage Publications.
Tomasello, Michael / Carpenter, Malinda / Call, Josep / Behne, Tanya / Moll, Henrike (Eds.)
(2005): “Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition”. In:
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28, pp. 675–735.
46 María G. Navarro
Franz-J. Heilgendorff
Conceptualizing Capitalist Globalization
Abstract: The philosophical theory of globalization is predominantly comprised
of a critique of modern globalization, which is based on a theory of equal distri-
bution of goods and guided by universal ethical principles. I argue that philo-
sophical ethics cannot approach the problem in a different way, because of a
lacking concept of society. The lack of a theory of society necessitates arguing
with universal principles: philosophers focus on poverty and suffering as
such, rather than on poverty and suffering generated by the process of globali-
zation. From the perspective of Marx’s critique of political economy, the empiri-
cal perception of human society leads to a mystified and overly simplistic anal-
ysis of social interaction. This means that only a conceptual theory of society can
reveal the hidden relationship between economical categories. It thereby enables
a more complex and adequate critique of globalization than the positivistic theo-
ry and its solution to the problems provided by philosophical ethics. Based on a
theory of capitalist society, the universalist promises of philosophy will not sim-
ply be criticized as illusions, but are recognized as realistic opportunities based
on cooperative productive capacities to be liberated from their current alienated
forms. Thus, globalization ultimately—in its alienated form—generates the basis
for the universal principles that are used by philosophy for its critique of global-
ization.
Introduction
Globalization and its scientific explanation are relevant today not only theoret-
ically. Regarding the enduring global crisis since the 1970s and the continuing,
immeasurable poverty, it is also important (for political reasons) to clarify
what globalization is and to what extent it is the cause of these phenomena. Fac-
ing these challenges, a concept of globalization is a scientific necessity and it is
reasonable to place this inquiry within philosophy.
However, in philosophy, approaches to globalization are formulated primar-
ily from the point of view of ethics. The existing philosophical theory of global-
ization predominantly consists of a critique of modern globalization, which is
based on a theory of equal distribution of goods and guided by universal ethical
principles. Above all, it is practical philosophy that responds to the phenomena
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of globalization and is guided by the following principle: an economic and tech-
nical globalization needs to be regulated politically and should be guided to-
wards a civilized and environmentally friendly coexistence (Niederberger /
Schink 2011, p. 144). For Niederberger and Schink, the main hurdle in the real-
ization of this goal appears to be the lack of a global society’s identity, caused
by the non-simultaneity of global development. Nevertheless, philosophers in-
sist that the aforementioned problems and the lack of a common value system
could be compensated for by philosophy, with its claim of universal reason (Fig-
ueroa 2004, p. 346; Reeder 2009, p. 15).
Accordingly, globalization is primarily problematized from the perspective of
ethics, as justice problems cannot be solved due to the lack of institutionaliza-
tion of the global arena (Hahn 2009, p. 16)—or solutions would fail because of
the subjects’ unwillingness to help (Singer 2007). All attempts to establish rea-
son as the foundation of a global order, as well as the different proposals to
limit global poverty, have had only limited effects in the past. This leads to
the question of why the variety of philosophical responses to the multiple crises
of the global order has been so unsuccessful.
Philosophy and globalization
Philosophers referring to globalization tend to uphold moral-philosophical posi-
tions, rather than developing an appropriate concept of globalization. Globaliza-
tion is not analyzed in its totality; instead, individual sides of it are taken as iso-
lated, presupposed and accepted as given.
As the reference to globalization appears to be made by acknowledging the
discrepancy between philosophical ideas and the factual, rather than by a con-
ceptual theory of globalization, philosophical theory of globalization usually
starts with a commonsense definition, instead of developing a concept of global-
ization. That definition’s origin is often trapped in everyday experiences. The sol-
utions thus remain on a general level. It is merely suggested that “a political reg-
ulatory competence must regain the global markets”, with the aim of “the co-
operation of political regimes and a new form of integration of cosmopolitan sol-
idarity” (Habermas 1998, p. 79).¹
But on this general level, the historical specificity of the capitalist era disap-
pears. The lack of impact of philosophical reflections on globalization seems to
be a result of this superficial approach,which relies on mere juxtaposition of reg-
 For all quotations given here from German-language sources, I present my own translation.
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ulatory principles. Even critics of individualized concepts of justice contribute to
a further individualization by means of their counter-argument of the overbur-
dening of the individual, and thus to the lack of success in limiting world pov-
erty. In order to avoid these shortcomings, it is necessary to clarify the constitu-
tional principles and thus the genesis of the social formation called globalization
instead of arbitrarily presupposing them.
If globalization is taken only as an external reason to argue about general
issues of justice and morality, the results will remain deficient, as will be
shown below. The self-image of political philosophy as a ‘theory of global distrib-
utive justice’ is already symptomatic of this (Kersting 1998, p. 11). The ethical re-
flections associated with it remain on a general level and they are centered on
the question of the responsibility of the richer towards the poor in the world
(Beck 2016, p. 14). Considering that one third of all annual deaths are caused
by poverty (i.e. by a lack of disposition of essential commodities), it seems “im-
portant to change the social structures that influence the distribution of such
goods” (Beck 2016, p. 14). Valentin Beck insists that the responsibility for this
lies not least in the mutual economic and ecological dependency due to global-
ization (Beck 2016, p. 15).
However, the meaning of globalization beyond this interdependence remains
remarkably imprecise, and something which calls for debate. Multiple attempts
are oscillating around the phenomenon of “an intensification of global social re-
lations, connecting distant places in such a way that events at one place are
shaped by events taking place at a distance of many kilometers and vice
versa” (Giddens 1995, p. 85). There is a lack of orientation among academics—
often openly admitted—“which expresses itself in the feeling that systematic
knowledge about the organization of society is not available” (Giddens 1995,
p. 10). The point of intervention of philosophical ethics consists in the proposal
of organizing the existing processes ‘above all equitably’ (Lenk /Maring 2007,
p. 16). In this discussion, globalization is what Osterhammel and Petterson
call only the ‘name of an epoch’. This name is based on the direct experiences
of the people, in order to articulate easily comprehensible everyday experiences
as well as complex interdependencies of global economic relationships (Oster-
hammel / Petterson 2004, pp. 7–8). The attractiveness of the concept of global-
ization for philosophy seems to be explained in this abstractness, since the ques-
tions of classical theories of justice or political philosophy could be transferred
to the level of international politics. One can find this exemplified in the essay by
Julia Nida-Rümelin and Martin Reichenauer on international justice (Nida-Rüme-
lin / Reichenauer 2009, pp. 302,310). Instead of a conceptual reconstruction of
what is called globalization, the focus is on the experience of borderless eco-
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nomics, politics, ecology, technology or cultural conflicts, to transfer their own or
traditional philosophical constructions to an international level.
This abstract-empirical version of a concept of globalization is problematic,
because in it, according to Hegel, thinking “is satisfied with characteristics, i.e.
determinations in which the essentiality [Wesentlichkeit]² is indifferent to the ob-
ject itself [Gegenstand] and which, on the contrary, has the only purpose of being
a mark for external reflection” (HW 6/516). At this level of empirical methodolo-
gy, there exists “no other criterion [for the generality [Allgemeinheit]] than the ex-
istence [Dasein] itself” (HW 6/515). This is particularly problematic because the
being [Dasein] of an object [Gegenstand] like globalization does not expose in
any way its essential purpose, which lies in the social nexus. This results in
the abovementioned individualization and moralization of social contradictions,
and culminates in “the unsolved question of what the more fortunate owe to
people in extreme poverty” (Beck 2016, p. 15).
This question is symptomatic for the world poverty debate that has been
going on since the 1970s. It is based on empirical findings, such as the observa-
tion of an ‘insurmountable gap’ between the living conditions of the richest and
poorest countries in the world (Birnbacher 2007, p. 131), often taken into consid-
eration when scholars try to justify ethical aid commitments through moral-phil-
osophical constructions.
This can be illustrated by an article by Peter Singer, who opened this debate.
It begins with the words: “While I am writing this, in November 1971, people in
East Bengal are dying because of the lack of food, shelter and medical care”
(Singer 2007, p. 37) But shortly afterwards, he relativizes the example of Bengal
in order to emphasize that suffering in general caused by poverty should be
avoided: “I begin with the assumption that suffering and death due to lack of
food, homelessness or the lack of medical care are bad” (Singer 2007, p. 39).
In this way, the individual case serves only as an illustration of the general prin-
ciple that suffering should be avoided; and this task should be the responsibility
of the better-off, i.e., the ‘western’ world. This principle is then explained from a
moral point of view by the example of a child who is in danger of drowning
(Singer 2007, p. 39). A number of other arguments subsequently formulate the
moral principle that anyone who can help is obliged to help, i.e., to donate
money to fight world poverty (Singer 2007, p. 50). As a result, the problem of
world poverty is faced with superficial moral-philosophical speculation and a
posterior regulation of unenlightened problems is claimed. There is neither a se-
 Italicized terms enclosed in square brackets […] refer to specific German (in the majority of
cases, Hegelian or Marxian) concepts of philosophy, which are difficult to translate.
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rious reflection on the social nexus that causes these conflicts, nor an analysis of
the social relationships that are intensifying these tensions. The debate also fails
to outline the difference between suffering as such and suffering in capitalism.
By considering these historical and concrete problems as individuation [Be-
sonderung] of a general, timeless problem (poverty), only abstract solutions re-
main, such as the requirement of equal opportunities on the basis of human
rights (Kesselring 2003, pp. 25, 51–52). The starting point is indeed the everyday
experience of the complex global structure of suffering and misery—but the de-
scribed version of the problem leads to rather ahistorical expression of it, in
which the specific nature of the present situation (and with it its own origin)
is obscured. In this way, the philosophical approach to globalization tends to-
wards ideology. In view of the highlighted shortcomings, the question arises of
how to move from an empirical approach to a scientific concept of globalization,
avoiding the aforementioned problems.
Above all, the main challenge arises from the fact that philosophy operates
without a theory of the society that generated globalization in the first place: the
capitalist society. One of the authors who developed a conceptual theory of the
capitalist society was Karl Marx. Based on the perspective of Marx’s critique of
the political economy, the following section attempts to show how to avoid turn-
ing philosophical considerations of globalization into abstract ethical and moral
reflections. Central to this are the remarks on the constitution of objects through
social praxis, which are developed in the ‘Capital’ and in the Grundrisse. On the
basis of this concept, social forms result from the unconscious socialization of
work or social praxis. In this way, globalization can be addressed as a form
that mediates the contradictions of the social nexus. Thereby, the production
of global relations becomes the focus of the analysis. This demands a scientific
analysis of globalization capable of reproducing in theory the social nexus as a
mental reproduction of the object which constitutes the form of globalization.
This approach is the epistemological consequence of Marx’s critique of political
economy as a theory of distribution. It can be stated that the division of the dis-
tributional sphere from the production sphere in capitalist society is symptomat-
ically expressed in a criticism based on distributive justice. Thus, only the way of
exchanging products is considered an issue that appears as changeable. The dis-
tribution of the means of production is ignored in this context, leading to the re-
sult that “history is banished into the field of distribution” (MEW 42, p. 32).
The debate on global justice, the attempts at a universalist justification of
ethical principles and the explication of the morally scandalous nature of the
current world situation should not be underestimated—but the debate can be
criticized by pointing out a methodological error that explains the ineffective-
ness of its arguments against factual problems. It does not suffice to confront
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the world with external moral principles (such as in Singer 2007, p. 39); rather, it
is necessary to explain the inevitability of the world’s dilemma from its own
principles (MEW 1, p. 344). Contrary to the ethical and moral approaches to-
wards globalization by philosophers, it shall now be shown that philosophy
can contribute to a philosophically reflected conceptualization of globalization
in the context of a comprehensive theory of society, whose goal is the enlighten-
ment of its unconscious preconditions (Stapelfeldt 2004, p. 14– 15).
Approaches to a materialist
theory of globalization
A systematic theory of capitalist production, which goes beyond the uncon-
sciously presupposed categories of political economy and on which more con-
crete forms of the capitalist mode of production such as globalization can be de-
termined, can be built upon the analyses of Marx’s Capital. A number of works
already exist (Sandleben 2003; Silver 2005; Harvey 2001, 2005 and 2007) that
can serve as a starting point for a critical theory of globalization.
Beverly Silver (2005) analyzes globalization in terms of the contradiction be-
tween capital and labor. The contradiction between the efforts of capital to re-
duce labor costs on the one hand, and the struggle of workers for a decent stan-
dard of living on the other, would force capital to constantly migrate and
reorganize production sites all over the world, in order to remain profitable or
maximize profits. Using the textile and automotive industries, she showed that
shifts of capital are a reaction to the crisis-ridden relationship between capital
and labor, but that the conditions for the emergence of crises are reproduced
along with the movements expected to solve them. Capital is therefore forced
to move restlessly around the globe. For this reason, Silver can analyze global-
ization as a form of the generalization of the fundamental contradiction between
capital and labor.
David Harvey starts with the reproduction process of capital to show how the
crisis processes of the capitalist economy constitute the global space that is ex-
perienced as globalization (Harvey 2005). Harvey adopts Marx’s concept of fixed
capital to analyze the economic processes that are mediated by a built infrastruc-
ture. The category of fixed capital thereby becomes the pivotal point in the anal-
ysis of global time and space by using the two meanings of ‘fixing something’.
On the one hand, capital is tied up for a certain time at a certain location on
which the global space has its bases; and on the other hand, economic crises
are fixed in the short term through relocation of capital.
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Günther Sandleben (2003) uses these categories for the analysis of statehood
and international relations. He criticizes the widespread perception of globaliza-
tion, according to which a highly mobile financial capital on the basis of deregu-
lated financial markets would provoke crises in a supposedly smoothly operating
real economy (Sandleben 2003, p. 18– 19). In contrast, Sandleben demonstrates
that globalization consists of the expanding and limiting processes of a total
capital. In both the commonsense and the macroeconomics analyses, the con-
cept of total capital is not present, but rather appears as the economy of a peo-
ple’s nation. These total capitals as entities of closest economic interdependen-
cies are commonly perceived as regional units (like the Rheinischer Kapitalismus)
or states (Sandleben 2003, pp. 73–74, 110).
As total capital itself is a non-political, functional-economic entity, accord-
ing to Sandleben, societal questions are being detached from their economic ori-
gin and the states are therefore “continuing the work of their corresponding total
capital with other, now political methods” (Sandleben 2003, p. 129). In this anal-
ysis, Sandleben somehow follows Poulantzas’s critique of the ‘thingification’
[Verdinglichung] of the state, by recalling and reproducing mentally the materi-
alized social struggles that are mediated within the state and the state appara-
tuses. The problem is that, on the social surface, this mediation [Vermittlung] ap-
pears immediate [unvermittelt] in the state as an everlasting thing [Ding].
Transferred to the nexus of total capital and state, the total capital as a function-
al economic unit could not exist without separating the political momentum in
the form of a state and the establishment of borders, whereby the states—inde-
pendently but not self-sufficiently—nevertheless remain bound to the move-
ments and struggles within total capital. He argues that a theory of financial cap-
ital, which in one form or another still forms the basis of globalization theory,
leads to misconceptions about the significance of political action and the state
as an autonomous, self-sufficient actor. The inaccuracy of globalization theory
is to presuppose a constant ‘urge to expand’ of the states, as well as the contra-
ry—an external pressure on them—without linking it to the immanent move-
ments that are produced by the underlying total capitals. Politics is therefore
not a “freely manageable instrument […] against the forces of economic global-
ization […, but determinated and defined in last instance] by the content of the
economy itself” (Sandleben 2003, p. 130). Thus, a ‘globalization trap’ of the state
is doubtful—as is currently becoming apparent from the return of protectionist
policies.
What characterizes all of these approaches is that they trace the way of the
social constitution of what is experienced as globalization. In this way, they are
guided by Marx’s understanding of science, “to develop from the actual social
relations the corresponding celestialized forms of those relations” (MEW 23,
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p. 393). By reconstructing this production based on a theory of capital, it is pos-
sible to differentiate between the manifestations [Erscheinungsformen] that deter-
mine everyday experience (such as the compression of time and space, or the
continuous transformation of the social environment) and their underlying na-
ture [Wesen].
Towards a philosophical concept of globalization
In order to transcend the sheer appearance of an object, like the state or global-
ization, a systematic conceptualization is required. According to this, it is clear
that in the predominant empirical comparison of external attributes, the social
context in which globalization is located remains obscured. So globalization ap-
pears as an external threat, just like a natural disaster that has little to do with
human activity and whose destructive forces people try to regulate afterwards.
The feeling of being at the mercy of naturalized societal conditions is reflected
in a language, which develops its terms in analogy to natural disasters (such
as the uncontrollable stock market climate, different waves of globalization, or
that globalization is unstoppable like a tsunami) to describe the current situation
of the global social nexus.
The process of inversion taking place here is that globalization does not pro-
duce these contradictions and crisis tendencies of the social metabolism, but (in
order to modify a remark made by Marx about money) the contradictions of the
capitalist accumulation process are appearing as globalization and giving it an
allegedly transcendental power (MEW 42, p. 81). It almost seems that the term
globalization is actually used to avoid naming the real problem: capitalism.
So how can thinking approach reality in such a way that the concepts ap-
proximately reflect it? This can be realized by reproducing the production proc-
ess of these social forms in thought as a rehearsal [Probehandeln], which means
a mental reproduction of the vanished constitution process of the object. Accord-
ing to this interpretation, the conditions of the possibility of current globaliza-
tion and world poverty are based on a specific social praxis: the accumulation
of capital. Globalization and the categories of political economy therefore exist
only in a specific dependency on each other. They are an unconscious “product
of the human hand” (MEW 23, p. 86) as an expression of a historically specified
social praxis. Globalization in this way refers to an unconscious social nexus
that could be named the capitalist mode of production. In this approach, it is
necessary to intervene consciously to illuminate the necessity [Notwendigkeit]
of the determinate being [Dasein] of the actual form of global social relations.
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Through this illumination of the genesis of the determinate being, it is possible
to reveal the points at which social change can be initiated (MEW 42, p. 373).
As an example of this approach, one can consider the still controversial (see
Beck 2016, p. 28–29) postulation of Singer that we are obliged not to spend
money on trivialities, but to donate it in order to limit poverty (Singer 2007, es-
pecially p. 43, 49). This statement summarizes the central attributes of globaliza-
tion: locating actions on the world horizon, an intensification of social relations
and the tendency of space and time disappearance in money as immediate aid.
The object that mediates this process is money. On the level of the social surface,
it seems obvious that monetary aid could solve the problem of world poverty.
Given the current form of social relations, money solves the problem of world
poverty in the form of hunger by interacting with commodities that can serve
as food. However, this is a fetishized form of reflecting the social conditions.
In this way, the essence of social relationship appears in a mystified form. The
stages of the process that obscures the relations of this essence [Wesensverhält-
nisse] can be revealed using the concepts of reification [Versachlichung] and thin-
gification [Verdinglichung], as elaborated by Tairako Tomonaga on the basis of
Marx.³
Reification [Versachlichung] means that the social relations of persons to
each other are expressed in the social relations of objects [Sachen] to each
other (Tomonaga 1987, p. 111). This is evident in the category of globalization
as such, insofar as it is always mediated by objects; the intensification of social
relations is mediated through global goods and financial flows, through trans-
port and communication. In globalization, these relations of objects are obvious,
insofar as the compression of time and space is always mediated objectively [sa-
chlich], i.e., materially. In order to remain in the generalized picture of the
world’s poverty debate, the relationship between a fortunate person from the
western world and a deprived person from the southern hemisphere appears
in the form of a ratio of a certain amount of money to another and thereby de-
 For a precise understanding, it is important to familiarize oneself with and understand the
differences between Marx’s concepts of thing [Ding], object [Sache] and object as such [Gegen-
stand]. Object as such [Gegenstand] is an object that is simply present. Thing [Ding] and object
[Sache] synthesize the forms in which an object as such [Gegenstand] appears. When Marx
speaks of object [Sache], he means that the object as such acts in the context of a mental repro-
duction of social relationships (MEW 23, pp. 87–88). Marx speaks of the object as such as a
thing [Ding], when the formerly present relationship of the object has disappeared and reappears
as a characteristic property of the thing itself. So, in the thing [Ding] the aspect of mediation or
processing has disappeared or is obscured and the properties set by this process are claimed by
the object as its natural attributes (MEW 23, pp. 71–72, 86; Tomonaga 1982, p. 72 and 1984, p. 94).
Conceptualizing Capitalist Globalization 55
termines the degree of quantitative participation from social wealth in the form
of commodities. In this common definition, globalization appears specifically in
the fact that monetary aid makes space and time disappear. Money enables one
to satisfy (almost) any need at (almost) any point in time and space, if the object
of desire exists in the social form of a commodity.⁴ Starting from the generalized
capitalist society, it becomes apparent that in terms of satisfying needs, it is not
the persons themselves that are related to each other in a social nexus, but prod-
ucts in the social form of commodities mediated by money. In other words: the
process of reification [Versachlichung] inherent in capitalist society transforms
working products as things [Dinge] into “independent entities in relation to
each other and to the people” (MEW 23, p. 86), and these things [Dinge] “become
independent subjects who actively establish social relationships” (Tomonaga
1987, p. 111).
The first process of mystification is the process of reification [Versachlichung]
described above, which turns both people and the things [Dinge] they have pro-
duced into objects [Sache] within social relations. This is where the process of
thingification [Verdinglichung] begins—where “the social relationships of objects
to each other [are] turning into self-conversion, into real-object-related properties
that are adhered to things [Dinge]” (Tomonaga 1982, p. 112). In other words,
things [Dinge] as products of human work merge with their economic form-deter-
mination.⁵ This process transforms the working product considered as useful
into a commodity, with its supposed properties of use-value and exchange
value expressed as a money-price. According to Marx, the existence of the
money form of an object is determined by the fact that it mediates in general
the abstraction from the concrete use-values and organizes their reduction to ab-
stract labor as a value measurement. This means that the money form that is at-
tached to a specific object is set by the development of the contradiction between
value and use-value. If this objectified relationship is generalized, as in the cap-
italist economy, it is constituted “as an object, becomes objectified by symboliz-
 The fact that the expropriation of the immediate producers is a precondition for this situation,
and that this possibility includes the entire history of colonialism and imperialism, which had
helped to release these ‘eternal natural laws’ of capitalist production (MEW 23, pp. 787–788),
is ignored by philosophical debates about the necessity of financial aid.
 Working products are also things, because as an existing object the product vanishes its pro-
duction process. How exactly it has been produced by the unification of work and nature in the
working process is obscured and extinguished in the manufactured product, in which nature is
transformed into an intended useful object—except in the case of malfunction: then, “a blunt
knife or weak thread forcibly remind us of Mr. A., the cutler, or Mr. B., the spinner.” (MEW
23, p. 197)
56 Franz-J. Heilgendorff
ing itself in a space-time sign” (Krahl 2008, p. 64). As a result, the contradictions
of the social nexus which produced the forms of value, commodity and money as
forms in which these contradictions can move, are obscured and mystified in
money as a thing and its capacity as a savior on the global scale.
The difference between reification [Versachlichung] and thingification [Ver-
dinglichung] is therefore that in the latter, the social definition of form is trans-
formed into a material attribute of the thing. In our case, a piece of metal, a
paper note, or any other commodity becomes the permanent form of money
and has the quality to decide about the degree of participation from the already
produced social wealth in the form of priced commodities. In this constellation,
the existence of time and space becomes irrelevant when an amount of money is
transferred from one person to another. Money therefore is the materialized
power of disposition over dead work, which is already preserved in a commodity
as the social form of the working product. What is striking here is that the at-
tempt to overcome world poverty through monetary aid only operates on the sur-
face of society by reproducing the objective forms of the capitalist economy.
How does this solution of monetary aid emerge? At the layer of appearance,
it is assumed that there is an unequal distribution of wealth, and that this un-
equal distribution is the essence of the appearing world poverty. But in this per-
spective, it remains unconscious that the appearances on the social surface are
mystified manifestations of essential social relationships. This leads to the fact
that an adequate understanding of the social nexus is lacking, and so in (phil-
osophical) attempts to globalization it remains unrecognized that the circulation
of money in it “represents social relations of production, but in the form of a nat-
ural thing with certain attributes” (MEW 42, p. 22.). Once exposed, it becomes
apparent that the solutions offered by philosophy are reproducing the underly-
ing problem: the ownership structure of society and its accompanying forms.
Money is perceived as a natural form of wealth—in other words, the specific
character of bourgeois wealth and, accordingly, the exclusion from it, is not un-
derstood at all. In particular, it remains unclear what the universal concept of
suffering and poverty actually mean in relation to capitalism. Poverty and suffer-
ing in capitalism are no abstract quantities or mere lack of money—they are a
result of the exclusion from ownership of means of production. That means
that as long as the stated social nexus and the ownership structures exist, people
will be controlled by the unconscious products of their social praxis, as well as
its negative impacts. In consequence, globalization must be understood as a spe-
cific manifestation of the capitalist world economy—in Marx’s words, “as the
theoretical expression of those material relations which rule over them [the peo-
ple]” (MEW 42, p. 97). At this point, it is evident that the solutions produced by
philosophy are insufficient, and that the criticism that Singer’s postulations “put
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unrealistically high expectations on the individual subject of responsibility”
(Beck 2016, p. 29) also does not address the real deficit of the argumentation.
A conceptual theory should therefore not simply presuppose globalization,
but must analyze it as a product of historical and specific conditions. In this
sense, it does not need an external point of view fromwhich globalization is con-
sidered destructive and dangerous, in order to oppose globalization with moral
principles. Instead, in the above-mentioned mental reproduction of the system-
atic context, in which the materialization of social relations emerges with all of
its consequences and which is perceived as globalization, the critique is pre-
served in the representation of the systematic context, which is at the same
time the critique of the matter itself (cf. MEW 29, p. 550). The critique has
been preserved by identifying the destructive forces and shortcomings as a ne-
cessity of the object itself. The principles for social change therefore do not
need to be derived from universalistic or moral principles, but result from the
matter itself.
Systematic development of concepts
in relation to historical development
In globalization, the contradictions and crises of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion are intensifying on a global scale. Globalization is the materialized form in
which the contemporary global contradictions of capitalist society are moving,
such as the conflict between capital and labor. However, not only the destructive
forces are shown in it, but also the tendencies which transcend the current form
of society and the organization of the metabolism between human and nature.
As mentioned, it is problematic that globalization in the philosophical de-
bate is taken as an occasion to point out that a global horizon of reflection is in-
creasingly opening up. Moral and ethical obligations are then attached to these,
and forms of political participation and supranational organizations are imag-
ined. Ultimately, it is from this external reference to the factual that the attempt
of practical philosophy results to actively influence and shape globalization.
However, since philosophy does not have a concept of social formation (cf. Le-
fèbvre 1969, pp. 74–75), philosophers remain bound to these antagonisms in
their attempts to take sides for certain tendencies. In the end, only the distribu-
tion sphere appears to be changeable and addressable for historical progress or
the overcoming of poverty and suffering, because of the lack of understanding of
what wealth in capitalist society means. Philosophical considerations in this way
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remain limited to a simple modification of the distribution of goods by state or
ethical-moral coercion.
But, based on a theory of capital, an alternative space of global experience
appears that transcends the present social conditions. If the utopian elements
are limited to human rights, supranational organizations or the hopes of a uni-
versalist ethics, then an important area of social reality fades out of focus: pro-
duction. Not only in philosophical reflection, but also and especially in the co-
operative work flow, it is possible to generate political and social consciousness.
In cooperation, according to Marx, in “planned interaction with others, the indi-
vidual overcomes [or better could overcome] his individual limitations and devel-
ops his general capabilities” (MEW 23, p. 349). In the division of labor and coop-
eration, a global horizon of reflection and action is thus also emerging, which
Marx refers to within the concept of the ‘collective worker’. Within capitalism,
however, individuals as laborers develop this competence only externally in re-
lation to and through capital as a ‘collective laborer’. But at the same time, it also
reveals the utopian possibility of a conscious socialization of the social nexus
and the division of labor.
The antagonistic character of cooperation, in its two spheres of intra-compa-
ny and societal division of labor, consists in the fact that, on the one hand, the
capitalist mode of production “does not appear to the individuals as their own,
united power, but as a foreign, external force” (MEW 3, p. 34). They only form the
‘building block’ of a combination of labor set by capital. On the other hand, the
“forms of transition from capitalist mode of production to a socialized and asso-
ciated mode of production” (MEW 25, p. 456) become apparent in the form of
stock corporations and cooperatives.
Even if the cooperative system alone is not capable of reshaping the global-
ized capitalist society, a new perspective of social transformation is emerging in
this context: “the organizing idea of a network of direct producers that antici-
pates the collective worker as the truly organizing subject of history” (Negt /
Kluge 1974, p. 21). A precondition for such a project, which could shape global-
ized human relations, is the understanding of the social nexus. This approach
avoids the idea of a society that negates the existing destructive forces as
being only voluntarily opposed to the current one. Therefore, the phenomena,
which are collected under the concept of globalization in the philosophical de-
bate, should be conceptualized by their real nexus. For this approach, it is essen-
tial to develop a social philosophy that is able to analyze the appearing imme-
diacy of social objects as mediated by revealing the vanished social
relationships in these materialized forms of a social nexus. From a methodolog-
ical point of view, this could be achieved by the previously developed concepts
of reification [Versachlichung] and thingification [Verdinglichung], which are ca-
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pable of illuminating the hidden mediation processes by analyzing the social
form-determination merged with the object itself. As it is prototypically formulat-
ed in the critiques of the separation of mental and manual labor by Oskar Negt
and Alexander Kluge (Negt / Kluge 1974), as well as Nicos Poulantzas (Poulant-
zas 2002), the precondition of this approach is the reappropriation of the social
organization capabilities separated from the individuals by the capitalist mode
of production into the state and politics, as well as the competence of coherent
conceptual thinking, which has been monopolized by intellectuals.
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Constanze Demuth
Liberalism’s All-inclusive Promise of
Freedom and its Illiberal Effects:
A Critique of the Concept of Globalization
Abstract: The narrative of globalization is twofold: it refers to the hope for the
export of democratic state forms and values from the Western world to the states
of the so-called global south; it also refers to the aim of worldwide economic
growth and extension of capitalist ways of production and consumption. But
paradigmatic cases of action of democratic liberal states in international politics
throw a twilight on this double hope. In certain cases, aggressive interventions of
Western democratic states are legitimized using precisely the norms of non-inter-
vention that claim universal validity, but turn out to follow an agenda of partic-
ular interests of economy and power. This article argues that these universal
norms are not contingently transgressed, but in light of the second paradigm
of globalization—of the economic spread of market relations—the process of
self-constitution of democratic states here takes not a self-limiting, but an ag-
gressive and exclusive turn. In addition, the so-called ‘new wars’ and ‘failed
states’ (apparently opposing phenomena to the international agency of demo-
cratic and liberal Western states) show surprising parallels to late modern dem-
ocratic liberal society. The ‘management of fear’ typical of these political situa-
tions aims at a regularization, through internalized habits and attitudes, of the
population—including their agreement to the terror regime. In light of these con-
siderations, the relationship between the aims of global growth and global de-
mocratization seems highly ambiguous.
It is considered to be a distinguishing mark of modern and democratic societies
that they limit the use of violence by the state as a means to enforce its authority.
Deliberative processes, practices and institutions limit and control as self-gov-
ernment the exercise of the monopoly of power of the state. Thus, democratic
government is a continuing self-constitution. Violence/power is used only as
counter-violence outwards to defend against outer threats—a use that is in
turn controlled by the governmental measuring of its proportionality.
The narrative of globalization claims, on the one hand, the substitution of
this dichotomy of outside and inside with an extension of the intrastate nonvio-
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lent structures, resulting in an increasingly peaceful cooperation of democratic
states. On the other hand, it also refers to the spread of capitalist forms of pro-
duction to a ‘world market’ and the connected economic regulation of social
order beyond the borders of nation states. This view is not without a teleology
—in fact, it postulates a progress of the political structures of the world including
the global south, directed towards peaceful and evermore rational forms of or-
ganization of capitalist democracies.
Nevertheless, there are political phenomena which invite us to question this
apparently evident narrative, especially in the periphery of the core states of
democratic liberalism. They prove wrong the assumption that prosperity and de-
mocracy for all are the beckoning aim of the global integration of economies; as
if the realization of this aim posed only minor applicatory problems,which could
be easily overcome. For these cases show the acceptance and relevance of na-
tional borders diminishing without the expected result of peaceful cosmopoli-
tism. Instead, relations of power spread, are restructured and newly established;
the disadvantage of the global south deepened and not remedied.
A sketch of a critique of theories
of democratic peace
In order to investigate this thesis further, let’s start with a critical look at the
basic assumptions of the so-called ‘theory of democratic peace’ (Geis / Müller /
Schörnig 2010). According to this theory, the liberal states have incorporated
higher normative demands—specifically norms claiming universal validity—
than undemocratic states. They internationally codified these norms, for in-
stance in International Humanitarian Law. The theory of democratic peace dou-
bles this observation with a hypothesis: that democratic states, with their ambi-
tious ideals of human rights and universal values, fight fewer wars than
undemocratic ones.
Different authors, such as Yves Winter, Anna Geis, Oliver Eberl and others,
have shown that this correlation doesn’t hold up to the test. In fact, democratic
states fight fewer wars with other democratic states, but more wars with un-
democratic ones, and in total about the same amount. In addition and maybe
even more significantly, the standards of conduct of war of the former (for in-
stance, with regard to the protection of civilians or of prisoners of war) are not
higher; that is, the legal, respectively moral commitment to universal norms nei-
ther improves the quality nor the quantity of military conduct of democratic
states.
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How can we account for the failure of this hypothesis? Without a doubt,
principles that claim universal validity are the mirror of everyday life of the West-
ern world, which incorporates the respect of the other as other into its practices.
It is increasingly transformed into the political structures and institutions of lib-
eral and democratic states. The codified and institutionalized ideal of the partic-
ipation and respect of everybody, including the marginalized and minoritized,
requires the ongoing democratic process of self-constitution of the community
as community. This process takes place in practices of the deliberation and par-
ticipation of potentially everybody. This normative commitment to processual all-
inclusion has, by definition, global applicability. Internationally, this claim finds
its codification in the principle of non-intervention of International Humanitar-
ian Law.
But the normative level is not only (as theories of democratic peace claim)
guiding for an increasing degree and extension of global democratization and
peaceful cooperation. It is precisely the incorporation of universal claims that
creates a new function of legitimatizing aggression against non-democratic
states. Liberalism has an aggressive aspect that annuls precisely these stand-
ards, even while invoking them. Oliver Eberl even spots a ‘new liberal antiplur-
alism’ (Eberl 2016, p. 364, my transl.). He considers it as a successor of Christian-
ization and colonization.
Internationally, the democratic practice of self-constitution is mediated by
the construction of an image of the undemocratic other, irrational and danger-
ous. This construction works by the utilization and, at the same time, transgres-
sion of norms with universal claims (such as the abovementioned International
Humanitarian Law of non-intervention). These are reformulated and transformed
into an instrument of rule and power. The reconstitution and self-affirmation of
the Western states as democratic here takes place precisely through this exclu-
sion. The history of the term ‘rogue state’, coined by George W. Bush, exemplifies
how the pretext of protective motives according to international laws can be
turned into a function of the enforcement of power interests.
Indeed, the acceptance and relevance of national borders is decreasing
under the democratic pretext of the increase of processual self-government.
But this democratic stance is coupled with the conception of a peaceful, global
economic cooperation launched by the democratic states of the Western world.
This second aspect transforms the very meaning of the processual reconstitution
of liberal states. The result is a paradigm of cooperation in the terms of market
rationality that raises doubts about the presumed effect of democratization and
extension of nonviolent relations of globalization. Globalization, here, turns out
not to lead to increasingly homogenous cosmopolitanism via all-inclusive polit-
ical practices. For the universal norms that correspond to the democratic princi-
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ple are utilized as a legitimization of exclusion, oppression and violence motivat-
ed by vested interests that they help to veil.
The incorporation of these universal principles into the political structures
and institutions of liberal and democratic states brings about its own tendency
to repress and oppress, which has to be reflected and criticized. In late capital-
ism, the economistic interpretation of the democratic ideals of equality and par-
ticipation of all is a very influential one. Thus, the fight for power on the one
hand and the fight for legitimization on the other become blurred. The claim
to all-inclusion implies here the utilization of the contribution of all and its
own radicalized exclusion.Whatever is detracted from this utilization is exclud-
ed; it is first imagined as wholly other, and is then imagined on all conceptual
levels to be excluded from humanity and rationality as such. This creates the im-
possibility of the conception of individual and collective ‘agents’ to whom the
rules of armed conflict and the right to autonomous self-government do not
apply.
‘New Wars’ and ‘Failed States’—cases of
dysfunctional state capacity or extreme examples
of neoliberal forms of regulation?
I now want to take a look at the so-called ‘New Wars’ and their relation to glob-
alization. New Wars are usually considered as a peripheral phenomenon of the
globalized world—a form of war activity turned completely irregular. Theories of
international politics tend to depict these phenomena as dysfunctional excep-
tions in contrast to the democratic state capacity with ambitious norms. But
this account overlooks or even veils the exemplary character of New Wars within
the organization of an increasingly globalized late modern world. They don’t es-
tablish chaotic violence as opposed to the political organization within the clear
borders of nation states. Rather, again, the fight for power on the one hand, and
the fight for legitimization on the other become blurred—and this entanglement
proves to be a specifically late modern condition in a globalized world.
Authors such as Mary Kaldor or Herfried Münkler draw a clear line between
the New Wars and interstate wars. Presumably, these new forms of conflict occur
from the beginning under the radar of International Humanitarian Law of armed
conflicts, since they do not limit themselves to classic military action. These new
forms, according to the authors, are constituted by an “indirect war conduct,
where the use of traditional military means and the use of political strategies
merge. In addition, excessive and broadly spread violence occurs whose agents
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are mainly private entrepreneurs of war with economic interests.” (Münkler
2002, p. 7, my transl.) According to the authors, the reason for this restructuring
of armed conflict is an internal lack of function of state capacity concerning law
and state apparatus. This lack of function is in contrast to the functioning of reg-
ular state force in Western states. The latter are affected by this development only
derivatively: they suffer from an export of globalization by the destabilized re-
gions in the opposite direction, which transports chaos and amorality in the
form of terrorism.
But this opposition is not as convincing as it seems at first glance. Key to the
critique is the following observation: the combination of forms of violence with
political strategies of conviction is a form of war not only against the population,
but also to win the population. In this respect, it is the equivalent of neoliberal
rule. Thus, the conventional military conflict steps back and is replaced in the
New Wars by a ‘management of fear’ exercised on the natives, which continually
and excessively terrorizes them, economically exploits them and psychologically
forms them into allies. This form of terror is neither acceptable under the rules of
war conduct of international law, nor does it follow rules of economical and ap-
propriate use of violence. It is nevertheless highly effective. Yves Winter com-
ments on this entanglement of a militarization of politics and a politicization
of war under the economic paradigm:
The battle of decision is replaced by the massacre and by a systematic sexual violence
which are used as instruments of fear management. […] The disestablishment of war under-
mines the limits of international law and initiates an era of commercialization of violence
with private entrepreneurs of war, warlords and international mercenary companies. War
becomes a form of life. (Winter 2008, p. 54)
This ‘form of life’ is marked not by the fading of state control, but by the blurring
of state control and state dysfunction—of deregulated forms of economy and
‘regulated’ enforcement of the interests of global companies. It is far from inef-
fective and follows its own rationality.
This specific structure is also typical for so-called ‘failed states’ like Mexico.
From the perspective of Western democracies (which international political theo-
ry usually assumes), the nationwide influence of drug cartels appears as the
powerlessness of the state. The cartels preclude resistance against their criminal
activities by means of organized murder, blackmail and rape. But this apparently
apolitical violence spreads even further: independent journalists, trade unionists
and representatives of indigenous people who act as opponents of capitalist
forms of privatization, land robbery and exploitation become victims of atroci-
ties as well. This terror is used to enforce the interests of politically and econom-
ically influential groups, without the intervention of the control of the state ex-
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ecutive. Paramilitary groups act as private armies of great landowners (Zelik
2009, p. 205–206). Activities of cartels are supported, protected and veiled by
police actions and politically motivated assaults. The different groups of agents
become more and more indistinguishable.
Eventually, in this situation in Mexico, the population have formed armed
militias. Initially, they try to replace the lost monopoly of power of the state
and resist the attacks of drug cartels organized paramilitarily. But their proce-
dures of self-justice themselves become quickly delimited, irregular and econom-
ically corrupted, assimilating to the forms of actions of the original agents of ex-
cessive violence. (The documentary Cartel Land by Matthew Heinemann follows
this development.)
That is, in New Wars and ‘failed states’, the population becomes both victim
and agent of violence; it is formed by and takes over the maintenance of the
structures of transgression. This is not accurately conceived of as an opposition
between destabilized state government on the one hand and boundless organ-
ized crime and private agents of violence on the other hand (the latter making
use of the gap of order). Rather, the entanglement of economic interests, govern-
ment interests and entrepreneurship of violence achieves thorough stability in a
regime of violence and forms the population into its participants and supporters.
Authors such as Münkler depict this situation as contingent and theatricalize
it. A case in point is the figure of the southern warlord,who appears in Münkler’s
account as the emblematic Other of state-ruled order. Diefenbach critically takes
this depiction to an extreme: “There he is: de-limited, de-disciplined, corrupted
by money and pop culture […]—a monstrous irregular killing machine.” (Diefen-
bach 2003, p. 186, my transl.) This theatricalized image veils the fact that this
state of affairs is not a contingent failure of state rule, but a necessarily occurring
symptom. It is the symptom of the entanglement of universal claims of freedom
and equality on the one hand and of the paradigm of market rationality on the
other. The consequence of this entanglement is a particular structure of the de-
velopment and implementation of habits and ways of action—turning the civil
population into a resource that continually needs to be worked on by shaping
and transgressing their form of life. It needs to be permanently formed and
coaxed into practical compliance, and to achieve this aim terror (or ‘fear man-
agement’) is not an irrational monstrosity, but precisely rational.
Classic theories such as Münkler’s assume that ‘failed states’ and the New
Wars are phenomena of state collapse that are not only geographically but
also conceptually peripheral. According to them, the source of these develop-
ments is that state institutions lose their monopoly of violence including the
power to protect their citizens. In fact, this loss of power is radically ambivalent:
the monopoly of violence of private war entrepreneurs weakens the state out-
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wards. At the same time, these proxies push state interests. It is a kind of irreg-
ular regulation by violence, in which the state suffers from and profits from its
own weakness (Zelik 2009). For governments thus don’t have to face the prob-
lems of legitimation, neither with regard to the violent means the proxies use
nor with regard to the aims thus furthered. In Mexico, this is the case, for in-
stance with regard to the capitalist opening of markets and the privatization of
common goods connected to land robbery, which thus become available to glob-
al capital investors after native peasants are violently dispossessed.
By now, this structure of excessive violence appears not as an opposite to the
functioning state capacity; rather, it appears as exemplary of the principles of
neoliberal organization, insofar as it is a government aiming at self-government.
The population subjected to these conditions also acts as their agents. It is an
extensive, all-present, inner political police-regulation, which integrates meth-
ods of convincing and questions of legitimacy into processes of incorporating
compliant forms of practice. The excessive violence is an effective means for
this subject formation. Therefore, it assumes both liberating and dispossessing
traits. Military power mingles with traits of police violence, managing of health
care and the control of secret services. Their joint activities record all details of
life, regulate and form them. As a training of the population it is at the same time
an economical government, since it assigns the work of disciplining to the sub-
jects themselves. These aspects seem contradictory, but they turn into the condi-
tion of each other.
Authors such as Zelik (see also Winter 2008; Comaroff / Comaroff 2012)
claim a special relevance for these phenomena of delimited violence in our in-
creasingly global, liberal world. They assume that the developments in the so-
called periphery of the core states of democratic liberalism point to a constitutive
aspect of globalization and its entanglement of democratic politic organization,
open markets and deregulation.
This development is often accounted for in very positive terms. Its down side
becomes apparent in the New Wars and so-called ‘failed states’. That is, to depict
the supposedly enlightened core countries of liberalism as ‘stable’ and commit-
ted to universal rights for humans and people is already one-sided. This result
yields the following suspicion: the rule with instability and contingency is pre-
cisely typical for the neoliberal shaping of societies and its claim on the individ-
ual. It forms the individual to conceive of her- or himself as ‘entrepreneur of him-
self ’ (Bröckling 2007, my transl.) and to act accordingly.
Thus, the central question turns out to be how exactly the phenomena de-
scribed so far connect to the globalization development of the world and the
West in particular—to those developments we are used to seeing as gains of free-
dom and political liberalization.
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Governing with security according to Foucault
as a type of judgment
The narrative of globalization assumes a historical development from the nation
state (which increasingly limits and controls state violence, but executes it out-
wards) towards global, democratic cooperation. The consequences of globaliza-
tion are, according to the narrative, global relations of peaceful and egalitarian
cooperation in economy and politics. The corresponding loss of relevance of
local forms of government and of nation states to transregional democratic po-
litical structures appears as unquestionable gain of freedom and progress.
Without a doubt, it is accurate to see this development as a story of eman-
cipation from historically specific forms of ruling and tradition. But to uncritical-
ly read it within the mentioned frame of a narrative of globalization is to fall vic-
tim to an ideology. On the one hand, this history of emancipation is by no means
the history of a progress without setbacks in terms of peaceful and free cooper-
ation. It is in fact a history of emancipation of people and minorities who in-
creasingly could (and had to) fight for their own voice and political representa-
tion. On the other hand, there is the implied equation of an ongoing spreading of
democratic state forms with a spreading of economically liberal state forms. In
fact, the increasing overlap of these two levels (the political and the economic)
not only results in post-democratic signs of fatigue like new nationalisms, which
can be witnessed in all Europe—it also leads to a form of illiberal rule of its own
which finds its current extreme but paradigmatic manifestation in the New Wars
and ‘failed states’.
The work of Michel Foucault describes the development of rule, law and
norms becoming more and more immanent within the society of late modernity.
He is highly critical in his evaluation of this development against the framework
of the increasing entanglement of politics and economy. Many phenomena of the
by now globalized world disclose themselves particularly clearly in light of Fou-
cault’s critical observations of the ever more self-limiting and self-delimiting lib-
eral society of late modernity. Correspondingly, a lot of authors by now adopt
this frame of interpretation (such as the aforementioned Opitz, Winter, Eberl
and others). I will now briefly explore the ways in which Foucault’s theory of
governmentality seems to be a useful tool to analyze developments of globaliza-
tion.
Neoliberal governing is not without ambivalence, as neoliberalism’s account
of itself suggests. Indeed, its landmark theme is the restriction of state interven-
tion. But it has a dubitable successor: the organization and operationalization by
the judgment and calculation of reality. This approach is far from the apparently
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objective and neutral accounting, but is constitutively the continual transgres-
sion of rules and rights set so far. That is the case, since it always sets its own
standards with its actions.
According to Foucault, characteristic of this structure of overcoming rules
and structures is the paradigm of security; the model of it is police action. The
‘police government’ of social processes creates one state of exception after the
other. It is “the permanent state of exception, which proceeds in the name
and in dependence of the principles of its own rationality without being
based upon the rules of law.” (Foucault 2004, GG I, p. 488, my transl.) This char-
acterization shows an uncanny resemblance to the terror management carved
out as typical for the New Wars and ‘failed states’ before it.
A faculty of judgment that is shaped by police action and bureaucracy ap-
pears in correspondence to a government of in-security. It rules via sub-legal
techniques and thus enacts and provisions every detail of social life. It counts
with insecurity insofar as it works with a non-codified situational knowledge,
which is formed out of and applied to precisely these details of everyday life
and its subjects. It is thus always working on its own limit; that is, it is always
integrating it.
With respect to the political subjects, this structure is democratic, because it
takes into account everybody and turns everybody into an agent of this accumu-
lation of knowledge. But at the same time, this concept of equality shapes it as
an economic equality of market agents. This paradigm of the organization of so-
ciety is characterized by an interplay between discourses and practices. Knowl-
edge production identifies dangers and develops forms to react to them in ways
of conduct. These ways of conduct form the material of an ongoing investigation
by these discourses and of a continuous regulation. Society’s agents now have to
turn all their ways of being and their prospects into valuable goods for the refine-
ment of regulation. The regulation of conduct aims at a normalization of the to-
tality of our ways of being. In fact, this aim appears to be just technical, but it is
thus veiled, naturalized and its normative, political dimension is concealed
(Meyer 2009, p. 29).
For within this paradigm, the ‘freedom of all’ takes on a peculiar meaning. It
is the freedom of all subjects who realize their own possibilities to full capacity
as subjects of their own self-management and self-interpretations of the market
of life scripts and symbolic value. This corresponds to a radical disenfranchise-
ment of the subject who doesn’t conform to this market organization. On the one
hand, the very emphasis on everyday forms of life and the formulation of com-
mon understandings of selves has an aspect of (democratic) generalizations and
democratic equality. But on the other hand, this formulation and formation here
takes on the shape of a practice of dominion.
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Though the calculating with constructions of danger seems, according to lib-
eral ideology, maximally self-limiting, it is illiberal at the core. It is self-limiting
and self-delimiting, since it proceeds by forming its own legitimation and object.
Its calculation registers ‘reality’ first of all, as a potential and as a virtuality—and
at the same moment, it reduces and calculates it. The procedures measure every-
body and the future possibilities emanating from their conduct as surplus value,
and enforces them to realize this future potential. It is thus a calculation of profit
and a calculation of risk that binds as if it had factual and normative power.
According to Ulrich Beck’s theory of risks, social risks de facto have in-
creased exponentially. Supposedly, these risks are barely to be anticipated and
accounted for (Beck 2007). In contrast, François Ewald considers the contempo-
rary attempts to determine and keep in check a potential danger as a play with
the imaginary. It doesn’t aim at a control of the given, but at a certain way of con-
stituting the other and, therewith, one’s own (Ewald 1993). This achievement
construes the world by reacting to it with adapting institutional forms; that is,
it is inherently self-exceeding. This order-transgressing ordering is a ‘political
strategy’ in the broader sense, precisely since the entanglement of constitution
and depiction in this world figuring activity is concealed by a positivist self-
image of natural science.
A case in point is the means of automatic face detection. It speaks of this
entanglement of universal norms turned into institutions on the one hand
and, on the other, of a regulation of the life world according to statistical calcu-
lus. At the core of it lies an emphasis on the permanent adaption of practice
rules guided by their limit: the potential and upcoming. It obliges anticipation
and prevention; that is, to register not particular subjects according to fixed at-
tributes, but all subjects according to their unrealized potential. This considera-
tion supplies the means to then classify all and everyone according to their uti-
lizability. In case of doubt (i.e., in the border case of non-calculability or non-
utilizability necessary to this method), it figures them and treats them as mon-
strous threats. According to Sven Opitz, this means is an ‘imaginary technology’
that grasps the Other and constitutes it as an ‘amorphous, fetishized Other’
(Opitz 2008, p. 223–224, my transl.).
Within this apparently liberal frame, the self-development of the individual
is considered at the same time as his or her participation in the social totality.
That is, just by ‘going on’, a person develops the possibilities and ways of life
of the whole, and the knowledge of it. It thereby affirms and stabilizes this total-
ity. This convergence turns the contingencies of the particular situation and its
outcome into the material of the regulating operation that constitutes the
order as such.What is yet unaccounted for is its limit and condition of possibil-
ity. It is this limit which here needs to be always constructed and thus integrated;
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as far as it stays unattained, it is to be controlled and violently mastered as a
monstrous threat. This technique of government as a matter of principle even al-
lows the exclusion of individuals from the protection of human rights—as the
case of the human rights violations in Guantanamo showed (see Butler 2004,
on the emblematic relevance of this political ‘state of exception’). These exclu-
sions, using the techniques of torture, rape and murder, signify a transgression
of universal norms by democratic government executives of state power—norms
that are by definition non-tradable and non-negotiable. But, as Butler has
shown, this is within this paradigm a ‘constitutive’ transgression (Butler 2004,
p. 50–51).
In question is precisely an appeal to the highest, universal norms, which at
present have to become practical in institutional forms. This requires their inter-
pretation and transgression over and over again. The semblance of presumably
endangered rights of protection and freedom that necessarily accompanies this
process is then used to legitimize precisely their most blatant violation: the para-
digm of social interaction of peaceful, market-shaped cooperation makes a pro-
ductive handling of dissent and conflict impossible—for it is accompanied by a
Hobbesian, omnipresent assumption of the danger of the lapse of these interac-
tions into a fight of all against all. This assumption is quite literally formulated in
the metaphor of war prominent in public discourse in the US in regard to all as-
pects of social life (Winter 2008, p. 70).
This rhetoric of danger lowers the acceptable standards for a breach of law
in all areas. It legitimizes the decentering and delimiting of practices and consid-
erations of security in favor of an increasing integration into the chain of con-
sumption of goods. Potentially risky subjects are identified and their behavior
anticipated, and a-human identities are thus not only registered, but presup-
posed and first of all constructed. It is a calculation of the cost of freedom,
which constitutes the Other as un-economic and irrational (Opitz 2008,
p. 223–224).
In this frame of thought, the protection of the population necessitates not
first of all military measures directed outwards, but police regulation and prac-
tices of knowledge directed inwards. Security is considered a scarce good.
Against appearances, further demand for this good, which is offered by different,
increasingly private providers, is precisely and ceaselessly created. For it is not a
lack of functioning, but a necessary aspect of this paradigm that a subjective
feeling of insecurity needs to be increased further and further, and thus the prod-
uct ‘security’ is more and more in demand. In fact, the limit of the current shape
of society is its working task, always aiming at a potentially global scope.
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Singularity as a commodity and the possibility
of emancipation
It is precisely the overlap of juridical, moral, economic and epistemic aspects
within the ongoing self-construction of the social whole that creates a violence
at the core of the liberal society itself. For it is potentially global only as a struc-
ture further and further integrating and exploiting its own limits. Evidently, this
fact concerns the organization of economy itself, but more radically, it concerns
all forms of individual activity as self-realization, including the activity of dem-
ocratic, political deliberation.Within these forms of democratic participation, ev-
erybody is supposed to be able to contribute to the shaping of the democratic
society. But at the same time, in the course of neoliberal progress, these forms
themselves are economized and thus exclude precisely the individual as such,
as irreducible and unaccountable, which they are supposed to express. It is
this unaccountability of the individual itself that is now turned into a source
of profit.
The ideal of a spirited democracy is the idea of a community that develops
norms and forms of life in its course, by the activity and participation of all of its
free subjects, and realizes them consensually. This idea is conceived here under
the paradigm of freedom shaped as self-interested self-government according to
a calculation of costs. Thus, each and every subject, in all their speeches and ac-
tions, works to continually transform and shape precisely their own unaccount-
ability as individuals into a productive, functioning social unity.
Late modern civic life is characterized by gains of freedom that have to be
analyzed and acknowledged as such. But neoliberal logic not only requires
the minimization of state intervention in social processes and structures—it
also models these processes and structures thoroughly after the model of the
market. Even political deliberation and civic engagement are pictured as calcu-
lations of contingencies that are considered as potentials of profit. This calculus
is illiberal at the core, not just contingently at the periphery (Opitz 2008, p. 223).
For it declares difference, conflict and social fights to be at the outer zone of
democratic society in need of control. Thus, Balibar points to the “irreducibility
of the phenomenon of extreme violence as a structural determinant of capitalism”
(Balibar 2001, col. 1287, my transl., highlighting orig.).
Late modernity values the individual ‘as him- or herself ’, not due to rights
which are owed to class membership, tradition and privileges. This is the result
of a far-reaching implementation of universal claims of freedom and of a dem-
ocratic sphere of civic interaction and discourse. However, it is precisely this in-
dividual freedom to shape one’s own life that is defined, utilized and ruled in
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this form of regime. Neoliberalism designs a model of humanity which pictures
the individual as rational and singular only insofar as he or she contributes to
and affirms the social whole by adding one more utilizable possibility to it.
He or she has to follow the logic of the market in the realization of his or her
individual and societal possibilities. Otherwise he or she is pictured as a violent,
irrational monstrosity.
Paradoxically, it is precisely the individuality of identities and life scripts
that turns into a material of integration, affirmation and processes of stabiliza-
tion. Any activity—even giving and taking arguments, contesting and resisting
—is seen as a practical design of meaning. Figured in this way, whatever an in-
dividual undertakes is always productive and ‘value creating’ insofar as it is read
within and creates new patterns and forms of life to be read and understood. To
realize oneself is at the same time a process of creating rules and designs of
one’s own and of shaping new general forms of human identity and conduct.
This dimension of any activity—at once individualizing and generalizing—now
constitutes a necessary effect that works as the affirmation of the structures of
society and as its own integration. On the other hand, these effects pose a per-
manent threat to a society conceived as such.
The legitimation of the hegemony of neoliberalism consists in the promise of
freedom to participate offered to everyone under the conditions of a world soci-
ety. It has been argued that this promise has not been fulfilled, at least for the
population of the global South, which has been subjected to massive violence
and impoverishment. But the problem of the economization of all areas and
democratic procedures in neoliberalism is not restricted to the periphery. Neolib-
eralism is constitutively illiberal, for what is at stake here is always the represen-
tation and depiction of the individual and groups in an ongoing construction of
both identities and a consensus of social forces. But at the end of the day, this is
not modeled as peaceful and liberal, but as forcefully integrating.
What is at stake here is a concept of unrestricted judgment and freedom of
radical democratization, which is distorted into the normalization of precisely
this faculty of judgment by itself. Judith Butler points to this problem as the
late modern ‘ghostly’ creation of rules always to be adapted by a ‘managerial
power’. What is at stake are “rules that are not binding by virtue of established
law or modes of legitimation, but fully discretionary, even arbitrary, wielded by
officials who interpret them unilaterally and decide the condition and form of
their invocation.” (Butler 2004, p.62)
Through this lens, the situation of the late modern subject appears as radi-
cally disenfranchised precisely in communal processes of deliberation. Its only
perspective on itself as capable of free judgment beyond the demand for con-
formity seems to be completely irrational and excessively violent. But it is pre-
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cisely this supposedly amorphous subject that points to the manifold of human
life scripts as irreducible to calculation. Balibar calls it the ‘non human’ and ‘all
too human’: “but taken together (and they certainly do not form a tout, an ‘all’ or
a ‘whole’), all these singularities are the majority, the quasi-totality of mankind.”
(Balibar 2012, p. 226)
This critique opens up a new meaning of globalization and, at the same
time, of the concept of a ‘human right’. A ‘Human right’ now appears as the
right to a receptive acknowledgment of difference. The idea of cosmopolitan in-
teraction gives up the paradigm of cooperation in favor of a conception of the
other as withdrawn, never grasped and determined. In fact, it shows the need
for the interruption of the activity of a continuing world interpretation and prac-
tice. This interruption reveals another figure of practice as requiring the bearing
of dissent and of confrontations.
Instead of deliberating and calculating as a basis of human practice and in-
teraction, this conception of ‘self-determination against oneself ’ implies a cri-
tique as the renouncement and interruption of one’s habitual ways of acting
and judging. Foucault coins the concept of “the art of not being governed or, bet-
ter, the art of not being governed like that and at that cost” (Foucault 1997, p. 29).
This account allows a development of a concept of globalization and a practice
of it in which freedom figures as contra-dominion—not as a cooperation of po-
tentially all under the same calculus, but as an endurance of incomprehension
and even of aversion against the other.
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Defense of ‘Soft’ Universalism
or ‘Clash of Civilizations’
Abstract: Even the politically more tolerant parts of the world are in no way im-
mune to cultural and national delimitation. The world seems to identify with
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. International organizations like the United
Nations try to push back. One attempt is the UNESCO program ‘Philosophy, a
School of Freedom’, the declared aim of which is to provide a prophylaxis
against radicalization and dogmatism. This article points out three specific ac-
complishments of philosophical education and their significance for the impend-
ing ‘clash of civilizations’: (i) philosophical education as differentiation and cri-
tique; (ii) philosophical education as a defense for universalism; and (iii)
philosophical education as transcendental tolerance education.
The Struggle of Cultures and the role played
by philosophical education
Both the awareness and the configuration of the political international situation
have undergone a dramatic paradigm shift. As to how greatly the asserted or ac-
tual ‘struggle of the cultures’ dominates minds in general and politics in partic-
ular can be shown by citing an optimistic ‘spirit of the times’ of a previous
era. 26 years ago, Fukuyama’s assertion of the ‘End of History’ elicited enthusi-
astic acknowledgement from broad circles of people: scientists, the public at
large and politicians (Fukuyama 1992). There were, after all, sufficient grounds
for optimism: the ‘bloodless’ revolution of 1989 led to the fall of the Berlin
Wall and put an end to the division of the European continent. The so-called
‘Cold War’ was at an end and the successor nation states of the U.S.S.R. were as-
piring to democracy. Parliamentarianism in the countries of the newly founded
Commonwealth of Independent States proved to be sufficiently resistant. Long
despaired-of disarmament agreements were ratified. The Republic of South Afri-
ca overcame ‘Apartheid’ and the world celebrated presidents such as Nelson
Mandela or Vaclav Havel. The conflict in Northern Ireland was pacified and Isra-
elis and Palestinians extended each other the hand.
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However, this stage was concluded by September 11th 2001, at the latest. This
was the greatest symbolic scenario of an open attack on Western life and culture,
and demanded new explanation and categorization. A suitable exponent was al-
ready available: Huntington’s lecture, article, paper and book, all linked by titles
containing Clash of Civilizations. A paradigm shift was again introduced. The
‘Struggle of the Cultures’ became the predominant interpretative sample for na-
tional and international conflicts. Dramatic, politically adverse decisions and
wars against international law became an expression of as well as a catalyst
for such developments.
The United Nations, which has become an organization of coagulated ideas
of global international understanding, has very little to offer as counteraction to
such disturbing developments. One initiative is the UNESCO program ‘Philoso-
phy, a School of Freedom’. Philosophical education, the declared aim of the
global project, is to act as a prophylaxis against any form of radicalization
and dogmatism. The idea is to promote a ‘world citizen’ of majority age, who
does not perceive plurality as a threat, but proceeds to participate in collective
opinion-forming by means of critical judgment. Federico Mayor Zaragoza
couched this idea in the following terms:
Philosophy and Democracy urge each of us to exercise our capacity for judgement, to
choose for ourselves the best form of political and social organisation, to find our own val-
ues, in short, to become fully what each of us is, a free being. Among so many dangers, we
have no other hope. (Mayor 1995, p. 12)
But what can philosophical education achieve amidst the increasing ‘clash of
civilizations’? I will highlight in this article three specific accomplishments of
philosophical education and their significance for the impending ‘clash of civi-
lizations’: (i) philosophical education as differentiation and critique; (ii) philo-
sophical education as a defense for universalism; and (iii) philosophical educa-
tion as transcendental tolerance education.
A differentiated image of the
‘clash of civilizations’
When Samuel P. Huntington published his article “The Clash of Civilizations?” in
1993 in the journal Foreign Affairs, the publishers claimed that he triggered more
debates in the first three years thereafter than any other contribution published
since the 1940s (cf. Huntington 1996, p. 11). Huntington’s principal claim main-
tains that coherence, disintegration and conflict in a world after the end of the
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Cold War is no longer emphasized through ideologies and/or individual nation
states, but by borders and the interplay of so-called ‘cultural spheres’, which
can be defined by the eight great cultures of the globe (cf. Huntington 1996,
p. 19).
The ‘One-World Theory’, as expounded at the end of the Cold War, and the
triumph of liberal democracy by leading politicians and intellectuals, are consid-
ered by Huntington to be naïve and unrealistic. Furthermore, he believes that the
universal hegemony claim of the West will lead not towards harmony but to con-
flict with other cultural spheres. Increasing integrational pressure in the global
world, he maintains, will increase withdrawal into the own cultural identity of
nation states and their individuals, and although the nation states will remain
the more important actors, their negotiations will be more and more influenced
by cultural awareness. “The world will decline into a Western civilization and
many Non-Western civilizations” (Huntington 1996, p. 95).
Fukuyama’s assertion of the ‘End of History’ is considered by Huntington to
be a great error. In no way, he maintains, will Western culture automatically be-
come a future universal world culture. Western consumer goods are well known
and appreciated throughout the world through economic networking and com-
munication, but the ‘central characteristics of the West’ are neither industrializa-
tion nor lifestyle products. Huntington moreover points to the separation of spi-
ritual and political power, the rule of law, social pluralism, representative organs
and individualism (Huntington 1996, p. 99). Such attributes were not necessarily
exported with the modernization of other nation states. Modernization is not the
same as ‘Westernization’, but only reinforces the resistance of other cultures to-
wards the West and tends to reduce its worldwide influence. According to Hun-
tington, the survival of Western culture will depend on the appreciation that
one’s own culture is ‘unique but not universal’ and is to be understood as worthy
of both protection and renewal (Huntington 1996, p. 20).
No matter what one’s attitude may be towards Huntington’s theories, his
forecasts have arrived and are being received to a breath-taking extent. In actual
fact, cultural conflicts have predominated the twenty-first century. Economic and
power-political aspects have played important roles. The separating characteris-
tics of individual groups have always been central fault lines. Huntington de-
scribes such fault-line conflicts from which controversies can emerge (Hunting-
ton 1996, p. 253). According to Huntington, the Ukraine is a culturally split
country. The western half has been dominated partially by Poland, Lithuania
and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whilst the eastern half has been dominated
by Russian Orthodoxy. These differences can be found at the political and lan-
guage level (Huntington 1996, p. 264). Huntington uses the Ukraine as an exam-
ple of a constitution no longer being able to unite a country; what is instead
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needed is a reorganization on the basis of cultural values. He states that “the dif-
ferences between West and East Ukraine are manifested in the attitudes of the
people” (Huntington 1996, p. 264), and that for this reason, “the Ukraine will de-
volve into two portions along its fault line, and the eastern part of the Donbas
will merge with Russia.” (Huntington 1996, p. 266)
Despite the admiration for Huntington’s astuteness and acumen, his inter-
pretation of world affairs is neither mandatory nor without alternatives. Further-
more, the query presents itself as to whether The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order turns out to be an objective phenomenon, or only pres-
ents one possible explanation of world events. In the latter case, an additional
query presents itself, namely that of causality. Has the actual effect of world af-
fairs generated this theory, or does an all-dominating interpretation of world af-
fairs have the effect of producing corresponding political power-awareness and
decision-taking as self-fulfilling prophecies? A philosophical reflection has the
assignment of inspecting such aspects and thereby of investigating the use of ter-
minologies, and the coherence and consistency of the resultant inferences and
conclusions.
It is of interest to note that Huntington’s Civilizations has been translated
into German as Kulturen. As a matter of fact, Huntington’s understanding of
the term seems to originate from that metaphysically ‘weighted’ context, which
is allocated to the sphere of the German cultural concept. It is not necessary
to enter into the details of the largely superfluous German-French Culture-Civili-
zation dispute. In fact, Immanuel Kant was using the term Kultur (culture) to de-
marcate ‘moral advance’ from technical and organizational progression (‘civili-
zation’). In this manner, Kant does not propound a ‘cultural concept’
characterized by ‘blood and soil’, but takes up a position close to the French civ-
ilization concept of the Enlightenment. Of interest above all is that the civiliza-
tion concept of the Enlightenment has an ‘including’ aspect, whereas the alleged
German culture concept has an ‘excluding’ effect (Fisch 1992). From the time of
the Enlightenment up to the catastrophe of the First World War, this civilization
concept stood for the ethical progression of all rationally gifted beings. Hunting-
ton tends to fade out this tradition of the French civilization concept, or rejects
this out of hand as the ‘Davos Culture’ of a disappearing ‘small educational elite’
(Huntington 1996, p. 78). International successes as well as the power of the in-
dividual are left unmentioned. People have always succeeded in overcoming
their cultural emphasis in favor of a universal perspective. Ethical universalism
in the sense of the Enlightenment needs neither a common religion nor a com-
mon language. The United Nations are a case in point, and the European Union
has, over decades, succeeded in converting the most warlike of continents into a
community of peace and common values.
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It would also appear questionable to deny economic interdependence and
communication from any form of peace-promoting effects. Of course, the dissem-
ination of Western consumer goods and pop culture does not equate to corre-
spondence with Western values, but their effects go beyond techniques and fash-
ion. Films, according to Huntington, are only entertainment and not cultural
conversions, and have always been otherwise interpreted and evaluated (Hun-
tington 1996, p. 80). But could not emancipated female protagonists, for exam-
ple, generate the idea of ‘equal rights’ and their attractiveness for women, via
dancing and sports films? If it were otherwise, numerous nation states could
waive the censoring of their press and media. More communication means
more information on what moral values exist in the world, and how life
would look with them. The ability to know alternatives represents the basis for
a reflective observation of one’s own life conditions, and can be a trigger for dis-
cussion (Baumann 1992, p. 1966– 1983). Moreover, the justification is missing,
that values like separation of power or freedom of speech cannot be attractive
to people of different cultural persuasions.
For example the ‘Global Ethic Project’ of Hans Küng (Küng 1990) rests upon
the assumption that the cultures and religions of the world are not all that dis-
similar, and that similar basic values exist. ‘Murder’ is almost always negatively
connoted, while other institutions such as the family, on the other hand, are
given positive significance. Huntington does not dispute this diagnosis, but
draws attention to the fact that humanity’s warlike past is also proved by history
(Huntington 1996, p. 76). The hope, however, that sooner or later identical uni-
versal cultural values will be generated in all cultural spheres is decidedly de-
nied by Huntington. He sends a clear denial to the cosmopolitanism of the En-
lightenment. Progression in the cultural spheres is primarily of a demographic,
technical and military, but not of an ethical nature. Civilization is thus reduced to
the level of ‘technical’ accomplishments, whilst identity is coupled with the met-
aphysical concept of ‘culture’.
The civilization concept in the French tradition is thus not substantially in-
validated. The core of this understanding of civilization is embedded in the de-
marcation to barbarism, as a higher degree of refinement and sophistication,
which can be measured by the objective standards of ‘bourgeoisie’. Civilization
thus restricts itself to formal ethical criteria, without negating cultural back-
grounds. If rules could be instituted so that people could live together as kind
of ‘worldcitizens’, then a universal culture would not be necessary; a form of civ-
ilization along French lines would be sufficient. The ‘clash of the civilizations’ is
thus, at least in the concept itself, not at all without alternatives.
Conceptual proof for an alternative may not be deemed to vouch for its eth-
ical consistency. For this purpose, an explicit defense of universalism is required.
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The defense of a ‘soft’ universalism
Huntington is a ‘cultural relativist’. The West is perhaps ‘unique’, but represents
no ‘universal’ culture (Huntington 1996, p. 513).
Whoever seeks to defend universalism will be confronted with a variety of
reproaches. These will extend from scientific theoretical ignorance all the way
to cultural intolerance. In this respect, the representatives of ‘relativism’ are
also altogether ambivalent. In day-to-day discussions, people who represent
the argument ‘other cultures, other morals’ suddenly understand that they
give up the possibility of a cross-border cultural and moral understanding. Sci-
ence theorists who declare metasciences, such as philosophy, to be superfluous
then regret that a real exchange between the individual scientific disciplines is
thus impossible. However, the regret of such consequences is no argument
against the truth of an existent matter of fact.
Any defense of universalism must therefore be practiced on the theoretical
as well as the practical level. Any sort of truth-theoretical discussion would go
beyond the limits of this paper. For this reason, the following statements are
based upon an epistemic concept of truth. Truth is the case, independent of in-
sight or acceptance. At the same time, rational beings should be in a position to
recognize portions of such transcendentally perceived truths, and to show their
validity intersubjectively. Consensus constitutes no truths in itself, but can en-
hance the probability of truthful and justified opinions in the form of a non-hi-
erarchical dialogue, by way of the maximization of information.Wittgenstein’s or
Foucault’s difference between ‘being true’ and ‘being in the truth’, is nothing
more than the difference between truth with or without recognition.
The following statements occupy themselves with the defense of a ‘soft’ uni-
versalism. An attempt is made here to show that (A) a participation in epistemic
oriented discourses is culture-independent, and that (B) generally binding val-
ues can be achieved during such discourses.
A culture-independent participation in an epistemic discourse (A) is a mat-
ter, of course, in discourse theory, and has experienced concrete form in philo-
sophical didactics. According to Martens, philosophy is an elementary cultural
technique of human life. As a result, not every culture, but every human being
can participate in the philosophical search for truth. Philosophy and/or philos-
ophizing is a ‘cultural technique’ because it is a characteristic of human culture
in general, and of the Greek-European culture in particular (Martens 2003,
pp. 30–31). Its etiology may well be strongly European influenced, but its es-
sence is not. Philosophy as ‘cultural technique’ means craftsmanship or artistry,
as well as knowledge of suitable materials and theories. A cultural technique is
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teachable and learnable for every human being. Philosophizing is thus a cross-
cultural act of intellectual orientation. All people are equipped with the capabil-
ity of abstracting themselves from cultural influences via pure reason. A dis-
course on concrete moral questions is seldom realizable without cultural influ-
ences and misunderstandings. Such, however, is not valid for the
transcendental criterion of ‘good’. An intersubjective discourse on the circum-
stances of the possibility of being able to say whether an action or a motive is
‘good’ can be adopted by any human being whose reason is able to differentiate
between reality and norms. A cross-cultural participation in epistemic discourses
is therefore possible of consistent thinking. For this purpose, it is not necessary
to raise oneself independently into the position of an intelligible person. It is suf-
ficient to provide, adopt and verify justifications. A universal perspective can ei-
ther be promoted by the rules of discourse or by experiments like Rawls’s ‘veil of
ignorance’.
The same could apply for the possibility of generally binding topics (B).Veri-
ties (even the normative type) tend to go beyond the context in which they are
discovered. In the descriptive sciences, the differentiation between claim and eti-
ology is a matter of fact. Many mathematical principles were defined in the
Maghreb sphere without losing their validity in Europe. Architectural principles
are valid on all continents independent of the cultural sphere of their propo-
nents. It is rather more a fact of life that numerous inventions and knowledge
have been discovered and recognized independently of each other at various lo-
cations of the Earth concurrently—a fact to indicate ‘multi-genre’ verities.
In fact, the epistemic, normative and emotional confusions inherent in the
modern have led in many places to a Renaissance of ‘closed’ concepts and
world outlooks. Huntington interpreted this development as a withdrawal into
the cultural identity and the cultural sphere. Such analysis, however, does not
indicate that cultural relativism is without alternatives. Just because we find it
difficult to redeem our epistemic self-pretension does not mean that this has
to be given up. Authorities such as Wittgenstein, Lyotard or Zygmunt Bauman
may have lastingly destroyed the hope of a final justification of ethical stand-
ards, but this does not mean ‘anything goes’, like Feyerabend suggests. We can
still differentiate between the quality of arguments (Tetens 2004, p. 23), or be-
tween sophisticated and unreflected self-interest (Gosepath 1992, p. 49).Whoever
undertakes such efforts ends up like Tugendhat—in no final certainty, but in a
thick tissue of motives and reasons (Tugendhat 1993, p. 89). Martha Nussbaum
mentions a vague but strong and resilient concept of ‘good’ (Nussbaum 1993,
pp. 323–363). The possibility of an ‘overlapping consensus’ (Rawls 1971,
p. 340) is thus not bound to an expansion of a cultural sphere. It is rather
more dependent on the extent to which self-discipline, social background and
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education enable anyone to approximate to the viewpoint of an intelligible per-
son.
The option of procedure-ethical universalism is demonstrated by different
theories. One is Otfried Höffe’s justification for human rights. The claim to
‘human rights’ can today no longer be taken for granted. In February 2014, a
flyer was passed from hand to hand among the student community in Berlin,
in which human rights were described as the ‘European centrist concoction of
a post-colonial system of repression.’ Huntington would probably disapprove
of such a vulgar, Marxist background of the student authors—but at the same
time, similarities can be recognized. According to the student authors then,
human rights would be a ‘product of the West’. They are unique, but not univer-
sal. Such an assessment has been resisted by numerous authoritative authors.
One of the more important contributions originates from Höffe and was publish-
ed in 1996, the same year as the book version of Huntington’s The Clash of Civ-
ilizations.
Although the ethics behind human rights may pose no final justification,
they are certainly not arbitrary or imperialistic. Höffe builds his argumentation
upon a minimalistic anthropology. It matters not how independent and divergent
our cultural ‘imprint’ may be; we can certainly agree that we are bodily, purely
rational, social and political beings. Any intervention into such necessities will
restrict our ‘freedom of action’, and will thus prevent us from realizing our un-
derstanding of a successfully led life. Any build-up of differentiality presupposes
the capacity to act. Since human rights seek to protect such a ‘capacity to act’,
they become a guarantee for diversity and disparity (Höffe 1996, p. 67). This
has nothing to do with the ‘imperialism’ of an ‘American way of life’, but instead
with the circumstances of the possibility of a diversity. Höffe mentions a ‘tran-
scendental exchange’ that, similar to Rawls’s ‘veil of ignorance’, constructs an
intelligible decision-taking situation:
Transcendentality is that which one implicitly affirms, provided that one always seeks what
one wills; transcendental means the circumstances, that one can have and pursue normal
interests. (Höffe 1996, p. 77)
To put it another way, whoever claims the entitlement to be otherwise in society,
must also claim ‘human rights’. The concept propounded by Höffe should not be
seen as a final justification. Nevertheless the criteria of reciprocity (as propound-
ed by Forst) and of intersubjective communicability are fulfilled.
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Transcendental tolerance education
In 1995, two years after the first appearance of Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations,
UNESCO published its explanation of tolerance:
Article 1: Meaning of tolerance
1.1 Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world’s
cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge,
openness, communication and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is har-
mony in difference. It is not only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal requirement.
Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the cul-
ture of war by a culture of peace. (UNESCO 1995)
In this definition, UNESCO lays great hope upon school education in general,
and philosophical teaching in higher education in particular. This was under-
scored by the publication of the UNESCO program ‘Philosophy, a School of Free-
dom’ (UNESCO 2007). Even in the curriculums in the schools of many European
countries, ‘tolerance’ is recognized as an educational objective in philosophical
schooling (Bruening 1998). The representatives of the subjects for school curric-
ulums themselves even promoted such expectant behavior. The possibility is em-
phasized of bringing together young people of various cultures and origins in a
mutual, normative discourse.
But, what exactly can philosophy education and the cultivation of tolerance
contribute to society? Essentially, two forms of tolerance education can be differ-
entiated: the first model represents ‘tolerance educational content’, in which a
‘canon’ of behavior and forms of life to be tolerated and accepted is communi-
cated; and the second model can be designated as ‘transcendental tolerance ed-
ucation’. The latter concept provides no obligatory content, but attempts to pro-
mote the circumstances of the possibilities of discernment and tolerance.
Basically, the matter revolves around a ‘reorientation’ of attitudes and thinking,
understood as an explanation of terminology and categories, as well as any non-
preconceived results of the discussions of individual queries.
A contextual education in tolerance, understood as a presentation of explicit
norms, may be indispensable. This applies to instructions in legal and statutory
affairs, as well as to integration in already existing social and cultural circum-
stances. Philosophical reflection is, however, a priori unbiased. In ‘teaching
methodology’, this difficulty is, however, described as a ‘values communicative
dilemma’ (Tiedemann 2015, pp. 23–29).
“We love people who say straight out what they mean, provided they think
on lines like us”. This was said to be propounded by Mark Twain and shows that
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it requires several mutes to conduct real philosophic education. Philosophy is
not the administrator of a selective level of ideas: it is the call to thinking for our-
selves, and the cultivation of that habit. The radicalism of the philosophical sa-
pere aude manifests itself in its principle of incompatibility with normative tar-
geted goals. This also applies to the issuance of legislative and constitutional
texts.
Whoever postulates that philosophical reflection leads to a primacy of de-
mocracy, human rights and humanism is in error. Of course, antidemocratic
drafts can be convincingly justified and many philosophers were definitely not
democrats. Is Plato’s idea of the philosophical tyrant inacceptable because it
is antidemocratic? Should a school pupil who, after thorough reconstruction
and critical reflection, aligns him- or herself with Plato, receive a ‘bad’ grade?
Certainly not. The dogmatic communication of a basic-value canon and the nat-
uralness of philosophical education are contradictorily opposed. A philosophical
accomplishment can be measured by the quality of its argumentation and not by
compliance with ‘political correctness’.
What effect, therefore, does transcendental tolerance education produce?
Let us commence with the explanation of categorical terminology and differen-
tiations. An example might be the differentiation propounded by Immanuel Kant
between ‘knowledge, opinion and faith’. Even the understanding of this differen-
tiation alone can cultivate the circumstances for the possibility of tolerance.
Whoever has perfectly understood that the essence of faith is the fact that it is
sufficiently credible for the faithful, without requiring any form of substantiation
by others, obtains a strongly effective dogmatism prophylaxis.
It is also possible that for an understanding of tolerance itself, philosophical
education can provide valuable perceptions. The initial benefit is the possibility
of being able to counteract the inflationary, non-binding and thus worthless ap-
plication of the term ‘tolerance’. Its derivation from the Latin root tolerare shows
the necessity of having to bear or suffer an unliked issue. Therefore, tolerance
must be justified. It is the same for both those who claim tolerance, and those
who reject tolerance: both have to explain their reasons in discussion. Only
those arguments that can be communicated reciprocally or intersubjectively
will be acknowledged. ‘We always did it like that’ or ‘I do not want that’ are,
in fact, no arguments at all. Provided that the arguments are sufficiently convinc-
ing, the dispute is then settled. In the case of tolerance, a tendency to a rejection
of the disputed issue remains. The argument is in itself acceptable, but not its
claim.
Of particular relevance in this respect, is the unbiased discussion of concrete
cases of conflict: May a hijacked aircraft be shot down? Is the circumcision of
boys and youths inacceptable without medical indication? Are burkas a sign
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of cultural diversity or an attack on a liberal society? Should ‘consuming embry-
onic research’ be permitted? Should a liberal democratic nation state be allowed
to impose obligatory healthcare insurance upon its citizens? How voluntary may
marriages be? Are honor and respect benefits that need to be earned, or is every-
one entitled to them? When and where can public religious ceremonies be toler-
ated? How much tolerance should a state-run school system display for immi-
grant traditions and customs? May an individual be a dual citizen of both a
democratic and an undemocratic nation state? Queries such as these can be ex-
plained, analyzed and interpreted between parties of different cultural and reli-
gious traditions.
Within the context of a multi-cultural society, philosophical teaching in the
curriculums of schools obtains a quite particular significance for the arbitration
of conflicts. How can the voluntary action of an individual way of life and collec-
tive integration be guaranteed? How can incursions be hindered? Does not his-
tory show that political and cultural communities tend to bind their members to
themselves all too often by the selection and manipulation of information or by
primitive compulsion? Who is going to protect the individual from his own com-
munity? Pascal Bruckner reproached those representatives of a naïve multicul-
turalism for being anti-racist racists. Bruckner speaks of a ‘paradox of multicul-
turalism’, in which all the various communities are granted the same treatment,
but not their members, because they refuse them the freedom of renouncing
their own traditions (Bruckner 2007, p. 58).
Indeed, an example of negative dialectic looms at this point. The heart of
racism is to reduce the individual down to its affiliation to an ethnic or cultural
sphere. There is also a differentiation between ‘persecution racism’ and ‘neglect
racism’. Recent German history produced an example of the cruelest persecution
racism in form of the Holocaust. The human rights of millions of individuals
were trampled on, because of a reduction to members of a target group of hos-
tility. The rule of persecution racism says: ‘We infringe upon your human rights,
because you belong to a certain group of people’. In order to prevent such bar-
barism from ever again raising its head, meticulous efforts are made, especially
in Europe, at not discriminating against racial or cultural groups. This is quite
right and desirable, as the primacy of individual rights may not be relativized.
Otherwise, ‘neglect racism’ is encouraged, which again reduces an individual
down to his affinity to a group. The rule of neglect racism says: ‘We will not pro-
tect your human rights, because you belong to a certain group of people’.
Even UNESCO takes up the position that tolerance and multicultural cohab-
itation should be subjected to binding rules and regulations. In its Declaration of
Principles on Tolerance, the following is pronounced:
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1.2 Tolerance is not concession, condescension or indulgence. Tolerance is, above all, an
active attitude prompted by recognition of the universal human rights and fundamental
freedoms of others. In no circumstance can it be used to justify infringements of these fun-
damental values. (UNESCO 1995)
Nevertheless, such a proclamation is far from being a legitimization. The indica-
tion that numerous nation states had voluntarily obligated themselves to com-
plying with such principles is, of course, a proper contractual argument—but
it loses its binding quality with the arrival of every new generation after the rat-
ification, who did not personally and actively politically ratify the voluntary ob-
ligation. The binding effect of human rights may be quite natural for some, but it
is unfortunately not self-evident. “Reasonable people have no doubt about cer-
tain things”. Julian Nida-Ruemelin used this citation from Wittgenstein at the
end of his speech to the Congress of the German Philosophical Society in
2014. But even if this remark can be applauded as a position of ‘ethical realism’,
the problem is far from being resolved. Do not reasonable people reveal their rea-
sonableness by providing accountability for their decisions and values, and seek
to reach others with the unconstrained constraint of a better argumentation?
Should not perhaps pure reason be developed and trained?
In this sense, philosophical education is the communication of an elemen-
tary ‘cultural technique’ of human way of life (Martens 2003). The teaching of
philosophy and ethics are forums for training of ‘giving and taking reasons’.
Their aims are not to indoctrinate values, but to negotiate these on the basis
of reciprocal argumentation. In this aspect, ethics are more important for the
Dalai Lama than religion (Dalai Lama 2015).
For the representatives of a conservative communication of values, all this
may well be too little. From the aspect of didactical theory, transcendental toler-
ance education remains without an alternative. The nurturing of attitudes and
philosophical education are not compatible with one another. In addition, the
outlook on success far exceeds even speculation: the previously mentioned
‘moral judgment test’ of Georg Lind measures the willingness and capability
of appreciating arguments that are directed against one’s own standpoint. On
this basis, numerous empirical studies were able to show that the aforemen-
tioned capabilities were able to be significantly enhanced (Lind 2003). In the
teaching of philosophy and ethics, exactly this happens. The school pupils jus-
tify their position and then explain what arguments of the counterparty they can
accept or reject. With a little good fortune, an attitude is formed that Voltaire
called ‘the philanthropy of intelligence’. The way in this direction leads philo-
sophical education towards being a form of transcendental tolerance education.
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The hope and adumbration of UNESCO is anything but unjustified. Philo-
sophical education by itself cannot stop the ‘clash of civilizations’—but its con-
tribution is, however, indispensable.Without any critical analysis of a dominant
paradigm, without a defense of universalism and without any education of dis-
cernment and transcendental tolerance, a further induration of the clash of cul-
tures is not to be avoided.
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Omar Acha
The Places of Critical Universalism:
Postcolonial and Decolonial Approaches
in Context
Abstract: This paper argues that the validity of universalism in the era of global
capitalism does not imply a smooth, undifferentiated spatiality, in which partic-
ularity is eliminated. The contemporary systemic logic is reproduced in places
where the universal and the particular are dialectized. This new dynamic raises
the possibility of a critical universalism capable of evading the objection to Euro-
centrism. In order to elaborate the conditions of critical universalism, I consider
the debates on postcolonial studies, the proposed decolonial option in Latin
America and the discussions that it raises.
Introduction
This chapter proposes a contemporary discussion of universalism. It is argued
that a concept of ‘critical universalism’ allows us to understand decisive features
of current debates on the legacy of the Enlightenment within a different histor-
ical framework defined by globalization.
The critical character of universalism does not refer only to its re-composi-
tion after a prolonged period of rejection by a context strongly influenced by par-
ticularist notions. Also and above all, it is aimed at showing its derivative, sec-
ondary and reactive character regarding a universal order of domination that
precedes it. This order is based on the emergence and prevalence of a capitalist
logic that subsumes the contradictory lines structuring the global world in which
we live today.
The first section elaborates the notion of ‘places of universalism’ in order to
show that the re-composition of universalism is not a return to the old monolog-
ical universalism. I will not analyze whether the monologism attributed to uni-
versalism as established from the Enlightenment is historically accurate (al-
though historical studies have provided a panorama of differences and
nuances far from the flat Eurocentrism with which universalism wanted to be
identified). Rather, to move forward more quickly, I will explain why critical uni-
versalism cannot be adequately developed without considering its ‘places’.
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The second section shows the peculiarities of critical universalism, such as
that it is comprehensible from the Latin American and Latin Americanist recep-
tions of postcolonial and decolonial theories. I explore the tensions inherent in
postcolonialism as a rejection of Eurocentrism and the non-essentialist quest for
a critical conception of universalism. One of the features of postcolonialism as it
has been received in Latin American cultural spaces is to exceed mere copying or
translation without modification. The most well-known intellectual movement of
the active reception attempts has been the so-called ‘decolonial option’. Rather
than enter into the study of the transformations operated by the decolonial per-
spective (of which I will nonetheless offer some analytical considerations), I am
interested in placing it in the series of an endless tension inherent in the rejec-
tion of universalism. That rejection can only be a moment of universalism itself.
In other words, even beyond the fantasies of an ‘own’ thought, emancipated from
Eurocentric intellectual oppression, the issues and problems presented by the
decolonial option reveal the demands of a critical universalism. A brief visit to
the considerations of Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui will show that the debate is far
from exhausted.
In the conclusion, I suggest why the understanding of universalism in its
‘places’ requires both a philosophical approach that can conceive its logic (not
accessible only empirically or scientifically) and a historical reconstruction—
i.e., a historiographical genealogy.
The places of universalism
For many decades, at least in this broad and ambiguous cultural space called the
West, universalism has been rejected. The re-evaluation of ‘difference’ or ‘partic-
ularity’, especially in the postmodernist moment of thought, led to a blurring of
positive evaluations of universalism. Universalism was seen as the more or less
immediate expression of a process of domination of the Other; of the subjugation
of otherness to the Same.
It is not the aim of this discussion to subject to criticism this attribution to all
universalism of an imperial and monological destiny. While some philosophies
of history were constructed according to unilineal and evolutionary patterns, re-
sulting in an indisputable normativity that consecrated a path to the best with-
out alternatives, it is equally true that other approaches revised the oppressive
pretensions evident in such historical-philosophical narratives. What is impor-
tant is that the monological and colonial/imperial image was the one that gov-
erned, by opposition, the vindication of the particular before the oppression of
the universal.
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During the last quarter of the twentieth century, particularism claimed the
rights of a weak critical thinking—a pensiero debole: first, thanks to the moderate
relativism of culturalist and structuralist theories especially active after the sec-
ond post-war period; then, since the late 1960s, in an ontological fragmentarism
deployed by poststructuralism, in which the minor and the different hold the
moment of validity.
The postmodern moment of thought contained the main themes against a
universalism stripped of any emancipatory aspiration and identified with a hid-
den or manifest oppressive will. Postmodern slogans are well known and it is un-
necessary to reiterate their main topics. Instead, I want to recover the postmod-
ernist challenge of the whole, or of totality. Indeed, the main objection against
the totality in that order of reasons consists in attributing to it a systematic con-
nection with the oppression of the totality on the parts.
Of course, it is possible to submit to the sieve of logical consistency the post-
modern statement of particularity, and to show how it is possible only in contra-
distinction to a regretted totality. In other words, how difference and ‘the other’
are unthinkable without the shadow of wholeness. This was perceptible from the
beginning in Jean-François Lyotard’s book on The Postmodern Condition (1979), a
‘condition’ that happened to the one where the modern condition had prevailed.
It was observed on numerous occasions that the postmodern rejection of totality
and its solidary terms (Sense, History, Evolution) implied a philosophy of history.
The theoretical weakness of postmodernism then lies in the absence of a
theory of its own possibility, since particularism leads to a relativism by which
both the aspirations of modernity and those of postmodernism are undermined.
However, logical inconsistency does not invalidate the discursive and cultural
existence of postmodernism.
It was Fredric Jameson (1991) who best placed its reality and its historical
reason. By postulating it as “the cultural logic of late capitalism,” Jameson al-
lowed us to represent the true aspects and false aspects of postmodernism with-
in an enriched explanatory framework. Postmodernism thus ceased to be a mis-
take or a decline in radical relativism to constitute a moment of the expansion of
capitalism in its most novel phase.
With globalization, theoretical ‘actuality’ reaches a new challenge because
we can understand, in the face of the failure of the analytical capacities provided
by postmodernism to account for what is happening, the need for a re-composi-
tion of an understanding to which totality and particularity do not constitute an
irreducible opposition.
My thesis is that postmodernism prevents the development of an active and
comprehensive thinking on globalization. This is certainly not the time to at-
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tempt a description, however succinct, of what globalization is, but I offer some
general features to follow in my argument.
I understand by globalization a multi-dimensional historical process of glob-
al interconnection mediated by the world market. In a stricter sense, it is the
world market that constitutes globalization. It is not by chance that globalization
has attained a clearer intelligibility after the collapse of the Soviet Union and
China’s definitive passage into the market economy: globalization was made pos-
sible by the victory of the capitalist market in expanding to fully cover the globe.
I do not think that the so-called ‘really existing socialism’ (Kurz, 1994) freed itself
from the internal pressures of the capitalist market, but I want to highlight that
since the events of 1989–91, the continuous development of the mercantile dy-
namic has advanced by leaps and bounds. This dynamic is not only economic. It
is crucial to neutralise any economic reductionism.
Globalization is also internally interwoven between its economic aspects,
cultural dimensions, communications and wars, with political and migratory ex-
pressions. The common thread, as I have mentioned, is mercantile mediation.
But if such mediation is possible, it is due to the reproduction of a global sub-
ject, without will or consciousness—a purely automatic subject, which is what
Marx called ‘the logic of capital’.
It is important to note that the logic of capital is not only economic, and in
that sense the concept of globalization is enriching because it far exceeds the
economicist reduction of capital. As Pierre Bourdieu pointed out (although in
his time he did it in debate with the economism of ‘historical materialism’),
there are ‘capitals’ in other orders, such as social and cultural. Bourdieu
(1986) perceived, in his sociological and anthropological inquiries, the flexibility
of a capitalist logic that long ago exceeded the competition for monetary accu-
mulation.
In his analysis of postmodernism, Jameson points to another trait, later
taken up in an anti-dialectical approach by authors such as Antonio Negri,
who modifies the notion of Fordist society in the expansive period of capitalism
(Negri and Hardt, 2000): the flexibility and structured destructuring of capitalist
production, where totality and part, identity and difference, are no longer incom-
patible. The social decomposition by the end of full employment, the fracture of
identities, the flows of people and goods, the mixtures of subjects and the defen-
sive reactions to the loss of a stable sense of reality form a very different expe-
rience than the one forged during the nineteenth century and the first two thirds
of the twentieth century. That is precisely what postmodernism cannot think:
that a logic of domination is particularist and totalist at the same time. It de-
prives itself of something more than its formalist rejection of totality: it rests
on a mistaken or, rather, antiquated social theory, for it supposes the determin-
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istic framework of Fordist capitalism as the antithesis of a radically fragmented
and disconnected actuality. On the other hand, the intellectual challenge behind
the crisis of the alternatives posed to capitalism in the twentieth century is to
think that the complexity and globality of the planet follow a logic that encom-
passes them, and that makes their contradictions the engine of their conflictive
growth.
Capitalist globalization replaces in new terms the denounced universalism.
If it is true that, as Alain Badiou (2003) proposed in his interpretation of the ori-
gins of universalism at a certain point in Christianity, a history of universalism
can be traced in the longue durée, it is a discontinuous history. What is interest-
ing to note here is that at the end of the twentieth century we experienced the
fall of the universalism proper to the ‘bourgeois world’ that emerged around
1800 in much of the world, with very different historical figures. The emergence
of ‘the rights of man’, with its lights and shadows,was an expression of that uni-
versalism that was rational and emancipatory.
The present moment of universalism is not merely a continuation of its mod-
ern episode. It is certainly historically linked to it, but not its immediate deriva-
tion. If, on the one hand, the universalism raised by globalization is incompre-
hensible without the modern era of the ‘bourgeois world’, on the other hand it
constitutes a novel phase. In order for the transition to be not arbitrary, it should
be considered as a self-transformation of capital in its unsurpassed crisis that
has dragged on since the mid-1970s and the factual novelty of its triumph over
bureaucratic socialism.
The novelty of the universalism of the twenty-first century global order (at
least in what we can see in its initial stages) lies in its reconversion of the nation-
al constitution of the real that prevailed during the nationalist framework of
world-market configuration during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It
should be made clear that while nationalisms affirmed the substantive and
non-transferable character of each national experience, the state-based nation
was a modern invention.
Today, it is not that national boundaries have ceased to exist, or that they
lack a decisive role in the construction of economic-social and political-cultural
systems. It happens that they are organized differently in the concert of global
flows of greater vigour. How? To clarify this is the task of, to put it in Foucault’s
terms, an ontology of our actuality (Foucault, 1984).
It is precisely here that the question of universalism is presented as an im-
pulse of thought. Irreducible to the already obsolete theoretical coordinates of
postmodernism, an ontology of the present time requires an account of the de-
cisive tendencies of globalization and its systemic orientations. The aspect of
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these tendencies that I have proposed to analyze is the situation of a universal-
ism that requires to be conceived of as a chapter of globalization.
To move to the more ‘localized’ phase of my argument, I will summarize in
just a few lines (for reasons of space) why, in my opinion, the thematization of
universalism as it is today is still possible to elucidate through a reinterpretation
of Marx’s critical legacy.
It is beyond dispute that the capitalist structure studied by Marx in Capital
has as an empirical reference a historically constituted logic. This generates a
real problem in the reconstruction of the validity or relevance of the Marxist cri-
tique of capital as an alienated subject when its social condition has changed.
Indeed, Marx’s capitalism is very close to its initial formations among which,
for example, cartelization is in its infancy. The ‘intervening’ state plays a margin-
al role compared to the one it will have in the next century.
Again, summing up an idea that would merit further development, I argue
that the logic of the expanded reproduction of capital is still valid in the
epoch of globalization—or more precisely, by its extension to a geopolitical
order different from that in force in Marx’s time, that the logic of capital endures
its transformation. The concept of its re-composition is the metamorphosis and
not the radical rupture towards a postcapitalist reality. Capital does not entail a
specifically economic reason in its monetary empirical figure, but the generation
of ‘the social as such’, with its many facets, including the seemingly more subtle
and immaterial.
The universality of capital preserves the political-cultural universalities that
have usually been considered by political philosophy and by philosophy tout
court. Democracy as an empty place of power that must be endorsed periodically
by the citizens’ vote as separate atoms, the constitution of individuals as subjects
of rights and the formation of a public sphere in unlimited expansion are among
other terms of the universality that has been maintained, despite the fact that the
advance of global capitalism has also been accompanied by a privatizing ten-
dency.
The devaluation of mass politics, the particularization of communication
through the Internet, the multiplication of media and networks that mediate
even sexual and affective relations, transform the ideals of universality that in
the eighteenth century had a strong imprint provided by Antiquity. There are
no exemplary models for conceiving contemporary universality. Studies of glob-
alization have convincingly shown that this process is not a simplification of
what was once complex. On the contrary, in globalization the success of the
globalizing dynamic comes from its ability to mutate in the particular and return
to the global by incorporating, or metabolizing, the particularity as a singularity
of the globally valid.
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I return to what I had begun to unfold in regard to the exhaustion of post-
modernism. The theoretical and philosophical challenges of our day can no lon-
ger take refuge in the seemingly radical agenda of the proliferation of difference,
nor can they be addressed naively now that the difference has been shown as
incorporable to the logic of self-valorization (aesthetic, political, economic, geo-
political) of capital. Hence it is unfeasible to renounce universalism in order to
define a site of resistance in the particular. It is important, rather, to rethink an
opposition that may have been inadequately elucidated.
Once the universal and the particular are dialectized by globalization, the
universal is no longer only unique, but multiple. In his discussion of universal-
ism, from which I have adopted the notion of ‘critical universalism’, Etienne Ba-
libar (2012) continues to analyse the pluralization of universalism as a distancing
from self-reproduction of the same. Balibar defends the idea of the passage from
a universum to a multiversum. However, this distance is obscured by the very sin-
gular materiality of global capitalism, where ‘glocalities’ are deployed. It is here
that the supposedly radical alternatives of the partial or peculiar, devalued by
assuming an old idea of social domination, are wrecked: they defend the partic-
ular as a space of resistance when that same particularity is no longer confronted
with globality, but is instead produced for this and in this.
The universality of capital continues to provide the social fabric of theoret-
ical, juridical, philosophical and conceptual universalisms, but modulates them
according to the ‘places’ of the universal. In this sense, the critical promise of the
‘place of culture’ proposed by Homi Bhabha (1994) is ‘put’ and neutralized by
the logic of capital, which makes the localization of culture an input of its valor-
ization.
The universalism that for two centuries, from the mid-eighteenth century to
the mid-twentieth century, founded its emancipatory promises in the removal of
the particular as a place of tradition, of hierarchies and continuities of the past,
is today revealed as possible only as a product of the contradictions of the uni-
versal domination of capital. The critical universalism that I want to support in
this text is not a regulative ideal nor the vindication of an essence mutilated by
globalization, but the radicalization of some perspectives enabled by the same
global domination of capital.
The particularity can not be, in this conceptual context, a defensive or eva-
sive refuge, because it is crossed by a universality that incorporates into its own
logic that which in previous centuries appeared as the greatest danger: the pos-
itivity, the irreducible. In globalization there are no positivities that threaten the
capitalist empire. However, that empire is not completely self-regulated. The con-
tradictions of globalization do not emerge from a collision between the universal
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and the particular, but from the way of placing itself, in its various places, with
its consequent specificities, in the materiality of situated universality.
I leave here the broader theoretical considerations to interpolate a transition
towards what I propose to elaborate in the following section: the definition of a
critical theory of globalization. The re-composition of the relation between uni-
versalism and particularism as a moment of globalization itself enables ‘nega-
tive’ interstices that emerge on the very contradictions of the tension inherent
in the global capital and defined in its ‘places’. These places constitute ‘the sub-
jects’ in the discussion that I have been carrying out.
A shortcoming of the notions presented so far is that they lack subjectivities,
wills and traditions, knowledge and desires, feelings and politics, as well as
emotional and cultural orientations. This introduces the possible places of the
universalized in their contexts. Today it seems unworkable to rethink universal-
ism without its ‘places’.
Situated receptions of postcolonial
and decolonial “theories”
The efficacy of the places of universalism must be evaluated in different situa-
tions. Here I will concentrate on the places that are most familiar to me, relative
to the ‘south’ and especially to that southern complex space called Latin Amer-
ica. First, however, I need to look at Indian postcolonial studies.
The fundamentally historical research identified with postcolonial studies
had a Gramscian beginning, and soon incorporated Foucaultian and Derridian
perspectives. The essence of their historiographical profile did not reside in
these intellectual influences but in the conviction that materials from Indian col-
onial and postcolonial history required particular theoretical and methodologi-
cal precaution. European historiographical schools were inadequate for prob-
lems arising in India after the Independence of 1947 and its historical
background.
The postcolonial studies approach, as early as the early 1980s, prioritized
the ‘subaltern classes’, and their experiences and resistances, both in the colo-
nial period and in the nationalist state-building process of a nation. The peasan-
try, the communities and working class making were the issues of their historical
accounts. A specificity of postcolonial studies lay in the theoretical sensitivity of
their concepts and procedures, which called into question the seemingly univer-
sal historiographical traditions of the West.
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By the early 1990s postcolonial studies became a ‘postcolonial theory’ that
had repercussions even on the faculties of the universities of humanities and so-
cial sciences of the Global North.With this theoretical legitimacy (i.e., universal
validation), it entered in the spectrum of Latin American conceptual options, to
the point that a ‘Latin American Subaltern Studies group’ briefly emerged (Latin
American Postcolonial Studies Group, 1993). After a foundational manifesto,
these postcolonial studies vanished after producing some works, perhaps the
most relevant of which is the Peasant and nation by Florence Mallon (1995).
The deferred translation effect of the subaltern studies came from the Latin
American and Latin Americanist reinterpretations known today as the ‘decoloni-
al option’, with authors such as Walter Mignolo, Aníbal Quijano, Edgardo Land-
er, Enrique Dussel and Catherine Walsh. Arturo Escobar (2002) organized the
clearest exposition of the project of a critique of coloniality, one aspect of
which is particularly relevant for what I am discussing here: the epistemological
dimension.
The decolonial option calls for a history of thought, organized chronological-
ly and politically, prior to that outlined by postcolonial studies. It argues that the
paradigm of universal reason was constituted by a non-rational subject in Amer-
ica, from 1492: the local cultures reduced to the incomprehensible or in need of
acculturation. The Western subject is then the product of a colonial operation
that has lasted for centuries and somehow continues today. In fact, for Mignolo
(2005) the decolonial option implies a rewriting of the Frankurtian critical theory
beyond its European-universalist cleavages.
The Bolivian intellectual Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, who played a prominent
role in the first diffusion of postcolonial studies in Latin America (Barragán
and Rivera Cusicanqui, 1997), has objected to the definition of a new decolonial
theory generated and legitimized from the academic places of the Global North.
The most interesting aspect of Rivera Cusicanqui’s approach, which is con-
nected with some precisions of the decolonial option (despite her political-aca-
demic objections to a university hegemony that speaks for subordinate subjects)
is that it does not result in a particularistic variant. As in postcolonial studies,
and with the conceptual emphasis of Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), it is by no
means a question of opposing an uncontaminated essence to Eurocentric univer-
salism. Rather, it is about negotiating the relevant aspects of universalism in its
liberating strands (for example through the very ‘Western’ demand for ‘rights’,
autonomous communities, women’s agency, etc.), with local implementations
that involve long and located traditions of social power building. The centrality
of the Bolivian case referred to in citing the above-mentioned author is important
because it not only exceeds the nationalist argument, but also puts into debate
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the multiple levels, scales and temporalities of global places. In that sense, it an-
ticipates issues that will have a huge presence in the coming.
For Rivera Cusicanqui, modernity is present in the same experience of the
‘indigenous world’, even if it is not within a vision of linear or teleological his-
tory.What happens to the universalism inherited from the French Revolution and
the Enlightenment? Here I would like to cite some passages from Rivera Cusican-
qui:
Today, the rhetoric of equality and citizenship becomes a caricature that conceals tacit po-
litical and cultural privileges, notions of common sense that make inconsistency tolerable
and allow the reproducing of structures of Colonial oppression. (2010, p. 56–57).
In Rivera Cusicanqui’s view, the Bolivian, liberal, populist, postmodern and even
postcolonial elites share this rhetoric. From a broad multiculturalism, the notion
of the indigenous people as ‘minorities’ is imposed, in an approach that domes-
ticates and displaces the pachakuti, the radical change. Thus, the indigenous de-
mands of ‘the issues of modernity’ (las lides de la modernidad) are excluded and
they are confined as peculiarities and stereotypes close to the ‘noble savage’.
They are deprived of their status as majorities and of the possibility of achieving
a ‘state effect’ (2010, p. 60), i.e., they continue to be ‘represented’. They are sub-
ordinated as a ‘multicultural adornment of neoliberalism’ (2010, p. 59). Rivera
Cusicanqui distinguishes between the ‘modernizing discourse’ of the elites and
the variegated modernity of indigenous productive activities. Decolonial scholars
then reiterate in the epistemological field the ‘internal colonialism’ that subalter-
nizes indigenous knowledge and especially practices. It is a new colonization in
the speaking and knowing by others that they are without voice and whose prac-
tices are not effective nor produce reality.
The Aymara term ch’xi means the mixed, variegated in the sense elaborated
by the Marxist sociologist René Zavaleta Mercado. Rivera Cusicanqui clarifies
that, “it raises the parallel coexistence of multiple cultural differences that do
not merge, but antagonize or complement each other” (2010, p. 70). It moves
away from the masculine notions of identity that are hardly accessible to the te-
jido (fabric) that characterizes the attitude of the women of the communities. For
Rivera Cusicanqui, the genre is introduced as a difference of the manifold within
the variegated modernity to neutralise the temptation of identity. Rather than a
counter- or anti-modernity, it would be a question of building a modernity of the
tejido, “more organic and self-sufficient” than that driven by elites with Western
categories.
Finally, Rivera Cusicanqui proposes another geopolitics of knowledge than
that suggested by the decolonial option. She aims for a south-south dialogue in-
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stead of the hierarchical and neocolonial north-south connection, of which the
aforementioned option would be a masked form.
These debates, outlined here, suggest that contemporary elaborations are sit-
uated within an order of reasons where the pure difference has been displaced
by a recomposition of the question for universalism in mixture with the partic-
ular. Once all access to an authentic and uncontaminated nucleus is no longer
possible, the theoretical conceptions in the times of globalization are oriented
towards what I call a critical universalism.
It is an analytic of the actuality underpinning the recognition of the mercan-
tile framework and the complexity of the contradictions that inhabit it, where the
values of the Enlightenment are not absolutely denied. The question is not about
the stage of modernization at which a given national state or community finds
itself, but about how they are settled in a concrete situation, with their histories,
traditions and conflicts; universal themes such as citizenship, recognition or
rights, become unthinkable without their places and subjects. A historiographi-
cal sensitivity, freed from the unifying and evolutionary trends of a nationalist
historical narrative, is then required to grasp the genealogies of actuality.
Conclusion
With globalization, we witness the re-emergence of universalism, but not in
terms of a restoration of its previous figures. Universalism returns as a problem,
and in critical terms, as an aspect of the social domination that prevails in the
new global order. Critical universalism is characterized not by the unlimited
unity of a clear and distinct set of principles, but by the way in which global he-
gemony happens in local terms, overcoming an opposition between the universal
and the particular.
This re-composition that I call a critical universalism does not have a general
formula. It requires an insertion of incorporated local histories (not without an-
tagonisms) into an indisputable integration of the globe. This integration is not
that of an absolute spirit that ‘posits’ its particular features as moments of up-
ward evolution, but of one that posits them as crises, tensions, projects and al-
ternatives. These are not derived from an uncontaminated alterity, but from the
very contradictions of the global process that must deal infinitely with the sub-
jects, situations and impossibilities immanent to a globalization without com-
mand.
This means that viable universalism is not the product of an authentic mean-
ing. It is the internal and troubled reaction of the possibilities stimulated by a
blind and generalized universality that we call globalization; a universality
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that is incomprehensible without a conception of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’.
In any case, it arises as a set of reactions situated with respect to a dominant uni-
versal that finds its general explanatory key in the logic of capital—one which
still finds in the mature approach of Marx its most convincing basic explanation.
Critical universalism is not then the mere external repulsion of a global dom-
ination structured in the flexible flows of capitalism, but the reverse of such
flows. Or, more accurately, it is the set of dilemmas that the same domain gen-
erates in its contradictory dynamics. It opens the space for a reconsideration of
emancipatory possibilities within a critical universalism that demands philo-
sophical reflections, but also inquiries of the tejidos, in which local histories
are linked to the new global history that dominates universally the contemporary
experience.
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2 Ethical Duty: Global Justice
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as a product of the contemporary crisis, lacking political history and semantic
genealogy, wanting nevertheless to become an explanatory wildcard for all pres-
ent events, both in a positive and negative sense. The initial thesis of this article
is that the current concept of globalization is an empty one that has been strip-
ped of its historical content. This emptying is part of the ‘postmodern’ processes
of thinning and deformation afflicting ethical-political concepts (freedom, equal-
ity, democracy) by depriving them of their ‘modern’ content without endowing
any other. Taking this into account, I defend the consequent thesis that the sup-
pression of these concepts’ semantic history implies in turn the eradication of
the ethical commitment that they entailed, whose inheritance by contrast should
not be renounced. I conclude that there is the need for a socio-political pedagogy
that contributes to transmitting ‘responsibility for the concepts’ that are the true
shapers of collective identities. Without this responsibility, our ability to adopt
any other type of historical, ethical or political responsibility would be impeded.
With this proposal, I want to recover in its true ‘universal’—not ‘global’—sense
the Leibnizian motto ‘Theoria cum praxi’ taken up by the Enlightenment, in
which a renewed philosophy of history acts as a bridge between history (mem-
ory) and politics (action), endowing both with ethical content.
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Introduction: Globalism, globalization,
crisis and conceptual reductionism
The great debate on globalization burgeoned two decades ago with the turn of
the century, unifying at least three different phenomena that in the collective
imagination converged under the name of ‘global threat’: planetary ecology,
free market economy and information technology. I will not delve here into
the details of the debate maintained by sociologists Ulrich Beck and Niklas Luh-
mann (among others) on the global threats that were themed around the so-
called ‘risk society’ (Beck 1986; Luhmann 2003). Yet I do want to reiterate a dis-
tinction that Beck made between three different concepts that has become some-
what blurred: ‘globality’ (we live in a world in which no country or group can live
on the fringes of global society); ‘globalism’ (a conception defending that the
world market dislodges or replaces political action); and ‘globalization’ (the
processes by virtue of which the sovereign nation states intermingle and inter-
weave through transnational actors). In my opinion: (i) this distinction has be-
come increasingly blurred to the extent that the intuition that different econom-
ic, political and cultural forms do not cease to interweave has overlapped with
the ideology of world market domination (liberalism and neoliberalism), crystal-
lizing in the idea of an inevitable and impersonal process that will affect the
whole planet whether we want it to or not—a process called ‘globalization’;
and (ii) in sociological approaches,we have forgotten a perspective that years be-
fore the philosophers of ethics Hans Jonas (1979) and Agnes Heller (1988) had
shown, aiming to emphasize the indissoluble relationship of individual and col-
lective actions with the degree of responsibility of the actors of these actions, as I
have highlighted previously (Roldán 1999). For this reason, we face a globaliza-
tion that, on the one hand, inherits the deterministic and dehumanized charac-
teristics of the oft-criticized classic idea of ‘progress’—with a component of great-
er threat by the ‘historical acceleration’ that it introduces (Koselleck 2000)—and
that, on the other hand, by adopting such a polysemic character (economic, eco-
logical, political, cultural, etc.), evolves to become an empty concept.
Less than a decade ago, the economic crisis of 2008 further polarized the so-
called ‘debate on globalization’—both towards a negative sense of the concept
globalization, and towards its identification with its economic content. It
seemed, in this way, that there was only one crisis—an economic crisis—and
that it was the only and inevitable result of the process of globalization. I
have been working (together with some of the colleagues that publish in this col-
lective book) on the analysis of this simplification as the main leader of the proj-
ect ‘The Philosophical-Moral Prisms of Crises: Towards a New Socio-Political
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Pedagogy’, and can verify both that we are facing a plurality of crises, and that
this phenomenon is not as novel as commonly believed, but rather recurrent
throughout history. To take a concrete example of the latter, Leibniz mentions
in his writings ‘a crisis that ravages Europe’, while Koselleck devotes in Heidel-
berg his doctoral thesis to the subject: Kritik und Krise: Eine Studie zur Pathogen-
ese der bürgerligen Welt (1954), referring respectively to a moral and a political
crisis. The stereotype of economic crisis has become a pretext that has allowed
the creation of apocalyptical political designs with a specific ideological bias un-
dermining the importance of the welfare state. Using the metaphor of a ‘prism’,
our aim was to examine the concept of crisis from several perspectives—philo-
sophical, sociological, historical, juridical, political and ethical—in order to ap-
proach the complexity of this phenomena. Therefore, our team brought together
sociologists, conceptual historians, philologists, historians and political scien-
tists, from different cultural traditions. The analysis of the above-mentioned
issue required a correct diagnosis facilitated by the etymology itself. After all,
in addition to ‘separation’ and ‘dispute’, ‘crisis’ also means ‘process’ and ‘justice’
in Greek; from ‘divide’ (krínein) comes kritikós—the one that discerns or judges—
and from there derives the critique or the aptitude to judge.
The etymological background of the concept of ‘crisis’ has further channeled
my latest research towards the objective of tracking both its continuities and rup-
tures in the history of our concepts. The historical inflections that thinkers like
Thomas Kuhn call ‘paradigm shifts’ are in fact warning us of a semantic renewal
concerning certain concepts that compel them to abandon some referents in
favor of adopting others. This process always takes place gradually, but we none-
theless become aware of it at a certain moment, in the same way, for instance,
that happens with aging: though growing old is a gradual process, there is a mo-
ment at which we ‘suddenly’ notice it, after seeing our image in the mirror. The
medical meaning that the concept of ‘crisis’ also has in Spanish and English (we
can say: ‘the disease has become critical’) seems to me a very adequate comple-
ment to explain this phenomenon. In every disease we witness a ‘critical’ mo-
ment that enables the healing of the same if the diagnosis has been successful.
Re-directing this metaphor to the issue at hand: we witness a time in which con-
cepts are becoming ‘empty’ of their previous content, to begin being filled with
others (hence the title of this article). As I see it, the ethical-political concepts we
use, including the one of globalization, are undergoing a critical period in
which, as in a disease, they are losing weight and deforming, so far without find-
ing an articulation that will lead them to be filled with univocal meaning, grant-
ing that this would ever be possible. It is precisely in this sense that in recent
decades we have witnessed an inflation of ‘turns’ in philosophical inquiry: the
‘linguistic turn’, ‘contextual turn’, ‘iconic turn’, etc. All this twisting, coupled
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with the historical acceleration that we are experiencing, has placed us in a sit-
uation of ‘vertigo’ (Böhme 2008), thanks to which we no longer know where we
are going.
In moments of loss of balance, it helps to step on firm ground and to hold on
to a structure sufficiently anchored such that it does not fall with us. In the def-
inition of the current moment, thinking about ‘perspectives’ (as Leibniz and Or-
tega y Gasset already advocated) instead of ‘turns’ helps us to find our way to a
new conceptual articulation of reality. Different perspectives of the same reality
become implemented from an interdisciplinary perspective, involving us in the
complexity of the real, which can only be accessed through scientific coopera-
tion, by virtue of the complementarity provided by collective effort. Besides
being complex, the concepts are not neutral; rather they transmit certain ethi-
cal-political values—something always attempted by established powers (be
they political, religious and/or cultural), and which different communities or cit-
izenships try to resist.
In what follows, I will try to show these two movements in two small sec-
tions. I will refer to the restorative process of ethical-political concepts within
the framework of a new philosophy of history, from an ethical and semantic per-
spective respectively. I will conclude by pointing to some of the tasks that now lie
before the new philosopher of history, in the so-called ‘Era of Globalization’ and
on the road to becoming responsible for concepts.
The ‘ethical perspective’ in the face
of ‘historical-political prescription’:
valuing from history
In his work on the Begriffsgeschichte (history of concepts), Reinhart Koselleck
evidenced that historical experiences had been leaving their mark on language
—one that the historian can trace and try to interpret. However, not insignificant-
ly, the possibility of living such experiences presupposed in turn that the actors
of history necessarily had to have certain notions and categories around which
they organized their lived experiences, since social reality is linguistically consti-
tuted and only what has been previously conceptualized is visible and intelligi-
ble to the actors. It is precisely this dialectic between notions and experiences
that conceptual history strives to bring to light around its two well-known ex-
pressions: ‘space of experiences’ and ‘horizon of expectations’ (Koselleck 1988).
Seen in this way, everything seems to have gone by calmly and smoothly. But
actually, far from being objective, exhaustive and common accounts of a society
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or people, histories are the subjective, incomplete and partial or biased accounts
presented by the established powers with hegemonic pretensions. It becomes not
only a ‘conceptual description’ of the past, but also a ‘valuation prescription’ for
how the society in question should continue to be. Thus, the ‘collective memory
with claims of universality’ attempts to build by the force of semantics a ‘collec-
tive identity’ that ultimately is ‘fictitious’. And in each coming back that each in-
dividual or group makes to that history—as if it were a trip to Narnia—it can be
verified that this alleged universal history was neither so universal nor so all-en-
compassing, but rather local and biased: the history of the aristocratic, liberal
and patriarchal groups (Roldán 2013a) of the most powerful and dominant
emerging western cities.
Reinhart Koselleck contemplated in his works what he calls ‘Sattelzeit’ (‘sad-
dle period’)—the period from the end of the eighteenth to the beginning of the
nineteenth century,¹ in which the same concept of ‘society’ was being forged,
and the idea of ‘nation’ was gaining great strength against the more neutral
idea of ‘state’ developed in the first modernity. ‘Nationalism’ gained great rele-
vance at this time in Europe, North America and Latin America, becoming the
new subject of political life against more federalist and pro-European streams
of thought that were reclaiming the ideas of Saint-Pierre, Leibniz, Rousseau
and even more cosmopolitan approaches like the Kantian one, to which the re-
flections of contemporary authors have been returning in an effort to emphasize
solidarity among all the peoples of the earth (Habermas 1998, p. 79). Aside from
some divergences in focus (on which I will not dwell now), regarding the German
perspective of Reinhart Koselleck, authors such as Quentin Skinner (who gives
an Anglo-Saxon interpretation), Giuseppe Duso (Italian interpretation), Jacques
Guilhaumou (French interpretation) and Javier Fernández Sebastián (Spanish
and Ibero-American interpretation, especially for the IBERCONCEPTOS project
of 2004) have been unanimous in stressing that political and semantic processes
are interwoven in this era to such an extent that when authors speak of history,
nation or society, they are referring to the same thing from different perspectives.
Most human groups—comprising both the ‘actors’ of history, and its ‘inter-
preters’ (historians)—possess and cultivate some kind of relationship with the
past, especially with what they imagine is their genealogy, their own collective
past, as Álvarez Junco (2013) has shown. In this way, history has normally
been erected as the discipline that collects and thematizes these collective
pasts—although often we forget that the hegemonic powers write and present
the typical and the most spread histories, tending to unify them as the stories
 For my criticism of this periodization, see: Roldán 2013b.
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of just one of the many human groups that conform collectivities and to silence
the ‘real multiplicity’ of different groups’ voices. These told histories thus consti-
tute what we call a ‘narrow mindset’ that originates from the ‘hegemonic group’
or ‘victor’, forgetting the voices of the ‘defeated’—as Reyes Mate points out (Mate
1991; 2011)—of the marginalized and of the invisibilized, as has been the case of
women in all the histories of knowledge (Roldán 2013a), earning mention in po-
litical histories only by merit of their social status.
In short: on the one hand, from a false historical unity (Belvedresi 2012), the
plurality of collective imaginaries was usurped; on the other hand, a number of
dominant political concepts, inheritors of a modern tradition, were imposed as
hegemonic, when they were actually an expression of de facto powers of the ori-
gins of modernity—what I have called in my work the ‘triumphant line of the En-
lightenment’ (Roldán 2005; 2012). These concepts were not neutral, but rather
transmitters of particular ethical-political values. For centuries, protagonism
was entrusted to some concepts of the Enlightenment that nurtured a way of in-
terpreting the meaning of history in a finalistic and deterministic way, leading to
a craving for explaining historical events that we call the ‘universal history’
through an all-encompassing, scientistic discourse, rendering these concepts
predominant: rationality, teleology, continuity and perfection (progress). At the
same time, other elements present in the works of authors of the Enlightenment
were relegated. They did not triumph and were hidden for almost two centuries
in the ‘blind spot’ (that part that cannot be seen in the rear-view mirror when we
are driving) of history—blind spots to which Israel (2010) also refers, but which
now, however, begin to break through and lay the foundations for a new philos-
ophy of history doubly concerned with ethics: the one that I want to defend and
uphold here.
In other words, alongside these concepts that we may categorized as ‘rigid’,
there appears in the origin of modernity another group of ‘flexible’ concepts
(Roldán / Navarro 2007) that are instrumental in introducing diversity, gradual-
ism and pragmatism (Ausín 2006) into our reflections. These concepts are none
other than those of contingency, freedom (autonomy), equality and tolerance
(Roldán 1997)—all of them placed under the umbrella of the broader principle
of ‘plurality’, which Leibniz describes from an ontological-gnoseological point
of view as ‘perspectivism’ in his Monadology, recaptured by Ortega y Gasset as
‘historical perspectivism’.
I aim to show that a philosophy of history with a new conception is possible
(Roldán 2005, 2006; Rohbeck 2007, 2014). Ankersmit (1986) coined the expres-
sion ‘new philosophy of history’, referring to a new movement that, on the
one hand, radically questions the epistemological presuppositions of traditional
historiography (especially its ideal of reaching a true account about the past and
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its consideration of history as a science) and, on the other hand, proposes new
forms of historical writing as an alternative to the traditional ones. From my
point of view, this new philosophy of history, in its complexity, plurality, modu-
lation and detail, is not something alien to the enlightened spirit, with its eman-
cipatory breath (Muñoz 2002)—both in its ethical commitment and in its pure
narrativity of the contingent. Perhaps these are the genuine roots of an Enlight-
enment, hidden by the rationalistic and scientistic excesses of the triumphant
enlightened line, but that nevertheless continue to nourish the new offshoots
of historical reflection in our postmodernity with even more radicality (Bloom
2010). It is my contention that it is an urgent task to rehabilitate politics and pro-
duce new collective actors, in accordance with concepts such as isogoria and
isonomy, including the necessary gender perspectives. The claim for a critical
spirit fleshed out with values of the Enlightenment can help us to counterbal-
ance the hegemonic way of thinking, which is riddled with prejudices that pre-
vent independent thinking. Reprioritizing the Enlightenment ideal of republican
cosmopolitanism would serve to redirect the dangerous drifts of globalization.
At this point, let me briefly recapitulate: we have considered concepts that
represent, so to speak, the ‘negative inheritance’ of the Enlightenment, and a
problematic conception of the philosophy of history that focuses on the idea
of progress: rationality, teleology, continuity and perfection. These are concepts
that, on the other hand, have been weakening and losing their semantic strength
to the point of being nothing more than empty terms that, nevertheless, are use-
ful in the description of phenomena, processes and, ultimately, concepts such as
globalization. Also, what happened to the other concepts that did not play a
leading role at the time, but which we are currently recovering for philosophy
of history—the ‘positive inheritance’—such as contingency, freedom, equality
or tolerance? Are these concepts not also becoming weaker?
The semantic perspective:
sense and objectivity in the narrative margins;
towards a new hermeneutical rationality
In addition to the question of the semantic weakening of the concepts that I want
to recover for the new philosophy of history, I believe that we can not leave aside
in these considerations the other great horse of history: namely, the historical ve-
racity and objectivity that other contemporary theorists qualify (downgrading in
this way their pretensions) as ‘reliable information about the past’ (White 1999),
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leading reflection on the meaning of history into the margins of narrativity. Let’s
briefly review the development of the problem.
The notion of ‘narration’ has been introduced into philosophy of history
hand in hand with analytic philosophy, filling the central role that ‘explanation’
had previously played. That is, the narrative structure emerges as an alternative
to causal explanation—as an alternative to a scientific historiography. Thus, the
philosopher of history seems to have stopped considering conclusively whether
history makes sense or, on the contrary, lacks it. That sense, as well as objectivity
and historical truth, must be sought in the statements that historians make in
their accounts. Is the philosopher of history, once dismissed from her trades
as prophet and meteorologist, perhaps being relegated to the role of literary crit-
ic? The historian has become only a narrator (for without a narrator there can be
no history), losing her role as ἵστωρ (hístōr), i.e. as witness of a factual history.
Reflections on history exhibit, in turn, a similar narrative structure. Then, the dif-
ference between a history—and I say ‘a history’ because there will be as many
histories as narrations of an event will be written—and a philosophy of history
cannot be that the latter provides relationships based on detailed findings on
facts, while the former does not. If there is any mission of the philosopher of his-
tory that is different from that of the historian, this will consist in problematizing
the interpretation that the historian suggests of her own account, criticizing her
approaches, her references, her omissions—of all things that are reflections of
her intentions. In a word, the philosopher of history acquires the status of a ‘met-
anarrator’ and her work will be presented as a metanarration.
Historical narration organizes and, at the same time, by applying its selec-
tion criteria, interprets. It is not a mere vehicle for the transmission of informa-
tion, but is instead a procedure for the production of meaning and, therefore, has
an explanatory function. As Fina Birulés has pointed out, although Danto’s work
attributes an explanatory function to narration, we should not forget that history
can only be known from within; we are subjects historically located at a later
time than the events recounted (Birulés 1989, pp. 26–27). Thus, the histories
we tell say as much about our past as they do about our present interests; to
a certain extent, we are a microcosm of the stories we are able to tell. This is
what prompts Habermas to state that Danto brings analytic philosophy to the
very threshold of hermeneutics. The historian does not speak from outside; his-
tory is not an impersonal reflection. So Danto’s work moves away from Hempel’s
covering law model and gives rise to a possible dialogue between the hermeneu-
tic and analytical traditions, allowing the problematizing of the links between
historical understanding and philosophy of action.
The new narrative structure stressing the importance of the present emerges
as an alternative to a scientific historiography, though it is condemned to leave
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the concepts of truth and objectivity in the very margins of the different narra-
tives. From these margins (this limit), there is the impulse to control different
narrators’ subjective and particular experiences, narrowing down the sense of
their necessarily fragmentary perspectives (Roldán 2005, pp. 175– 180).
It is not a question of renouncing the truthfulness and sense in historical
narrative—although this unfortunately seems to be the (increasingly widespread)
practice in the speeches of our politicians. Should the new philosopher of histo-
ry renounce the role of ‘metanarrator’ or ‘metahistorian’; of guardian of the ve-
racity of the narrated sense and of historical interpretations of the past (Roldán
2005, p. 176); and of tracing the limits between the literary imagination and his-
torical veracity? It cannot be otherwise if philosophy acquires its ‘ethical commit-
ment’, which is how it seems to me that we have to interpret Agnes Heller’s
words in A Theory of History—i.e., in favor of giving sense to history and looking
for the sense in history:
[D]espite severe criticism of the false consciousness of the philosophy of history, despite all
scepticism in regard to its achievement, despite awareness of the dangers inherent in this
undertaking, both theoretical and practical […] one has to repeat with Herder: ‘Auch eine
Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit’ (a philosophy of history, too, is need-
ed for the education of mankind). (Heller 1982, p. 190)
(Provisional) conclusion: responsibility for
concepts of philosophy of history in the
‘Era of Globalization’
In concluding these pages, we find that the problem that reappears in the so-
called ‘Era of Globalization’ is not very different from the gap between language
and reality opened by the work of Kant at a time when concepts described not
only universal abstractions, but also states of things. Koselleck’s proposals
(like Rawls’s in the area of justice) do not depart much from the Kantian orbit.
The promoter of conceptual history develops Gadamer’s idea of the centrality
of language in the articulation of historical experience, but moves away from
the Gadamerian influence by highlighting the irreducibility of the second (histor-
ical experience) to the first (language). Social factors—the extralinguistic plot—
exceed language insofar as the implementation of an action always exceeds its
mere enunciation or symbolic representation. Still, an action that is not narrated
—orally or in writing—is condemned to ostracism and invisibility: it is as if it had
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not happened. To narrate is to conceptualize and to conceptualize is, in turn, to
structure, interpret and value the contingent.
Everything in the universe is contingent, but history is contingent par excel-
lence, insofar as it immediately depends on human action. To narrate an event
that is itself contingent means to try to transmit the plurality of the points of
view expressed in it, for which a ‘hermeneutical rationality’ is needed that focus-
es on the grasping of the part of truth present in each perspective of reality. The
plurality of perspectives will be the best safeguard for an approach to truth, free
from prejudice and dogma, which prioritizes none of them. In this approach,
however, a commitment will need to be found for avoiding falling into relativ-
ism: a commitment that is nothing more than the individual or social group’s
ethical responsibility when acting; the political responsibility of every citizen
aware of the history of his/her own political concepts (Gómez Ramos 2007),
but still willing to review its use and meaning to overcome the inherent fragility
of human actions (in the most Arendtian tradition); in short, if we take up the
original meaning of politics (understood as ‘conceptual elaboration of experien-
ces’), it is all about taking on responsibility for concepts, since reflection on his-
tory calls us to return to ethics—to action. The philosopher of history can no lon-
ger devote herself to making terrifying or hopeful predictions of the future,
though nor must she renounce making any estimative assessments about it;
she cannot announce what it will be, but she can propose how it should be—
or in any case, how it should never be (Roldán 2005, p. 16).
The new philosophy of history has a complex task ahead. It is concerned
with, on the one hand, the problems suggested by its historical present, and
on the other, directing itself to questioning the received philosophical tradition,
knowing that its interpretation is only one more perspective that provides an in-
complete truth (from its subjectivity and present) in the framework of a dynamic
history of philosophy. Just as the future cannot be predicted, nor is the past
something fixed, closed, finished—a view for which Danto reproached Peirce:
“We are always revising our beliefs about the past, and to suppose them
‘fixed’ would be unfaithful to the spirit of historical inquiry” (Danto 1985,
p. 145). We are always reviewing our research on the past, which is only intelli-
gible to us in the light of the present and with our eyes on the horizon, since
without a future project our concept of humanity would vanish. Therefore, reflec-
tion on history does not pursue specialization in a philosophical discourse, but
rather advocates interdisciplinarity—an interdisciplinarity in which ethics, poli-
tics, literature and sociology are perhaps the starring protagonists. It is all
about an evolving thinking that is ever more interested in defending a ‘living his-
tory’ (with a critical perspective from both an omnivorous past, pluperfect, and a
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rickety future) than in elucidating how many degrees far to the starboard side of
postmodernity it is.
Ars inveniendi thrives only from complexity, just as the crossroads are the
best places at which to exchange experiences or knowledge, to enrich ourselves.
Human history is, like human life, a ‘complex adaptive system’ that develops by
trial and error. But we mustn’t forget that the idea of a ‘continuous increasing
complexity’ is a myth (Rivera 2000, p. 29) that demonstrates that the idea of his-
tory as progress is false, just as one can not presuppose a ‘natural’ or ‘cultural’
selection that always favors optimal solutions or the best possible ones. History
is a collective event, but is also none other than the desires and beliefs that
shaped those human actions. In fact, we could affirm that history is a ‘collective
by-product’, the result of ‘multiple multi-personal games’, sometimes the collat-
eral effect of what we are doing guided by other ends (Rivera 2000, p. 47).
This new philosophy of history requires, ultimately, a new rationality: flexi-
ble, gradual and ‘hermeneutically imperfect’. It would be a concept of rationality
in the line of that defended by Stephen Toulmin (2003) as situated rationality,
which would move away from ‘arrogance of reason’ in an inversely proportional
relationship to its approximation to a concept of ‘perspectivism’ à la Leibniz:
what Marcelo Dascal (2001) has termed a blandior ratio. It would be a rationality
that is no longer based on absolute truths, but rather on the graduality of them;
i.e., ordered in different steps, ‘modulated’, so that ‘true’ and ‘false’ lose their
static and abstract character, but without falling into relativism; in which the val-
ues of truth are not only housed in the propositions themselves, but in their ‘in-
tervals’ (as fuzzy calculus defends) or in its ‘intermediate steps’, supported by
the relational character of truth, as the ontological and moral point of view of
Dewey’s pragmatism holds. It would be a rationality for whose definition we
could also borrow from the field of legal logic the concepts of ‘weighting’ and
‘presumption’ (Ausín 2006). It would be an argumentative rationality, in short,
that is the recovery of a certain ‘heterodox’ enlightened tradition that we can
find in the ‘nuanced’ rationalism of Leibniz, in Marie de Gournay’s discourse
on equality; in the one on sympathy by Sophie de Grouchy (excluded from the
usual histories of philosophy, as is Marquise de Châtelet’s Lessons in Physics),
or in Lessing’s concept of tolerance.
A new philosophy of history would not pretend, therefore, to dispute Clio’s
favors to history, nor to emulate Cassandra in her prophetic gifts, but more mod-
estly to remind us that we are all moral subjects of a history that, whether we
want to recognize it or not, concerns all of us—as Javier Muguerza notes (Roldán
2005, pp. 6–7); a history that does not do or say anything by itself, but always
through human beings, who are its actors, narrators and interpreters. No history
will ‘tell’ or ‘give us reason’ as the misnamed popular wisdom affirms, regardless
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of what we all do (or do not do) and say (or do not say). It is time to abandon the
exaggerated victimhood, the perverse age of innocence in which we have fallen
asleep, and try to grasp the reins of our destiny—because when the facts go be-
yond language, the intellectual can not ignore her task: she has to take respon-
sibility for the concepts.We cannot and should not wait with arms crossed hop-
ing that history, like a gracious sea, will return to us the remains of our
shipwreck.
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Elisabetta Di Castro
Globalization, Inequalities and Justice
Abstract: The considerable inequities and exclusions that exist in our globalized
world call for a global framework to deal with them. In particular, the problem of
methodological nationalism, citizenship and exclusion from the entitlement to
many basic rights (both social and political) in national constitutions is stressed.
The consolidation of a global institution (or network of institutions) is presented
as necessary; one that, overcoming the discrimination between person and citi-
zen, might watch over and defend fundamental rights, enabling them to become
effective rights for all persons, irrespective of the place where they were born and
the place where they happen to be. The aim of a just distribution not only of
wealth but, in general, of the benefits that globalization has to offer requires in-
stitutional reforms that depend on a renewed perspective of global constitution-
alism. This in turn demands a new approach leaving behind the confrontation
between uniform universalist visions and closed multiculturalisms.
Globalization is one of the most controversial phenomena of the contemporary
world. Since the end of the last century, it has been regarded by some as a source
of prosperity of nations; others, by contrast, see it as the origin of new inequal-
ities between and within nations, hence as fostering global injustice. Yet others
view it as a space of power, negotiation and cooperation for the construction of a
new global order.
We cannot conceive of the development of globalization without the scien-
tific-technological revolution that required a redesigning of nation states,
whose frontiers were being eroded as a result of the development of digital infor-
mation and communication technologies (Castells 1996). These gave rise to infor-
mation flows and knowledge networks that surpassed the territorial controls of
states, and these, in order to maintain their international competitiveness and
quotas of power in the world system, had to opt for the formation of regional
blocs. Hence, the world was restructured with growing international economic
interdependence and an increasing differentiation in development between re-
gions.
In the final decades of the twentieth century, the division of global power
between two parts—capitalist and socialist—became a thing of the past and, al-
though the United States has continued to exert a strong presence, other impor-
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tant nuclei of power have emerged. Likewise the East-West conflict took on new
characteristics and was joined by a new disjunction: the North-South divide
(Kennedy, 1993 and 2008). The nation states were obliged to promote the liberal-
ization of national markets in goods and services, as well as liberalizing their fi-
nancial systems, although it must be stressed that national labor markets re-
mained within the narrow margin of each nation state. The great world power
intensified its control over the arbitration of regional conflicts—with actions
that on many occasions violated international law—and the nation states gave
impulse to the creation of supra-national centers of regulation, such as the
WTO, and strengthened others, such as the IMF.
One of the consequences of the globalization process has been the crisis of
the nation state, which questions the traditional significances of sovereignty and
citizenship that are implicated in it and which were once a factor of inclusion
and equality, present since its origins.¹ While the nation state and citizenship
came to be regarded as global norms (to the degree that a considerable propor-
tion of the world’s population was living in democratic nation states), the end of
the Cold War heralded the appearance of a new world order in which a hierarchy
between states became manifest (Castles and Davidson 2000; Castles 2003).
The hierarchy of states that characterizes this emerging world order is in ac-
cordance with the level of dependence of each in relation to the superpower, as
likewise the differing degrees of power they have among themselves, which may
vary considerably. Stephen Castles called this new order the ‘hierarchical nation-
state system’; its structure can be understood as a set of concentric circles
around a dominant superpower. In correspondence with the differing degrees
of power (in cultural, economic, military and political terms) wielded by nation
states, their populations are subject to a similar hierarchy of rights and freedoms
—a situation that Castles refers to as one of ‘hierarchical citizenship’. In this
sense, we may say that the dominant development in our globalized world is
one of hierarchization, and hence of inequality and exclusion.
In contrast with the liberal supposition that all citizens are equal and free
persons (irrespective of their belonging to specific groups), in reality, citizenship
has always been differentiated in nation states, based on criteria of origin, ethnic
identity, race, class and gender. This tendency has become more acute with glob-
alization, and in particular with the increase in international migration and
 As Luigi Ferrajoli has pointed out, the changes linked to this crisis should not lead us to the
advent of new types of sovereignty and citizenship as many have proposed, but rather, in the
long term, to a change of paradigm—both at the international and state levels—to the extent
that the concepts of sovereignty and citizenship will inevitably remain connected to relations
of inclusion-exclusion in states and between peoples and persons (Ferrajoli, 1998 and 2001).
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transnationalism. The typical categories of differentiation of citizenship within
nation states are: ‘full citizens’ born in the country, ‘naturalized migrants’,
‘legal residents’, ‘undocumented residents’, ‘asylum seekers’, ‘ethnic minorities’,
‘indigenous peoples’ and ‘groups discriminated against on the basis of gender’.²
In the differentiation of citizenship rights in the international sphere, five levels
can be distinguished: the citizens of the United States; the citizens of other high-
ly developed countries; the citizens of countries in transition and recently indus-
trialized; the citizens of less developed countries; and non-citizens (without
doubt the worst possible situation in a world made up of nation states).³
There is a close link between these two types of hierarchization of citizenship,
that is to say the intra-state and the international hierarchies: being a native
of a country with a high position on the international citizenship hierarchy
may well lead to a high position in the hierarchies of other nations; thus,
while few migrants from highly developed countries end up as undocumented
migrants or asylum seekers, many people from low levels of the international hi-
erarchy do end up in a low position on the national scale of their country of des-
tination. Besides, it must be considered that the greater prevalence of discourses
about the naturalness of violence and chaos, and transnational racism, clearly
play a role in the assignation of groups to a subordinate national status (Castles
2003).⁴
In view of this situation it is worth remembering that, at least on the norma-
tive plane, since the 1940s, with the United Nations Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, both the concept of citizenship and the principle
of state sovereignty have been superseded by the creation of a supranational
order in which nation states became subject to norms, and citizenship ceased
to be the sole basis of rights conceived of as vital (and which are those that
allow the enjoyment of other rights, such as may even include that of citizen-
ship); rights that ought to belong to each person, irrespective of where he or
she was born or happens to be. Obviously, this occurred only on the normative
plane since, as we have seen, in international relations today the principle of
 While legal discrimination against women is now less common (although still found in some
parts of the South), institutional and informal discrimination against them persists.
 Persons can be non-citizens for various reasons: because they live in a country in which the
state has disintegrated and lack any kind of protection against rival armed factions; because
their country is defined by the United States as a ‘proscribed country’; or because they are ref-
ugees that were deprived of their original citizenship when fleeing, and the state where they are
seeking asylum denies them citizenship or even the right to remain.
 For a broader development of the relation between migration and rights, see Di Castro (2012b).
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sovereignty and the exclusive vision of citizenship still hold sway. In this respect,
as Luigi Ferrajoli has remarked:
[…] sovereignty is now no more than a legal black hole, its rule being the absence of rules
or, in other words, the law of the strongest. As regards citizenship, this has become the ul-
timate personal privilege, the ultimate factor of discrimination and the last surviving pre-
modern relic of differentiations by status; as such, it contravenes the much acclaimed uni-
versality and equality of fundamental rights. (Ferrajoli 1998, p. 178)
In spite of their deficiencies and of the critiques that can be directed against
them, the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
can be seen as comprising an embryonic global constitution. Of course, this con-
stitution, though formally established, still lacks institutional guarantees—that is
to say the adequate instruments for activating those rights—these comprising
precisely one of the main pending tasks of global justice. To achieve that, a
change of paradigm would be required, which in the long term leads to the ‘su-
perseding’ of citizenship and the ‘denationalization’ of rights because, as Ferra-
joli had already glimpsed before the turn of the century, it will not be feasible in
the long run to maintain the coexistence of “rich and comfortable democracies
with secure standards of living alongside famine and misery in the rest of the
world” (1998, p. 183).
This superseding of citizenship and denationalization of rights ought to lead
to the future consolidation of a global constitution in which fundamental rights
would be universal, recognized for all persons as such; hence, having lost their
moorings in citizenship, they would have to be supervised not only within, but
beyond and even in opposition to nation states. Here, fundamental rights are to
be understood as not only the classical human rights or first-generation human
rights, but also later formulations, such as:
[…] all those rights which must be guaranteed in order to ensure equality in relation with
the faculties, needs and expectations that are assumed as essential; to link the forms and
contents of democracy to those faculties, needs and expectations; to ensure peaceful coex-
istence; and finally to operate as laws of the weakest as against the law of the strongest that
would rule in their absence. (Ferrajoli 2007, p. 284)
Ferrajoli explains how modern law was characterized initially by the principle of
‘formal legality’: a legal norm, whatever its content, exists and is valid on ac-
count of the way in which it was formulated, thus leaving aside the traditional
visions of legality as conferred by the justice or rationality intrinsic in the
norm. Later, the principle of ‘substantial legality’ was incorporated, by which
law is subject to conditions not merely formal but also substantial, imposed
by the fundamental principles and rights established in constitutions. The incor-
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poration of this second principle took place following the Second World War
when, both on the national and international plane, the meaning ‘arose’ of a
‘constitution’ as the limit and bond to which the public powers are subject, as
substantive norms guaranteeing both the division of powers and the fundamen-
tal rights of all individuals, which had been negated by fascism. As a conse-
quence, rigid constitutions were to become a regular feature of the legal systems
of democratic states, along with the subjection of nation states to conventions on
human rights in international law (which, as has already been pointed out, do
not yet enjoy the legal force that would be accorded a global constitution).
Hence, in a system with a rigid constitution, a norm is valid not only because
of being in force and having been issued in accordance with the forms predis-
posed for its production, but also because its substantial contents respect the
fundamental principles and rights established in the constitution.
It must be underlined that the entitlement to rights plays a crucial role in the
subject we are dealing with because existing legal systems have not included all
persons as enjoying that status. Although various criteria have existed for setting
some human beings apart from the status that would enable them to be title-
holders of a recognized normativity—which historically has been subject to dif-
ferent limitations and discriminations—today only two basic differences exist
that still delimit the equality of persons: citizenship and capacity to act. On
the basis of these differences, nowadays two important divisions can be distin-
guished in constitutions: the division between ‘rights of the person’ and ‘rights of
the citizen’ (whether entitlement belongs to all persons or only to citizens); and
the division between ‘primary (or substantial) rights’ and ‘secondary (instrumen-
tal or of autonomy) rights’ (whether entitlement belongs to all persons or only to
those who have capacity to act). Hence, an initial classification is formed that is
subjective to the degree that it attends to subjects to whom are attributed, and
who receive, the expectations of a right (whether they are persons or citizens);
and a second classification is formed that is objective in the sense that it rests
on the behavior of subjects that make up the selected category (whether or
not they have capacity to act).
When we cross these two basic divisions, four classes of fundamental rights
come into view:
1. The primary rights of persons, whether or not they are citizens or have or do
not have capacity to act (These include the right to life and the integrity of
the person, personal liberty, freedom of conscience and freedom to express
their opinions, the right to health and education and the penal guarantees.);
2. The primary rights accorded only to citizens, whether or not they enjoy ca-
pacity to act (These include the right to movement within the national terri-
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tory, to meeting and association, the right to work, to subsistence and assis-
tance for those who are unable to work.);
3. The secondary rights ascribed to all persons having capacity to act (among
which stand out the power to negotiate, freedom to sign a contract, to
choose and change jobs, economic freedom, and in general all the potesta-
tive rights in which private autonomy is manifested and upon which the mar-
ket is founded); and
4. The secondary rights reserved only to those citizens with capacity to act
(among which are the right to vote, the right to accede to public office
and, in general, all the potestative rights in which political autonomy is
manifested and upon which representation and political democracy are
founded).
Thus, the distinction between person and citizen that underlies the fundamental
rights recognized in the local constitutions of each nation state is a source of
considerable inequalities and exclusions;⁵ to which must be added, as we
have seen, those derived from the hierarchical system of the nation state that
characterizes our globalized world. Hence, the proposal for a global justice in ac-
cordance with our times ought to include, even if in the long term, the formula-
tion of a global constitution (or equivalent) in which the fundamental rights are
guaranteed for all persons without exceptions. In this way, for Ferrajoli, justice
could finally stop being a matter relegated to individual morality, to acts of be-
nevolence and sentiments of solidarity.⁶
But how can we arrive at the construction of this global justice? One must set
off from the fact that basic questions regarding justice arise when we evaluate a
present situation as unjust. Luis Villoro (2007) proposed a negative path for un-
derstanding justice from the awareness of its absence: reflection on justice must
set off from some concrete reality, an experience of suffering caused by injustice
and the consequent perception that the damage suffered in our relation with oth-
ers has no justification, thus eliciting the rejection of an unjust situation and the
 This is based on the assumption that the rule of law really exists with its corresponding ad-
ministration of justice—an assumption that also harks back to problems that are crucial for the
subject of inequality and exclusion that remain beyond the matters dealt with here.
 Many others have also suggested this—the most outstanding being Nozick (1974), in the con-
text of a minimal state, and Rawls (1999), as regards international relations. To relegate justice to
individual morality, acts of benevolence and sentiments of solidarity also takes us back to cru-
cial problems for the subject of inequality and exclusion, since many atrocities and arbitrary
acts were committed using that as their pretext. For a broader development of the relation be-
tween rights and global justice, see Di Castro (2010).
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determination to resist it. This negative route for understanding justice from the
point of view of its absence has the virtue of concentrating on concrete and di-
verse situations of injustice, rather than abstract universalisms that ignore the
historical, social and cultural differences that influence the way people live
their daily lives. Likewise, Amartya Sen (2009) stresses the need to take specific
situations of injustice as the starting point: the awareness that manifest injusti-
ces can be overcome is what impels social actors to promote changes in society.
Nevertheless, the feeling of injustice that may serve as a signal for mobilization
always demands a critical examination. A theory of justice that aims to serve as a
basis for practical reasoning must include ways of judging how injustice is to be
reduced and how to advance towards justice. The possibility also exists of differ-
ent arguments regarding justice passing the scrutiny of criticism and leading to
divergent conclusions. This should, however, not weaken the commitment to the
need for reasoning.
This negative approach to justice has various antecedents—for example, the
historical study by Barrington Moore (1978) of the sentiment of injustice that on
occasions, though not always, leads to the rejection of an existing situation and
the promotion of change. The starting point of Moore’s study is that social coex-
istence has always implied problems of coordination, among which those related
with authority, the division of labor and the distribution of goods and services
stand out—problems that the members of society must resolve, since otherwise
that society would cease to exist. Among social needs, Moore distinguishes three
aspects in particular: a causal relation as regards the ordinary temporal order
(i.e., if the need is not satisfied something serious will happen); an element of
inevitable choice (i.e., the society may satisfy the need or fail to do so); and,
in the case of managing to satisfy the need, a variety of forms may exist for ach-
ieving this (which may generate, in turn, diverse social inequalities which, it is
hoped, will be accepted). This study concludes that social needs or imperatives
lead to moral imperatives and, through these, when they are violated, to moral
outrage and the feeling of injustice. But social rules and their violation are not
sufficient as fundamental components of moral affront and the sentiment of in-
justice. The latter also has to be ‘uncovered’: people must perceive and define
their situation as a consequence of a human injustice—as a situation that
must not, cannot and need not be borne. This enables us to understand how
there can be long periods in the history of peoples in which large social groups
accept humiliating and unjust situations, and other periods in which they reject
these situations and rebel.
Here, the difference between law and justice takes on its full meaning: not
every positive law is just, nor is every demand for justice transformed into
law. As Javier Muguerza (2004) has pointed out, moral demands, which are
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prior to law, are stated in the name of justice and it is intended that they materi-
alize in a just law. Nonetheless, not even in the latter do justice and law coincide
perfectly, since there is always the possibility of arriving at a fairer law than any
so far known. Muguerza points out that in the history of how the demands for
justice have come to take form in positive law, the most important thing has
been not so much consensus on the fairness of such laws (thereby making a
clear reference to the cornerstone of the principal contemporary theories of jus-
tice), but rather the dissent in view of the injustice undergone by those who were
excluded from its enjoyment. Hence,when we speak of law,we are thinking of an
institutional fact; on the other hand, when we speak of justice we are thinking in
‘utopian’ terms, of that horizon that urges us to ‘go forward’, to ‘make the law
advance’ so as to become fairer.
One of the most relevant examples of this fundamental difference is the his-
tory of the struggle for human rights—before their legal recognition, these were
only ‘moral demands’ claiming justice. In this sense, for Muguerza, as long as
justice is an ideal to be attained (like other ideals of humanity, such as peace
or democracy), utopian thinking will remain alive, accompanying societies in
their development. What is involved is a utopian form of thinking that does
not confuse ideals with illusions, or whose struggle is distant from efficacy—
one that is, rather, closely linked to the ‘here and now of reality’ setting off
along a ‘negative path’. In other words, a struggle for ideals takes place through
the rejection of its opposites. In the case of justice what is aimed at is the erad-
ication of injustices (just as peace is opposed to war and democracy to tyran-
nies). But even in the case of these struggles finally achieving success, utopian
thinking ought not to disappear because, as Muguerza points out:
[…] if by good fortune some day our world were to see the instauration of a peace, a justice
and a democracy widespread and reasonably stable, we would still have to be on our guard
against somebody or something with the power to summon up regressions, causing the re-
turn of humanity to prehistory or its falling into dystopia. In other words, we must ensure
that nobody nor any material situation be capable of transforming the dreams of reason
into nightmares. (Muguerza, 2013, 31)
As we have already seen with Sen, a theory of justice that aims to serve as a basis
for practical reasoning must include ways of judging how injustice is to be re-
duced and how to advance towards justice, without ignoring the possibility of
mutually opposing claims arising, or of reasonable arguments leading to diver-
gent conclusions. Thus, a reflection on justice should acknowledge the relevance
of differences between social groups, as well as the concepts of domination and
oppression. In this sense, it is worth mentioning authors such as Iris Marion
Young (1990) who, far from pretending to elaborate a comprehensive and neces-
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sary theory of universal justice, proposes a rational discourse on justice, the ar-
guments of which cannot be considered definitive because they are directed at
other persons and must remain open to their replies in a situated political dia-
logue—they form a normative reflection characterized by historical and social
contextualization. In fact, constitutions and declarations of fundamental rights
can be conceived of as syntheses of specific historic-socio-cultural dynamics.
As Giacomo Marramao (2008 and 2009) has pointed out, far from reflecting sim-
ple abstractions or ideal dimensions, these respond to actual processes of con-
quest and acquisition of values obtained, whether by hard-fought conflicts or
compromise solutions.
The theories of justice of the past century centered basically on what had to
be equaled between the citizens of a state, what sphere was to be prioritized for
seeking equality (in turn legitimating inequalities in other spheres) and who are
those to be included and who are to remain excluded. Suggestions have been
made to equalize primary goods (Rawls 1971 and 2001), capacities (Sen 1992
and Nussbaum 2006), incomes (Van Parijs 1995), opportunities (Roemer 1998),
and resources (Dworkin 2000), to mention just some of the main proposals.
But today, it is insisted, the citizens and the state have ceased to be relevant be-
cause the living conditions of the subjects of justice do not depend solely on the
political community of which they are citizens; there are extraterritorial and/or
non-territorial structures that have an important impact on those conditions
(Fraser 2008).
As we have seen, citizenship and states are not homogeneous but rather dif-
ferentiated and hierarchized,which leads to serious inequalities, discriminations
and exclusions. Hence it is necessary to overcome ‘explanatory nationalism’ in
order to understand the principal contemporary injustices, which can no longer
be reduced to domestic causal factors—such as the dominion of the local elites
and the political weakness of the impoverished majority—and which incorpo-
rate, for example, international economic and power relations (Pogge 2009).
Likewise, in our globalized world, in which a transition is taking place between
a modernity characterized by an inter-state order under the hegemony of the
West and one characterized by a new supranational order in the process of
being constructed multilaterally, the standard conception of the processes of uni-
versalization has been questioned. That conception takes as its reference two
conditions linked to the beginning of modernity: equivalence of culture and
identity, and the uniform conception of universalism. The latter in particular
needs rethinking if it is to be applicable in a world of multiplicity and difference:
“it must be newly formulated, taking as its starting point the awareness that—to
borrow the celebrated words of Hamlet—there are more ways towards liberty and
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democracy than are dreamt of in our poor philosophy” (Marramao 2009,
pp. 14– 15).
Let us take it by stages. There are two basic ways of conceptualizing the
problem of cultural differences: on the one hand, there is what has been called
strong or mosaic multiculturalism, according to which human groups and cul-
tures are well-delineated and identifiable totalities that coexist (although with
clear frontiers) as if pieces of a mosaic; on the other hand, different cultures
can be regarded as constant creations, recreations and negotiations of imaginary
frontiers between an ‘us’ and the ‘other(s)’ (Benhabib 2002). In the latter case,
the ‘other’ is always linked to the ‘us’; we cannot lose sight of the fact that ‘one-
self ’ can only exist as such in distinction from ‘another’. Hence, we can conceive
the various struggles of persons and groups as a demand for respect, freedom
and equality, while each maintains a sense of ‘oneself ’. In view of the cultural
differences that characterize everyday coexistence in almost all corners of the
planet—the exchange of which has increased and accelerated with the process
of globalization—two perspectives can be adopted to accompany the conceptions
already mentioned. The first is a vision of cultures as clearly definable totalities:
a view of the culture under study as seen from the outside which generates a co-
herent image of it with the aim of understanding it, and at times also of control-
ling it. In the second, on the contrary, the vision is from within the culture, in
which the participants experience their traditions, histories, rituals and symbols,
tools and material conditions of life through shared narrative accounts, although
also subject to controversy and even susceptible of being overturned.⁷
The globalization process is not only characterized by the increasing interde-
pendence of all nations and, in this sense, by a strong impulse towards homog-
enization—it has also led to a process of localization, and hence an insistence on
differences. In response to this, the term ‘glocalization’ has made its appearance
in recognition of the fact that the tendencies toward homogenization and heter-
ogenization, far from confronting each other, take each other’s existence for
granted. In fact, as Roland Robertson (2000) has emphasized, in various areas
of contemporary life, both homogeneity and heterogeneity combine, as do uni-
versalism and particularism. The dichotomies ‘we/others’, ‘West/East’ and
‘North/South’ mask a considerable diversity in each of these poles; there is no
single ‘we’, nor ‘West’, nor ‘North’ confronting a discrete ‘other’, ‘East’ or
‘South’. Such simplifying stereotypes must be left behind, with the understand-
ing that they are mere indicators that include within each extreme a plurality of
 For a broader development of the relation between identities and justice, see Di Castro
(2012a).
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phenomena. As Marramao has pointed out, the monolithic representation of cul-
ture postulates a reified image of civilizations as monolithic entities, thus prepar-
ing a fertile soil for the arising of fundamentalisms. Hence, the need arises to go
beyond these visions and to confront the crisis of the two models of modern
democratic inclusion: both the republican model that assimilates differences
in a neutral space of citizenship without belonging, and the strong multicultural
model in the ‘mosaic’ sense. Thus, against the universalism of identity postulat-
ed by the conceptions of citizenship by assimilation and the anti-universalist dif-
ferentialism postulated by the stronga versions of multiculturalism, the author
proposes a cosmopolitanism of difference that, drawing on multidisciplinary
studies of comparative law and cultural anthropology, sets about outlining pos-
sible codes for an intercultural democracy based on multi-polar and mestizo law.
The identity characteristic of present global conflicts cause them to manifest
a greater proximity to the fundamental conflicts that had marked the civil wars
of religion in the phase before Westphalia than those typical conflicts of the in-
dustrial era (Marramao 2003 and Sen 2006). Against this, the tradition of modern
rationalism—even in its noblest forms, such as the Kantian ethical universalism
and legal guaranteeism—seems to lack by itself the capacity to find a solution to
the conflicts of our times and to contribute to building a ‘cosmopolitan republic’.
In a similar sense to Sen’s reflections on the concept of democracy,⁸ Marramao
states, quoting Raimon Panikkar (2008), that:
[…] the house of the universal is still not ready; it has to be constructed multilaterally. We
cannot say to others: ‘come on and be guests in our house; integrate and let yourselves be
annexed to our civilization of law’. On the contrary, it is necessary to negotiate a new com-
mon space: together to build a new house of the universal. If our view of other contexts of
experience were less vitiated by prejudices, we might become aware of the existence in
other regions of the world of conceptions of liberty and dignity of persons just as noble
as ours (or at least not less respectable). (Marramao 2009, p. 26)
One characteristic that accompanies the history of the nation state is the process
of assimilation that has tended to blot out community identities, but which in
many cases has led to these resisting in underground forms, with occasional ex-
plosions of violence. Hence, we should not be surprised that one of the main
problems of contemporary political theory has to do with the conflicts of recog-
nition and their relation with conflicts of redistribution. If we set off from a rad-
 Sen has pointed to the undue appropriation of values by the West, which responds to “a seri-
ous lack of attention to the intellectual history of non-western societies, on the other, to the con-
ceptual defect of conceiving democracy substantially in terms of votes and elections, instead of
the broad perspective of public discussion” (Sen 2010, p. 40).
Globalization, Inequalities and Justice 133
ical democratic interpretation of the principle of equal value, as does Nancy
Fraser (2008), the most general significance of justice ought to be parity in par-
ticipation, and overcoming injustice would be a matter of dismantling institu-
tionalized obstacles that prevent some from being able to participate in equality
with others. It is here that the political takes on a special relevance, to the degree
that it provides the scenario in which to develop struggles for both redistribution
and recognition. This has to be thought out on a global level, giving particular
emphasis to the problems of inequality and exclusion, not only between nations
but also within them. Hence, far from remaining confined within the narrow
sphere of the state, rethinking justice today requires considering it on different
scales and levels, both above and below the state, which introduces also the rec-
ognition of a diversity of agents and powers, not only political parties and public
agencies.
History has also shown that the attempt to impose a standard model, ethno-
centric and hegemonic, of modernization is doomed inevitably to produce an ex-
tension and deepening of conflicts. Thus, an adequate policy towards the ‘others’
cannot be the ‘exportation of freedom’, but should instead be a policy favoring
the emergence of processes fostering rights and democracy, on the basis of au-
tonomous paths and methods:
[…] we should be more open to what an old and illustrious anthropology called ‘functional
equivalents’, taking as our program a subsequent, decisive theoretical task: to graduate
from the method of comparison to the politics of translation… We should be capable of de-
tecting in other cultures principles, values, normative criteria, of equal value although de-
fined in different ways from our own: without yielding to the temptation of imposing upon
them our own definitions, once again fraudulently positing the old Manichean division be-
tween good and bad. (Marramao 2009, pp. 29–30)
The principal contemporary conflicts and injustices, therefore, demand that his-
torical dynamics be oriented towards a path transcending identities postulated
as closed or homogeneous. A politics of translation and a cosmopolitanism of
difference could make the globalization process a space for negotiation and co-
operation oriented towards the construction of a less unjust world.
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Julia Muñoz Velasco
From a Bounded View to a Globalized
Perspective: Considerations on a Human
Right to Health
Abstract: In this essay, I will argue that even when there are important difficul-
ties concerning the possibility of a human right to health that must be ad-
dressed, it is nonetheless a better strategy for promoting global health than
the ones relying entirely on States’ duties or on a duty to charity. The idea
that there is such thing as a right to health is very controversial. One of the
most important difficulties has been to determine if a right to health can be con-
sidered as a human right, as an institutional right or just as a humanitarian char-
itable cause.Which of these we take it to be will shape the possibility of a global
demand for health.
The idea that there is such thing as a right to health is very controversial, and
“there is no single universally agreed-upon interpretation of the right to health.”
(Lawrence 2014, p. 257) One of the most important difficulties has been to deter-
mine if a right to health can be considered as a human right, as an institutional
right or just as a humanitarian charitable cause. Which of these we take it to be
will shape the possibility of a global demand for health.
One can argue that, in fact, there is already a human right to health, stated
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 25 (1) of the Universal Dec-
laration states that:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessa-
ry social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disa-
bility, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
(UN General Assembly 217 A (III), art. 25(1))
Another formulation of the human right to health is provided by article 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which
states that everyone has the right to “the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health.” (United Nations, Treaty Series,
vol. 993, art. 12) The ICESCR points out that this goal can be achieved by provid-
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ing medical care for all, assuring the improvement of environmental conditions,
reducing the stillbirth-rate and infant mortality, and with prevention and treat-
ment of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases (United Nations,
Treaty Series, vol. 993, art. 12).
Despite being recognized as such by the Universal Declaration and being re-
affirmed by the ICESCR, there have been many arguments that intend to show
that both formulations are too vague, too demanding or even damaging (Wolff
2012a), and that consequently, they do not offer a good account of what a
human right to health could be. Although the ICESCR offers us a more precise
account, both formulations face several problems and have been considered
as posing a spurious demand that cannot be legitimately considered as a
human right.
In this essay, I will argue that even when there are important difficulties con-
cerning the possibility of a human right to health that must be addressed, it is
nonetheless a better strategy for promoting global health than the ones relying
entirely on States’ duties or on a duty to charity. To show this, I will present
two strong objections that have been made against the possibility of a human
right to health. The first corresponds to Onora O’Neill, who has pointed out
that it is incoherent to propose a human right to health because to every right
there must be a correspondent duty and in this case, it is not possible allocate
who should bear the correspondent duties. The second belongs to Gopal Sreeni-
vasan. Although he has presented different arguments to reject the possibility a
right to health, here I will discuss only his argument regarding the ‘doubly uni-
versal’ condition for every human right, and how this condition cannot be met
by a pretended right to health. After reviewing these objections, I will explain
what would be a strategy that relies on a duty to charity for the global promotion
of help. I will also argue how this contrast allows us to appreciate the advantag-
es of a human rights narrative.
Onora O’Neill’s objection
to a human right to health
There are two main arguments that O’Neill poses against the possibility of a
human right to health. The first stresses the interdependence between rights
and obligations and denounces the incoherence of defending a human right to
health that aims to be universally claimable, but that cannot allocate who is re-
sponsible for the claimed demands. The second argument focuses on the distinc-
tion between liberty and welfare rights to claim that a right to health is properly
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a welfare right and that as such, it cannot be regarded as a human, pre-institu-
tional right. Together, these two arguments constitute a strong objection to the
defendants of a human right to health.
Firstly, I will address the argument about the interdependence between
rights and obligations. O’Neill contends that some discourses about human
rights have abused a cosmopolitan rhetoric making rights the center of the dis-
cussions about justice and leaving behind concerns about the allocation of the
correspondent obligations. After all, it is more promotable and certainly easier
to propose that some demand must be universally claimable as a human right
than stating precisely how—and especially, by whom—that demand is supposed
to be met. O’Neill says that:
… only if we jettison the entire normativity understanding of rights in favour of a merely
aspirational view, can we break the normative link between rights and their counterpart ob-
ligations. If we take rights seriously and see them as normative rather than aspirational, we
must take obligations seriously. (O’Neill 2016, p. 196)
It would be one thing to defend a human right to health if we only pretend to
point out an aspirational or humanitarian goal that would serve as an ideal,
without any kind of normative force—but this weak scenario is not what is ex-
pected from a human right to health. For example, the ICESCR has made it pos-
sible—through the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESC)—
to receive reports from its State parties and to make some suggestions about what
they can improve (Gostin 2014, p. 252). Although considered an important step,
this has also been regarded as insufficient. The main problem with focusing too
much on the rights and leaving behind their counterpart obligations is that even
if there is an individual claim to health, there is no one that is accountable for
meeting that demand—and after all, ‘rights are demands on others’ (O’Neill
2000, p. 126). From O’Neill’s reading, it is incoherent to think about a human
right to health if we cannot offer an account of who is responsible for what is
being claimed. But this question about who is responsible in the specific case
of a human right to health is what leads us to the second part of O’Neill’s objec-
tion: the distinction between liberty and welfare rights.
Liberty rights have also been named ‘civil and political rights’ (Gostin 2014,
p. 246) and ‘negative rights’ (Nagel 2005, p. 127), because they only demand that
others do not interfere with these rights. It has also been assumed that these lib-
erty rights, precisely because they are negative rights, demand “no positive ac-
tion or resource commitments from government.” (Gostin 2014, p. 246) In con-
trast, welfare rights have been considered a kind of ‘positive right’, because
they demand more than just a non-interference policy from States and from
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the international community.Welfare rights are also identified as ‘economic, so-
cial and cultural rights’ and, unlike liberty rights, it has been assumed that they
imply a much bigger commitment on behalf of the State (both in terms of positive
action and resources) in order to meet the claims of welfare rights.
The idea that one of the most striking differences between liberty and wel-
fare rights is the level of commitment that is being asked from the States has
been widely criticized. If we think of this contrast in terms of individual liberties
and socioeconomic rights to public goods, this certainly can lead us towards this
conclusion—but “the idea that civil and political rights impose no affirmative
State obligations, while socioeconomic rights impose costs on societies, is vastly
oversimplified.”¹
Departing from this explanation of the difference between liberty and wel-
fare rights in terms of positive or negative rights, and of the commitment as-
sumed by the States, O’Neill explains the difference between liberty and welfare
rights² in terms of a right’s universality and its independence from any given in-
stitution. Liberty rights have a universal scope, regarding both their right-holders
and their duty bearers. That is, any human being has a right to freedom of speech
or to freedom of religion. Equally, every human being has the duty to respect
these rights of others, and States must assure that this condition is met. Liberty
rights assume the whole international community both as the right-holder and
the duty-bearer. Welfare rights, however, cannot have this universal scope.
Even if we consider that every human being has the right to health, its corre-
spondent duty cannot also rely on the whole international community. Providing
health care, or preventive care such as vaccinations, is not a task that can be
 For more detail on how this has been used as an argument against the possibility of welfare
rights (and especially against a human right to health), see: John Tasioulas and Effy Vayena
(2015a). They argue that there is not an antagonistic relation between these rights, and that
both liberty and welfare rights, require an important commitment in resources and in positive
action by the government.
 This distinction has also been explained as a contrast between individual and collective
rights. The existence of collective rights has been widely discussed (Spicker 2001, p. 9). Even
if O’Neill does not appeal to the distinction between individual and collective rights to explain
liberty and welfare rights, I consider that this is also an important distinction because both pairs
of rights have been regarded as equivalent—liberty rights being individual rights, while welfare
rights are collective rights. If we accept that for something to count as a right it must be individ-
ually claimable, this equivalency would prove to be detrimental to the defense of welfare rights
and thus, to a human right to health. This has raised arguments that there are no collective rights
and that there cannot be individual claims to collective public goods such as health or food.
Thus, this individualist feature of human rights has been important to distinguish what can
count as a human right and what should be excluded. For more detail, see: John Tasioulas
and Effy Vayena (2015a; 2015b).
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done by every individual around the world. For conditions of health to be met it
is necessary to appeal to certain institutions—in this case, States as primary
agents of justice and other institutions like hospitals or clinics, as secondary
agents of justice.³
For O’Neill, the right to health cannot be regarded a human right because it
does not have a universal scope regarding the duty bearers; that is, we cannot
allocate its correspondent duties to the international community even if we
want to ascribe the claimable individual right to every human being. Moreover,
it cannot be a human right because it necessarily relies on the existence of cer-
tain institutions. Its alleged universality as a human right cannot in fact be inde-
pendent from institutional structures, and for this reason, O’Neill concludes that
welfare rights, such as the right to health “must be special, institutional rights
rather than universal human rights.” (O’Neill 2016, p. 199)
O’Neill’s objection does not stop there. The first part of her objection af-
firmed that it is incoherent to normatively sustain human rights without allocat-
ing the duties implied in them. But from what I have said here, it would appear
that this challenge can be dismissed because O’Neill recognizes the States as pri-
mary agents of justice and other institutions (from hospitals to NGOs) as secon-
dary agents of justice. At least, this is the standard position when thinking of
who is responsible for guaranteeing and protecting human rights, and this is
how it is managed by the ICESCR and its State parties. But O’Neill not only con-
siders that welfare right are institutional and not human rights—she also strong-
ly criticizes this standard position for both human and welfare rights, and dis-
cusses the great difficulties of allocating the duties of welfare rights.
If a right to health is institutional given its dependency on being fulfilled
only by certain given institutions, then the success of this kind of rights depends
on the reliability of its institutions. But O’Neill, challenging the standard view,
affirms that States are ill suited to being primary agents of justice for welfare
rights. The same cosmopolitan rhetoric denounced by O’Neill for focusing too
much on defending rights and too little on allocating duties is also responsible
for idealizing States’ agency regarding the institutional right to health. She dis-
 The distinction between primary and secondary agents of justice is used by O’Neill to identify
who has the greater responsibility regarding the realization of rights. Simon Caney explains
O’Neill’s distinction, saying that while primary agents of justice have a legislative and an exec-
utive role, secondary agents limit themselves to the tasks assigned to them by the primary agents
of justice. Caney further claims that this distinction is very important to thinking of how human
right’s correspondent duties can be allocated, but he claims that we could understand this dif-
ference as two compatible roles that can be adopted by different institutions, rather than differ-
ent kinds of agents (Caney 2013, pp. 133– 156).
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tinguishes between an abstract and an idealized theory: abstraction, on the one
hand, is indispensable, because only by leaving some act-descriptions indeter-
minate can we offer a proposal that is suitable for a plurality of diverse agents;
idealization, on the other hand, does not leave indeterminate certain predicates
and rather, it erroneously asserts or denies some predicates about the agents in-
volved (O’Neill 2000, p. 68).
The standard view regarding the States’ role as primary agents of justice for
welfare rights is guilty of idealizing States’ agency. O’Neill thinks that every ide-
alization leads us to a ‘rosy view’ in which individual rights are guaranteed by
the State, and reminds us that:
… we do not inhabit an ideal world. Idealized conceptions of justice simply do not apply to
international relations, social relations or individual acts in a world in which states, men
and women always lack the capacities and the opportunities of idealized agents. (O’Neill
2000, p. 162)
One way to avoid this idealization is to recognize that States are ill suited for
being the primary agents of justice for welfare rights, because they lack either
the capacities or the resources (or even both) needed to accomplish this. O’Neill
identifies three possibilities that not only aren’t farfetched, but are rather com-
mon, and that could severely undercut the efforts towards realizing an institu-
tional right to health. States can be: (1) unjust with their own people, such as
tyrannies and rogue States; (2) incapable of securing justice for their citizens be-
cause they either lack the capabilities to enforce their law successfully or be-
cause they lack the minimal infrastructure needed to secure welfare rights,
such as schools or hospitals; or (3) weakened by different processes of globali-
zation that give international agencies more power within their boundaries
(O’Neill 2016, pp.164– 165).
In light of these difficulties, O’Neill suggests that we cannot continue with
our idealized conception of States’ agencies, but nor can we wait until all
these problems are solved to continue the realization of institutional or
human rights. To wait until States can be sufficient primary agents of justice
would amount to returning to an aspirational or humanitarian conception of
rights, disregarding their normative role.
Instead of abandoning their normative role, O’Neill invites us to consider the
possibility of replacing States in their role as primary agents, and to be more flex-
ible regarding who can be responsible for the duties entailed in institutional and
human rights. She argues that for the realization of an institutional right to
health, it is indispensable to recognize the importance of globalization and
how it has shaped the way we think about epidemics, contagious diseases,
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the availability of vaccinations and health services around the globe. For exam-
ple, some NGOs have been able to substitute for or substantially aid different
States in providing all the services that a right to health implies. O’Neill asks
us to consider more global agents to whom we could allocate the correspondent
duties of a right to health. This strategy has the advantage of not relying on an
idealized conception of States’ agency, and because is not territorially bounded,
it can better address global health problems.
Gopal Sreenivasan’s objection
to a human right to health
Gopal Sreenivasan has given several arguments to refute the possibility of a right
to health.⁴ In this section, I will only explain why Sreenivasan thinks that there
cannot be a human right to health. Although he does not deny the existence of a
State’s duty to take care of the conditions for its citizen’s health, he denies that
we can find a correspondent right to this duty. For Sreenivasan (as well as for
O’Neill⁵), the relation between rights and duties can be explained in the follow-
ing way: for every right, there must always be a correspondent duty and a duty
 Sreenivasan has been a strong and extensive critic of a pretended right to health. I consider it
important to briefly say here why he considers that any right to health is unattainable. One of
Sreenivasan’s most devastating arguments against the possibility of a right to health is to appeal
to the ‘nature of health’. This argument claims that health is an outcome that depends on many
factors, among them, luck and biology. From this, he affirms that there cannot be any duty that
can be held against the State to assure that all the relevant factors of health are met. Given that
there can be no rights if there is no allocation of the proper duties, a right to health cannot be
understood as an outcome. He also considers the arguments that try to replace ‘health’ for
‘health care’ in the formulation of this human right to dismiss the ‘nature of health’ argument,
and to claim that what is being demanded is not an outcome but a service. He discredits this too,
by pointing out that health care is just one part of what a right to health pretends to claim, so
that it would be a morally defeating strategy to falsely equate health to health care. These argu-
ments are very important to understand Sreenivasan’s position, but I have decided to focus just
on his argument against the possibility of a human right to health, and not against a right to
health in general, because I consider that it emphasizes an important difficulty entailed by a
common conception of what it takes for something to be regarded as a human right. See: Sree-
nivasan (2012; 2016).
 “While claim rights are mirror images of obligations, not all obligations have mirror images
(…) This thought by itself is reason enough to begin with obligations and not with rights.”
(O’Neill 2000, p. 99)
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bearer, even if not every duty entails a right. Sreenivasan explains this thought
with the following example. Even if one accepts that:
… there is a moral duty to provide—or even, that some agent has a moral duty to provide—
individuals in a given population with herd immunity against contagious disease (…) [one
can still deny] that any individual has a moral claim-right that correlates with any agent’s
moral duty to provide herd immunity. (Sreenivasan 2016, pp. 347–348)
He assumes that the agent who could bear this duty is the ‘domestic state’ (Sree-
nivasan 2016, p. 360), but even with this consideration, he rejects that from this
duty we could conclude the existence of a right to health.
First of all, he takes human rights to be a special kind of moral rights rather
than international legal rights. Then, he asks what distinguishes human rights
from other kinds of moral rights, and what makes them “more than a random
label for any old universal standard of justice.” (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 360) The
answer is what he calls the ‘doubly universal’ (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 355) condi-
tion of every moral human right. As the name suggests, it alludes to two univer-
sality requirements that must be met by a moral right in order for it to be con-
sidered a human right.
The first universality requirement is called the ‘synchronic universality’ and
it demands that “if any human being has a given human right, then every other
contemporary human being also has that right.” (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 355) This
entails that every human being on earth has the same claim-right to health. Even
if we overlook the difficulty (outlined by O’Neill) of the allocation of the corre-
spondent duties, there is another problem when we consider whether a right
to health can meet this first universality requirement. That any human being
on earth can claim her or his right to health regardless of the correspondent
State’s resources would be an idealization, if not a serious mistake. One cannot
claim a right to health without considering the specific socioeconomic condi-
tions that shape one’s access to health care, vaccinations, clean water or food.
From this, it seems problematic to assert that a right to health could meet the
synchronic universality requirement, because even if we want to assert that
every human being has a right to health, actual economic conditions will deter-
mine whether each one of them actually has the possibility of claiming and re-
ceiving what is guarded by this right.
This consideration leads us to what Sreenivasan identifies as the ‘moral sub-
stance’ universality requirement, which he explains through the slogan: “One
world, one standard.” (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 355) This second requirement affirms
that “for any particular human right that all contemporary human beings have,
the moral substance conveyed by the right is the same for every right-holder.”
144 Julia Muñoz Velasco
(Sreenivasan 2016, p. 355) The difference between the first and second universal-
ity requirement is that this last one adds a temporal criterion on how a human
right should be realized. For Sreenivasan, moral human rights should always
rule out “the doctrine of ‘progressive realisation.’” (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 355)
The realization of a moral human right to freedom of speech is not a goal that
must be gradually achieved. Rather, it is a moral rule that states how we should
act towards others’ rights and what we could individually claim as our right to
do. But this is not the case with a human right to health. It is impossible for
it to be realized at once. Rather, it would seem that what we consider to be
the defining characteristics of a human right to health, such as access to some
services and goods, is inherently relative to a plan of progressive realization, de-
pending on the limited resources and capacities that any State (as duty bearer)
would have. As an example, Sreenivasan says “the state of Senegal simply can-
not afford to spend $1038 (PPP) annually per capita on health.” (Sreenivasan
2016, p. 360) If we concluded that the State of Senegal cannot realize the
human right to health as other States are doing it during the same period,
would this be enough to blame the State of Senegal for the failing of the
human right to health? Could we hold accountable all those States that, due
to their limited resources, fall behind on the ‘moral substance’ universality re-
quirement?
The most fundamental idea to Sreenivasan’s second universality require-
ment seems to be that human rights should exclude the possibility of different
States implementing the same “right at different levels or to different standards
without infringing on their correlative moral duties.” (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 355)
As stated by the ICESCR, a human right to health entails that every human
being has the right to “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of phys-
ical and mental health.” (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, art. 12) The kind
of health care that one can receive and claim varies greatly from country to coun-
try. It would seem that ‘the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health’ can only be determined within each State’s boundaries. If this is true,
there can be no universally claimable human right to health, because the duties
that correspond to this claim are dependent on the limited resources and capaci-
ties of the State as the morally responsible duty bearer.
Moreover, we can conclude that States with the most limited resources are
not the only ones that cause this failure to meet the second universality require-
ment. Even in those countries that can guarantee access to health care to all its
citizens, and that regulate access to clean water, food and preventive goods such
as vaccinations, there is always room for improvement. Unlike other human
rights like the right to freedom of expression, a human right to health can be pro-
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moted more fittingly, according to the needs of the people, by better infrastruc-
ture, resources and education.
The difficulty arising from the second universality requirement has led to the
consideration of welfare rights as secondary rights, and this is reflected by inter-
national agreements:
Scholars sometimes frame civil and political rights as “first generation” and economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights as “second generation”. Despite the unity and equal status of
human rights in the UDHR, international treaties reflect this divide. The ICCPR demands
immediate state compliance, while the ICESCR is progressively realizable. The collective na-
ture of socioeconomic rights, the progressive realization, and connection to resources
meant that they would not be as rigorously enforced. The second generation of rights —al-
though of equal value— has in practice been relegated to secondary status. (Gostin 2014,
p. 246)
Unlike human rights that can be enforced right away (for example, to prevent the
obstruction of liberty rights), a right to health can only be achieved progressively.
The ICESCR recognizes this in its second article by stating that:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the max-
imum of its available resources,with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particu-
larly the adoption of legislative measures. (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, art. 2)
This article leads us to accept what Sreenivasan denounces—that is, that a right
to health cannot meet the second universality requirement: “‘One world, one
standard’ turns out to be a rather challenging requirement for a right to health
to satisfy.” (Sreenivasan 2016, p. 361) If human rights are characterized by virtue
of their doubly universal nature, and a right to health cannot satisfy these re-
quirements, it follows that, just as O’Neill also concluded, a pretended right to
health cannot be regarded as a human right. Furthermore, even when O’Neill ac-
cepts that it can be an institutional right, she points out severe difficulties en-
tailed in its realization. In the same way, Sreenivasan’s criticisms lead us to ques-
tion whether it is a worthy strategy to keep trying to defend the existence of a
right to health, even when it would not be considered as a human right.
Along the lines of both authors’ arguments, we could ask now whether it
would be better to just consider a certain duty towards health, that States should
bear, even if this does not have a correlate claim-right.What would that duty be?
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Taking global health seriously:
the insufficiency of a duty to charity
O’Neill’s and Sreenivasan’s arguments have pointed out the difficulties of realiz-
ing a right to health even within a State’s boundaries. As long as this right de-
pends on institutional structures and these are insufficient, the realization of
this right will be at risk. When we consider these difficulties from a global
point of view, the problem seems to amplify. If a State cannot successfully
bear its duty towards its own citizens, what kind of duty could be enforced be-
tween different States to promote health globally?
If we decide to abandon the human rights narrative, and even the defense of
an institutional right to health, it would still be possible to say that every State
bears a duty to its own citizens to provide conditions for their health.⁶ But here I
want to suggest that the strategy of considering States’ duties is also insufficient
for promoting health conditions for every human being.
The question about what kind of States’ duties could promote health glob-
ally has raised a debate between cosmopolitans and communitarists about the
existence of international duties to justice and, in this case, of international du-
ties to promote health. I will not discuss this debate here. Instead, I want to point
out how unsatisfactory it is to establish a duty to charity as an international
strategy to promote health.
One of the main problems regarding international relations of justice is that
it recognizes each State’s sovereignty as fundamental, up to the point that it does
not necessarily entail any enforceable duties towards other States—or even to-
wards human beings that are not citizens, even if they are within that State’s
boundaries. One strategy to avoid the problems corresponding to international
duties of justice has been to appeal to a duty to charity between States. This strat-
egy has had important outcomes, and has been more easily adopted because a
duty to charity is less demanding for States than the recognition of an enforce-
able human right to health. This duty to charity only supposes that: “one can
help others in serious distress without excessive cost to oneself.” (Nagel 2008,
p. 52) It does not impose how many resources should be invested towards pro-
 I do not intend to address here the degree up to which a State should care and provide for the
conditions of health of its citizens; nor whether this would have to involve every State providing
universal access to health care, or even to vaccinations and clean water and food. I consider sim-
ply that all States should bear this duty, even if we accept that there could be varying degrees of
each State’s level of commitment.
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moting global health—rather, it can be left up to each State to decide how to
manage their aid towards other countries.
Although this duty to charity has been carried out with fewer problems than
the strong enforcement of an alleged human right to health, it faces serious ob-
jections when regarded as a solution or as a way to promote global health. Two
strong criticisms of the duty to charity as a replacement of the human rights
strategy are: firstly, that a duty to charity always entails a dubious distinction
of who is most in need and thus most deserving the correspondent aid, creating
more inequality; and secondly, that charity neither remedies nor corrects the un-
derlying structures from which many health problems arise at an international
level—it merely reaffirms the dependence of some States on others.
A duty to charity is flawed from its very conception as a viable way to pro-
mote global health. Firstly, it could be argued that all foreign aid should be di-
rected towards helping those most in need. This leads to the distinction between
the ‘very poor’ and the ‘relatively poor’ (Millum 2012, p. 27), which creates more
inequality: the international community can leave behind those who are not
most in need—even when they face severe health problems—because their aid
is not (yet) intended for them. But how can it be decided who is most in
need? And who decides where the aid should go? This undetermined structure
of charity has promoted that biased political and economic interests become
the factors that decide who receives help now, and who should wait until
their situation worsens to receive it.
The second problem with charity is that even when regarded as a duty, it
necessarily entails a relation between unequal partners—one in desperate
need and one with enough resources to help others without compromising its
own interests. If we rely on this structure to promote global health, there can
be no real progress; just momentary relief for those in the most vulnerable po-
sitions, but without an actual solution. The point of these criticisms is not that
a duty to charity is useless. Instead, it emphasizes that it is not an actual solu-
tion because it does not challenge the causes that obstruct the realization of the
conditions for health.
Every action that can be regarded as charity assumes from the start a paral-
lel between inequality of wealth and inequality of power (Nagel 2008, p. 52).
From this starting point, global health does not stand a chance, because the re-
sources needed to promote it are still being withheld from those in need. Further-
more, weak States could argue that they are not able to perform their duties to-
wards their citizens due to lack of donations, and given that aid is not mandatory
and it is not a reliable source of resources, this attitude could lead to a worsening
of the conditions of health for citizens of these countries (Gostin 2014, p. 19).
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Appeals to charity, even when regarded as a special international duty, may
still seem a more feasible way to promote global health than posing a human
right to health, which faces the criticisms presented earlier. But in fact, a duty
to charity would not accomplish much towards this global goal, because:
Rich donors remain rich (…) the poor remain poor, though, for the moment, not in desper-
ate need. Humanitarian aid is essentially conservative; it preserves existing power struc-
tures (…) By contrast recognizing someone’s rights is (…) to put them in control (…) It is
to accept another person’s legitimate claims to power. Rights claims are not restricted to
needs, but also extend to liberties and opportunities (…) Humanitarianism is, therefore, at-
tractive to those who are in power and like to keep things that way. (Wolff 2012a, p. 8)
If we take seriously the thought of global health, it seems that there are impor-
tant reasons to recover the human rights narrative, even with all its problems.
Here, I will present what I consider to be three of the most relevant reasons to
continue with the human rights narrative.
First, one weighty flaw of a duty to charity is that it disentangles global
health from a correspondent sense of responsibility. From the point of view of
charity, wealthier States do not have an obligation to make donations or provide
aid to others, and weak States may excuse themselves and disregard their re-
sponsibilities towards their citizens just by maintaining that they have not re-
ceived enough resources. In this scenario where no one is responsible, charity
leaves us with a far more diminished hope of achieving global health. A
human rights narrative, although having the problem of allocating specific du-
ties, recognizes the need of asking who would be responsible for achieving
those rights.
Second, if we consider global health to be ‘a globally shared responsibility’
(Golin 2014, p. 19), we must make explicit the damaging effect of international
omissions. A duty to charity cannot address the lack or insufficiency of dona-
tions as a morally worrisome omission, precisely because it does not recognize
any inherent responsibility for donors. The human rights narrative, by contrast,
makes visible the impact of omissions:
Individuals may have been wronged through neglect, but no rights would have been violat-
ed, on such a view. However, once the claim is made that rights will be violated if assis-
tance is not forthcoming, the argument has shifted to one of justice: that we neglect or vi-
olate people’s rights by failing to help. (Wolff 2012b, p.79)
Unlike a duty to charity, an appeal to human rights can point out the need to find
agents that are responsible for global health. It can also help to denounce what
is not being done to promote it, and to emphasize the need to repair this failure.
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A third advantage of the human rights narrative is that it does not presup-
pose a hierarchic structure in which what motivates global health is not a
human entitlement but, on one hand a never ending need and, on the other,
mere philanthropic donations. Given that charity has as its core the idea of
need as its motive, it cannot end it; charity’s aim is just to briefly mitigate it.
These three reasons offer an important counterweight to criticisms of human
rights and of the possibility of a human right to health. One of the most relevant
flaws of a human right to health, as regarded by O’Neill and Sreenivasan, is that
it does not meet certain universality requirements that are usually considered to
be the defining features of any human right that can be legitimately regarded as
such. But these criticisms do not necessarily force us to abandon this narrative.
Instead, they can be seen as good motives to revise what we consider fundamen-
tal about human rights and, perhaps, to reconsider how have we been thinking
about their universality.
Concluding remarks
One way in which globalization has shaped theoretical discussions about health
is that it has shown how flexible and limited boundaries are, when we consider
health problems and the resources and capabilities we have to address them. The
multitudinous factors that are relevant to people’s health around the globe can-
not be bounded within States. Certain “situations can only really make sense
from a global perspective that takes in the structure that affect people’s lives
(…) And it is only from a global perspective that options for addressing their dif-
ficulties can be identified.” (Millum 2012, p. 2)
This change of perspective, which is necessary to address contemporary
problems of health, has not yet found an appropriate theoretical justification.
One way it has been defended is by posing a human right to health. But this
idea has received strong objections that question whether it is actually possible
to claim a human right to health, and whether this would be the best strategy to
promote health. In this essay, I have intended to show that although it is not free
from difficulties, it still is the best strategy available in order to continue to de-
fend a global perspective on health. Much still needs to be said about how a
right to health can be considered a human right if it does not possess the univer-
sal requirements that we have ascribed to other human rights since their incep-
tion. I consider that these objections raise an important challenge to the way we
think not only about global health, but about human rights in general. Perhaps,
in adopting this global perspective, we could reconsider the way we think about
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the relationship between universal requirements and global demands regarding
health.
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Who Are the Subjects of Justice in a
Globalized World?
From the ‘Unidimensional Identity’
to the ‘Diversity of Identities’
Abstract: This article states that the idea of national citizenship, bound to rights
and duties circumscribed to a State, is no longer fit to reflect upon the political
challenges of a globalizing world. Instead, I argue in favor of the ‘diversity of
identities’ as a ‘political heuristic’ that offers an alternative frame to the question
about who is the subject of justice.
Our current understanding of the political and social action lacks of something:
the concept of a citizen that we inherit from Modernity—the citizen as the subject
of rights and duties—doesn’t let us explain its current dynamics in a globalizing
world. Problems such as migration, refugees and contemporary social move-
ments, among others, have led us to problematize two ideas associated with
that concept: a) citizenship is defined based on exclusively national rights and
duties, that is, those which are circumscribed to a politically and geographically
well limited territory; and b) a State’s citizens are the only subjects for whom jus-
tice is understood as the equal distribution of those rights and duties. But the
paradigms of national citizenship and just distribution are being undermined
by globalization’s dynamics, since we are shown that their effects are transna-
tional and that the expressions against these effects can also have a global char-
acter. This context rushes us to find new forms of understanding for those trans-
formations, as well as the political action of people. To meet this challenge, this
work argues in favor of the idea of the ‘diversity of identities’ as a way to under-
stand people close to their concrete experiences of injustice, and as a ‘political
heuristic’ that lets us offer an alternative frame to national citizenship as an an-
swer to the question about who are the subjects of justice in a globalizing world.
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A first answer: the ‘national who’
The concept of citizenship has a long tradition, from its formulation until its
most recent criticisms. It is not my intention to make a critical balance of this
long tradition or its different meanings. Instead, I will adopt as a reference
point the political idea of ‘person’ developed by John Rawls (who interprets cit-
izenship in a specific way, which I will hereafter call ‘unidimensional identity’),
to argue that such an interpretation contributes to the theoretical impasse in
which we currently find ourselves: having to reflect upon the political dynamics
of global and diverse effects using homogenous concepts from national frames;
or, as Benhabib would write, discovering ourselves as “travelers sailing an un-
known territory, with the help of old maps, made in different moments and in
response to different needs.” (Benhabib 2005, p. 117) Those ‘old maps’ are the
concepts of citizenship and the Nation-State as the frames through which peo-
ple’s political action has been interpreted, and on which the struggles for justice
have been staged. Let us see then the distinctive notes of the person as citizen in
the Rawlsian theory.
Within Rawls’s wide conceptual plot that puts together theory of justice as
equity, the political conception of the person is key, because its characteristics
enable political agreement about basic justice questions that consolidate the
construction of a reasonably fair society. According to this purpose, Rawls mod-
els his political understanding of the person as “someone who can be a citizen,
that is, a normal and cooperative member of society through a lifetime.” (Rawls
1996, p. 18) Rawls tells us that this is a conception that starts in the public polit-
ical culture, impressed on the fundamental texts of a democracy, and also comes
from our daily notion of people as basic units of thought, choice and responsi-
bility. What turns it into a normative conception is that it emphasizes certain
characteristics that allow making people as citizens a key element to achieve
a reasonably fair society. One of these characteristics is the distinction between
‘public identity’ and ‘moral identity’. The former is conceived of only in reference
to the political rights and duties according to its shared status of citizenship,
whereas the latter includes deeper commitments in people bound to values
and principles of a reasonable, comprehensive doctrine (religious, moral, philo-
sophical).
Values and principles that form moral identity are so important to people
that they could even represent an obstacle to the agreement upon a political con-
ception of justice fit to a democracy. To overcome this hurdle, Rawls states that
public identity has a priority function to reach such an agreement, because only
from its perspective could we make the distinction between our commitments
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derived from a reasonable, comprehensive doctrine and those that we acquire as
citizens. This doesn’t mean that we are supposed to be two different persons; we
all are at the same time a moral person within a comprehensive doctrine and a
citizen in the public environment—but to Rawls:
[…] we can only hope to achieve a constitutional liberal democracy if we manage to distin-
guish between a private sphere and a public sphere or, as he says, between the shared cul-
ture (background culture) and the public environment (public forum). (Dreben 2002, p. 325)
Out of the priority of public identity above moral identity, the political concep-
tion of the person is a key element to agreeing upon a political conception of jus-
tice, because people, as citizens, by prioritizing their public identity assure the
fulfilling of their freedom and political rights, as well as the freedom to practice
their own understanding of good. This priority guarantees, on the one hand, the
full preservation of their person irrespective of any alleged wellbeing and, on the
other hand, that their ideas of good may have the same consideration and re-
spect as those of any other. The fact of reasonable pluralism also forces them
to privilege public identity, because in the same measure they are not able to
reach an agreement on any base or moral rank (and even doing so would
bring undesirable consequences)—only their goals and political commitments
would allow the finding of a point of shared agreement. This doesn’t mean
that people as citizens must abandon all comprehensive doctrines in the quest
for agreement. Priority states that they must be framed inside the limits of the
political conception of justice, to promote that the social order guarantees a dia-
gram of liberties and equal rights for all, and to avoid that their comprehensive
doctrines can get to exercise a coactive power through the State. Distinguishing
the field of influence of both identities, and giving priority to the public identity,
is a strategy that helps guarantee a shared status as free and equal citizens with-
in the frame of a Nation-State that will be in charge of solving every conflict of
basic justice, by means of the political idea of justice agreed by the people con-
ceived of as citizens.
The political conception of the person and its emphasis on public identity is
thus a paradigmatic example of citizenship as the ‘national who’ of justice, be-
cause the latter, understood as a measure of distribution (of income, liberties,
rights among others), is exclusively addressed to those on the inside of the Na-
tion-State, which in due time becomes the legitimate scale for expressing and
solving possible conflicts of justice—even if a widening of rights and liberties
is demanded or the current measure of distribution is questioned. The only rel-
evant subjects of justice in both cases are the people conceived of as national
citizens. Further, this ‘national who’ not only determines the rights and duties
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of the people considered citizens, but also the language with which these people
express themselves and formulate their demands for justice, so that an argument
between people thus conceived of and the State is valid only if they interrogate it
about the measurement of distribution; that is, the current conception of justice.
Whatever is found outside this environment, such as the cultural dimensions of
acknowledgement, the problems of economic inequity, or the political exclusion
due to gender reasons, are not conceived of as matters of basic justice.
John Rawls’s political conception of person justifies itself within his theory
of justice, but we must admit that it was created in a political and social context
that was already in transformation. Before taking on its criticism and stating the
need for new categories, we will take a short stroll through the characteristics of
that transformation.
Nevertheless, it’s suitable to depict that even the characterization made of
those who compound the old and the new social movements was in consonance
with the ‘national who’. In the so-called old social movements, even though they
had international repercussions (Tilly 2009), the working class had as a range of
action and protest the Nation-State, and the paradigm of justice as distribution.
And in the case of the so-called new social movements (ecologists, pacifists,
among others), although their objectives and vindications (world peace, preser-
vation of nature) sought repercussions outside the Nation-State, what is true is
that they didn’t achieve the level of global coordination required to leave that
range, and hence their actions or protests stayed inside the Nation-State, refuting
more the symbolic terrain than the political (Melucci 1999). We must look to the
transformations surrounding the national frame to explain how the movements
that followed let through to what is global and contributed to the theoretical im-
passe.
The context of globalization
At dawn of the twenty-first century, Albert Melucci described the political and
social arena as a global stage, based on a ‘hypothesis of discontinuity’ (Melucci
2001). To him, we were being witnesses of structural phenomena that would rad-
ically modify social and political life on a planetary scale. That hypothesis stated
that while the global map was changing based on new phenomena, the modern
categories we used to attempt to describe them remained the same. So there was
a discontinuity between the tools of analysis and the phenomena that they tried
to explain, such that to him those were “crucial years that see emerge, at a plan-
etary scale, unforeseen actors and struggles, but that have also shown the inad-
equacy of the instruments [allegedly] capable of catching and interpreting the
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emergent forms.” (Melucci 1999, p. 176) Those structural phenomena and the the-
oretical discontinuity associated with them are collectively what today we have
agreed to call globalization.
Beginning at a simple definition, we can say that globalization is a phenom-
enon of history in which relationships among countries, societies and people
have soared, and time-space boundaries have been reduced through the flux
of goods, services, products, knowledge and financial capital. Of course, global-
ization as a concept is a much more complex phenomenon, but that basic de-
scription allows us emphasize the fact that its effects have been so widespread
that we face a double challenge: ‘how to understand the global society’ and ‘how
to think of the global society’ (Campillo 2015); in other words, how to elaborate a
philosophical and political reflection that enables us to comprehend the current
world, and how to reflect upon the impact that this kind of society is having on
our understanding of intellectual philosophical work and its role in such a soci-
ety. Without trying to exhaust the complexity of globalization, but hoping to
build an understanding of the same that adds to the purposes of this work, I
will briefly expose three characteristic dimensions.
Firstly, one of the factors that stimulated this phenomenon was the revolu-
tion of information and technology that lets us stand in a digital space from
which we can establish relations regardless of physical or time barriers. The In-
ternet is the main tool of this revolution, because its most important technolog-
ical innovation was turning that digital space into a platform from which almost
anybody can produce and publish content in a simple way, using basic technical
knowledge and skills. This innovation allowed digital applications to thrive in
almost every dimension of life, keeping us in a non-synchronized but neverthe-
less coordinated state of interconnection. That innovation created a whole new
process of “hypersocialization [by which the] new technologies of information
create the possibility of action detaching from space and time, thus letting
through to the appearance of time and the virtualization of space” (Melucci
2001, p. 32), and introducing to our actions both the global dimension and si-
multaneity, by separating them from lineal space and time. In the same way
that content on the Internet can be hypertextual (audio, video and text all at
the same time), so too can human action, by occurring in various spaces and
times simultaneously through its global dispersion on the great digital spider
web.
Secondly, besides the interconnection, globalization also implies interde-
pendence at different scales, because decisions made within a State can come
to have an influence on the life of those who are not part of it. For example,
the economic measures that a country undertakes related to agriculture could af-
fect the migrant workers and the families in their country of origin; or if a coun-
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try decides to close its borders to legal or illegal migration, this would have con-
sequences in diverse regions of the world. Interdependence is also part of the
inter-, trans- and supranational organizations that thrust agendas with objectives
and actions that are framed beyond any one Nation-State. For example, the im-
plementation of certain economic politics that the International Monetary Fund
demands in exchange for loans has regional and global repercussions; or in the
case of organizations such as Reporters Without Borders that champion freedom
of speech worldwide, we are shown the shared responsibility we have regarding
such topics as ecological disasters, refugee crises or famine. Interdependence
created by globalization points out how impossible any ‘reversibility’ (Bauman
2004) of our mutual dependence appears.
Thirdly, interconnection and interdependence also reveal to us that global-
ization is built upon a series of relations marked by the exercise of power that
entail the generation of deep inequity among and within countries. While it is
true that with globalization the positive flow of capitals towards developing
countries has thrived, it is also true that with the global consolidation of finan-
cial elites and the supranational institutions that back up and take care of their
interests, less developed governments and local markets exhibit their inability to
recover from economic crises and their incapacity to fix the inequities that result
from being subordinated to the benchmarks dictated by those elites. While the
number of countries with prosperous economies that develop a stronger immun-
ity to crises diminishes, the number of countries with poorer welfare and greater
political uncertainty soars. This uncertainty increases their internal inequity by
increasing the gap between those who have access to social benefits and
those who don’t, those who can access education and those who cannot, etc.
The inequity spawned by these global relations of power makes visible the con-
stitutive injustice of our world.
Each of the three dimensions pointed out implies the need for reckoning
both its specific complexity and also their communicating links, because it is
in them that the fight for justice is taking place. The wide range of political lan-
guages by means of which that fight is expressed represents a problematic hori-
zon of reflection. Because the space of our actions is broader, the common ob-
jectives are restated, the distinction between what is global and local stops
being clear, and the involved and affected actors increase in number. As a con-
sequence, “globalization is changing our way of speaking about justice” (Fraser
2010, p. 12), by being the stage of the political and social battles of our time, and
demanding new strategies that enable us to explain and analyze a variety of lan-
guages and vindications in the social and political environment that can’t be ap-
proached through a homogenizing lense.
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In the previous section, I stated that the old and the new social movements
didn’t reach a global impact because, among other things, they didn’t account
for the digital tools that could allow them to overcome time-space barriers.
But it is important to also point out that the sociological and philosophical the-
ories that explained them conceived of them within the frame of Nation-State,
and refuted justice in terms of the distribution, either of labor or symbolic—
but always within that frame and without considering their possible effects on
a wider scale. That is the reason why whenever the alterworld and networked so-
cial movements following the former first appear, the need for restating our mod-
ern conceptual diagrams arises, because in their protests they involved a wide
range of vindications and actions that are only understandable without the
tight frames of the Nation-State and citizenship—precisely because the dynamics
of their action and the content of their protest had a global character that went
beyond those frames and those theories. Thus, before proposing new forms of
understanding, we must first undertake a criticism of the ‘national who’ and
thereby identify the milestone for remaking the map.
The ‘unidimensional identity’
of the ‘national who’
The conception we have inherited of people as citizens framed by the Nation-
State is ‘unidimensional’ insofar as it emphasizes their ‘political identity’ to
turn them into subjects of justice. But under the circumstances of a globalizing
world, this unidimensional conception of people produces more questions than
it ever offered certainties. Let us consider the case of the aforementioned social
movements.
There was a time in which we could clearly identify who demanded some
vindication of justice and their opponent: the struggle of the workers’ movement
(mainly formed by the workers themselves) fought against capitalism and the
educated property owner (bourgeois) State; the feminist movements gathered
persons, without gender distinction, who shared the diagnosis of the patriarchy
represented by the State as an oppressive power; and to these can be added
many ecological or peace movements. It can also be said that, despite their glob-
al repercussions, these struggles were always framed within the Nation-State.
But with the emergence of antiglobalization movements (Juris 2004) and subse-
quently, of networked social movements (Castells 2015), that break with the Na-
tion-State frame, “the movements lose their condition as a character [giving] in-
dividuals and groups a benchmark to rebuild divided identities among different
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memberships, functions and times of the social experience.” (Melucci 1999,
p. 118)
‘Unidimensional identity’ no longer seems to be the adequate category to
conceive of people, nor to explain their social action, because in those move-
ments the opponent was no longer the Nation-State but, for example, suprana-
tional organizations such as the International Monetary Fund. Additionally, the
members of each movement no longer conceived of themselves just as workers or
feminists or ecologists, but all of their particular belongings gathered in a com-
mon indignation due to the negative effects of the world politics or economy,
and, in some cases, not only did they refute the conception of justice as a
scale, but also demanded a ‘radical democracy’ that implied a change in our
conception of justice. I will return to this topic later. I will now explain the errors
of the inherited conception of the ‘national who’, to show the reason why this
response cannot help us deal with the contemporary challenge of simultaneous-
ly managing the difference and the integration within the frame of globalization,
and hence our need for an alternative point of view.
In her book Scales of Justice, Nancy Fraser tells us that the contemporary
philosophical theories in matters of justice (such as Rawls’s) are based on two
given ideas, which she identifies with the images of a scale and a map. The
first image evokes the intention of impartially, assessing different vindications
of social justice based on a ‘distributive’ measure that makes them measurable;
whereas the image of the map sends us back to the metric resource of the geog-
rapher, with which it is possible to limit and represent spatial relations through
which those social demands would take place. (For the case of such theories the
adequate scale or frame is the Nation-State and its citizens.) But given the prob-
lematic context of globalization, we must ask ourselves what is their pertinence
as normative categories: because in the case of the scale, the complexity and va-
riety of the current political language on which the vindications of justice are for-
mulated take to trial the paradigm of distribution; and, concerning the map, be-
cause cases like the ones I have mentioned regarding social movements refute
the frame of Nation-State, since their demands of justice succeeded to transcend
the national scale thanks to their dynamics and the content of their protest.
Globalization, especially because of the three dimensions I have highlighted,
is then the stage on which the vindications of justice and the claims of injustice
demand us to discuss yet again the question: who are the subjects of justice? The
‘national who’ reassured by theories like Rawls’s was the agreed answer for a
long time, but since today the negative or positive effects of political decisions
are global, dynamics of protest and political action that can be carried out by
people are global too. Based on this certainty, I add to Fraser’s statement—ac-
cording to which those theories of justice can’t offer a guide for analyzing the
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problems derived from these challenges for having fallen into a ‘dogma of ega-
litarianism’ (Fraser 2010, Chapter 3)—that the Nation-State is the correct frame
for the reflection of justice, and that its citizens are the subjects to whom it is
addressed. In democracies based on the idea of the Nation-State, the arguments
about justice agreed that distribution was the measurement to solve justice de-
mands. Although they debated what should be equally distributed (rights, liber-
ties, capacities, cultural identity), they agreed on the who: the national citizens
to whom distribution was addressed. Given the challenges of globalization, both
coincidences are being questioned and the national scale with the citizens
bound to it no longer seems fit to set justice the relevant questions. Having as-
sumed the ‘national who’ dogma, theories like Rawls’s can’t help us determine
who should count as a relevant justice subject in a globalizing world, because
the dynamics of political subjects, as well as those of social movements, escape
from their theoretical diagrams; they set sail from the experience of injustice of
both the ones on the inside and the ones on the outside of the national frame,
which recoils in a dynamic of global protest and starting from different identi-
ties.
But besides having fallen into this dogma, the point of view both traditions
offer about the ‘national who’ is also limited. In Rawls, the conception of identity
is ‘unidimensional’ by limiting it to its political aspect, in which it is only pos-
sible to take part of the public affairs and formulate vindications of justice
from the language of rights and duties, forgetting that those same vindications
can only be made from concrete positions of exclusion, and that expressing
them just in political terms can imply its perpetuation when not taking into ac-
count their specificity. In this way, Rawls’s political conception of person as the
‘national who’ of justice leaves voiceless those who demand the amendment of
an injustice that has had global effects. In this sense, the theory of Rawlsian jus-
tice not only has assumed without reckoning the idea of the ‘national who’, but
also offers us a limited understanding of it by presenting it in terms of a political
identity that enclosures people within the same interests and the same needs,
rendering the political dialogue unnecessary.
From the challenges before us in a globalizing world, those ‘monological
theories’ of justice (Fraser 2010, p. 27) lack the necessary concepts to analyze
and understand the political dynamic of those who are both on the inside of
the national scale and on the outside of it, and who need to express their de-
mands in another language which is not that of distribution. When blindly as-
suming the framing of the Nation-State and of national citizenship, this
dogma turns into an instrument of manipulation of the public space, because
from it the rules of political decision unfairly exclude people who belong to
the community, and because the boundaries of community exclude those affect-
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ed by the inner decisions. This phenomenon, which Fraser (2010) calls a ‘misrep-
resentation’, denies people the possibility of denouncing an injustice and partic-
ipating in its amendment; by conceiving of them from a ‘unidimensional identi-
ty’ perspective, an unjustified exclusion is performed and we are left with a
conceptual gap that appears unavoidable.
Today’s political and social conflicts are the result of many factors, and the
struggles for justice are no longer only for the widening of rights and liberties;
hence, political action of protest by people is also the result of multiple inner
and outer factors. Conceiving of people as having a unidimensional identity
has made us think that what is important is explaining, analyzing and solving
conflicts, since the actors are already given—but in reality, the multiplicity of
the actors that appear at a local and (sometimes simultaneously) global level de-
mands us paying attention to the diversity of people. Amartya Sen has pointed
out this same need by demonstrating that beginning at a unidimensional iden-
tity (or a ‘singular affiliation’ of the identity, as he calls it) opens an unbridgeable
abyss between the ideal conception and the real behavior of people (Sen 2009),
because the ‘singular affiliation’ of identity mistakes its perspective about people
by putting them in very tight circumstances for their action. In his opinion, only
the acknowledgement of our different commitments and adhesions could allow
us “a bigger understanding of the plurality of human identity and the acknowl-
edgement that such needs overcome across and act against a strict separation
along a unique rigid line of impregnable division.” (Sen 2006, p. xiv) The con-
ception of unidimensional identity creates an idealized vision of people, and
consequently, leaves us without a proper guide for thinking the dynamic of
the conflicts and people in their political action. As a result of this conceptual
gap, the ‘right to the word (Melucci 2001, p. 57) and to ‘parity of participation’
(Fraser 2010, p. 28) of groups of individuals to decide what they are and what
they want to be, has been limited. These authors consider this to be an injustice,
both within and beyond the frame of Nation-State, and contemplate what it takes
to remediate it.
To get over the conception of unidimensional identity, we must undertake
the following challenge: provided that people don’t exhaust their identity nor
their action under the idea of citizenship, we must be able to find a conception
of the same that transcends that conceptualization through analytical instru-
ments that describe and analyze what people are or can be and what people
do or can do. The person as citizen within the Nation-State is no longer the start-
ing point, as supposed by theories of justice like Rawls’s. Instead, within the
frame of the challenges that a globalizing world presents, it is a phenomenon
to be explained by some dynamic model that facilitates catching the complexi-
ties of the actors and the conflicts derived from them.
162 Alberto Ruiz Méndez
A second answer: the ‘diversity of identities’
as ‘political heuristic’
I now return to the aforementioned social movements, to exemplify this chal-
lenge and to derive from their experience the idea of ‘diversity of identities’.
Digital interconnection allowed the creation of a different dynamic in social
movements from the last years of the twentieth century until the movements of
the outraged. Internet, text messages from mobile phones and digital social plat-
forms like Facebook or Twitter made possible a wider diffusion of protest, which
allowed other networks and people to support protest speeches that might be
territorially distant, but brought emotionally near thanks to digital interconnec-
tion. Pioneers in this dynamic were the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional
and the so called ‘Battle of Seattle’, since in both cases they used the digital
communication tools of their time to broadcast their message and coordinate
their own and third parties’ actions. But the ones who maximized the usage of
those tools were the social movements that occurred between 2009 and 2012
in Iceland, the movement of the Outraged in Spain, the occupation of Wall Street
in New York and the movement #YoSoy132 in Mexico. Each of these has its spe-
cificity and would require a particular study, but from the common characteris-
tics that Castells (2015) has proposed, we can abstract one that helps the purpos-
es of this research: the identity of the people who took part in those movements.
Since mobilization was organized through communication and coordination
networks to which anybody could materially or virtually access, participants
didn’t have to be identified exclusively as workers, feminists, ecologists, global-
iphobes, pacifists or any other discrete group. In the context of these networked
social movements, people could assume demands, protests or indignation as
their own, even though they didn’t belong to their immediate context, and with-
out having to compromise their own identity or goals in case of belonging to an-
other movement. Characterization of earlier movements had a tendency to cen-
tralize the identity of their members, but in these new movements, each
individual gets involved from a ‘diversity of identities’ that favors union around
a common objective. The global injustice present in our world affects us in differ-
ent areas of our lives—we don’t need to see ourselves exclusively as workers or
ecologists to mobilize. It was precisely the confirmation of that injustice through
the diversity of identities that we acquired and affirmed as persons that led the
participants of these movements to mobilize and protest.
Based on what has been exposed about the context of globalization, the mis-
takes of theories of justice such as Rawls’s, and the dynamic of social move-
ments as an example of the political and social challenges of that context, the
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conception of the citizen now appears before us as a reductionist vision of peo-
ple’s identity within democratic societies. In particular, Rawls’s theory of justice
created a conception of the person based on a ‘public identity’ that favored the
language of rights and duties to express demands that at the same time were
valid only within the frame of the Nation-State. Nevertheless, this conception en-
tails singularizing its identity to certain needs or interests valid in resolving ques-
tions of basic justice—but that cannot include the demands of justice that people
make based on their social position, their economic situation or their cultural
identity at a global scale, because the effects of globalization transcend the na-
tional frame. Therefore, we can say that no philosophical reflection of politics
that alleges a ‘unidimensional identity’ in people conceived of as citizens can
be a useful guide for reflecting upon the conflicts of global character, because
conceiving of people as a ‘national who’ doesn’t take into account that people
act from different positions, adhesions and indignations that go beyond the po-
litical language exclusive to rights and duties, nor that they are even aware that
the formality of such language is no longer adequate to express their discontent.
In consequence, the unidimensional identity keeps us from understanding that
“contemporary individuals act in the confinement of diverse systems and have
the increasing need of pregnable identities that allow them to transit through
the different regions of meaning and the different institutional frames.” (Melucci
2001, p. 47)
To overcome this conceptual gap, it is necessary to factor in a conception of
people’s identities that reflects the ‘diversity of identities’ that constitute us, and
which are built from the influence that the different adhesions, loyalties and
commitments—both political and moral—that set up our demands of justice
and that encourage us to mobilize against some kind of injustice have in the
course of our lives. This idea of the diversity of identities appears as a ‘political
heuristic’ that could serve, on one hand, to make possible critical reflection on
the categories of the political philosophy we have inherited, and, on the other
hand, as an alternative point of view about the people opposite to the ‘national
who’ that could help us break out of the rigid conceptual structures that have
been passed on to us, so that we could design a map to guide us accurately
through a globalizing world.
By ‘political heuristic’, I understand a knowledge that appears as an alterna-
tive method to solve a problem when all the other existing methods generate
more confusion than solutions (Navarro 2015). Regarding the question about
who counts as a subject of justice, the answer of the ‘national who’ generates
more problems than satisfactory explanations when we try to approach global
phenomena like networked social movements. For this reason, I propose using
the idea of the diversity of identities as a political heuristic to redesign a relevant
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and reliable starting point; to help us determine who counts as a subject of jus-
tice in each case—but not in such a singular way that in the long term would
generate more uncertainty rather than options to think about the conflicts. The
heuristic I am trying to build from this idea of the diversity of identities is polit-
ical because it would only apply to the analysis of subjects that refute the frames
of Sate-Nation and citizenship from the global perspective of injustice and ineq-
uities; thus it justifies its characterization as a tool for the creation of new knowl-
edge concerning the political problems of a globalizing world by assuming, on
one side, that inherited political philosophy doesn’t guide us correctly in its ex-
amination, and, on the other side, that that world is complex, interactive and in-
terdependent enough to elaborate exhaustive analysis or seek exact solutions.
The way in which the question about who counts as a subject of justice is
answered is crucial, because by doing so from the perspective of the diversity
of identities, we are set on the inverse course within the map; in other words,
while inherited theories of justice determined monologues like the goal and
the path to reach it, setting sail from the diversity of identities means instead
to begin with the concrete experiences of the people (such as the ones we find
in social movements) to determine the steps to take towards justice. Beginning
from the diversity of identities would mean acknowledging that the different
spheres within which we define our actions, responsibilities and additions rep-
resent a different political language that we have the right to vindicate, because
it is precisely this diversity of identities—national citizens, workers, defenders of
animal rights, or all of these at once—that favors and sustains collective action in
a globalizing world. Those “multiple identities get past national frontiers, and
the people do things they feel they really ‘have’ to do, instead of accepting
them by virtue.” (Sen 2009, p. 129).
Of course, none of the problems that the three dimensions of globalization
entail can be solved just with a change of perspective about the people—but I
think it would be much more difficult to propose an adequate view if we don’t
incorporate a conception of the person based on their diversity of identities,
and which reflects the variety of commitments and adhesions that are part of
their interpretation of the injustices that could affect them in one or more aspects
of such a variety. The diversity of identities seems to be a good starting point to
reflect upon the refutations of justice at a global level because, on one side, it
lets us bear witness of the injustice of the current system in different ambits,
and, on the other side, it also lets us associate with common actions derived
from injustice, such that we can experiment in different aspects of social life.
Its pertinence as a political heuristic is that, in opposition to the ‘national
who’, it allows us to “open a way for the acknowledgement of the plurality of
meanings and forms of action present in the concrete collective phenomena.”
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(Melucci 1999, p. 59) The conception of people from their diversity of identities
seeks to contribute to the creation of a theory according to our time that serves
to undertake the task of drawing the proper map to guide us from the inside of
the complexity of a globalizing world. Its success will depend on our capacity to
think from the global frame, and to explain how the political action of the peo-
ple from the convergence of their diversity of identities is configured.
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Abstract: The primary concern of this work is to ask what we want to leave to
future generations. The argumentation is grounded in two premises: firstly,
that there is an intrinsic interdependence between justice and sustainable devel-
opment; and secondly, that the capabilities approach proposed by Amartya Sen
and Martha Nussbaum has made the crucial contribution of pointing out that for
social justice, it is ‘ends’ that are fundamental and not just ‘means’. The idea be-
hind this hypothesis is that people transform resources into valuable ways of
‘being’ and ‘doing’ differently, so the informational focus should be shifted
onto ‘freedoms to’, or the real opportunities that people have. Thus, compared
to theories that place the emphasis on income or needs in relation to develop-
ment and sustainable justice, the capabilities approach presents a more promis-
ing framework for correcting intergenerational injustices. However, this theory
must also deal with problems unique to prospective justice, in addition to the
limitations of its own incompleteness. In this sense, it could be very helpful to
complement it with an idea of intergenerational responsibility and a specifica-
tion of the content of capabilities, for its implementation in the intergenerational
context.
Introduction
Goethe said that, “to grasp that the sky is blue everywhere, one does not need to
travel around the world” (1836, p. 266). Indeed, every human being, I believe,
shares Goethe’s strong intuition: it is not necessary to travel widely to know
that we all live under the same sky. Nevertheless, it is very likely that to admire
a blue sky from some corners of the planet may present challenges. Imagine try-
ing to view a pure blue sky from Delhi or Cairo, the most polluted mega-cities in
the world.¹ Apart from constituting a statistical fact, it is also basic intuition that
 For a ranking of the most world’s air polluted cities, see the recently released WHO Global
Urban Ambient Air Pollution Database: http://www.who.int/phe/health_topics/outdoorair/da
tabases/cities/en/
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we have not been very respectful of our ecosystem in the global process of indus-
trialization, still in its premature stages in many developing countries. Under this
sky, sustainability has become one of the most pressing issues for theories in-
tended to conceptualize justice in intergenerational terms.²
This Promethean era, to use Jonas’s adjective (1979), has given rise to unpre-
cedented volatility between human action and ecological fragility. Contemporary
predictive knowledge, epistemological tools and the practical range of human
activity have evolved to a level patently superior to any past incarnations. Taking
this into account, I shall argue that sustainable development requires a thinking
rooted in praxis regarding the effects of our present actions on the future, con-
sidering not only the ecological level but also, moral and socio-political sustain-
ability (Avner de-Shalit 1997, p. 130). Theories of justice deal with the questions of
how to distribute resources and what is essential for human well-being, and rec-
ognize the importance of identifying a concept of justice that extends towards
the future. There can be no intergenerational justice without human sustainable
development; equally, sustainable development can not take place without
thinking of justice for the future.
With this premise in mind, I will present a brief genealogy of the concept of
sustainable development (and its consanguinity with human development). I
will limit this overview to show the origins of sustainable development, recog-
nizing its historical and ideological connection with the paradigm of economic
growth. The bias that considers development and economic growth to be nearly
identical still prevails in mainstream economics. Although it is proven true that
there is a positive correlation between the increase of economic variables and so-
cial progress, the two should not be confused as identical. It is imperative to rec-
ognize the excessive emphasis that many economists place on economic growth
as the only driving force for development, and the corresponding belief that
growth axiomatically results in the benefit of all population sectors. These hy-
potheses are considered so apodictic that they prevent consideration of what
 In the literature devoted to the topic, it is usual to find the concepts of ‘sustainable develop-
ment’ and of ‘sustainability’ used interchangeably. The difference is subtle: sustainability refers
to the end of a process (longevity of the planet), while sustainable development refers to the
process itself (the ways to reach such an end). That is why sustainable development can ulti-
mately consist of many different means, such as sustainable consumption, sustainable produc-
tion, sustainable agriculture, sustainable transport and so on. I will use both concepts without
making any further distinction, prioritizing the fluidity of the reasoning. To explore the differen-
ces between both concepts, see the UNESCO portal on sustainable development:
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/education-
for-sustainable-development/sustainable-development/
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is really substantive in people’s lives, and do not commonly lead to a reflection
on the principles of development.
In Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen argued that, “[d]evelopment con-
sists of the removal of various types of unfreedoms that leave people with little
choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency” (1999, p. xii). It
is clear that there is the temptation among an important sector of neoliberal eco-
nomics, with strong influence in public policies of countries with economic and
military power, to perpetuate a thinning, a devaluation of the notions of devel-
opment and well-being. For this reason, I aim to defend that while economic
growth can be an important factor for development, development is not ground-
ed solely in economic growth.
I believe that this conceptual map is a useful first step for thinking about jus-
tice for the future and the spaces of social responsibility. The human actions that
constitute the current third wave of globalization have produced a fragility in
both human and environmental terms (Ricoeur 1997). The evolution of the nor-
mative basis of development is the prelude to the primary concern here: to
bring to the fore the central question of what we want to leave to future gener-
ations.³ Answering this question is neither a simple nor an immediate task. As a
second step, I shall examine contemporary mainstream conceptions of sustain-
able development, and highlight their limits in comparison to the capabilities
approach in the intragenerational sphere. In the intergenerational sphere, the
stakes involve what we consider valuable for our descendants and future individ-
uals to inherit. The claim is that the substantive elements for a human life are the
ones that should be preserved and proliferated (Sen 2013), so the analysis of the
ends and means of sustainability is fundamental to extending notions of justice
across generations.
I propose that, while the capabilities approach has proven to be absolutely
prolific in praxis and a superior alternative to resource-based or utility-based ap-
proaches, in the context of prospective justice it still needs to be philosophically
complemented beyond the schema of coexisting generations. The last part of this
study is devoted to outlining some elements that can inform a deeper investiga-
 In this work, I use the terms ‘next generations’ and ‘future generations’ interchangeably. How-
ever, in terms of obligations or duties between generations, they have subtly different connota-
tions that are explored elsewhere. The norm among works on future ethics is to consider that the
temporal space of obligations and responsibility extends forward two generations. Thus, the
popular tendency is to focus on the sentiments that we have for our children and grandchildren.
It constitutes the primary source of responsibility in Jonas (1979) and is found in the work of
contemporary contractualists (John Rawls 1971, 1993, 2001; Kumar 2003), contractarianists
(Gauthier 1986), communitarists (Thompson 2009), and in Solow (1992) and Van Parijs (1998).
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tion in this sense. In particular, I will underline the need for examining our ob-
ligations towards future generations, and investigate the process of selecting val-
uable capabilities and their content, in the domain of intergenerational justice.
The question of development
From the point of view of the North, interest in how nations grow and how this
can benefit individuals is not new at all. Something similar can be found in the
writings of the classical economists: Adam Smith, David Ricardo, the Marquis of
Condorcet, Thomas Malthus and John Stuart Mill, not forgetting the great utopi-
an Karl Marx. In the absence of the term ‘development’, they wrote of civilization
and decay, of wealth, evolution and poverty, of capital and population growth.
Curiosity related to knowing the causes of prosperity was the engine of their hy-
potheses regarding economic expansion and international trade. The study of
modern development did not arise until after World War II with the evolution
of economic growth theories that dated back to the 1930s and 1940s.
In the context of anticolonialism in the late 1940s, governments in Asia and
Africa began to approach the economists of Britain and the United States to seek
advice on the appropriate methods to boost their economies. First World econo-
mists, encouraged by the idea of making the emerging countries flourish like
their own, perceived in the implementation of their economic model the perfect
solution. The diagnosis grosso modo of why some countries were poor and others
rich was expressed as the former having a problem of low income that would be
easily correctable by expansion of their GDP: more income, more well-being. A
new line of very fertile thought emerged in this way, which finds in the model
of neoclassical economics the panacea of development. Nonetheless, the pre-
scriptions of wealthy country economists who pushed population control, for-
eign investment, the promotion of education and the availability of loans and
debits to underdeveloped countries, turned out to be not only misleading in
most cases, but totally disastrous in many (Easterly 2001, p. xi-xii). The failure
of this model motivated a number of economists to provide a more accurate
measure of what makes a human life considered to be a good human life, and
the idea of human development was born during the 1970s.
The first human development report, commissioned two decades later to
Mahbub ul-Haq by the United Nations, proposed that:
Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical ones are
to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living. Ad-
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ditional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights and self-respect.
(UNDP 1990, p. 10)⁴
In comparison with the previous ideological archetype, this approximation
represents a more comprehensive assessment of quality of life, because the infor-
mational focus is not goods and/or resources, but the well-being of people. Sim-
ilarly to the capabilities approach, the concept of human development is a per-
spective inspired by the Kantian conception of human dignity; human beings
should be recognized as ends and not only as means.⁵
The term ‘sustainable development’ first appeared in the publication of the
World Conservation Strategy by the International Union for Conservation of Na-
ture (IUCN 1980). However, the expression did not become popular until the
publication of the Brundtland report, which advocates for conceptualizing devel-
opment as the fulfillment of individuals’ needs:
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without com-
promising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two
key concepts: the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to
which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state
of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and fu-
ture needs. (WCED 1987, p. 43)
Income, needs and capabilities
GDP (or its counterparts, income or wealth per capita) is a precise quantifying
measure that is quintessential to economic analysis. This is certainly useful for
explaining how production could be maximized, formulating an idea of the
availability of goods and services, and measuring levels of occupation. Often,
wealth is also the gateway to having a voice in political decision-making. How-
ever, this type of assessment also hides a trap difficult to circumvent, because
taking the shortcut of reductionism can have real consequences for people’s
lives. The question of income is ineluctable in measuring gender inequality
 The imprint of Sen’s idea of justice is absolutely patent in this flagship report (on which he
collaborated), as is the concept of capability.
 The capabilities approach of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen extends the conception of
human development maintained by the United Nations: while both conceptions recognize the
fundamental role of human rights, the capabilities framework entails a philosophical investiga-
tion that goes beyond the simple measurement and results of concrete variables used by the
United Nations for assessing quality of life.
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and intergenerational justice. For instance, women generally have less access to
the job market than men and are occupied in sectors in which wages are lower—
something that translates into both the limitation of the full and autonomous re-
alization of their freedoms, as well as hindering wider economic development.
But income, wealth and resources are means to something else, so sustainability
that aims only at sustainable income and/or consumption should not avoid the
question about what we want to create, preserve and transmit to next genera-
tions—the ends of sustainability.⁶
Consider the following illustration: Alma has a high income level and holds
a leadership position in a company where gender pay discrimination does not
take place. In terms of income (interpersonal income per capita comparison),
we can say that Alma is well-positioned and that this helps her not only to satisfy
her basic needs, but also to enjoy other aspects of her life that she considers sig-
nificant. When widening the informational focus to establish that Alma lives in
Mexico City, one of the most dangerous cities for women in terms of public trans-
port (VAWG, p. 2), and that the probability of suffering verbal and/or physical
abuse is very high, then it seems relevant that her set of freedoms is not entirely
satisfactory. Alma is being prevented from realizing the primal capabilities of
physical integrity (Nussbaum 2011), bodily integrity and security, as well as
the ability to be respected and treated with dignity (Robeyns 2003).⁷ One
could still claim that Alma’s income would make opting for private transporta-
tion a feasible option, but defending this statement would mean to fall into
the trap of reducing the set of possible options for Alma, and thus her freedom
to choose.
 I agree with Sen’s (2013) main conclusion, that theories of sustainable consumption replicate
the same shortcomings as those based on people’s needs. Neither goods nor income alone can
endow people’s lives with what is fundamental. It is crucial to consider the different ways in
which resources are transformed into freedoms because of individuals’ differences in age,
sex, race, abilities, environmental circumstances, socio-cultural context or family structure. Fo-
cusing on the sustainability of resources as well as consumption, leads us to Rawls’ ‘primary
goods’ problem, as criticized by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.
 In 2008 the program Viajemos Seguras (We Travel Safely) was launched in Mexico, which in-
troduced buses and train compartments to be used only by women. Similar initiatives exist in
other countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Thailand, and the Unit-
ed Arab Emirates. Every step made in the direction of raising awareness of the problem and
showing political commitment signifies the global effort to eradicate gender injustices. Nonethe-
less, although meant to ensure safety and dignity in transportation, these initiatives do more to
‘segregate’ women than to actually widen the range of their real freedoms, or to create real op-
portunities to choose valuable lives. Of course the problem needs different kinds of policy meas-
ures—a sustainable educational plan, for instance. (See: VAWG, p. 6)
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This idea is perhaps shown even more clearly in the context of someone suf-
fering from a serious disease. It is salient to compare how well a severely ill per-
son can lead his/her life possessing a high level of wealth, but needing constant
medical treatment, to the real set of opportunities of another person with less
wealth, but good health. In this context, it is wise to ask which of the two people
is the ‘poorest’ (Sen 1999, p. 124). It should be noted that it is not a terminological
problem that has to do with the word ‘poverty’, but rather a deep problem that
implies a certain conception of well-being and human life. It is clear, then, that
sometimes having a high income does not mean having more freedoms.What we
do with income and wealth, the opportunities they provide us, and how they
contribute to our good life is affected by a series of circumstances that explain
the heterogeneity of the human sphere. Without capabilities, individuals could
have a generous income, yet remain unable to transform it into valuable func-
tionings –achieved ‘beings’ and ‘doings’. The global initiative that promotes
basic income, which seems to be producing encouraging results in a pilot experi-
ment started this year in Finland, is directed towards achieving a minimum
threshold of income (economic egalitarianism) and also ensuring long-term sus-
tainability of that crucial element for quality of life. Even this initiative has lim-
itations, overemphasizing values that flow through the veins of the economic
system and neglecting others.
Compared to the frameworks of thought built on the priority of resources,
income or consumption, the most solid alternative is undoubtedly the one pro-
posed by the Brundlandt Report. It is the result of a normative trajectory in
line with the principles that inspire human rights as universal guarantees, and
ultimately in favor of a more ‘human’ development. A possible criticism of this
perspective is that it ignores the point that needs considered as mental states
can sometimes be an unreliable criterion for intergenerational justice. Individu-
als sometimes struggle to identify their ‘real’ and complex needs, beyond those
most basic to survival. Frequently, we adapt our preferences and expectations to
cultural, social, political or religious circumstances that appear to be natural and
good for ourselves. The political implication of this mechanism is that the fron-
tier between real needs and conditioned mental states is usually very vulnerable;
consequently, policies often collapse in preserving people’s autonomy and iden-
tifying real preferences. Secondly, there is the problem of who decides what are
the relevant needs, a recurrent question in social justice theories. In addition, we
must understand what are the minimum needs to be fulfilled, and then how to
solve the tension between present people’s needs and those of future persons:
what is the intergenerational threshold that requires political protection? To ful-
fill needs for the sake of needs cannot be a complete answer to the problem of
human sustainable development—not only because of the aforementioned re-
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flections, but also because a solely needs-based perspective does not embrace
other essential aspects, such as the freedom to choose whether to satisfy
those needs or not (Sen 2013, p. 11– 12).
Capabilities and principles
for intergenerational justice
It is clear that there is an elusive element to developing a more inclusive view of
current and future human flourishing—one that is worthy of being promoted and
transmitted. This criterion might well be the currency of capabilities, offering a
relevant informational space to assess and compare individual advantages and
social injustices.
I contend that there is strong justification for normative orientation based on
capabilities compared to other current proposals, of which I have reviewed here
only those based on income and wealth, or human needs as a source of respon-
sibility and sustainability. The capabilities approach gives attention to human di-
versity and embraces the coexistence of different impartial reasons of justice, by
understanding that the action of specifying capabilities consists of a poiesis, and
in this sense constitutes what John Rawls called ‘the exercise of public reason’.
The real opportunities that individuals have, or the ‘freedom to’ do and be what
they consider of value, are the criteria to be complemented with other fundamen-
tal elements for human life. In this sense, the capabilities approach is a perfect
example of an incomplete theory with a pluralist view of values. This starting
point might be crucial for a future-oriented ethics.What is involved is the possi-
bility, and not only the factual realization, of a personal set of freedoms. In terms
of intergenerational justice, focusing only on achievements can perpetuate a
dominant set of ways of doing, policies and status quo, which may lead us to
an undesirable state of things.
Focusing attention on real opportunities can help us diagnose new forms of
inequality that are born out of the progress of technoscience. Equally, the way to
advance a correct conception of intergenerational justice from a sustainable
point of view, is to place the attention on the role that individuals have as agents
of their own lives and not merely as passive recipients of others’ will: this idea
constitutes the bedrock of the capabilities framework. A perfect example of this,
in the context of reinforcing women’s agency, is that the education of women in
India has proven to be effective in many different aspects, such as decreasing
infant and neonatal mortality, improved family nutrition, increasing women’s
autonomy within the home and the prolongation of life expectancy (Saidi
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Reddy 2014, p. 229). In countries where women are better educated and more in-
tegrated into the workforce, those women also tend to have fewer children,
which has positive implications for global climate issues (Sen and Drèze 2013,
p. 15– 17).
Nevertheless, I believe that there is a cardinal absence within the literature
of capabilities of subjects strictly linked to prospective responsibility. The most
interesting attempts at complementing the approach by including an idea of in-
tergenerational justice have been confined, in most cases, to the frontiers of the
concept of sustainable development. Broadly speaking, critics agree that the
conditions lacking in the basic theoretical framework for the possibility of inter-
generational justice are twofold: firstly, more attention must be paid to the pres-
ervation of nature and the relationships between people and environment; and
secondly, there is also a marked concern to explain the links between systems
and individuals, and to emphasize that motivational problems are alleviated if
the individual burden is shifted to the political character of the system.⁸
In my view, and in light of the above, the notion of responsibility should take
center stage not only for intragenerational human relations, but also for justice
between generations. An idea of justice anchored in a future-oriented ethics
should analyze rights and obligations (as well as their scope and limits) in the
creation of capabilities. That is: to whom are these obligations established;
whose are the responsibilities; and, what nature do they have? I also consider
that in the task of defining obligations towards future generations, it is important
to add to the initial theoretical framework some explanation of the reasons peo-
ple may have for giving more weight to some capabilities than others. Going be-
yond the empirical description of capabilities can give a greater impetus to the
creation of public policies aimed at intergenerational justice. In principle,
there should be no conflict between the freedom to choose the life that one con-
siders valuable to live and deliberating upon which are the components that
allow us to affirm that a life is ‘good’. Focusing only on freedom as ‘the freedom
to choose’ is undoubtedly a political end, but when it comes to addressing the
issue of what we want to leave to future generations, we must reinforce the de-
bate by suggesting some elements that may be intrinsically good for the lives of
human beings.⁹ Even if we cannot immediately articulate what it means to ach-
ieve a ‘good human life’, we do feel a strong indignation when we come into con-
 See, for instance; Holland (2008, Jun.); Lessmann / Rauschmayer (2013); Schultz / Christen /
Voget-Kleschin / Burger (2013).
 In the works of Amartya Sen, while there is no explicit rejection of the idea of a ‘good life’, he
chooses to leave in the plane of public discussion the exercise of endowing capabilities with
more specific content.
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tact with an injustice, as the philosophies of Ricœur and Sen have taught us. The
identification of what prevents many human lives from being considered ‘good’
could be a prosperous point of departure for conceptualizing responsibility for
the future.
A central issue, frequently the object of controversy, is the necessity of a pre-
conceived list of capabilities. In this matter, Nussbaum’s proposal shows some
advantages. This is an especially sensitive issue in intergenerational justice. If
it is problematic in the present to establish whether it is morally or politically
legitimate for someone to generate one list with universal validity (with all the
nuances Nussbaum considers necessary: being always open to discussion, revis-
able, and sufficiently abstract), at the intergenerational level emerge the added
difficulties that these choices can not be discussed with the unborn, and that
such a list cannot mitigate epistemological uncertainty.¹⁰ At the very least, it
is essential to understand that any such list must, by its very nature, change
with time. Additionally, we need one type of list for addressing concrete prob-
lems and another for more universal and abstract levels of implementation.
We must also ask what conflicts could arise between the capabilities of individ-
uals of different generations and what are the priority rules in these cases of con-
flict. Furthermore, some capabilities are exhaustible (Basu / López-Calva 2011)
by present generations, and must therefore be reexamined for the sphere of in-
tergenerational justice. Conversely, some capabilities are very fertile (Wolff / de-
Shalit 2007), and could well expand across many generations.
These and other related questions show clearly the enormous complexity of
the subject. I have tried to contribute an outline of valuable itineraries for inves-
tigating the ends of sustainable justice, as well as some guiding principles for a
research agenda for intergenerational justice, embedded with the notions of re-
sponsibility and capabilities.While we may not yet have a full grasp of what in-
tergenerational justice demands, we have an intuition that tells us that we
should at least leave the world as we have found it, if not with more and better
options (Barry 1977, p. 275). This is common sense, which we all share beyond
philosophical positions (Visser’t 1999, p. 2–3). Thus, in terms of obligations,
we are beneficiaries—we use the resources of the planet that we have inherit-
ed—but we are also responsible, because we have duties in relation to future
people’s well-being. The intuition is also that humans across generations (as
well as, recalling Goethe’s poetic words, around the world) are not going to
want fundamentally different things. This should remain foremost in our
minds as we further develop theories of intergenerational justice.
 Interesting works on this subject are those of Claassen (2011) and Fibieger Byskov (2017).
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Johannes Rohbeck
Global Responsibility
in a Historical Context
Abstract: Contemporary theories of globalization seldom mention history. This is
surprising, because ‘globalization’ is essentially a historical term, describing as it
does a historical process. There is less mention still of the philosophy of history,
especially given that it has been discredited. And yet, if one probes the accounts
in question more deeply, there is no overlooking that nearly all of the relevant
discourses operate more or less explicitly with patterns of interpretation bor-
rowed from the philosophy of history. The authors speculate upon which general
tendencies of globalization are recognizable, and whether it is more indicative of
‘progress’ or of the ‘downfall’ of human civilization. Moreover, the questions of
when globalization actually began,what is ‘new’ about the state of globality ach-
ieved thus far and what developments can be expected in future cannot possibly
be answered without reflecting on history. After all, the ethical problem of global
justice, which demands compensatory measures to alleviate historic harms, re-
quires us to take into account the course of history thus far. Such topics under-
line that recourse to history, with all of its historico-philosophical implications,
is essential if we are to resolve the problems resulting from globalization.
Globalization and history
Considering the phenomenon of globalization from a philosophical viewpoint,
one must first note that the global has always been a theme in philosophy (Fig-
uera 2004, p. 9; cf. Negt 2001, pp. 42; Toulmin 1994, p. 281). The search for uni-
versal concepts and principles that could claim validity for all of humankind is
part of the philosophical tradition. From the (early) modern period onward, phil-
osophically grounded human rights were intended to apply to all of the earth’s
inhabitants equally and universally. In particular, the history of philosophy as it
has developed since the Enlightenment proclaimed the existence of a universal
or world history in which all peoples and cultures participate (Rohbeck 2010,
p. 54; Brauer 2012, p. 19; Roldán 2012, pp. 83–84). This also applies to subse-
quent philosophies of history that distanced themselves from the ideas of prog-
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ress and teleology, and even to the later position of posthistoire, which posits the
‘end’ of history.
Contemporary theories of globalization seldom mention history. There is less
mention still of the philosophy of history, especially given that it has been dis-
credited. And yet, if one probes the accounts in question more deeply, there is
no overlooking that nearly all of the relevant discourses operate more or less ex-
plicitly with patterns of interpretation borrowed from the philosophy of history.
The authors speculate upon which general tendencies of globalization are recog-
nizable, and whether it is more indicative of ‘progress’ or of the ‘downfall’ of
human civilization (Scholte 2005, p. 49; versus Hardt / Negri 2003, p. 296; Ke-
hoane / Joseph 2005, p. 76; Baudrillard 2007, p. 22; Groß 2007, p. 16). This
shows that globalization is largely understood as a historical process. The very
questions of when globalization actually began, what is ‘new’ about the state
of globality achieved thus far, and what developments can be expected in future
cannot possibly be answered without reflecting upon history.
This global history perspective in turn changes the way history is viewed. In
traditional theories of history, the focus was on historical time, whose concepts
and structures the authors explored (Koselleck 1979/2004; Ricœur 1984). History
was equated with ‘temporalization’, and corresponding studies focused on his-
torical times with their continuities and ruptures, as well as changes in the
tempo of history such as stagnation and acceleration. In the context of globali-
zation, the focus is increasingly on historical spaces, so that history is not merely
‘temporalized’ but also ‘spatialized’ (Osterhammel 1998, p. 374; Schlögel 2003,
pp. 12– 13).When we analyze how economic, political, social and cultural spaces
are created with time, history comes to appear as a spatial-temporal construct.
My thesis is that the ethics of globalization, too, could benefit from the re-
flections of historiography and the philosophy of history. For there can be no
doubt that catastrophic climate change and global poverty, which are to some
degree connected, were ‘made’ by human beings in the course of their history.
From this we may draw the ethical conclusion that the harms caused should
be rectified through compensatory measures. The current debate over such meas-
ures shows what a central role the treatment of history plays. Those who gener-
ally reject the industrial nations’ moral duty towards the poor countries already
consider the historical context to be irrelevant. But even those who believe that
rich countries have an obligation to help make their arguments independent of
history. A farther-reaching responsibility that includes compensation for the ef-
fects of harmful behavior, in contrast, can only be justified with reference to the
course of history thus far. For that reason, I call this type of responsibility ‘his-
torical responsibility’. It follows, in turn, that the recourse to history, with all of
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its historico-philosophical implications, is indispensable for a resolution of the
problems resulting from globalization.
Historical responsibility
Leaving aside extreme libertarian and nationalist positions, there is a consensus
that people living in rich countries have an obligation to help the needy in poor
countries. This expressly also applies to states on a global scale. To be sure, one
can distinguish between certain degrees of remedial responsibility, allowing for
special obligations towards members of one’s own family or nation, which pro-
duces a graduated conception of justice (Walzer 1999, p. 38; Zurbuchen 2005,
p. 139; Nida-Rümelin / Rechenauer 2009, p. 314, 319). It does not follow, however,
that there is no basis for farther-reaching obligations towards people who live in
distant parts of the world. The objection that such a redistribution of goods from
rich to poor countries presupposes a ‘world state’, with all its potential for abus-
es (Nusser 1997, p. 92), is also not convincing, because, as was explained, indi-
vidual states and transatlantic organizations are also in a position to do this.
Nevertheless, we need to ask why people are obligated to help other people.
Opinions on this question differ: on the one side, we have the position of so-
called remedial duties, based on the argument that human beings as such are
obliged to help others to the extent that they are able (Previous cooperation or
even historic connections between these people expressly play no role here.);
and on the other side, we find the position of outcome responsibility, which as-
sumes that the plight of individuals in poor countries should be viewed as the
‘consequence’ of acts performed by the inhabitants of rich or powerful countries
(At this point the historical aspect comes into play, for such an outcome respon-
sibility is, after all, rooted in a historical process that led to great injustices in the
past.). I propose that global responsibility for unjustly treated people and peo-
ples is, in turn, in need of both historical and historico-philosophical reflection.
If one examines the argumentation on remedial duties more closely, its po-
sition on history appears paradoxical. One argument is that human suffering and
death is something fundamentally bad that needs to be overcome in all cases,
without creating a practical-historical relationship between the givers and seek-
ers of assistance (Singer 2007, p. 39; Schlothfeld 2007, p. 77; Schaber 2007, p. 139).
Those with a duty to assist function merely as witnesses capable of helping, who
observe the needy from afar. Because what is at stake is ultimately an anthropo-
logical principle (and thus the unity of the human species, which has a duty to
assist) this is a case of abstract cosmopolitanism. The meta-ethical approach of
universalist morality, which calls for general assent to the moral norm of reme-
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dial measures from an impartial perspective, offers a similar argument (Birn-
bacher 2007, p. 139). According to this approach, the global moral community as-
sumes responsibility, as efficiently as possible, for the well-being of all human
beings, whose standard of living must not fall below the minimum subsistence
level.
A further argument states that people are obligated to prevent or alleviate
suffering, whatever its origins, as far as possible. The pragmatic boundary con-
sists in limiting remedial duties to preventing the bad rather than promoting the
good, so as to demand no excessive sacrifices. Repressed history reappears in
this argument; for the power to assist even distant people is largely dependent
on the technological means of communication and transport as they have
evolved (Singer 2007, p. 40). It is therein that the real conditions for the possibil-
ity of global remedial duties exist. And because these conditions change over the
course of history, the position of the remedial duty assumes an unanticipated
historical dimension. In contrast to traditional ethics, which was limited to the
narrow circles of family, region or nation-state, a new ethics of global remedial
duty is emerging.
Reversing this argumentation, one could also formulate it as follows: be-
cause people have access to novel technological means for assisting very distant
people, they should do so. To the extent that one assumes that the alleviation of
suffering is desirable in general, this entails no naturalistic fallacy, but it does
imply recognition that the new technological instruments create new moral
aims or historically conditioned norms, which amounts to a technologically
mediated transformation of values. Thus, from this position, the historical refers
not to the previous history of the sufferer’s plight, but rather to the historically
evolved power of the helper.
The second position of outcome responsibility raises the question of whether
the argument of pure remedial duties is sufficient, and whether farther-reaching
duties cannot be justified.
On the side of the helpers, the problem already exists in the subjects who are
obligated to assist. The impression arises here that it is primarily individuals who
decide to provide assistance without any previous agreement. Moreover, there is
no social differentiation among the affluent or assignment to social systems. One
could object that collective actors have far greater significance in global aid ac-
tions. Even an appeal for donations to which individuals spontaneously respond
represents a coordinated action (Schlothfeldt 2007, p. 77). This applies all the
more to states and trans-state organizations, which take action as social institu-
tions.
On the side of those requiring assistance, the problem is that the needy ap-
pear solely as victims. They remain passive and anonymous sufferers (moral
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strangers), to whom no particular relationship of responsibility exists (Birnbach-
er 2007, p. 132). They figure as mere objects of a donation, which therefore risks
becoming authoritarian and arbitrary. It is striking above all that while this as-
signs particular obligations to the wealthy, it accords no rights to the poor. Duties
are thus accompanied by no rights that could be asserted in the form of legiti-
mate demands. There is in fact no preceding interaction between givers and tak-
ers. This also cancels all criteria of commutative justice.
If, however, one insists that the poor have certain rights beyond universal
human rights, one is referred to concrete contexts associated with the social im-
balance that stands to be remedied or alleviated. People frequently speak of co-
operation here, which can establish a global obligation (Nida-Rümelin / Reche-
nauer 2009, p. 316). Those who baulk at referring to interactions with the poor as
cooperation (Birnbacher 2007, p. 135) can speak neutrally of an action context
that precisely encompasses discrimination against foreign peoples, including
their exploitation. Positive or negative cooperation forms the basis of rich, indus-
trialized nations’ moral responsibility towards poor, developing countries.
This relationship yields obligations that extend beyond mere remedial du-
ties. To be sure, wealthy citizens and states have the positive moral obligation
to assist people in conditions of life-threatening poverty. At the same time, how-
ever, they have the negative obligation to minimize the harms they cause (Pogge
2003, p. 243). Because the world order is not just, the poor must be compensated
for the disadvantages they suffer. Such compensation is not aid, but the lessen-
ing of harm; it is not redistribution from the rich to the poor, but a corrective to
an unjust social structure between poor and rich. Not helping the disadvantaged
is less reprehensible than denying them justified profits by exploiting their dis-
advantaged condition (Pogge 2003, p. 244).
This conception of outcome responsibility, however, has historical implica-
tions—so I would like to speak of a historical responsibility; for behind this argu-
ment is the recognition that world poverty is the consequence of an historical
process, which since colonialization has included enslavement, genocide, and
exploitation (Pogge 2003, p. 222). To limit oneself, in contrast, to mere assistance,
is to overlook the roots of the West’s enormous economic superiority over centu-
ries of common history that devastated four continents (Nida-Rümelin / Reche-
nauer 2009, p. 300). The great majority of property rights came about in an un-
acceptable manner, through violence, conquest and oppression. From this
derives the call to demand farther-reaching duties to compensate for the injusti-
ces suffered. The legal principle of fault-based liability applies here: those who
actively cause distress are responsible for alleviating it, for the creation of an
evil generates a particularly high degree of responsibility.
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A number of objections have been raised to the historical argument in par-
ticular. The scope of the duty to compensate is allegedly limited. On the one
hand, it presupposes that the previous harms are actually demonstrable. On
the other, it must be proven that past damages continue to affect the present.
The first objection states that present-day governments in the developing coun-
tries are as much to blame for current poverty as past colonialists. Moreover, the
duty to compensate for harmful behavior applies only to those states that actual-
ly participated in the injustices committed at an earlier time (Birnbacher 2007,
p. 136). Finally, there is the problem of moral subjects, if one holds only individ-
uals and not collective actors accountable.
A particularly widespread objection cites so-called internal causes, stating
that the essential factors for global poverty should be sought within present-
day developing countries and thus in domestic difficulties. This objection
seems to be underlined by the significant differences between the developing
countries stemming from local factors, so that in the end the entirety of local fac-
tors were the cause of global poverty (quoted in Pogge 2003, p. 224, 229; Rawls
2002, p. 134; Nagel 2005, p. 123). This appears to be confirmed by the frequency
of brutal and corrupt regimes in developing countries today. By implication, the
successes of some developing and newly industrialized countries seem to dem-
onstrate that the harmful effects of past colonialization have since faded. Aside
from the fact that the thesis of ‘internal causes’ serves as an excuse for the rich
countries, this impression is also the product not least of historians’ and sociol-
ogists’ tendency to focus more on national and regional factors than on world-
wide developments.
Conversely, the duty to compensate is justified by the fact that local circum-
stances cannot adequately account for global poverty. The world economic order,
with all its inequities, remains responsible for the failure to thrive of economies
in developing countries. Thus, even with continuous economic growth, Africa
today has no chance of catching up with Europe’s lead of 30 to 1. Given this mas-
sive advantage, current inequality is not simply the effect of free choice. In ad-
dition, so-called domestic factors are themselves conditioned by the global
order, because the current world order contributes significantly to corruption
and oppression in developing countries (Pogge 2003, p. 233). This includes the
international resource privilege, the disequilibrium between rich natural resour-
ces and economic growth, as well as dependence on the global realm (Pogge
2003, p. 235; Kesselring 2005, p. 48). The consequence is that it is not merely
a matter of distributing goods fairly, but above all also of eliminating unfair con-
ditions of production.
If nothing else, we need to repudiate the fallacy that the duty to compensate
calls remedial responsibilities into question, as if the two types of duties were
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mutually exclusive. Naturally all rich countries have a duty to help, even if they
feel no guilt, or do not accept the concept of outcome responsibility. But accord-
ing to the farther-reaching argument, those states that were involved in past
harm have a particular duty to compensate in the present.
The whole debate underlines how essential the historical aspect is. After all,
it rests on the elementary insight that global poverty was ‘made’ by certain peo-
ple in the course of history. And ultimately, it is precisely this manner of ‘mak-
ing’ history that is subject to debate. Even historical details about which global
and local factors should be weighted to what extent and with which spatial and
temporal scope play a role here. This harnesses the entire arsenal of historical
research, down to methodological questions about the explanatory function of
certain data. Even the method of counterfactual explanation comes into play,
for example in discussions of whether people in developing countries are better
off today than they would have been had they persisted in a fictional state of na-
ture, and had colonialization processes never taken place (Pogge 2003, p. 237).
Finally, there is the pragmatic question of to what extent referring to the past
produces quantifiable compensatory measures.With respect to actual assistance,
it is far removed from any practical dimension where the theoretical distinction
between remedial and outcome responsibilities might play a role. But in fact, the
historical aspect is important in the discourses because it leads to payments
that, while not truly compensations, can still be understood as partial acknowl-
edgements of injustices suffered. This is clearly connected with the intention to
heighten awareness of specifically historical responsibility. Even if such an argu-
ment is not directly reflected in appropriate figures, it can contribute to doing
more for the poor countries than strictly required in a given situation. Above
all, the historical argument calls upon us not just to alleviate suffering, but
also to attack its causes by promoting a more just world than the one that has
evolved over the course of history. This presents us with the task of seeking al-
ternative possibilities for global developments in the future.
Conclusion
The problem with most ethics devoted to the problem of global poverty is that
they are conceived without reference to history. This lack of history represents
a double difficulty. On the one hand, universal principles provide no sufficient
argument for the remedial duties invoked. On the other, these principles remain
so abstract that it is impossible to differentiate both those who need help and
those who have a duty to provide it. The fight against global poverty should
not be mistaken for universalism. Rather, to assume the global ethical stand-
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point is to analyze the historical process of globalization, and to derive concrete
and differentiated responsibilities from the conditions in which global poverty
arises.
As we have seen, the globalization process takes place in diverse historical
spaces and times. In the field of the world economy, this means envisioning the
new spatial economy of capitalism with the development of natural resources,
the increase in sales markets, and the search for favorable conditions of produc-
tion in distant lands.While it is legitimate to point to local factors as well when
making international comparisons, this should not tempt us to underestimate
the influence of the world economic system. In the political arena, this means
that the role of nation-states needs differentiation. This also applies in particular
to developing countries, which were and still are dependent in specific ways on
the old colonial powers. Thus, if one points to the inadequacies of these states in
order to shift the blame for global poverty onto them, one should equally recall
that these domestic deficiencies are also conditioned by the global order. In
order to overcome hardship, associations of states are increasingly emerging
within the groups of developing and newly industrialized countries that fulfill
a similar function to the European Union. In these cases, too, the national
and transnational levels overlap to form a supra-territorial space-time structure.
It is precisely these new assemblages that require special support from the old
industrial nations.
Thus when we consider the history of globalization, we no longer need only
to enquire into the historical beginnings of the process, but also to determine
more precisely where and when to seek the roots of global poverty. If this ques-
tion is in the foreground, we can surely place the beginning of globalization ear-
lier—if not already in the earliest phases of colonialization from the sixteenth to
the eighteenth centuries, then at least in nineteenth-century colonialism. And if
we declare the emergence of electronic networks in the twentieth century as the
birth of modern globalization, we need to ask to what degree these networks pro-
mote or hinder development in the poor countries. There is no question that this
development, too, disadvantages or excludes entire regions.
Finally, addressing the long-term effects of these developments on living
conditions in poor countries raises the historico-philosophical question of the
continuities and discontinuities in the globalization process. It makes sense
that postulating historical responsibility is possible only if one assumes a mini-
mum of historical continuity, for those who treat the ruptures in the globaliza-
tion process as absolute run the risk of underestimating their long-term effects
and playing into the hands of those who deny any historical responsibility. Ad-
hering to sustained development in no way means naively believing in a linear
process of modernization, let alone in homogeneous progress. Affirming a histo-
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ry with shared responsibility is perfectly compatible with criticism of the down-
sides of the course taken by history. Ultimately, the struggle against global pov-
erty presupposes a conviction that living conditions can be improved in the long
term. The world’s poor are not the only ones who consider such improvements
‘progress’. An ethics of global responsibility is quite inconceivable without
this regulative idea. These considerations show the fundamental nature of histor-
ical patterns of interpretation, and demonstrate just how indispensable histori-
cal and historico-philosophical reflections on globalization are.
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Nicholas B. Miller
Philosophical History at the Cusp of
Globalization: Scottish Enlightenment
Reflections on Colonial Spanish America
Abstract:This article contributes to the evaluation of how historical philosophers
of the Age of Enlightenment reflected upon incipient processes and forces of
globalization. Drawing upon assessments of colonial Spanish America by late
eighteenth-century Scottish philosophical historians, including William Robert-
son, Lord Kames, John Millar, Adam Smith and David Hume, the article consid-
ers the challenges Enlightenment-era thinkers encountered in balancing univer-
sal accounts of mankind with extensive human difference in a context
particularly defined by European-managed trade and migration flows. By em-
phasizing the challenges that individual philosophical historians confronted in
narrating processes of cultural and national change in the Americas during
the early modern period, this article reveals a core tension between two basic
components of Enlightenment-era historiography: national character and prog-
ress.
The ‘discovery’ of the New World has long been heralded as an epochal event.
Thinkers from the sixteenth century onwards judged it a sacred historical mile-
stone. Spanish historian Francisco López de Gómara [c.1511—c.1566] went so far
as to declare it “the greatest thing since the creation of the world, excluding the
Incarnation and the death of He who created it” (Gómara 1552, dedication; Burke
1995, pp. 40–41). In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith recast this narrative in
terms of global trading relations, naming this discovery as one of the “two great-
est and most important events recorded in the history of mankind” (Smith 1776,
vol. 2, p. 235), the other being the Portuguese rounding of the Cape of Good
Hope. He likewise drew upon circulating early modern paradigms in designating
‘the sacred thirst of gold’ as the force “that carried Cortez to Mexico, and Alma-
gro and Pizarro to Chili [sic] and Peru” (Smith 1776, vol. 2, p. 154). Smith situated
the discovery and conquest of the New World as landmark events in the initia-
tion of mercantile globalization, both being driven on by the rapacious desire
of Europeans for profit. Yet other Enlightenment thinkers remained compelled
by the events as watersheds in the global spread of Christianity. During the
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1760s and 1770s, the clerical historian William Robertson, Smith’s friend and as-
sociate in Edinburgh, engaged in a systematic attempt to appraise the history of
the New World as one of the planting of European social, cultural and religious
forms overseas. First published in 1777 in two volumes as the History of America,
Robertson’s work placed its attention particularly on “the most splendid portion
of the American story”: that of “the discovery of the New World, and of the prog-
ress of the Spanish arms and colonies there” (Robertson 1777, vol. 1, p. vi).
While the contributions of the Scottish Enlightenment to the practice of his-
tory have recently been subjected to renewed attention, the engagement of its
historical thought in reference to Spanish America has yet to be considered at
length (Sebastiani 2013, pp. 1– 102; Allan 2013, pp. 307–342; Quiro Chueca
2005, pp. 160– 163). This article addresses this gap by examining discussion of
colonial Spanish America in historical works composed by a range of Scottish
Enlightenment thinkers, including Henry Home (Lord Kames), John Millar,
James Dunbar and James Beattie—along with Robertson and Smith—and thereby
offers new insights into the comparative horizons of historical knowledge in the
Scottish Enlightenment. In particular, they reveal aspects of these thinkers’ con-
tributions to what David Hume heralded the ‘science of man’, which ostensibly
sought to derive practical political lessons from the philosophical synthesis of
empirical evidence about societies across the globe and throughout history.
The case study of Spanish America affords particular insights into how practi-
tioners of the ‘science of man’ engaged in inter-regional comparison and grap-
pled with the question of conquest-induced change in collective identities, or,
as they rendered it, national character.
Modes of narrating the Spanish conquest
Latin America has tended to be marginalized in historical accounts adopting
global frames of analysis. Budding world or global historians—and universal his-
torians before them—have found it difficult to reconcile comparative methodol-
ogies based on relatively static core cultural zones (civilizations) with Latin
America’s mestizo formation. Rather than constituting a distinct core culture,
Latin America tends to be viewed as a contact point of competing traditions:
linked on the one hand, through many cultural similarities—from religion to lan-
guage—to Europe and North America; and perceived on the other hand as a re-
gion with a distinct character, separated in terms of economic power and geopol-
itics from the Western core encapsulated in organizations like NATO (Feres
Jr. 2008).
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In the age of Enlightenment, trajectories towards the ‘two Americas’ binary—
a wealthy, Protestant, English-speaking North opposed to a poorer, Catholic,
Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking South—were still only embryonic. Two alter-
native paradigms predominated. One, championed by natural historians such as
George-Louis Leclerc de Buffon and Cornelius De Pauw, took its lead from climat-
ic and geological speculations to polemically dismiss America as a literally
‘newer’ world, defined by degenerative climatic conditions retarding the devel-
opment of all living creatures. In the case of humans, this likewise impacted
their intellectual and psychic faculties (Carbia 1943; García Cárcel 1992). Alterna-
tively, America was taken as a laboratory of comparative settler colonialisms. In
the case of Spanish America, the leyenda negra dovetailed with physical theses
of American degeneration, subjecting Spanish American creoles to double de-
merits in the eyes of various European publics, borne from a decadent, un-En-
lightened home culture (Spain) and as natives of a degenerative continent. Intri-
guingly, this led to a macrohistorical vision during the eighteenth century
contrasting the glory of the two most extensive pre-Columbian civilizations (Mex-
ico, represented by the Aztecs; and Peru, by the Incas) with a supposedly deca-
dent and baroque Spanish colonial present. Contemporary anti-Spanish polem-
ics of the Enlightenment, which saw Spain as the embodiment of all that was ill
with the ancien régime, thus rendered the history of Spaniard influence in the
New World as one of decadence and decline.
The history of European colonialism and expansion excited great interest in
the Enlightenment for a diverse range of figures, from novelists and playwrights
to historians and political economists. Spanish America held particular appeal
as a shining example of these processes. In Abbé Raynal’s critical history of Eu-
ropean colonialism, the Historie des deux Indes, America featured as a poster
child of the ills of conquest, plantation slavery and imperial rivalry. Scottish En-
lightenment discussion of these phenomena tended to be less vociferous, in line
with its generally conservative political orientation. Smith critiqued American
plantation slavery as being economically counter-productive due to discouraging
investments in productivity, but failed to voice much sympathy for the human
lives it destroyed. His protégé John Millar was more vocal in this regard, conclud-
ing the third edition of his Origin of the Distinction of Ranks with hopes of the
imminent abolition of slavery.
Whereas Smith and Millar discussed contemporary American conditions
within their treatises on political economy and historical jurisprudence, Raynal
and his co-writers, including Denis Diderot, did this through a politicization of
the genres of the travel narrative and accounts of foreign lands. These genres
had been the primary disseminators of information about the world beyond Eu-
rope ever since the first great drama of Columbus’s stumbling upon the islands
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of the Caribbean. Jesuits and missionary learned men, soldiers like Bernal Díaz
(who accompanied Cortés’s invading force) and hybrid figures such as Garcilaso
de la Vega (who defended the honor of his Inca ancestors by writing a descrip-
tion of the Inca empire before its fall) all produced descriptions of the distant
lands they had the occasion to visit or belong to, covering matters ranging
from epic battles to descriptions of government and attire. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, imperial bureaucrats and natural scientists such as La Condamine, Antonio
de Ulloa and Jorge Juan continued the practice of offering extensive descriptions
of the inhabitants of the lands through which they travelled. These accounts con-
tained much useful information, but for the most part lacked a historical dimen-
sion. They represented the political and economic orders of non-European and
past societies (as was the case with the Aztecs and Incas) as basically static en-
tities. The travel narrative offered a description of the conditions of a different
place, not the patterns or processes of change operative in these places. Informa-
tion about the Americas was additionally provided through early modern, ‘great
man’-focused historical narration, with the discovery as well as the conquests of
Mexico and Peru presented as heroic endeavors led by Columbus, Cortés and Pi-
zarro (Burke 1995, pp. 31–51).
Staging Americans in stadial history
Building upon the works of seventeenth-century French historian Jean Baudoin,
a coterie of British historians from the mid eighteenth century onward (David
Hume, Edward Gibbon, John Millar and William Robertson) sought to compose
a different sort of history (Miller 2017). Rather than focusing on specific battles or
illustrious leaders of the past, they charted broader stories of the rise and fall of
empires and the transition of societies to different governmental, legal, econom-
ic and property orders. For our purposes here, the contribution of the cleric-
turned-historian William Robertson is of prime interest. Robertson served as
Principal of the University of Edinburgh for three decades during the height of
the Scottish Enlightenment, and was well connected with all its major figures.
Following the success of his History of Scotland (1759) and History of Charles V
(1769), Robertson turned his attention west to engage with Europe’s expansion
into America and the amalgamation of the Western Hemisphere into the Europe-
an sphere of power (Lenman 1997, pp. 200–201).
Events in the 1770s undermined the basic premise of Robertson’s History. The
American Revolution left it unclear how linked the western hemisphere would
remain with Europe. In terms of public demand, the events certainly promised
great public interest in a new history of the Americas—but at the same time,
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any critical comments about British colonial policy could be interpreted as acts
of sedition, as unpatriotically siding with colonial rebels over a unified transo-
ceanic British commonwealth. Striking a cautious balance between the two, Rob-
ertson limited coverage to Spanish America when he released the work in 1777.
His broader ambition went unfulfilled. His son posthumously published his un-
finished work on the British North American colonies in 1796 (Robertson 1796);
Robertson never made much progress with the histories of the colonies of the
other European powers. In any case, Robertson’s main interests had already
been oriented to Spanish America—as having the longest history in the region
and as site to the most significant events. Robertson benefitted in this endeavor
from a unique assortment of manuscript documents, direct testimony (via ques-
tionnaires) and an array of earlier published works that no historian of his gen-
eration had yet explored in such depth (Cañizares-Esguerra 2002, pp. 38–59).
Crucial were Robertson’s close connections with the British Ambassador to
Spain, Lord Grantham, and the collaboration of his chaplain Waddilove (Len-
man 1997, pp. 202–06).
Robertson’s history of Spanish America ran to two volumes and eight chap-
ters, but corresponded to three basic phases: the state of American peoples be-
fore the Spaniards (books IV and VII); the decisive turning points of discovery
and conquest (I-III,V-VI); and the aftermath (VIII). Robertson began with discov-
ery and conquest—unsurprisingly, given that they had long proven their power to
captivate reader interest. The majority of Robertson’s history of Spanish America
consisted of exciting and well documented (albeit rather conventional) narra-
tives of the adventures of Columbus, Cortés and Pizarro. Robertson’s most inno-
vative historiographical contributions came after these narratives, wherein he re-
counted the condition of the inhabitants of the Americas prior to the arrival of
the Europeans. He separated the Aztecs and the Incas from the rest of pre-Co-
lumbian Spanish societies, categorizing the latter as ‘savage’ and the former
as ‘half-civilized’. He thereby situated American peoples within the framework
of stadial history, which assigned various societies around the world to different
temporal stages of development within a universal historical schema of material,
moral and social progress (Sebastiani 2014; Berry 2011, pp. 2– 19; Miller 2017).
Stadial history aspired not to understand the unique, internal historical process-
es of change within individual societies, but rather to synthesize a universal
process of social development out of dissonant testimony—one culminating at
an end of history located in contemporary ‘commercial’ European society. Rob-
ertson and other practitioners of stadial history refurnished the ahistorical ten-
dency of travel narration, providing putatively empirical evidence for a universal
history of mankind.
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The development of the Spanish colonial order in the Americas was by Rob-
ertson’s time a story centuries old. James Dunbar [1742– 1798], Professor of Moral
Philosophy at King’s College, Aberdeen, described colonial society as a humiliat-
ing disaster for the natives of America, whom the Spaniards had shunted to a po-
sition below African slaves (Dunbar 1780, pp. 394–96). Dunbar wondered if the
inhabitants of ‘the empires of Peru and Mexico’ would have chosen extinction
over such a disgrace, should they have known their eventual destiny (Dunbar
1780, pp. 394–96). Dunbar did not tender a response to the famous essay com-
petition of 1785 on whether the discovery of America had been beneficial or
harmful to the human race, but was adamant about the devastating impact of
discovery for the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas: “The pen drops from
my hand, in reciting the enormities acted by Europeans in the new hemisphere”
(Dunbar 1780, p. 396). Dunbar here pointed, albeit darkly, to the emergence of
Spanish America out of the ashes of destruction, and the founding of a colonial
society upon the basis of a racialized order that forced the indigenous inhabi-
tants to perpetually relive their defeat.
There are at least two ways to understand why Dunbar expressed more sym-
pathy for the plight of the descendants of the Inca and Aztec empires than for
their European counterparts, the Spanish conquerors. One could ground his
comments within a local, intra-European political context, attributing them var-
iably to the leyenda negra, inter-imperial rivalry and Enlightened contempt for
the Spanish Empire. Going deeper into the history of medial representations of
other societies, we could alternatively emphasize the function of the Aztecs
and Incas as compelling thinking devices for eighteenth-century thinkers to con-
template alternative forms of social order and governance.
Henry Home, Lord Kames [1696– 1782], a prominent figure in the Edinburgh
legal establishment and a vital link between wealthy Scottish patrons and phi-
losophers, admired both the Aztecs and Incas, noting that “there never was a
country destitute of iron, where arts seem to have been carried higher than in
Mexico” (Kames 1774, vol. 2, pp. 97–98). Kames further wrote that the Incas
held “an absolute monarchy […] but the farthest in the world from being despot-
ic: on the contrary, we find not in history any government so well contrived for
good of the people” (Kames 1774, vol. 2, p. 96). Kames was relatively restrained in
his praise. Aberdonian poet and moral philosopher James Beattie [1735– 1803]
declared that “every body has heard of the magnificence, good government,
and ingenuity, of the ancient Peruvians” (Beattie 1771, p. 509). Farther afield,
in Germany, the Cameralist thinker Johann Heinrich Gottlob Justi [1717– 1771] bril-
liantly evidenced the potency of pre-Columbian American civilizations as exem-
plars of government. Admiring the efficacy of collectivist practices of national
granaries and land redistribution, Justi praised the supposed lawgiver of the
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Incas as ‘the second Lycurgus’, going so far as to call him the better Lycurgus!
(Justi 1762, p. 546)
Robertson’s lengthy discussion of the ‘Mexicans and Peruvians’ began with
the dismissive preface that neither society could be compared with the Romans,
nor were either entitled to rank reproduced most of what had been written about
their institutions and accomplishments without qualification (Kontler 2014,
p. 140). It is likely that an early form of the chapter constituted the source
base for Kames’ commendation of both societies in his Sketches (1774). Adam
Smith may have been the decisive factor behind Robertson’s rhetorics, given
that he was one of their greatest skeptics in the eighteenth century. As Christian
Marouby has explored, Smith’s marginalization of the achievements of pre-Co-
lumbian American societies arose from the contradiction they posed to his
model of agricultural progress in his rendition of stadial history (Marouby
2007, pp. 85– 102). Smith, inspired by local Scottish conditions, claimed that
the domestication of animals was a necessary precondition to extensive agricul-
ture. The empirical record of the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas openly
contradicted this thesis. Not only was it widely noted that various tribes raised
crops while lacking domesticated livestock, but the Aztecs and Incas were famed
to have ruled over great empires of millions of inhabitants. In terms of the former
groups, Smith suggested that plant-based sustenance was mere ‘seasoning’ to
game, constituting simply a local variant of savagery. As for the Inca and
Aztec, Smith mocked the limits of their contribution to the global economy. In
the Wealth of Nations, he wrote that in spite of “all the wonderful tales which
have been published concerning the splendid state of those countries in ancient
times […] all the ancient arts of Mexico and Peru have never furnished one single
manufacture to Europe” (Smith 1776, vol. 1, p. 254). Robertson’s fidelity to stand-
ing historical testimony prevented him from making such a brazen move as
openly contradicting it. He affirmed that most of what had been written about
the Aztec and Inca had been credible. Yet, in forcing a stadial interpretation of
their societies, he stumbled into contradictions at the intersection of his compet-
ing ambitions of a providentialist history of America, an exhaustively document-
ed history of the region, and a stadial history of the indigenous inhabitants of
the Americas.
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Robertson’s millenarian and
colonial disappointments
As the Scottish Enlightenment’s greatest advocate of global evangelization and
the civilizing mission, Robertson was captivated by the early modern Spanish at-
tempt to convert the inhabitants of the Americas. While incomplete, it marked
the greatest extension of Christianity’s global footprint in a millennium. In Rob-
ertson’s providentialist understanding of human history, Spain’s conquest of the
Americas was part of a divine plan to extend Christianity globally. Like Smith
and Millar, Robertson was highly critical of the colonial practices of plantation
slavery, but his religious convictions made him sympathetic to European coloni-
alism as a means of achieving the conversion of all mankind to Christianity.
The shortest part of the History of America was that which recounted the
contemporary state of Spanish America. It was, however, the only extended treat-
ment by a Scottish Enlightenment thinker of the colonial social order produced
in the aftermath of conquest. Robertson was unsparing in his contention that
Spain had failed to properly Christianize the indigenous people, blaming the
spontaneous actions of men on the ground, rather than imperial design. Addi-
tionally, he was adamant that the Spaniards had squandered their fortune of
American domination through economic incompetence and mismanagement.
Robertson made sure to note that the tide seemed to have turned with the com-
ing of the Bourbon kings. He lauded the administrative reform efforts of Carlos
III and his father Felipe V, as well as their promotion of freer trade between the
different lands of America (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, pp. 415–418). On a personal
level, Robertson’s praise of the Bourbon reforms might also be attributed to grat-
itude to Carlos III for tolerating his project of a history of the New World—though
Robertson never managed to obtain access to manuscript materials sequestered
at Simancas (Armitage 1995, p. 66).
Robertson recounted the social world of Spanish America through the prism
of the sistema de castas, a complex status system that featured a spectrum of ra-
cial categories assigned mainly on the basis of racial descent, but also of indi-
vidual distinction (Miller 2013, pp. 21–32). Robertson balanced two theories sur-
rounding the emergence of mixed-race ‘casta’ peoples—an intentional politics of
national integration on the one hand, and basic lust on the other:
As the court of Spain, solicitous to incorporate its new vassals with its ancient subjects,
early encouraged the Spaniards settled in America to marry the natives of the country, sev-
eral alliances of this kind were formed in the infant colonies. But it has been more owing to
licentious indulgence, than to compliance with this injunction of their sovereigns, that this
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mixed breed has multiplied so greatly, as to constitute a considerable population in all the
Spanish settlements. (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, p. 368)
Robertson sought to rigorously document his study and offered precise foot-
notes, including page numbers, to his sources. However, as was typical in the
Scottish Enlightenment, these citations frequently held only a tenuous connec-
tion with the original claim of the source. Robertson cited three references in
support of the claim that Spanish sovereigns ordered their subjects to mix;
none, however, had actually made this claim themselves. In his citation of a re-
compilation of the Laws of the Indies carried out under Carlos II in 1680, and his
two citations from Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas’s Historia general de los he-
chos de los Castellanos en las islas, y tierra-firme de el mar océano (1601– 15), the
closest assertion one can find is the order given to the early Governor of Hispa-
niola Nicolás de Ovando to promote Christianization through intermarriage—not
explicit political vassalization!
Robertson speculated that Spaniards maintained the sistema de castas to in-
tentionally excite racial tensions for their own advantages, fomenting hatred be-
tween Africans and Indians for purposes of colonial order. Dunbar repeated the
point (Dunbar 1780, p. 394–95). The Spaniards “endeavored to prevent every in-
tercourse that might form a bond of union between the two races” (Robertson
1777, vol. 2, p. 370). Unlike in other parts of the hemisphere, the black population
in Spanish America allegedly resented native people and viewed themselves as
closer to the white population than to the native population (Robertson 1777,
vol. 2, pp. 369–70). Robertson saw this as emanating both from the black com-
munity itself as well as from Spaniard design: “By an artful policy”—both laws
and injunctions—“the Spaniards derive strength from that circumstance in pop-
ulation which is the weakness of other European colonies” (Robertson 1777,
vol. 2, pp. 369–70). The center of interracial tension in Spanish America for Rob-
ertson was Peru. Although the peninsular leadership persistently sought to have
Indians accepted to priesthood and religious orders, Peruvian orders continually
ignored them (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, p. 506). To Robertson, nothing demonstrat-
ed more the insurmountable ‘hatred and contempt of the Indians among the Pe-
ruvian Spaniards’ (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, p. 506). He thought this discord also
defined relations between Indians and black people: “[although the] negroes
seem to be more numerous […] they maintain their ascendant over the Indians,
and the mutual hatred of one to the other subsists with equal violence” (Robert-
son 1777, vol. 2, p. 369).
Robertson also emphasized cleavages within the white (or Spaniard) popu-
lation of Spanish America, beginning his discussion of the sistema with a dis-
tinction between peninsulares (Spaniards born in Europe) and criollos (Spaniards
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born in the Americas). It was here where he damned Spanish America as a de-
cayed society. Robertson described creoles as:
languid and unenterprising: by the enervating influence of a sultry climate, by the rigour of
a jealous government, and by their despair of attaining that distinction to which mankind
naturally aspire, the vigour of their minds is so entirely broken, that a great part of them
waste life in luxurious indulgences, mingled with an illiberal superstition still more debas-
ing. (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, p. 367)
Due to their superiority complex derived from living in a caste-ridden society,
they were unwilling to do any manual labor, and unlike peninsulares, who ac-
tually created new fortunes in the Americas, creoles merely lived off the inheri-
tance of their predecessors (Robertson 1777, vol. 2, pp. 366–368). Robertson’s dis-
cussion pointed to a great polemic that played out further afield in the
Enlightenment in the 1760s and 1770s, following Cornelius de Pauw’s publication
of Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains in Berlin in 1767. As evidence that
America was a degenerative land, de Pauw pointed to the inability of any Amer-
ican creole to make a single significant intellectual achievement! Robertson’s
rendering did not go this far, but recycled the general opinion in eighteenth-cen-
tury Europe of the decadence of Spanish American creoles.
Conclusion: Patriotism and the dilemma of the
historical formations of national character
Around the turn of the nineteenth century, contexts across America witnessed
the rise of patriotic creole discourses that countered the degeneration thesis
with patriotic celebrations of their own localities and communities (Entin
2013, pp. 19–34; Cañizares-Esguerra 2002). This refutation of climatism via re-
gional identity formation was paralleled in the Scottish Enlightenment with
the attempt to de-prioritize environmental explanations of human difference in
favor of national character. While Scottish historians of the second half of the
eighteenth century followed David Hume in understanding national character
as a principal differentiator of peoples across the world, they did not possess
a rigorous explanation of the effects of time and historical processes upon the
emergence, formation and evolution of these characters. This followed in good
part from their inability to fully escape climatic and geographical explanations
of human difference. Hume’s infamous speculations upon essential racial in-
equalities—that black people were naturally inferior to other varieties of man
—did not constitute the path taken up by most of his Scottish Enlightenment suc-
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cessors. It betrayed, however, the limits of his own methodological consistency
in his proposition of a science of man, given that it took the synthesis of all
human experience as its starting point. The famously eclectic (and self-contra-
dicting) Henry Home enthusiastically resorted to climate as one of many possible
causes for any given historical facet, yet even the more rigorous Glaswegian Pro-
fessor of Civil Jurisprudence John Millar was unable to fully escape its rhetorical
power. In the introduction to the third edition of his Distinction of Ranks, Millar
claimed that climate had little explanatory power: “How many nations are to be
found, whose situation in point of climate is apparently similar, and, yet, whose
character and political institutions are entirely opposite?” (Millar 1779, p. 13)
Nevertheless, his natural history of mankind was unable to offer a convincing
explanation for why national characters themselves changed outside of histori-
cal accident (Millar 1779, p. 14).
In the case of William Robertson, the absence of a historicized conceptual-
ization of collective identity formations led to a conventional portrayal of Span-
ish American creoles and mixed peoples as crude versions of peninsular models.
Rather than paying attention to how forces such as conquest and intermarriage
could produce new national characters, Robertson drew upon two older dis-
courses: (i) decadence, via latent civic humanist strictures of the consequences
of extreme inequality; and (ii) heat-induced indolence, via climatism. Although
Robertson noted with hope the recent reforms of the reformist Bourbon monarch
Carlos III, he conjured a dismal image of contemporary Spanish America, rife
with ethnic tensions, dominated by degenerate creoles and decayed from centu-
ries of administrative and economic mismanagement. He had received more
sympathetic testimony from people with actual experience in the Americas
through a series of questionnaires he commissioned, but chose to ignore this tes-
timony and to rely instead upon contemporary tropes. What Robertson reveals
above all is the depth to which colonial American societies lacked concrete cul-
tural identities in the eyes of eighteenth-century European observers. This lacu-
na was soon confronted. His original project of a magnum opus recounting the
spread of European nations to the Western hemisphere was disrupted mid-com-
position by white elites in the British North American colonies. A generation of
Spanish American creole thinkers reared in their would soon join their ranks. In-
cipient globalization processes would indeed deepen the mark of European in-
stitutions and epistemologies upon the rest of the world—but in different ways
than Robertson anticipated.
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Jesuit Mission and the Globalization of
Knowledge of the Americas: Florian
Paucke’s Hin und Her in the Province of
‘Paraquaria’ During the Eighteenth Century
Abstract: This article addresses the early globalization phase of the Jesuit Order
in America through Florian Paucke’s work Hin und Her.¹ Special attention is
given to the analysis of the field of tensions underlying the proto-globalization
processes of the Spanish empire and the frontier mission, for which three narra-
tive components are considered: ‘Paraquaria’² and the cartography of the spiri-
tual ‘mission’; a reflection on intercultural stereotypes (indigenous, Spaniards
and Germans); and the deconstruction of the autonomist myth of Nicolás I,
King of Paraguay.
In current research, the history of globalization and its accelerated impact on the
economic, political, sociological, juridical and technological sciences, among
others, demonstrates the multidisciplinary resonances that this category has at-
tained—not solely in the scholarly field, but also in everyday speech. Thus, the
complexity of the components that converge in the conceptualization of global-
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ization, as well as the dimensions and the respective phases of its evolution,
have been the objects of diverse theoretical approaches. This has been particu-
larly true since global transformations accelerated after the end of the Cold
War. Multi-dimensional and international changes in the market economy, cos-
mopolitism and technological connectivity intertwined with the reshaping of a
new global village (cf. Fäßler 2007; Osterhammel 2003, 2017; Conrad 2013).
Amid the coordinates of this global history, the necessity of re-thinking this cat-
egory in its apparent unity as a historical phenomenon of the West opens up the
question of what Romanist Ottmar Ette terms the ‘archaeology of globality’:
For speech about an archaeology of globality implies a singular, but nevertheless does not
define whether an ur- or early history are supposed to be analyzed as a pre-history of glob-
ality, or if the object of such archaeology may also include earlier forms of the former which
are not part of a pre-history, but constitute an essential element of globality in its temporal
and spatial transition. To what extent we will wish to attribute a spatial and historic phe-
nomenon (and our knowledge about it) to a history of globality or, alternatively, “only” to
its pre-history, will depend decisively on how globality is defined and exactly what phe-
nomena we are trying to investigate. How could we, then, conceptualize globality in the
plural? (Ette 2010, p. 22)
This question about the distinction already drawn by sociologist Ulrich Beck be-
tween ‘globality’ and ‘globalism’ (the ideology of the world market) takes us back
in time to the early modern age of the sixteenth century (Beck 1997). As an early
phase—or ‘proto-globalization’,³ to employ Fäßler’s term—it is characterized by
the colonial expansion of the Iberian powers, modern nautical technologies,
the search for overseas routes with the ‘Asian invention’ of America (Dussel
1994) and the Catholic missionary project in the two Indies; in short, by compo-
nents that contributed to the political-spiritual, economic, cartographic and an-
thropological redesigning of new spaces of interaction in the Atlantic world, with
the ensuing debate on and redefinition of European hegemony (Guérin 1992). For
Ette, the distinction between four phases of accelerated globalization (Ette 2010,
pp. 24–25) and in particular his interest in the analysis of the early philosophical
reflections by De Pauw, Forster, Raynal and Humboldt on the Americas and Eu-
rope during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, delineate an archae-
ology of globality open to a permanent revision of its actors, dynamics, and
modes of representation and reflection, within the framework of the hetero-dis-
 Fäßler suggests the periodization: until 1500—‘pre-global epoch’; 1500– 1840—‘protoglobali-
zation’; 1840– 1914—‘first phase of globalization’; 1914– 1945—‘period of contrary developments’;
1945– 1990—‘second phase of globalization’; and 1990 until today—‘third phase of globalization’
(Fäßler 2007, pp. 46–51).
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cursivities that moved through this global Aufklärung [‘Enlightenment’] (D’Aprile
2016).
One of the distinctive components of this process of accelerated proto-glob-
alization was the expansion of the Catholic church to the four corners of the
world, especially by the Jesuit Order (cf. Koschorke 2012, pp. 4–5; van der Hey-
den 2012). Ever since its foundation in 1540 by Saint Ignatius of Loyola, the Jesuit
Church’s structures and transcontinental networks of communication—true to
their pastoral motto ‘urbi et orbi’—have made them excellent examples to be
studied as a globalizing model of multidimensional (scientific, historical, eco-
nomic, philosophical, etc.) and international knowledge,⁴ born of the missionary
norms of the Society of Jesus (apostolic mobility, human adaptation and ad-
vancement of indigenous peoples) and its intercultural experiences in India,
Asia and the New World (Banchoff 2016).Within this broad chapter of the Jesuit
spiritual conquest, this essay aspires to determine the specific modalities of rep-
resentation of and reflection on Spanish colonialism in the Americas during the
eighteenth century, examining in this early phase of globalization German-Sile-
sian Jesuit Florian Paucke’s contribution, known as Hin und Her. My objective is
to problematize, from the evangelist experience and narrative memoire of this
expelled traveler, some of the issues that underlie this proto-history of globaliza-
tion and the utopian Christian-social project that the Jesuits represented in the
New World.
Hin und Her:
memoire and itinerary of an expelled traveller
The text by Paucke known as Hin und Her [‘There and Here’] constitutes one of
the most representative chronicles of the frontier ministry carried out by the
Ibero-American missions in the Chaco region.Written in German, the manuscript
is preserved in the Cistercian monastery in Zwettl (Austria) and was published in
a complete edition in German in 1959. The work offers a narrative and visual por-
trayal—in over 1000 pages, 104 watercolors integrated into the text, and ten very
large scrolls—of diverse aspects of the life and customs of indigenous peoples, of
a missionary experience lasting 21 years in the north of the present-day Argenti-
nian province of Santa Fe, and of the rich geographic and natural environment
of the region (Furlong 1973; Binková 2001). Paucke’s legacy complements that of
 For more on this multidimensional and international knowledge produced by Christian mis-
sionaries, see: Koschorke 2012; van der Heyden 2012.
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the Bohemian Jesuit Martin Dobrizhoffer, who after returning to Austria com-
posed his Historia de Abiponibus (1772– 1775) in Latin. Dobrizhoffer’s Historia
was soon translated into German and published in Vienna (Dobrizhoffer 1784),
adding to the corpus of literature on the expulsion of the Central-European Jes-
uits from the interior frontier of South America (Meier 2007a).⁵ In Hans Jürgen
Lüsebrink’s opinion, the chronicles by the expelled missionaries from Central
Europe who had a Germanic language and culture, such as Johann Jakob Baegert
(missionary in the southern California peninsula) and Martin Dobrizhoffer, testi-
fy to a twofold effort: on the one hand, “to understand the alterity of the values
and forms of behavior of the indigenous peoples” (Lüsebrink 2007, pp. 384–
385); and on the other, to furnish a counter-discourse, since they sought—just
like the expelled criollos—to correct mistaken conceptions in Europe regarding
the reality of the New World (Lüsebrink 2014). Such intentions can be identified
in Paucke’s work in those that impact on a specific perspective of his narrative of
the political-spiritual conquest of the New World.
The adverbial use in the manuscript’s title Hin und Her indicates, according
to Edmundo Wernicke,⁶ less a static understanding and identification of the pla-
ces visited by the traveler, ‘but rather the emotions encountered in going there
(hin) and returning (her)’. The pendularity of this pathos, as expressed by
Paucke—‘hin’ (there, sweet and pleased) and ‘her’ (here, bitter and sorrowful)
—corresponds to his trans-Atlantic itinerary (via Olmütz [Olomouc], Malaga, Lis-
bon, Buenos Aires, Cordoba), with a clear focus on his missionary experience in
Santa Fe and San Javier until the enacting of the decree of expulsion in 1767,
which obliged him to retrace his maritime journey from Montevideo to Spain
and ultimately Germany.⁷ The compositional complexity of Paucke’s text (auto-
biography, spiritual, ethnographic, linguistic chronicle and natural history) for
the Chaco region is lent coherence by the unifying thread of his ‘memory’ (Zanet-
ti 2013) in the ‘Province of Paraquaria’:
No one should be surprised that in the 59th year of my life, after suffering the heat of the
sun and the exhaustion of my travels, after 21 years of laboring in Paraguay without ever
having, before I went there, at least briefly noted something down on paper, I perceive a
considerable loss of memory. Instead, I marvel that I have preserved in my memory all
the things I write about. If I had cherished the hope of ever seeing Europe again, then I
would not have so carelessly let my notation quill dry up, for my will was to remain eter-
nally with my Indians. (HH, V2/P6/C9, p. 730)
 See also: Schatz 2000; Meier 2007b.
 Wernicke translated Hin und Her into Spanish in 1942 under the title Hacia allá y para acá.
 Furlong (1973, p. 11) explains that ‘Germany’ refers to the Jesuit province of Bohemia, where
Paucke died in 1780.
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Despite the enforcement of the punishment of expulsion, Paucke’s narrative
memory is synonymous with the recording of his evangelistic experience
among the indigenous Mocovís in the Chaco region and his re-encounter with
Europe. The narrative self-referentiality of this subject, whose Hin und Her em-
braces the autobiographical pathos, is distinguished not merely by the pendular-
ity of his emotions, but also of his own understanding. In other words, he has a
reflective consciousness, whose act of writing revives the successes as well as the
tragedies of his individual—and the Order’s collective—missionary experience in
the Province of Paraquaria. At the same time, I aim to place his historical revi-
sionism, as regards the colonial project in the Americas. For this reason, it is
worthwhile to determine how his narrative stages the framework of submerged
tensions in this process of the proto-globalization of the colonial empire and
the frontier mission of the Jesuits later expelled from Ibero-America.
‘Paraquaria’, frontier mission and
trans-continental communication networks
From the dawn of globalization’s first phase, the exploration of the American ter-
ritory and the concurrent creation of the ‘frontier’ were part of a process of in-
venting an unknown alterity. The traditional paradigm of civilization/barbarism
operated as an interpretative matrix during the early representations and inter-
pretations in the colonial textual and visual heritage, as an expression of the Eu-
ropeanizing and ethnocentric authority of the early modern age.Within this con-
text, the geostrategic significance of northern Mexico (due to the Chichimeca
War and the exploitation of the silver mines) or the Chaco region (due to its im-
portance in livestock supply for Peru and as a border against Portuguese ‘ban-
deirantes’), for example, already demonstrated in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries the frontier conflicts on the borders of the Spanish empire in the Amer-
icas and the active role played by the religious Orders.⁸
In Manuel Lucena Giraldo’s opinion, the changes triggered around 1740 by
‘geographic territorial consciousness’ (Lucena Giraldo 1996, p. 268) led the Bour-
bon state to impose greater social, political and economic control of the Ameri-
can space at the southern margins of its empire. These measures affected the so-
called ‘Jesuit state’ in Paraguay through the Order’s expulsion from Portugal
 Cf. Lázaro Ávila (1996). Kohut (2007) further distinguishes between the geopolitical impor-
tance of the exterior border in the North (Nueva España), the exterior border in the South
(Chile, Río de la Plata) and the interior borders (el Chaco, el Altiplano Andino, la Amazonía).
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(1759), France (1763), Spain (1767), Naples, Parma and Malta, as well as from the
overseas colonies. Despite anti-Jesuit propaganda in Europe and America, the es-
tablishment of missions and their intervention in the ‘parliaments’ or ‘peace
councils’ contributed to a ‘sphere of consensus’ that regulated the intercultural
friction between Spaniards and indigenous peoples in the frontier space. Accord-
ing to Guillaume Boccara, one should accentuate a critical perspective that con-
ceptualizes the frontier zones as dynamic and dialogical spaces, and as “an im-
mense ‘laboratory’ for the study of the processes ofmestizaje and for the creation
of new historical subjects” (quoted in Battcock 2004, p. 2). This latter perspective
certainly breaks with the apparent geometric linearity of the space of frontier
confrontation that for centuries justified the expansionist policies of the Spanish
and Portuguese crowns in the human (‘savage’, ‘cannibal’, ‘pagan’ Indians) and
natural (inaccessible jungle, gold, rivers, mountains) landscapes of the New
World.⁹ On the contrary, it means the ‘conjugation of cultural heritages’ (in Gru-
zinski’s terms) that allow the frontier to be ‘porous, permeable and flexible’. The
constitution of the Jesuit utopia of the ‘reductions’ alerts us to the efforts put into
the conquest of this fluid territorial dimension of South America and of the mo-
bility of diverse indigenous groups in the so-called Province of Paraquaria.
As is well known, the projection of utopian ideals in the so-called pueblos de
indios or ‘reductions’ has intensely captivated the attention of scholars, in partic-
ular of the ‘doctrines’ of Jesuit missions in Paraguay (cf. Cro 1990; Armani 1996),
which have been regarded as a “materialization of the Augustinian ‘Civitas Dei’
on earth, given the strongly theocratic character that the Jesuits imposed on
these civic groups in the reductions in Paraguay” (Rodríguez de Ceballos,
p. 162).¹⁰ The debate in the eighteenth century was marked on the one hand
by their defense by Ludovico Muratori and José Manuel Peramás,¹¹ and on the
 The combination of military and religious frontier again occurred in the relationships estab-
lished on the border of the Gran Chaco, with the Jesuits as the principal mediators between the
indigenous peoples and the de facto powers of the vice-regal administration (Lázaro Avila,
p. 284).
 References to the Guaraníes of Paraguay in early modern sources are frequent. Of special
importance are: Antonio Ruiz de Montoya’s Conquista espiritual (1639); Nicolás del Techo’s His-
toria de las Provincias del Paraguay (1673); Francisco Jarque’s Insignes misioneros (1687); Anton
Sepp’s Viajes (1696); and Ludovico Muratori’s Il Cristianismo felice (1743). See also Voltaire’s fa-
mous Candide ou lʾoptimisme (1759), as well as his Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations
(1756).
 See Muratori’s Il cristianesimo felice nelle missioni de padri della Compagnia di Gesú nel Para-
guai (1743– 1749) and Peramás’s De Vita Et Moribus Sex Sacerdotum Paraguaycorum (1791).With
regard to utopian thought in the works of Peramás, see: Hudde (1983).
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other by their negative evaluation by authors such as Ibañez de Echevarri, Tho-
mas Raynal and Cornelius de Pauw.¹²
The circulation of geographic knowledge of the Chaco frontier can already
be discerned in Martin Dobrizhoffer’s Historia de Abiponibus, which mapped
the immense extension of that region in South America, from Brazil to Peru
and Chile, and from the southern delta of the Río de la Plata to the northern Am-
azon area (fig. 1).
Paucke’s work likewise focuses on the so-called province of Paraquaria. The
geographical immensity and the identification of unknown lands—i.e., beyond
the reductions (HH,V2/P3/C3, p. 146)—demonstrate the will to inform and rectify
previous letters and to transmit ‘true’ knowledge of the imperial Spanish-Portu-
guese frontier and of spiritual conquests, thanks to the reduction of San Javier.
For this reason, the categorical visual certification of Paucke’s knowledge is not
surprising:
I draw solely on what I have seen with my eyes and trodden with my feet in the maps made
of America. Oh, how mistaken the far-away cartographers have been! I will report later on
how we Paraquarian missionaries, when we were expelled from America by order of the
king of Spain, were commanded to draw up a genuine iconographic map of the Grand
Chaco, where we have worked, one for the king, the second for the viceroy in Lima, and
the third for the governor of Buenos Aires. If one compares these maps against the ones
made beforehand, then one will discover how erroneous they were. (HH, V2/P3/C3, p. 458)
Paucke’s missionary-exploratory work and his criticism of the ‘Geometers und
Ichnographisten’ [cartographers] of the American realms confirms the lack of
concurrence between the political colonial territory and the spiritual dominion
(Fernández Bravo 2014). This acquires greater relevance when the discourse enu-
merates the diversity of ‘Indian nations’ in the regions of Chaco, Mocovíes, Abi-
pones, Tobas, Mataguayos, etc. (HH,V2/P3/C3, p. 456), thus visualizing the multi-
ethnic, cultural and especially linguistic condition in the space of this mission.
The corrective function of Paucke’s narrative refutes the supposed unity of lan-
guage, customs, nature and physiognomy of the American indigene (HH, V2/P3/
C1, p. 447). At the same time, he argues for the indigenous people’s capacity of
understanding and ability (HH,V2/P3/C17, pp. 562–575). Ultimately, the Jesuit in-
tervention not only confirms that in these Spanish possessions “one finds more
differences in nations and languages than in the remaining three parts of the
world” (HH, V2/P3/C3, p. 457). Moreover, it underlines the preeminence and rec-
 For an general overview of the subject of Jesuit reductions in the works of authors of the Eu-
ropean Enlightenment, cf. Fernández Herrero (1992, Ch. 5, pp. 393–431).
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ognition of the service of the indigenous peoples and ‘soldiers of God’ for the
colonial project, since “the king of Spain alone possesses many more countries
than all the princes and kings of Europe” (HH, V2/P3/C3, p. 146).
However, it must be emphasized that the cartographic, natural and ethno-
graphic investigation of the vast American realm undertaken by the Jesuits ac-
Fig. 1 Mappa Paraquariae/ In multis a me Correcta./ Quid si in pluribus porro peralios Corri-
genda?/ Authore M.D. eius provinciae Misionario. Source: (Furlong 1936, Vol. I, pp. 120–121).
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quired special relevance in Europe thanks to the knowledge transfer facilitated
by their networks of transcontinental communication during this first phase of
globalization. This component deserves to be highlighted, thanks to the publica-
tion of the cultural ethnographic periodical Neue Welt-Bott [‘New World Messen-
ger’], edited by the Jesuit Joseph Stöcklein between 1725 and 1761, and subtitled,
“Letters, Writings, and Travel Descriptions, Most of them from the Missionariis
Societatis Jesu from Both Indies and Other Overseas Lands which since 1692
Until this Year Have Arrived in Europe (…).” This collection of letters—the major-
ity of which originated from the overseas missions in the Orient—also included
the narrative and cartographic production of the Jesuits from South America
(Furlong 1936, Vol. I, p. 49). A representative example is the map and report¹³
on Paraquaria that appeared in the 1730 volume of Neue Welt-Bott (fig. 2).
Galaxis Borja González has demonstrated the significant role the German
press played in the diffusion and reception of literature by the Jesuits in America.
In particular, Dobrizhoffer’s abovementioned Historia de Abiponibus (1784) and
other Jesuit writings in German contributed to the emergence of a ‘global aware-
ness’ without the need of translators or mediators. They also played an impor-
tant role in the construction of an imagined political community in eight-
eenth-century Germany:
In this manner, the Jesuit missionary narratives are inserted into the efforts of German
scholarly elites to define an early national identity, constructed on the idea—or in reality
on the desire—of possessing a common language and of sharing a determined canon of vir-
tues, attitudes, and values. This positive and inter-confessional handling of the notions of
“the German” was possibly the reason why the Enlightenment authors of the second half of
the eighteenth century were interested in the missionary texts and referred to them when
approaching […] the issue of the nation. (Borja González 2012, p. 188)¹⁴
Borja González’s proposal seems particularly interesting within the context of an
accelerated proto-globalization, since it highlights the circulation and reception
of sources (in Latin or German) written by the Jesuits during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. In contrast to the ‘proto-national’ identity awareness of the
Jesuit criollos expelled from Mexico or Peru, the narratives of central-European
Jesuits allow us to critically examine the folds of this process of early globaliza-
tion by means of two questions: 1) is it possible to postulate possible divergences
in the missionary perspectives within the Jesuit Order itself during its eighteenth-
 For a digital version of both, see http://digital.ub.uni-duesseldorf.de/ihd/content/pageview/
3017735 (visited 25 July 2017). I have also been able to trace a report possibly written by Paucke
in Neue Welt-Bott Vol. 4, 2/563, a copy of which is held at the Iberi-American Institute in Berlin.
 For a more detailed description of these ideas, see: Borja González (2011); Friedrich (2011).
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century colonial project in the Americas?; and 2) does an identity proto-con-
sciousness exist in Paucke’s work, based on the attitudes, values and virtues
that define him as a European subject? The following shall address these two
questions.
Archetypical constructions in Paraquaria:
a Prussian Jesuit among Spaniards
As mentioned above, in the context of the foundational postulates of the Jesuit
Order, ‘travel’ and ‘mission’ are almost synonymous. The term ‘mission’ express-
es the aspirations of universality and of the knowledge and conversion of ‘pagan’
peoples, but also specifically the truncated (by expulsion) project of Jesuit evan-
gelism in the deserts, jungles and plains of Spanish America. Hin und Her is not
only marked by the missionary vow of preaching the faith in this phase of proto-
globalization, but also by the loss of his own patriotic identity in the Old World:
As everyone must know,we Jesuits, in particular those from German lands,who by the zeal-
ous soliciting of our superiors succeed in being allowed to travel to these pagan lands, go
there voluntarily and completely perish for our fatherland. If I have left out many things
that in certain passages have escaped my weak memory, then if they return to me I will,
as long as God gives me life, add an appendix at the end. (HH, V2/P6/C9, pp. 730–731)
In sharp contrast, the discourse of the expelled criollos Jesuits—such as Francis-
co Javier Clavijero, Juan Ignacio Molina and Juan de Velasco—was placed in the
context of the debate on the New World (Gerbi 1982). They identified themselves
with the interrupted criollo ‘homeland’ that formed part of Peruvian Jesuit Juan
Pablo de Viscardo y Guzmán’s idea of independence (Pinedo 2010; Hachim
2008).
Paucke seems to experience the symptoms of a double crisis during his re-
turn to Europe: on one hand, the crisis of the foundational and corporative pos-
tulates of the subject who obeys the punishment of expulsion and suppression
of the Order (Fernández Arrillaga 2013, p. 16); on the other hand, that of his own
patriotic identification with the central-European countries as former subjects of
the Holy Roman Empire. No less relevant in Paucke’s ‘memory’ is his self-repre-
sentation as a globalized passeur, relativizing the prejudices and civilizatory pre-
ponderance of one nation over others:
I will admit that inclinations, habits, and customs are not the same all over the world and I
have experienced this myself. But to believe that all the people in a country are subject to
their natural inclinations, to the enjoyment of their passions, and permit all their desires, is
Jesuit Mission and the Globalization of Knowledge of the Americas 215
a prejudice. I have travelled around the greatest part of our Europe, except for the realms in
the far north and in the east near Turkey, and have experienced and known all of those
peoples who are more moral than others. Nevertheless, although the Germans are praised
above others in the sciences, arts, and skills, my experience has convinced me that none of
these are lacking in other lands (…). I will continue to speak from my experience and dis-
passionately report the truth. (HH, V1/P1/C1, p. 107)
Paucke’s movements blur the binary opposition between civilization/barbarism
by means of distancing (‘expulsion’) as an instrument of knowledge (Fernández
Bravo 2014, p. 178). From the beginning of Hin und Her, Paucke advocates a
broad knowledge of the New World, emphasizing the archetypical and civiliza-
tory traits of the ‘Germans’ (scientific knowledge, arts, technology) in compari-
son to Spaniards and indigenous peoples. One should recall that this reference
to ‘Germans’ and to the loss of a ‘patriotic’ sentiment in Paucke is expressed in
the age of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation—not from the political-
national map of the twentieth century—and contains the underlying question re-
garding the identity of those Jesuits from Bohemia, Moravia, Croatia, Silesia,
Hungary, Austria and the Palatinate.¹⁵ This is a topic of enormous complexity,
if one considers that the geopolitical, linguistic and cultural landscapes of
these central-European states already encompassed a heterogeneous space
whose ethnic, linguistic and national boundaries were for centuries experiencing
transformation and redefinition.
This complicates the debate on the imagological, ethnographic and cultural
components inscribed in the early reflection on (inter)national stereotypes in En-
lightenment discourse.¹⁶ During the first half of the eighteenth century:
… the double condition of the Habsburgs as emperors of the Holy Roman Empire of the Ger-
man Nation and Kings of Austria, Hungary, Croatia, and Bohemia, meant that a large share
of Jesuits belonging to German monasteries were at the same time subjects of two crowns:
the imperial and the Austrian. (Borja González 2012, p. 186, note 37)
It can be supposed that this inner polarity for a member of the Jesuit provinces of
Silesia (Paucke) or Bohemia (Dobrizhoffer) affected the construction of a differ-
 Meier (2007b, p.163) states that “knowledge of the Americas in German during the 18th cen-
tury comes to a great extent from the works of the Central-European Jesuits who worked in this
continent and communicated with the distant homeland. It is not incorrect, when referring to
them, if we speak of the first Americanists in the German language, decades before the famous
voyage by the Prussian researcher Alexander von Humboldt (1799– 1804)”.
 See, for example: Friedrich Leopold von Augsburg’s Völkertafel (1725); Johann Zedler’s Uni-
verallexikon (1723– 1750); or Benito Jerónimo Feijoo’s “Mapa intelectual, y cotejo de Naciones”
(1728). Also, cf. Raposo (2011) and Stanzel (1999).
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entiated narrative perspective in relation to the imperial program of the Spanish
crown in the Americas (Valle 2009, note 22; Nebel (2007). Czech scholar Zdeněk
Kalista has highlighted how in comparison to their Spanish companions in the
Order, Jesuit missionaries from the province of Bohemia “could not believe them-
selves owners of the colonies in New Spain in a sense similar to the conception
of the immediate subjects of the Spanish king” (Kalista 1968, p. 156) and con-
demned the methods, the treatment of indigenous peoples, and the colonial sys-
tems of both the Spanish and the Portuguese (Kalista 1968, pp. 156– 157). Paucke
offers a clear counterpoint to any presumed heterogeneity of perspectives within
the Jesuit Order.
Firstly, his representation of the practical skills of the exemplary industry of
the Catholic world, thanks to the ‘gift of works and trades’ (HH, V2/P3/C17,
p. 568),¹⁷ was a virtue that distinguished him to the indigenous people and con-
tributed to the acculturative and productive achievements resulting from the re-
duction. This is expressed in the comment made by the Austrian missionary José
Brigniel:
He soon understood me, returned to his room, and said: ‘Yes, my God! This is a powerful
miracle, God bestow on this Mestre de Camp sufficient energies; he is a Prussian (he said
this because I come from Lower Silesia) and makes the impossible possible, like his king’.
(HH, V2/P3/C17, p. 569)
In addition to strengthening Paucke’s virtues and attitudes, the praise of his mi-
raculous action—convincing the young indigenous men to undertake manual
work in the reduction—openly contradicts the colonial prejudices of an alleged
lack of intelligence, reason and ability for manual production among the indig-
enous peoples. In his opinion, “solely the absence and dearth of all instruction
and doctrine lies at the fault of this” (HH, V2/P3/C17, p. 562). Paucke ultimately
deconstructs the entire history of European civilization: “And if the Europeans
had been raised with neither doctrine nor education, without the opportunity
of knowing anything, in forests, among peoples of equal ignorance, Europe
would be an India just like America” (HH, V2/P3/C17, p. 573).
Secondly, no less revealing is the negative stereotyping of the Spaniard
(whether European or American) in the space of the mission:
 It is noteworthy that the knowledge of languages was also of prime importance, since “there
was no other nation that was more gifted to study indigenous languages than the German one.”
(HH, V1/P1/C6, p. 175)
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This occurs in those new peoples: if the missionary can do something, if he is skilled and
determined to do such things, then the Indians learn what they see; if he is not, then they
remain dullards. For who else could they learn from? The Spaniards themselves are hardly
eager to learn a trade, everything is only commerce. They regard practicing a trade the most
contemptible activity. One will not find any American Spaniards who are tailors, shoemak-
ers, carpenters, or suchlike, all of these trades, and many others, are practiced by their
slaves and mulattos. (HH, V2/P3/C17, pp. 571–572)
Paucke here emphasizes the intercultural conflict between the Spanish criollo
secular, the clerical and the indigenous worlds in the reductions, counterposing
the advancements of Christianization—such as the case of chief Aletín and the
defense of the reduction of San Javier (HH, V1/P2/C1, p. 268)—against the dis-
grace of those ‘dissolute Spaniards’, that ‘vulgar rabble’ whose sole aims were
commerce and profit, and the slave exploitation of the indigenous peoples. He
rejects the accusations that “the Jesuits, as men greedy for possessions and
gold, sought to make Paraquaria their own kingdom” (HH, V2/P3/C18, p. 575),
and enumerates the warrior services (provided by the missions against the ene-
mies of the Spaniards) and the tributes paid by the Indians to the crown. Paucke
underlines “the conspiracy engendered in the court against the missions” in the
province of Paraquaria (HH, V2/P3/C20, p. 603),¹⁸ and rejects any accusation of
insurrection orchestrated by indigenous peoples and Jesuits against the colonial
regime.
An Indian king in the Republic of Paraguay:
deconstructing an imagined global fiction
Finally, within the context of those Jesuit travelers and their contribution to a
universal ‘geography of knowledge’ (Harris 1999), the informative collections
of the Order and the printing of their letters, news reports and travel descriptions
permits the consideration of their counter-discursive character in regards to the
anti-Jesuit propaganda of the eighteenth century. The texts by Dobrizhoffer, Per-
amas and Paucke not only aimed to establish and rectify the imperial discourse
on the frontier, but also to oppose the libels and defamatory texts against the
Society.¹⁹ They strove to deconstruct the fictional global imagining of the Jesuit
 For a similar discussion, see also: HH, V2/P3/C19, pp. 579–582.
 One of the most influential works with regard to the expulsion and suppression of the Jesuit
Order was El reyno jesuítico del Paraguay por siglo y medio negado y oculto, hoy demostrado y
descubierto (Madrid, 1770), authored by the ex-Jesuit Bernardo Ibañez de Echavarri.
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state in Paraguay, disseminated in the press in the Netherlands, France, Germa-
ny, Italy and Spain, such as in the case of the History of Nicholas I, King of Para-
guay and Emperor of the Mamelukes. Paucke states:
Although everything was glorious and peaceful in our new missions, there was no peace
and no tranquility in the old and large missions due to the persecution they suffered at
the hands of the Spaniards and Portuguese. They wanted to completely exterminate all
the missionaries. The persecution had already been carried out for more than ten years
with the greatest zeal. A variety of reports came from Portugal and Spain that more and
more claimed that the Jesuits had a separate kingdom in Paraguay and had elected a
new king, whose name was Nicholas I. (HH, V1/P4/C10, p. 373)
The impact of this libel (widely translated from French into German and Span-
ish) from 1755 about ‘Nicolas I’,²⁰ and its representations of the ambitious ‘delin-
quent’ Nicolás Roubiouni is of enormous interest. Born in Andalucía, this clever
libertine schemed his way into the Jesuit Order and obtained permission to travel
to the Americas, learned an indigenous language and fomented the indigenous
rebellion against the Spanish-Portuguese domination. His imaginary kingdom in
Paraquaria rejected the power of the absolutist state and created the space for
the realization of the autonomist aspirations of indigenous peoples, black slaves,
mestizos and ‘barefoot’ subjects (thieves, murderers). In a relevant chapter of his
work (“Of the pseudo king Nicholas”: HH, V1/P1/C6, pp. 167–178), Paucke not
only denies the existence of this monarch²¹ but also categorically rejects this vi-
sion of the reductions as regimes that are temporally autonomous, as claimed by
defamatory propaganda. For Félix Becker, the myth of Nicholas I can be inscri-
bed in the framework of accusations of a Jesuit plot against the Treaty of Madrid
(1750) between the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. It required Spain to cede the
territories of seven reductions from the province of Paraguay, which triggered the
armed opposition of the indigenous peoples and the alleged leadership of the
Jesuits in 1754.²²
 Becker mentions that the first reports of Nicholas I date from the Gazette d’Amsterdam and
from the coins minted in Paraguay by a Nicholas I: “Three French editions, two Italian, and one
German were published in 1756, a Dutch version in 1758, and a French one in 1761” (Becker 1987,
p. 34). This rumor was denied by the Gazette itself.
 Other Jesuits contributing to this rejection are José Cardiel (Breve relación de las misiones del
Paraguay, 1771), Martin Dobrizhoffer (Geschichte der Abiponer, 1783) and José Manuel Peramás
(De administratione guaranica comparate ad Rempublicam Platonis comentarius, 1793) (Becker
1987).
 Portugal renounced the Sacramento colony, but Spain had to give up the territory north of
the river Ybycuí and east of the river Paraguay. Seven Jesuit reductions were located there,
which meant that the missionaries left the territory with the indigenes and moved to the Spanish
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In spite of this historical rectification and of the extensive analysis of sources
to date, there exists little critical attention towards the configuration and circu-
lation of these fictional identities in the space of the frontier and their impact on
Paucke’s narrative. In particular, in addition to the supposed figure of Nicholas,
the savage and rebellious condition of the Indian, the African and of the troupe
of mestizos that made up this new overseas power was repeatedly emphasized. A
notable example is that Nicholas I was reportedly the emperor of the ‘Mame-
lukes’, a name originally designating a lineage of warrior slaves in the Middle
East, which in Brazil was applied to the mestizo population and the Spanish
hunting of indigenous peoples in the Jesuit reductions. In this invented
human geography indigenous and mestizo resistance against the troops of
Spain and Portugal completely obscures the advances of the angelical project
of Jesuits such as Paucke. In this manner, king Nicholas’ ambition for power,
arising from the European fantasy of an imaginary dissidence within the colonial
project of the Spanish-Portuguese empire, exposes one of the components that
transcends the phases of early globalization: the struggle for self-determination
and independence of indigenous peoples in the colonial and post-colonial Amer-
icas.
Conclusion
The phenomenon of the Christian mission’s proto-globalization in the province
of Paraquaria allows us to recognize the significance of sources like Paucke’s
Hin und Her, which together with Dobrizhoffer’s Historia de Abiponibus repre-
sents a chapter from the central-European spiritual memory of South America.
In his dimension as a global player, Paucke’s narrative not only distinguishes
him by its efforts to appreciate American alterity, but also by his clearly coun-
ter-discursive component that seeks to rectify the epistemological racism of
Spanish colonialism, as well as to contest the circumstances and the reasons
for the forced expulsion of the Order. From such a perspective, Hin und Her im-
merses the field of underlying tensions in the pathos of the Indian missionary
experience, as the triumph and loss of the individual and collective identity
memory of the Jesuits.
lands (Becker 1987, p. 24). One can imagine the resistance of the fathers of the province of Para-
quaria and the armed opposition of the indigenous people against this international settlement.
See: Mörner 1966, 1968.
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One can distinguish in Paucke’s narrative the enunciation of a reflective
awareness in relation to three distinct fields within the dynamics of globaliza-
tion. Firstly, his writings on Paraquaria allow us to analyze not only his rectifying
vision of the territorial and spiritual cartography of the Americas, but also to
identify the possible impact of this mission on the transcontinental communica-
tion networks of the Jesuit press in the eighteenth century, and the formation of a
German national proto-identity. Secondly, Paucke elaborates and puts into circu-
lation an assortment of intercultural stereotypes that counter the prestigious and
exemplary industry of the Catholic world, and the achievements of the mission
against the vices of Spanish commerce and the colonial interests of a Habsburg
monarchy, which for Central-European Jesuits was a double monarchy: imperial
and Austrian. Thirdly, we can acknowledge his fruitless efforts to deconstruct, in
addition to the historical circumstances of the expulsion, the autonomist and lib-
ertine imagination (Nicholas I) of anti-Jesuit propaganda in Europe. On the
whole then, these are elements that I believe strengthen the reflective and cor-
rective awareness of Paucke’s work, as a result of the lens of a revisionist
(even skeptical) perspective of his own European history and of the ‘civilizatory’
project of the modern age in the so-called era of Enlightenment.
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Urban Globalization and its Historicity:
The Case of the Global Sanitary City
in Mexico in the Nineteenth Century
Abstract: Medicine and sanitary engineering were applied gradually during the
nineteenth century as solutions to the terrible conditions of life and habitat
that prevailed in the cities of the capitalist world—but also with the purpose
of regenerating the human work force necessary to reproduce wealth. This
essay shows how this global sanitarian effort was applied in Mexico City during
the government of President Porfirio Díaz (1876– 1880, 1884– 1910), exemplifying
the conceptions and prejudices about health, disease, environment and urban
government shared by Mexican elites and their international peers, and with
which they justified reforms aimed at controlling and disciplining nature and
the social environment.
During the inaugural ceremony of the Mexico Valley drainage system on March
17, 1900, Mexico’s president General Porfirio Díaz—on his fifth term in office—de-
clared it “such an important and transcendent occasion for our future that it has
to be registered in the annals of the Mexican people beside and at the same level
of our independence day” (“Una de las más grandes fiestas del progreso. Inau-
guración de las obras del Desagüe”, El Popular, México City, 19/3/1900). The
Drainage Project, set out in 1886, consisted of a main conduit 47.58 km long
and between 5 and 21 meters in depth, which spanned from the San Lázaro
gate through the Guadalupe range towards Lake Texcoco, where it twisted to-
wards the west, traversing diagonally Lake San Cristóbal and a portion of
Lakes Xaltocan and Zumpango, to finally connect to the ovoid (10,021 meters
long, 4.28 meters high and 27–98 meters deep) Tequisquiac tunnel, through
which the waters flowed through the Tequisquiac river and finally to Atilalaquia,
to be used to generate power and irrigate land in Actopan, in Hidalgo state. Re-
sidual waters went to the Tula River, a branch of the Pánuco River, from which it
flowed into the Gulf of Mexico, south of Tampico. Its main goal was apparently
to get Mexico City’s water and sewage out of the valley, while preserving the val-
ley’s drinkable water.
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In the mindset of the Mexican president, the significance of such a gigantic
hydraulic infrastructure being tantamount to that of Mexico’s independence,
doubtless stemmed from the fact that both enterprises had liberated the Mexican
people from, on the one hand, oppression from the Spanish Empire and, on the
other hand, from material harm to its health and prized possessions from the
constant flooding that for centuries ravaged Mexico City and other nearby valley
communities. Consequently, from this standpoint, at the onset of the twentieth
century, Mexicans faced a very promising future: they belonged to a sovereign
and independent nation, and under Díaz’s leadership, they had vanquished
the dictatorship of the environment, thus placing themselves in the sphere of
progress and modernity, just like the United States and any nation in Europe.
Henceforth, Mexico would have the modern water supply and disposal systems
required to improve the material state of public health in the capital.
Yet, from another standpoint, the conception and completion of the Mexico
Valley drainage works may be interpreted as an updating and modernization of a
material, technical and environmental scheme supported by an absolute politi-
cal power (such as Díaz’s), through which the elites had since colonial times en-
forced and tried to control the social, political and environmental milieu, so as to
reproduce and increase the own wealth along with the income of their firms, sit-
uated in Mexico City and allied to the regional, national and global markets. By
then, urbanization had become capitalism’s main force for economic, social, po-
litical and environmental change, and cities were not just stages of capitalist
modernization, but means and gears of the new globalization of wealth making.
Nevertheless, driven by the recent industrial development of production sys-
tems and the dramatic impoverishment of workers and peasants upon which it
stood, throughout the nineteenth century cruel realities dwelt within cities, con-
stituting severe conflicts and threats to the reproduction of capitalist wealth.
Along with class conflicts, political struggles and revolutionary outbreaks, nine-
teenth-century elites agonizingly lived and faced the conflict between health and
wealth existing in most countries, as the world raced toward an urban civiliza-
tion during the nineteenth century.
As Bruno Latour says, by the middle of the century the battle between health
and wealth had reached a breaking point:
The consumption of human life as fuel for wealth production led, firstly on English cities
and henceforth on other European cities, to an actual energy crisis. Men, as it was often and
widely stated, were of bad quality. That could not go on. Cities could no longer be death
chambers and sewers, neither do the poor go on being miserable, ignorant, surrounded
by vermin and infectious vagrants. The reactivation and broadening of exploitation (or
prosperity, for that matter) demanded a better educated and cleaner population, well ven-
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tilated, as well as rebuilt cities, with drains, fountains, schools, parks, gymnasiums, clinics,
nurseries. (following Latour 1988, p.18)
Medicine and sanitation engineering were thus the gradual solution to end the
dire habitat and living conditions in cities across the capitalist world; but like-
wise to revive the human workforce vital for reproducing wealth, as health
and urban policies helped to consolidate the social and spatial segregation
that existed in cities since the ancien regime.
In this context we can interpret the completion of the Mexico Valley drainage
works implemented by the Díaz government as part of the expansion of the
health-oriented urban model of capitalism. As we will try to demonstrate in
the following pages, Mexican elites shared with their pairs from other countries
certain concepts about health, disease, the environment and urban government
by which they justified reforms that imposed control and discipline on both na-
ture and the social milieu.
Sanitary urbanization
During the nineteenth century, certain technological advances made possible the
wild urbanization of the planet, or, in other terms, the wild colonization of na-
ture. One of these technological developments was the removal of the wastewa-
ter produced by workshops, industries and homes in cities, which could be col-
lected and later expelled from the urban milieu, as demanded by the principles
of urban hygiene then in vogue. Such principles, along with their technological
groundwork, were also supported by social, cultural and historical perceptions
about human waste. In certain Asian countries and in Medieval Europe, at
least until the eighteenth century, human feces and urine were used advanta-
geously in crops and workshops, until people became prejudiced against their
look and scent. In those times, as stated by Verena Winivarter, human litter
was regarded as a useful (albeit foul-smelling and ugly) resource for farming
and industry, and not dreadful trash or waste that had to be hidden from
sight and evicted from the city, in accordance with the morals of nineteenth-cen-
tury industrialized societies in which a new social and urban order was institu-
tionalized, bound to public health medical and sanitary policies. Drainage be-
came thus the technological vehicle for promoting the healthy, but also
comfortable, urban life demanded by the new capitalist bourgeoisie (Winiwarter
2010).
Vienna, Paris, London and Venice, as Alexander Cowan and Jill Steward
posit, were capital cities that in the nineteenth century instilled their spaces
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and population with a strong trade and management activity, as well as with
public rituals, and thus with an intense and spectacular cultural dynamism un-
seen in lesser cities. Likewise, capital cities enticed huge crowds of immigrants,
hence nourishing the cultural and social inequalities cast upon the social layout
of their spaces. In time, their growth brought about major changes in the urban
environment, and physical and demographic expansion furthermore affected the
sensorial experience significantly. The stresses on space came from the develop-
ment of industrial activity that made towns denser, intensified assorted olfactory
experiences and forced authorities to intervene by controlling foul smells and
fecal waste (Cowan and Stewart 2007, pp. 9– 10).
When modern drainage systems were introduced in Europe’s capitals and
main cities by mid-nineteenth century, the thinking on public health was domi-
nated by the miasma theory, according to which wastes and foul stenches were
the main cause of disease (Schott 2004). For centuries, the ‘pestilence’ was re-
garded as an illness that fouled the air, soil, water, animals and men. Its causes,
symptoms and treatment were identified by fifteenth century physician and phi-
losopher Marsilio Ficino, founder of Florence’s Platonic Academy. According to
him:
[Whenever visible and tangible] the air of that place leaves its nature, declining from hot
and humid, when there are many dense clouds, dust clouds, dense and hot wind […];
when fields and water turn into steam and emit a foul smell, fish do not taste or smell
good; there is an abundance of animals breeding in corruption, foul funguses and pastures,
fruits of the land and insipid animals, and stored for very little time; wines tend to become
muddy, animals escape and birds fly away; disease ensues with continuous, hidden, furi-
ous, deceitful, unusually hot fevers, with suffering of the chest, exhaustion of the pulse,
agitation, darkened urine, skinning of the palate and the intestines, stinging in the eyes,
worms, smallpox and measles, miscarriages and stillborn babies, rages, wild laughter,
cruel wars and quite new miracles of nature or God. (Ficino 1564, p. 50)
Therefore, it was high time to run away—and for a long time—from places and
spaces wherein the hints of ‘pestilence’ were obvious. Moreover, it was best to
do so at the first warning, because if one should linger further, there was a
risk of contagion by ‘someone injured’ or “that the quality of that air would be-
come familiar and almost natural.” The suitable place to escape to was wherever
no person or thing infected by the pestilence was present and, if possible,
“where there is neither sound, listened or felt, nor news from the spoiled
place, and there are high mountains to forestall the fumes from coming either
through the incoming wind or air to spread the poison.”
How feasible were Marsilio’s recommendations? In early modern cities, fam-
ilies from the nascent bourgeoisie could perhaps follow them. Getting away from
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the sources of pestilence meant having resources to travel and sustain oneself at
the chosen place, either temporally or definitely, besides covering the expenses
entailed in getting a cure. For many, the only option was staying put, hoping that
luck or God’s will (‘the only safe and true health,’ according to Ficino) would free
them from the pestilence’s onslaught.
Nonetheless, cities grew in size and population, and so their authorities and
inhabitants had to take measures to prevent diseases and fight their probable
causes—mainly corruption of the air brought by emissions from foul stagnant
water, in addition to animal and human feces. Even though physicians who
faced the sixteenth and seventeenth century plagues in the western Mediterra-
nean cities believed that animals (besides the poor) were the source of infection,
the circulation of water and air was the guideline for medical practice both in
European and in American cities since the sixteenth century (Villar 2005; Valder-
rama 2005). The city was then regarded as an organism, whose health largely de-
pended on the flow and expulsion of filthy water and air from graveyards, land-
fills, canals and sewer mains, filled with mud, feces, carcasses, and generally,
with refuse from hospitals, convents, churches, slaughterhouses, farmyards, tai-
lor shops, taverns and inns.
Although bacteriology disproved the miasma theory by the 1880s, belief in
the adverse effects of bad odors on health remained dominant across Europe
and the rest of the world well into the twentieth century, as could be seen in
the importance bestowed upon scrubbing streets and introducing tap water
and water closets in households. Technical advances in sanitation engineering
—like those devised by Sir Joseph Bazalgette in mid nineteenth-century London
(Halliday 1999), or those made in Paris (Barnes 2006) in the latter part of the cen-
tury—to expel refuse and waste out of the urban environment enticed other cities
into adopting water and sewer systems, which eventually were integrated into a
comprehensive water supply and disposal system, which was in turn quite suc-
cessful in improving urban cleanliness and reducing water-transmitted diseases
(Schott 2004; Melosi 2008).
So, Ficino’s recommendation of leaving the city to escape from the plague
and preserve health became moot by the early twentieth century. Conversely,
bacteriology and its ally, sanitary engineering, fought against popular beliefs re-
garding the origin of diseases and the ways to treat them, and sponsored a new
reordering of the urban space, thereby rendering old and traditional waste dis-
posal and recycling systems in garden and farmlands obsolete.
However, the battle against rubbish that cities were winning did not take
into consideration the negative offshoots on the environment the expulsion of
refuse would have, both on the cities themselves and on those lands and rivers
that would collect and store the garbage. Worse still, changes in the urbanites’
Urban Globalization and its Historicity 229
mindset, habits and culture would finally cause a major unanticipated environ-
mental impact. Energy and resource consumption (and depletion) for every city
dweller grew dramatically. To satisfy such demand, it became necessary to in-
crease spending on infrastructure and maintenance, as well as taxes, besides
rises in the prices of houses, rents and urban land. All of this would strengthen,
in the end, the very longstanding social inequalities that the modernization of
the water supply and sewer system was supposed to eradicate.
Mexico City and its valley:
drainage and power in the nineteenth century
In nineteenth century Mexico City, sanitation works to preserve and improve
health conditions for its inhabitants had to be undertaken on several levels.
Cleaning up streets, rivers, ditches, canals and water mains within the city, in ad-
dition to rivers, land and lakes in the surrounding valley became paramount,
since stagnant water and sewage were deemed the main cause of the infectious
diseases that repeatedly struck the population throughout the century. Natural
conditions of soil and climate in the valley and city made that stagnation possi-
ble. On the one hand, according to Manuel Orozco y Berra, the Mexico Valley
spanned across a vast extension of land situated at the center of a mountain
range then called Anahuac. This range limited the valley to the north, wherein
the terrain rose to form huge hills that merged with those of the Pachuca and
Atotonilco ranges.
The structure of the soil and the influence of volcanic activity created a pond
into which the northern mountains spilt their waters. However, this natural
draining was finally closed due to geological action, thus forming a lake system
in the middle of which the Indian city of México Tenochtitlan would eventually
be built. There were several lakes in the Mexico Valley (as opposed to the city)
whose surface was unstable. In 1864, the southern lakes, Chalco and Xochilmil-
co, measured 5.98 and 2.68 leagues respectively; to the east was Texcoco (10,395
leagues); and to the north, San Cristóbal (0.63), Xaltocan (3.08) and Zumpango
(0.98). Those lakes did not have fixed boundaries. During the rainy season,
the water level rose quickly and it spilled over a wide even plain that seemed
like a wide basin, but which was not so, since during the dry season water
evaporated or was absorbed into the land, and consequently the basin almost
disappeared.
In particular, the Texcoco Lake was the most unstable. Since the terrain that
surrounded it to the west was almost flat and very shallow, deposits, torrential
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rains and different water flows that spilled into it could flood the city; sometimes
it was enough just for the wind to blow from the west to flood the basin. After-
wards, water leaked and flowed back into the center: “it was not odd that the
place now swamped tomorrow might be located at a distance of three to four
thousand meters from the lake shore.” (Orozco y Berra 1864, pp. 108–115) In
times of torrential rains, the southern lakes of Chalco-Xochimilco also threatened
to leak water into the city and engulf it, which happened more than once.
Given the purposes for which the Mexico Valley drainage system was plan-
ned in the seventeenth century, it could drain the water from these lakes out of
the valley as well as sewage from the city out of the Texcoco Lake basin. How-
ever, the works took too long, due to stoppages. It wasn’t until the 1880s that
they were resumed and they were finally finished in 1900. Meanwhile, flooding
and the pestilence, ensuing from stagnant water and putrid sewage in the summ-
er, besides the dust storms that carried rotting particles, constantly threatened
the people’s health.
Regarding Mexico City’s drainage, it must be said that throughout the cen-
tury, it suffered from severe flaws, as the canals were in utter disrepair and
were not at the same level as the Texcoco Lake. Overall, small street canals at
ground level performed the city’s drainage; there were oriented from west to
east, being the direction from which the terrain slanted more regularly, whereas
from north to south the pitch was more variable and less pronounced.
In the downtown streets, the canals were 2.5 feet (c. 76 cm) wide and 5.5 feet
(c. 1.67 m) deep. At the upper part they were covered, but they also had several
openings through which garbage used to slip and from which rotting matter
oozed. The waters went to the Square Ditch (Zanja cuadrada), exiting to the
canal crisscrossing the city, the Paseo de la Viga, which took them to the San
Lázaro gate, and then toward the Texcoco Lake where they ended up after accu-
mulating all the refuse the population had littered into them. Beyond the down-
town area, the canals were irregular. They were mostly rough, makeshift, ex-
posed, uneven gullies—some so deep and wide they hindered traffic and
flooded streets with putrid fecal matter.
According to M. L. Smith, an American engineer, in 1848 the transit of liquid
matter through the canals stalled, because the elevation of the city’s ground
floor in relation to the surface of Texcoco Lake was quite short. The distance
from the Main Square (now called Zócalo) to the point where the water was
dumped in the lake was 6.5 feet (c. 1.98 m), but from the point where the city
water drained into the Canal de la Viga, near the San Lázaro gate, the elevation
was barely 3 feet (c. 0.91 m) in relation to the lake. Therefore, the bottom of the
canals were barely one foot over the lake’s level, hardly two feet below the canal
water that drained into the lake. As a result, the canals were always filled with a
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semifluid muck that released ‘noxious miasmas,’ harbingers of the city’s and the
valley’s unhealthiness.
Because of its malfunction, throughout the century, the city and valley drain-
age was regarded as the cause of the insalubrity and pestilence that the people
suffered. However, despite the fact that there were other political, economic, in-
stitutional, educational, social and environmental realities that deserved to be
attended to in order to solve this very complex problem, neither citizens nor au-
thorities had a comprehensive picture of the reasons for the unhealthiness of the
city and valley, nor consequently an outlook on a long-lasting solution. Every au-
thority, either local or federal, and every social or professional sector had their
own, often biased, perceptions of the causes and the likely solutions that the
city’s insalubrity demanded.
Even though the 1604 master plan contemplated draining the valley lakes,
by the mid-nineteenth century new projects, based on studies and experiences
from other cities, offered, on the other hand, to restore and preserve the valley’s
hydrological balance, while avoiding flooding and further health hazards. How-
ever, a centralized political power structure—displayed in the figures of Austrian
Emperor Maximilian of Hapsburg (who ruled Mexico from 1864 to 1867), and
presidents Benito Juárez (1858– 1872) and Porfirio Díaz (1876– 1880; 1884–
1910)—combined with urbanization projects underwritten by foreign investment
and promotion of pasteurization, forced upon public opinion the idea that drain-
ing the valley was the solution that the government and society’s expectations
had to look forward to. Lack of resources, in addition to the indolence and dis-
cord of authorities and the community, also helped to further this idea.
This was endorsed by the medical, engineering, geographical and farming
guilds gathered at the 1878 Medical Congress—even though one year earlier an-
other physician, José María Lobato, reporting on the positive results of 17 years of
studying the problem, recommended the preservation of the city’s and the val-
ley’s hydrological balance in order to eradicate epidemics and favor agriculture.
In his studies, Lobato stated that he replicated Hans von Pettenkoffer’s experi-
ments of years earlier in Munich, where the medical community and municipal
authorities had successfully adopted them in their struggle against typhus. Ac-
cording to Lobato:
In Mexico as in Munich, the quantity of rainwater fallen during the rainy season and dis-
tributed proportionally on a monthly basis must be perfectly related to what flows through
the underground veins of the haulage terrains within the city’s groundwork. If the hydro-
logical balance were looked after, typhus would disappear since organic matter that
cover the soil would not decompose or be uncovered; otherwise, typhus will appear. [Pet-
tenkoffer] infers that the miasmatic principle causing typhus is absorbed or fixed on the
surface permeable layers of the ground, and when the drop in the groundwater level un-
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covers these layers, typhus appears with the assorted pathological forms we know (José
María Lobato, “Estudio higiénico sobre el tifo exantemático”, Gaceta Médica de México,
1/2/1877).
However, it was too late to override the scientific consensus obtained by the Mex-
ican government, which rather than sanction a scientific-environmental truth,
actually authorized the conclusion of the works to drain the Mexico Valley.
The new Díaz government deemed crucial to pursue the urban, social, political
and economic reforms needed to discipline and control not just the water from
rivers, canals and lakes, as well as waste water from the city, but especially the
city’s dwellers, and bound their fate to the same processes of modernization with
which the major capital cities in Europe and the United States were experiment-
ing. Liberals and conservatives had ceaselessly criticized the city’s unhealthy
conditions, and the regime supported by both factions throughout the nine-
teenth century promoted urbanization and favored private urban business ven-
tures; so for them, continuing the valley’s drainage works was essential.
In the 1870’s (in particular since the beginning of the Díaz regime) the city’s
expansion and urbanization tended to accelerate at an even and sustained pace,
being the outcome of the public and private interests and projects regarding real
estate and urban land that began decades earlier, even before independence. As
soon as the American invasion ended in 1848, several urbanization projects were
set forth on land west of the city—thought the most suitable, as it was the least
exposed to flooding, being on higher ground—in order to build new urban neigh-
borhoods and set railway tracks between the city and other valley townships.
Some were indeed built, but Maximillian’s imperial government, though it
launched manifold urbanization projects planned by both the oligarchy and
the emperor himself, hesitated in adopting the draining of the valley.
As the valley dried out—a process sanctioned and legitimized as a scientific
and urgent necessity by the 1878 Medical Congress—urbanization projects multi-
plied during the Diaz regime, becoming a juicy business that the revolutionary
government took over and sustained. Lawyers and engineers, architects and
physicians, were the professional groups leading the political, material, health
and environmental changes the valley and the city experienced during the nine-
teenth century, and their power and influence spanned across the entire country,
the twentieth century and the regimes established by the Mexican Revolution.
During the nineteenth century, these professionals, both as individuals and
as a group, disparaged the municipalities’ anachronism and inability to estab-
lish an orderly and healthy urban regime, denounced the squalor and immoral
habits of the poor in the press, demanded the draining of the valley and the city,
and benefited politically or economically, through occupying positions of author-
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ity or being related to them, from the reforms to urban and rural property. They
demanded and wrote projects for social, healthcare and penal control, and au-
thorized and planned huge real estate developments on the land west of the
city, so as to move to where the city was least unhealthy. Meanwhile, the rest
of the population, incapable of buying a land plot on which to build their
own houses, went to live in old houses and neighborhoods downtown, or on
plots already dried out in the east, where the federal and local government
and business interests allowed the construction of illegal, very unhealthy tene-
ments. Therefore, by the end of the Porfirian Age, as the draining of the valley
was over, spatial segregation was evident in many of the capital’s quarters.
The decision to drain the valley was purportedly made by the colonial re-
gime to protect New Spain’s capital from floods, but actually became a way to
exploit and expropriate natural resources as well as peasant land within the val-
ley, whose communities had preserved the necessary hydrological balance to
sustain themselves for generations. As proven by Eva Candiani (2015), the drain-
age works’ purposes and uses put New Spain in the reproduction sphere of a
worldwide capitalist system. Nineteenth century liberal and conservative re-
gimes maintained the drainage works’ original purpose, as well as the reproduc-
tion of the capitalist interest of a new national urban, liberal and conservative
elite, solidly related, politically, economically, urbanistically and morally to for-
eign oligarchies, especially those of the United States, France, the United King-
dom, Spain and Germany.
Even though the colonial drainage had affected the valley’s hydrological and
social balance (and consequently the health of the population) deeply, during
the nineteenth century, some engineers (M. L. Smith, Gargollo, Orozco y Berra,
Río de la Loza) and physicians (Lobato) scarcely discussed the inconvenience
and harm to the environment and the people’s health the full draining of the val-
ley would cause. From their standpoint, the restoration, repair and expansion of
the old draining system, both in the city and the valley, might have helped to
reestablish the now-lost environmental balance, in addition to improving the
housing and health of the city’s increasingly impoverished population, which
would have helped create a less adverse urban environment.
However, Mexico’s wars and conflicts, and the interests the winning side
forced upon the direction of national affairs, as well as the fears and prejudices
regarding the origin and effects of the diseases that secularly ravaged the health
of the inhabitants of the valley, were in favor of draining it. Certainly, as the cen-
tury progressed, fear of flooding subsided as riverbeds and lakebeds dried off—
but at the same time, health hazards began to grow. The correlation between
both phenomena could barely be understood, when at the close of the century
a new correlation emerged: as the city’s population grew, socio-environmental
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prejudices developed regarding the causes of the valley and the city’s unhealthi-
ness. In that context, the discourse of physicians and engineers was used to
sanction an environmental policy based upon elements not discussed or debated
enough within the circle of the scientific community of the age. However, se-
duced by power, it supported draining the valley and thus a bourgeois environ-
mental dream became a nightmare.
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A Land of Opportunities:
Foreign Engineers in the Ottoman Empire
Abstract: Hundreds of foreign engineers worked in the vast lands of the Ottoman
Empire from the eighteenth to the early twentieth century. These engineers and
the works they carried out are worth exploring from the perspective of the circu-
lation of experts in a global context. A closer look at the patterns of their employ-
ment contributes to developing a better understanding of the formation of engi-
neering as a profession in the Ottoman context. This article studies the motives
of foreign engineers for moving to the Ottoman lands, the projects they were in-
volved in, their countries of origin and their relationships with local engineers.
We argue that the presence of foreign engineers in the Ottoman lands was ben-
eficial to all parties involved. Foreign engineers obtained prestigious jobs and
brought with them access to a kind of expertise that distinguished them from
their less mobile colleagues. The Ottoman Empire in turn benefited from their
work and expertise at many different levels of administration, in public works,
in upgrading infrastructure and in education.
Foreigners had served Ottoman sultans since the early years of the Empire. There
was nothing exceptional in that; anyone whose skills were considered useful
could establish a relationship of personal loyalty with the sovereign, independ-
ently of his or her origins. This does not mean that being part of a specific ethnic
or religious group was of no importance.While being non-Muslim could be a bar-
rier to accessing many posts and ranks (particularly in the armed forces), certain
groups were nevertheless associated with desirable knowledge and skills, and
their members were sought after and their services prized for that reason.
In the eighteenth century, the idea that Europe (Avrupa) was gaining impor-
tant advantage over the Ottomans in specific strategic areas—such as arts and
sciences linked to warfare (e.g., military drills, artillery, fortification, shipbuild-
ing and cartography)—gained ground among the Ottoman ruling elites. This had
major repercussions for the practice of employing foreigners. People coming
from European countries became associated with this superior knowledge and
skills, and were thus offered advantageous conditions of service. At the same
time, the notion of European superiority in terms of knowledge and skills was
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becoming deeply rooted in the minds of the Europeans themselves, which made
them more self-confident, more demanding and less willing to fully shift their
allegiance and sense of belonging from a European sovereign and country to
the Ottoman ruler and lands. These trends subsequently shaped patterns of re-
cruitment and of service (Ágoston 2005; Aksan 2002; Kaçar 1996).
As in the past, foreign individuals, including technicians and military ex-
perts, continued to offer their skills to the sultan—sometimes moved by the
need to seek refuge from a dangerous situation they faced in their own country,
or from shameful personal circumstances. In these cases, conversions to Islam
were still common for those who wished to integrate into the Ottoman military
structures—although since the Hungarian baron Ferenc Tóth (François de Tott)
undertook a partial reform of Ottoman military training in the 1770s, many for-
eign experts were commissioned to carry out military and naval tasks without
the requirement of conversion. This trend was further strengthened when official
inter-governmental collaboration was established between France and the Otto-
man Empire, and Louis XVI sent several groups of expert officers and craftsmen
to improve the performance of the Ottoman navy and armies by introducing new
shipbuilding techniques, reshaping and enhancing military education and train-
ing, and innovations in weapon production, artillery and fortifications. This col-
laboration continued under the French revolutionary government and, later, sev-
eral other countries followed France’s example and put their experts at the
sultan’s disposal (Kaçar 1996; Firges 2014). In their turn, the Ottoman rulers
(as well as their highly autonomous Egyptian vassals) began to send students,
apprentices and experts of all ethno-religious origins to foreign—mostly Europe-
an—schools, workshops and military establishments, as did Ottoman families.
Ottoman Christian elites (particularly the Greeks, and some Jewish groups—
mainly those with ties to Italian lands) had always sent their sons to European
universities, but by the second half of the nineteenth century, this practice was
being adopted by Ottomans of all ethno-religious groups. Several sons of power-
ful Ottoman pashas were educated in prestigious engineering schools in Europe
and went on to actually work as engineers: this was the case of Mehmed Refik,
Yusuf Razi and Kamuran Sırrı.
Employing foreign experts via intergovernmental collaboration had impor-
tant advantages, the most significant being that, unlike in the case of individual
‘fortune-seekers’—who tended to exaggerate their knowledge and skills, or to
fashion themselves as experts in strategic fields despite their limited experi-
ence—the expertise of the men sent by foreign governments was guaranteed.
Among the disadvantages of this practice was the fact that these foreign experts
gave detailed reports on Ottoman military issues (including maps of strategic
places and plans of fortifications) to their governments—and their missions
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were sometimes abruptly interrupted when their country switched its alliances
and/or entered in war with the Ottoman Empire. This type of intergovernmental
collaboration continued until the end of the Ottoman Empire (and beyond):
high-ranking officials of the French corps of ponts et chaussées engineers were
employed as technical advisors at the Ottoman ministry of Public Works; officers
of the British Royal Navy served in the Ottoman Navy for many years; and Ger-
man and Austrian officers not only trained Ottoman officers and advised Otto-
man officials, but even came to command Ottoman troops (Martykánová
2016–2017; Soydemir 2007; Ortaylı 1981). Sometimes, the nationals of small
states were explicitly preferred, such as when Belgian general Henri Alexis Brial-
mont was commissioned in 1892 by Ottoman imperial authorities to draft plans
for an improvement of the fortifications of the Straits (Alloul 2017, pp. 21–22).
Occasionally, foreign engineers might have found themselves in the midst of
highly delicate political issues. Their tasks could create a conflict of political and
economic interests involving different parties, including their own countries. Be-
tween 1845 and 1858, the region of Mount Lebanon experienced severe political
turmoil. The region’s social structures began to dissolve due to multi-directional
struggles, including ethnic and religious conflicts, center versus province rivalry,
and inter-communal struggles and tensions between feudal lords and villagers.
In addition to the Ottoman administration, France, the British Empire, Austria,
Russia and Prussia were actively involved in the region. The Ottoman govern-
ment had been searching for solutions to stabilize the region, to provide security
for its people and also to collect taxes by negotiating with local forces and their
‘protector’ countries. In these circumstances, with the expectation of solving po-
litical problems, the government created a commission to make a cadastral sur-
vey of the region that would lead to a more equitable distribution of taxes among
subjects. Two Prussian engineers were appointed to carry out a cadastral survey
of the region. Nonetheless, different actors and groups who did not agree with
the project or with the way it was supposed to be carried out fiercely opposed
the engineers’ presence in the region. Even the Prussian consul was annoyed
with the Ottoman government for placing Prussian subjects under the command
of the Ottoman governor, and he made his discomfort clear to the engineers. The
Ottoman authorities made an effort to minimize these tensions by appointing
local men to escort the Prussian surveyors while they were making their recon-
naissance. In spite of these measures, the lives of the two foreign engineers were
threatened many times during the course of their duty (Farah 2000, pp. 477–
487).
With the growing integration of the Ottoman Empire into the European con-
cert of powers, and increasing contacts between the sultan’s subjects on the one
hand, and nationals of different European countries on the other hand, the Otto-
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mans often took the initiative and recruited skilled persons themselves. Such an
initiative played a pivotal role in the story of the Polish engineer ‘Vankovitch’,
recorded by British Army intelligence officer Fred Burnaby (1842–1885). This
Pole, who was to become a chief engineer in several provinces of the Ottoman
Empire, was most probably Teodor Wańkowicz, born in 1846 into a Polish
noble family from a region near Minsk in today’s Belarus, and also known as
Teodor Bej (Bey).Wańkowicz, who was a subject of the tsar of Russia, graduated
as a military engineer from the Military College of St. Petersburg.When the Pol-
ish insurrection against Russian rule (the January Uprising of 1863– 1864) had
broken out, he joined the rebels. He fought against Russia as a commander of
a group of insurgents. After the revolt was suppressed, Wańkowicz escaped
and, after a troublesome journey, he found himself in Istanbul, penniless. To
make his own living, he started to work on the construction of roads. The engi-
neer who supervised the work noticed that Wańkowicz knew as much about
road-building as did he himself. Thus, he promoted him to assistant-engineer.
His skills took Wańkowicz (or Teodor Bey) to provinces such as Yanya (Ioannina)
in the Ottoman Balkans, and Yozgat in Asia Minor, where he worked in the serv-
ice of the Ottoman state as a chief engineer of the province (Burnaby 1877,
pp. 185– 186; Konstantynowicz 2013).
In turn, foreign engineers spotted and trained local talented men. During his
employment as chief engineer at the Ottoman Imperial Arsenal, a British engi-
neer named Shanks was assisted by local mechanical engineer Ahmed Besim.
After Shanks’s resignation from the post, Ahmed Besim was appointed as his re-
placement (Tekeli / İlkin 2010, p.143). Émile Lacoine, a French engineer who en-
joyed a long and fruitful professional career in the Ottoman administration of
Posts and Telegraphs, set his eyes on the young Salih Zeki, a talented technician
who had been educated in the Darüşşafaka—a state-funded school for orphans
that was known for its good technical and scientific curriculum. Lacoine ar-
ranged for Salih Zeki to be sent to study in France and, after he returned to Con-
stantinople, the young man went on to have a remarkable career as a mathema-
tician, including teaching posts at prestigious state schools (Günergun 2005,
pp.117–118).
The government or particular institutions sometimes asked the Ottoman em-
bassy in a specific country to contact and recruit experts that were needed. In
other cases, the Ottomans who (had) lived, studied or travelled abroad, ap-
proached the candidates and proposed to them the idea of working in the Em-
pire, be it for the government, for a public institution or for a private company.
Thus, for example, when the above-mentioned Ottoman electrical engineer
Mehmed Refik, who had studied in the Institute de Montefiore in Liège, became
director of the Civil Engineering School (Hendese-i Mülkiye Mektebi, later Mühen-
240 Darina Martykánová and Meltem Kocaman
dis Mektebi), he recruited Belgian engineers to teach in this Ottoman public in-
stitution (Akbaş 2007–2008, pp. 101– 119).
Personal recommendations and networking proved to be an important force
shaping individual professional trajectories, and an efficient means of recruit-
ment. The Austrian engineer and expert in hydraulics Philipp Forchheimer
(1852– 1933) obtained his diploma in engineering at the Technical Hochschule
of Zürich in Switzerland and received his Habilitation in the Prussian city of Aa-
chen. In 1874, he worked on the construction of the railway from Rakovník to
Protivín in Bohemia, which was then part of the Austrian Empire. We do not
know how exactly he came to teach the ‘sciences of Public Works’ at the Civil
Engineering School in Constantinople in 1891– 1892, but he soon returned to Aa-
chen as a professor and subsequently taught at the Technical Hochschule of
Graz,where he became a rector in 1896/7. In 1913, he was back in Constantinople:
the Ottoman authorities appointed him a ders nazırı, or director in charge of the
lectures (academic director) of the School of Engineers (Mühendis Mektebi); that
is, the reformed Civil Engineering School where he had taught more than twenty
years before. Besides his administrative tasks, he lectured on hydraulics, canals,
bridges and similar subjects. Forchheimer’s motivations for his professional in-
volvement in the Ottoman Empire are unknown, but we know that, at least ac-
cording to his Ottoman students and colleagues, he felt comfortable in Constan-
tinople and had a good relationship with local staff and students. Moreover, he
might have been attracted by the opportunity to pursue his interest in Byzantine
hydraulics and architecture: he is an author, together with the art historian Josef
Strzygowski (later infamous for his Nazi activism), of the book Die Byzantini-
schen Wasserbehälter von Konstantinopel, published in Vienna in 1893, soon
after Forchheimer returned from his first teaching engagement in the Ottoman
Empire (Kozeny 1961, pp. 295–296; Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaf-
ten 1957, p. 336; Uluçay / Kartekin 1958).
During the Great War, when Austria and the Ottoman Empire were allies,
Forchheimer contacted another Austrian engineer, Karl Terzaghi, and asked
him to join him. Terzaghi, born in 1883 in Prague, had studied at the Technical
Hochschule of Graz—the school where Forchheimer had taught and served as rec-
tor. Terzaghi accepted Forchheimer’s offer, probably using it as an opportunity to
escape the meat-grinder of the Great War. In 1915, he became a professor of the
‘tolerance of railway instruments’ and of the ‘principles of civil engineering’ at
the School of Engineers in Constantinople, training some of the members of
what was to become the first generation of civil engineers of the Turkish Repub-
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lic.¹ In the following decades, this young man was to become a famous engineer
who worked and taught on several continents (he became a lecturer at Harvard
University in 1938), and is considered the father of soil mechanics (Goodman
1999). Terzaghi’s mentor Philipp Forchheimer did not seek talent only in Europe,
though. During his appointment as academic director at the School of Engineers,
he recruited an Ottoman Muslim, Salih Murad (who later adopted the surname
Uzdilek), who taught at the Ottoman Naval Academy, to teach physics to his en-
gineering students (Uluçay / Kartekin 1958).
As we have already observed in the case of Teodor Wańkowicz, the willing-
ness of Ottoman authorities to grant exile to refugees from European countries
had collateral benefits for Ottoman engineering. In such cases, the Ottomans
did not have to go and seek skilled men in Europe; these experts came to the
sultan’s domains on their own, thirsting for an opportunity to earn their living
by making use of their expert knowledge and skills. There were several major
waves of refugees in the long nineteenth century that brought in useful exper-
tise, the first of which was linked to the French Revolution, the Napoleonic
wars and the Restoration of absolutist regimes. The partition of Poland and
the uprisings that followed from time to time throughout the following century
also created several refugee waves, as did the revolutionary wave of 1848 and
the struggle for Italian unification. Italians, Poles and Hungarians came in note-
worthy numbers and were often willing to fully commit to the Ottoman Empire
and become Ottoman subjects. This was the case, for instance, of a Polish engi-
neer called Franciszek Sokulski, who was a distinguished member of the Polish
émigré community that gathered and organized themselves in the early 1850s in
the city of Shumla in the Ottoman Balkans. Realizing that he had little chance of
returning back to his homeland, Sokulski decided to permanently settle in the
Ottoman Empire. Apparently, he discussed this issue with Omar (or Ömer)
Pasha (1806–1871), a high-ranking and successful Ottoman military man who
was himself of Serbian origin, born as Mihajlo Latas in an Orthodox Christian
family in the Austrian Empire—though in his case, his exile to the Ottoman
lands (and subsequent conversion to Islam) was motivated by embezzlement
charges, rather than by the sort of noble political reasons that most probably
caused the flight of Franciszek Sokulski. Omar Pasha encouraged Sokulski to
apply to the Ottoman grand vizier for a job as a civil (ponts-et-chaussées) engi-
neer, building roads in the Ottoman provinces of the Balkan Peninsula. It
 The term ‘civil engineer’ is highly polysemic. In this article, we do not use it in the way ingé-
nieur civil is generally used in French to denote an engineer working in the private sector, but
rather in the sense of the Turkish inşaat mühendisi, the French ingénieur de ponts-et-chaussées
or the Spanish ingeniero de caminos.
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seems that he finally achieved his aim and was even able to retire—still a Cath-
olic—with a state pension, as an engineer of a convincingly similar name ap-
pears in Ottoman documents during the several following decades (Martykánová
2010, p. 169). In this context, it is no surprise that their Ottoman peers and stu-
dents cherished the memory of these exiles, particularly of the Poles.² Unlike
their French, British or German colleagues, these engineers did not benefit
from the backing of a great power with strategic interests in the Ottoman
lands, nor had they their national companies operating in the Ottoman Empire
and willing to systematically discriminate in their favor.
In most cases, foreign engineers in the service of the sultan were better paid
than their local counterparts. Their term of employment was extended annually,
or for longer periods if the agreement proved mutually beneficial. The expansion
and consolidation of the administrative apparatus in charge of public works
broadened and stabilized the career opportunities for both Ottoman and foreign
engineers, as there existed no principle of national exclusivity that would estab-
lish Ottoman nationality as a requirement for all Ottoman public employees.
Thus, for example, Italian engineer Luigi Storari was commissioned by the Otto-
man government to work on specific tasks in different cities of the Empire, and
ended up appointed to a permanent post as a specialist in cartography and
measurements in the Direction of Buildings (ebniye idaresi) of the newly founded
municipal government of Istanbul.³ However, the extension of service over dec-
ades might not have been so advantageous for foreign engineers, because in
comparison to a local citizen it was often more difficult for foreign subjects to
obtain the right to a retirement pension from the Ottoman government. Thus,
for instance, British engineer Frederick Taylor worked in various industrial facili-
ties of the state from 1833 on, only to become unemployed after 23 years of serv-
ice and denied a retirement pension (Özbay / Bülbül 2009, p. 209).
One should not suppose that all initiatives to employ engineers came from
officials of the central government. The central administration received demands
for engineers from almost all regions of the Empire. Those engineers were sought
for major and minor projects in cities, towns and villages. For the period between
 For such an acknowledgment, see the speech on the anniversary of the School of Engineers,
delivered by its director Sami Bey on 20 November 1920. It is reproduced in full in: Uluçay / Kar-
tekin 1958, pp. 637–639.
 State Archives of the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey (BOA): A.AMD, file 68, sheet 13,
1855/6; A.DVN, file 141, sheet 77, 1855/6; A.VN.MHM, file 28, sheet 4, 1858/9; A.MKT.MHM, file 139,
sheet 11, 1858/9; A.MKT.NZD, file 178, sheet 31, 1855/6; A.MKT.NZD, file 377, sheet 35, 1861/2;
A.MKT.NZD, file 350, sheet 82, 1860/1; A.MKT.NZD, file 351, sheet 28, 1860/1; I.DH, file 395,
sheet 26165, 1857/8; I.DH, file 410, sheet 27159, 1858/9; I.DH, file 430, sheet 28443, 1858/9.
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1854/55 and 1864/65, we have identified ninety-five projects for which engineers
were requested in provinces and towns. In fact, the real number may be much
higher, as our analysis was limited to the documents included in the online cata-
logue of the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives. These engineers were employed in
short-term works, upon completion of which they were immediately employed in
another task. In case of an emergency, engineers could even be taken away from
their posts and sent to another region of the Empire, leaving their current work
unfinished. The existence and frequency of such demands points to the growing
consolidation of the figure of the engineer in the social imagination of the ruling
elites. The need for technical expertise was becoming widely acknowledged, and
the social legitimacy of engineers expanded drastically. In this context, the au-
thorities were in desperate need of experts: they tried to tackle this need by em-
ploying both Ottoman and foreign engineers.
For example, for the period between 1854/55 and 1864/65, we have identified
at least 47 foreign engineers who were appointed by the Ottoman authorities to
work on different civil projects, in state institutions, or for provincial and local
administrations. Bearing in mind that this number does not include all of the for-
eign engineers who worked in the Empire at that time, we may nevertheless af-
firm that these engineers came mainly from Great Britain, France, Austria and
Italian states. Besides other tasks, they were employed mainly for the construc-
tion of roads, the installation of telegraph lines, for mining, the construction of
railways and for other tasks (including the amelioration of rivers, lakes and
marshes, map-making, the construction of ports, docks and lighthouses, the re-
furbishing of urban areas destroyed by fire, the construction of buildings, etc.).
The conditions of their employment varied from temporally limited contracts to a
full integration into the Ottoman administration.
The growing presence of foreigners—be they recruited individually or via
inter-governmental collaboration—at all levels of the Ottoman administration
shaped and molded bureaucratic practice. One of the most obvious manifesta-
tions of the impact of their presence was that French became one of the languag-
es of official communication, along with Ottoman Turkish. Many institutions, bu-
reaus and departments, as well as territorial administration schemes, were
inspired by European institutions and arrangements—but rarely were they an
exact copy of a foreign model. Rather, foreign experts and Ottomans who had
become acquainted with specific foreign establishments and practices, pro-
posed, created and implemented institutions and arrangements that resembled
what they knew from abroad, but included ad hoc adaptations to local circum-
stances and solutions to specific challenges, and often integrated local adminis-
trative and institutional traditions and routines. Foreign experts—even the most
powerful and influential ones—could not create, reform and redesign the Otto-
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man military forces and institutions of government at their whim; they had to get
support and funding from Ottoman dignitaries and keep it long enough for their
innovations and reforms to take root. Case studies show that creating working
relationships and alliances with their local peers, including immediate superiors
as well as junior colleagues or students, was often the most efficient way for for-
eign experts to ensure that their projects would survive long after their initial
contribution.
Besides being recruited by governments and public institutions, foreign
technicians were often sent by foreign companies to the Ottoman domains to-
gether with new technology (machines, iron bridges), or hired by those compa-
nies to build a particular element of infrastructure (port works, railways) in the
Ottoman lands. These practices multiplied after the Crimean War, when an un-
precedented number of European foreigners from all social classes arrived in Ot-
toman lands throughout the nineteenth century. British documents concerning
foreign affairs recorded that 66 British engineers were working in İstanbul in
1886, while the total number of British subjects residing in the city was 640.
That is, more than 10% of British residents were engineers, engineering being
the most frequently registered profession among the local British population
(Kocabaşoğlu 2004, pp. 170– 171). The number of French engineers residing in Is-
tanbul in 1906– 1907 was close to 30. This figure includes engineers who were
working in Istanbul or its hinterland, as well as those who worked as managers
at the headquarters of several French private companies. These numbers, how-
ever, are far too low to realistically constitute the total number of French engi-
neers working all around the Empire (Giraud 2002, pp. 25–27).⁴ Engineering
and business activities further expanded and diversified from the 1880s on, dur-
ing the so-called First Era of Globalization (1880– 1913), which implied massive
penetration of foreign capital into the Empire and direct European intervention
into Ottoman affairs, including the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt
Administration in 1881, following the sovereign default of 1875 (Pamuk 1987;
Thobie 1977; Geyikdağı 2011). Foreign engineers socialized with their fellow
countrymen resident in the Ottoman lands, but also with their colleagues—for-
eign and local engineers and architects, be they Christian, Muslim or Jewish.
After the Young Turk Revolution (1908), freedom of press and association vastly
expanded the opportunities for professional activism and foreign engineers did
not lag behind their Ottoman colleagues in taking part in the process. Together
 For instance, while there was only one French engineer from the mining company Société Hér-
aclée residing in Istanbul (he was the general manager) in the above-mentioned statistics, the
number of foreign field engineers working in Zonguldak was five.
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with their Ottoman (mainly non-Muslim) peers, foreign engineers and architects
of various nationalities co-founded and joined the Association des architects et
ingénieurs en Turquie (1913– 1914), in which, as the press stated, “Ottomans, Ger-
mans, French, Austrians, Italians, Swiss, Egyptian(s) and English fraternise
under the presidency of Mr. Joseph Aznavour, architect” (GCO 1914,
pp. 45–48). In fact, the statutes of this professional society clearly acknowledged
the key role foreign experts played in Ottoman engineering and architecture,
stating that its council was to be composed of two Armenians, two Greeks,
two Jews, two Turks, and two of all other Ottoman ethno-religious groups, and
that seven were to be foreigners of different nationalities. Moreover, several jour-
nals were published in Constantinople to which foreign engineers actively con-
tributed, including the above-mentioned Association’s journal Génie Civil Otto-
man, the Revue Technique d’Orient and the trilingual German–French–Ottoman
Zeitschrift für Technik und Industrie in der Türkei (published during the Great
War, in 1916– 1917).
Vast Ottoman territories were also lands of opportunity concerning the ren-
ovation and expansion of communications and infrastructures, and their adap-
tation to the latest technologies. This stimulated foreign presence in many ways;
the engineering projects themselves were appetizing investments for foreign
companies, whilst simultaneously contributing to European countries having
more economic and political control of the territory. Foreign companies, local en-
trepreneurs, the Ottoman government and regional authorities all engaged in an
unprecedented level of building activity. Ottoman government officials had an
undecided attitude towards infrastructural construction projects. On the one
hand, they understood them as means to economic prosperity and to a better
control of the territory, as well as symbols of what they understood as the prog-
ress of civilization—an inevitable process resulting from humankind’s striving for
perfection, in which, however, no country or group had a guaranteed place and
in which an active effort had to be made to participate, and to avoid the danger
of falling victim to stagnation or decline. On the other hand, Ottoman statesmen
were well aware of potential risks and liabilities, such as providing easy access
for foreign armies, or investments being shaped by foreign rather than Ottoman
interests. Furthermore, public investment in separatist regions could be lost once
these became independent.
Besides the clashing strategic interests of local elites, Ottoman authorities
and foreign governments, the rivalry among foreign companies/investors over in-
frastructure projects was unavoidable, even in cases of relatively minor works.
The construction of the quay of İzmir is an example of such rivalry between
the British and the French. Although the quay was originally a project of the Brit-
ish settled in İzmir, the company they founded, Smyrna Quay Company, could
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not overcome financial difficulties to execute the project. So, the Dussaud broth-
ers, French engineers, bought the company and completed the quay in 1880. It
was a success among projects of its kind, for its scale and modernity (Franga-
kis-Syrett 2001). French companies doing business in Ottoman lands made use
of French and foreign engineers who had graduated from French engineering
schools. Thus, for instance, Joseph Volay from Lyon, who had received his diplo-
ma at the prestigious École centrale des arts et manufactures in 1897, worked as a
railway engineer in China, the Ottoman Empire (at the Soma-Bandırma railway
that employed several centraliens of this generation), Spain, Cuba, Syria and
France, before becoming (by 1920) the engineer-in-chief of the Régie général
de chemin de fer et travaux publics in Beirut. Cairo-born Eugène Girard, who
had graduated from the same school in 1899, worked as assistant-engineer of
the chief engineer at the construction of the Homs-Tripoli (in Ottoman Syria)
and the Soma-Bandırma (in Asia Minor) railway lines. Another centralien,
Félix Courras (grad. 1880), born in the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo, worked
in Ottoman Syria for the Compagnie des chemins de fer de Beyrouth-Damas-Haur-
an et Biredjik sur l’Euphrate in 1897 (Annuaire des anciens 1920).
While European economic domination grew exponentially, this was also a
period of collaboration, joint ventures and multinational teams of workers and
experts, cooperating to carry out projects of unprecedented nature, size and
complexity. Foreign engineers not only advised Ottoman ministers and other of-
ficials of central, provincial and municipal administrations, and taught Ottoman
students and trained local apprentices—they also worked in ministerial depart-
ments side by side with Ottoman Armenian and Muslim technicians, managed
companies owned by Ottoman Jews and Greeks, and founded joint enterprises
and applied for concessions with their Ottoman Muslim and non-Muslim collea-
gues. For instance, another French centralien, Émile Foucart (grad. 1879), began
his professional career in a family business, Maison Joly et Foucart, machine-
builders and producers of ceramic products. By 1897, however, he was the man-
ager of a ceramics factory in Karaagaç near Constantinople, an establishment
owned by the Camondo family, Ottoman Jewish bankers and entrepreneurs
who had moved to Paris in the late 1860s, while they continued to run several
businesses in the Ottoman Empire (Annuaire des anciens 1897). Foreign and Otto-
man engineers worked together on the construction of the Hejaz Railway—the
emblematic public works project and propaganda operation of Abdülhamid
II’s reign, and the first Ottoman railway on which Muslim engineers who had
graduated from Ottoman engineering schools worked in significant numbers
(Gülsoy 1994).
The multitude of examples of efficient collaboration did not prevent a sense
of rivalry. As mentioned above, foreign engineers were often offered much better
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contracts and salaries than their local counterparts, who were well aware of this
and, particularly after the Young Turk Revolution, felt free to complain. Europe-
ans’ knowledge and skills were often taken for granted. It is true, however, that
towards the end of the Empire, Ottoman public institutions began to check the
engineers’ credentials and let them apply only for posts that were considered
suitable for their level of qualification, or adapted their salaries accordingly.⁵
Managers of foreign companies tended to seek expert technicians among their
fellow-countrymen and among other Europeans, though there was a growing
trend to hire Ottoman subjects who had studied abroad—particularly the non-
Muslims among them.
There were advantages in employing locals, not only as expert technicians,
but also as executive managers: they knew better how to negotiate with the dif-
ferent levels of Ottoman administration, they had useful contacts and they were
better at handling local workers than the often arrogant foreign engineers, who
expected obedience and were unaware of important and potentially dangerous
power dynamics on the construction sites—particularly in rural areas where vil-
lagers were employed in the framework of a scheme designed in the mid-nine-
teenth century, according to which villagers paid their taxes by working in
mines, or building and maintaining public works (Martykánová 2010, p. 148;
Atayman 1984). Nonetheless, particularly Ottoman Muslim engineers who grad-
uated from Ottoman schools complained bitterly of heavy discrimination, as for-
eign companies proved extremely reluctant to hire them, even for posts below
their qualifications (Uluçay / Kartekin 1958, p. 583).
Public institutions did not always do better in this respect, preferring to im-
port outstanding—and expensive—foreign experts for a specific project, rather
than train and employ local technicians, be they Muslim, Armenian, Jewish or
Orthodox (Martykánová 2014). On the other hand, the posts of military engineers
were staffed exclusively by Muslims, and non-Muslims had very limited options
to access the ‘technical’ posts within the Navy, too. Moreover, during the reign of
Sultan Abdülhamid II, policies were put in place striving for an Islamization of
public service: putting the newly-founded School of Civil Engineering (1883)
under military supervision made it inaccessible to Ottoman non-Muslims. This
meant that Ottoman non-Muslims (particularly Armenians) and foreigners
that, together with Ottoman Muslims, staffed the administration of Public
Works, were to be gradually replaced by Muslim technicians. In practice, howev-
 An example is the 1917 case of the Ottoman authorities’ concern over the credentials of Italo
Fazanotti. An Italian citizen, Fazanotti applied for the post of engineer in the Istanbul Munici-
pality. As his diploma was of the second class, he was only allowed to apply for the post of as-
sistant-of-the engineer. (BOA, DH.UMVM, file 71, sheet 39, 10 February 1917)
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er, the demands of the expanding public works administration made this inten-
tion inapplicable, as the government proved to give priority to a swift realization
of specific projects, rather than to long-term policies, including the replacement
of non-Muslims with Muslims.
The principle of ‘national preference/exclusivity’, defined in terms of Otto-
man citizenship and thus including people of all ethno-religious allegiances,
shaped the demands of the Ottoman engineers, although they never went so
far as to claim that foreigners should be excluded from public employment (a
principle that, by the way, was becoming the norm in European countries).
When freedom of association was established after the Young Turk Revolution
in 1908, the newly created Osmanlı Mimar ve Mühendis Cemiyeti (OMMC: Society
of Ottoman Architects and Engineers) accepted as members all Ottoman citizens
who had a diploma from an engineering school in the Empire or abroad, or who
were generally acknowledged as engineers for their work. One of the grievances
the Society wished to highlight was the continuing discrimination against Otto-
man engineers by companies operating in the Empire, as well as the preference
Ottoman public institutions (state or municipal) showed regarding foreign ex-
perts. It is no coincidence that this professional association, whose dealings
were conducted in Ottoman Turkish, accepted only Ottoman members (most of
them Muslims and Armenians), while the francophone Association des ingénieurs
et architectes en Turquie was open to all professionals who worked in the Otto-
man lands, but whose membership was heavily skewed towards foreigners of all
nationalities and Ottoman Greeks.
Once the Ottoman Empire became integrated into European power politics
and the structures of global capitalism, and opened up to the influx of foreigners
of all nationalities and social strata, it became a true land of opportunity for Eu-
ropean technicians and entrepreneurs. Despite the growing numbers and self-
confidence of local men trained in modern engineering, foreigners never lost
their privileged access to engineering works in the sultan’s domains. Even con-
stitutional governments that operated under the notion of national sovereignty
preferred their modernizing projects being carried out as quickly and as cheaply
as possible to the enforcing of mid- and long-term policies, such as the creation
of local schools and training programs driven by the nationalist principle of
kendi ihtiyaçlarımızı kendimiz betaraf etmek: “to cater for our needs ourselves”
(Martykánová 2014, pp.143– 144).
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Kaan Üçsu
Cartographies of the ‘Eastern Question’:
Some Considerations on Mapping
the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea
in the Nineteenth Century
Abstract: The Sea of Marmara, the Black Sea, and the Bosporus and Dardanelles
straits have always been geographically and, therefore, politically crucial for the
state ruling Istanbul. Centuries of intermittent warring between the Ottoman Em-
pire and their enemies often pivoted on the quality of naval knowledge of this
region. In this article, I aim to give an overview of how cartographical develop-
ments progressed alongside the geo-political struggles in this area, and some-
times played a role in them. I suggest that map-making was particularly impor-
tant during the ‘long’ nineteenth century of the ‘Eastern Question’, which can be
dramatized as a play entitled ‘The Balance of Power’, in which the Ottomans,
France, Russia and Britain were the main actors to take the stage. This period
was full of struggle and conflict, treaties and alliances, and ended in 1895
with establishment of the first modern cartography unit within the Ottoman mili-
tary.
Introduction
Historically, the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea constituted an integral geo-
graphical unit, along with the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Most importantly,
the state ruling Istanbul always needed to control this unit for its food supplies,
security and commerce. Indeed, the Byzantine Empire and the Ottoman Empire
were aware of this phenomenon and acted accordingly to seek control of the en-
tire unit (İnalcık 1979, p. 74).
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Ottomans had begun to settle around the Bosporus and the Dardanelles
soon after their emergence onto the stage of history. They began to populate
the eastern shores of the Bosporus during the Battle of Pelekanon in 1329, and
around Dardanelles through the conquests of Gallipoli in 1354 and Adrianapoli
in 1361 (İnalcık 2008a, p. 65). They then initiated a fortification process in order
to maintain their existence in these areas. Although these activities and the fate
of the region preoccupied Byzantine-European alliances, the dominance of the
straits by the Ottomans after a series of conflicts, brought this era, inevitably,
to an end with the conquest of Istanbul in 1453 by Mehmed II (1451–1481).
The conquest of Istanbul by the Ottomans dramatically changed politics in
the west. Upon realizing that Europe would not like to leave Istanbul and its en-
virons to the Ottomans, Mehmed II hurried to consolidate his power to impede
probable attacks from enemies. To this end, his navy set sail in the Black Sea
and the Aegean Sea in 1454 and 1455 respectively. Its venturesome campaign
in the Aegean Sea resulted in the capture of some crucial northern Aegean is-
lands. In response, the Venetian endeavor to establish a crusade against Otto-
man expansion actualized on 1 March 1456. In the early years of this crusade,
Western allies captured some islands in the Aegean Sea. However, the Ottoman
navy strengthened its presence in the region by the conquest of Midilli in 1462
and by the construction of fortresses on both sides of the Gallipoli Strait in
1463– 1464 (İnalcık 2008b, pp. 45–49). Ottoman expansion continued in the
Black Sea. They imposed a duty on Genoese colonies in 1454 and on the Pontus
Empire in 1456. By the conquest of Amasra and Trabzon in 1459 and 1461 respec-
tively, they dominated the southern part of the Black Sea. Thus, the Ottoman
State secured the protection of Istanbul and emerged as an imperial power with-
in ten years (İnalcık 2008b, pp. 51–52)
In the face of this Ottoman success, the Venetians constituted an alliance in
1463 with Uzun Hasan, sultan of the Aq Qoyunlu dynasty—enemies of the Otto-
mans in the east. That started a new war that lasted almost 16 years, and ended
with the resounding defeat of the Venetians in 1479 (İnalcık 2008b, pp. 50–51).
Meanwhile, Mehmed II continued to struggle for control in the Black Sea. Having
closely monitored the problems between the Crimean Khanate and the Golden
Horde Empire, and the emergence of Russia as a power, he eventually sent the
navy to conquer Caffa and annexed the Crimean Khanate in 1475 (İnalcık
1944, p. 206). Even though the conquest of Caffa rendered the Ottomans the
most powerful actor in the Black Sea, they continued to expand by capturing
Copa and Anapa in Circassia in 1479, and Akkerman and Kilia in Moldavia in
1484. Finally, the conquest of Southern Bessarabia (Budjak) in 1538 rendered
the Black Sea an Ottoman lake (İnalcık 1979, p. 108).
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The emergence of Russia
This Ottoman dominance over the Black Sea region threatened Poland and the
emerging power Russia. Therefore, these two states tacitly (and sometimes overt-
ly) supported Kazakh tribes consisting of Tatarians and Circassians against the
Ottomans and the Crimean Khanate from the seventeenth century onwards (İn-
alcık 2008c, pp. 60–61). Assaults by these tribes forced the Ottomans to war
with Poland and Russia in the second half of the seventeenth century. These at-
tacks and wars burdened the Ottoman Empire, causing the failure of its Vienna
Campaign in 1683.
Taking advantage of the situation, Russia attended the Holy League in order
to realize its ambitions over the Black Sea. Sixteen years of war ended in the de-
feat of the Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of Karlowitz was signed in 1699. How-
ever, Russia did not accede to an agreement with the Ottoman Empire. The two
empires decided to continue peace talks in Istanbul, where they signed a treaty
in July of 1700 leaving the castle of Azov, its dependent castles and the body of
water between them to Russia. In return, the Ottomans imposed their conditions
regarding territorial issues and rejected Russia’s demand for free trade in the
Black Sea (Özcan 2001, pp. 504–507).
That Russia’s first attempt to rule the Black Sea was blocked by diplomacy
did not eradicate its ambitions. From then on, Russia built a comprehensive
plan for the Black Sea and, accordingly, the Mediterranean Sea. A new war start-
ed between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1735. During the four-year course
of the war, the Russian foreign minister Heinrich Andrei Ostermann (1686–1747)
elaborated a program to install Russia’s presence in the Black Sea, and its expan-
sion towards Moldavia and Wallachia. Although Russia’s failure in this war de-
nied them the chance to realize it during his lifetime, Ostermann’s program later
bore fruit in the 1768–74 war (Ledonne 2006, pp. 3–4, 8). This six-year, intermit-
tent war ended with Russia’s triumph and constituted a landmark regarding the
destiny of the so-called ‘Eastern Question’.
According to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, signed in 1774 at the war’s end,
Russian commercial ships would be able to sail the Black Sea and the Straits (Be-
ydilli 1992, p. 266). These developments prompted indignation throughout the
West and a ‘play’ called the ‘Balance of Power’ begun to be enacted upon the
stage of the aforementioned historically and geographically significant unit com-
prising the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea. Russia’s destruction of the Otto-
man fleet in Çeşme in 1770 had turned the tables on the Ottoman Empire (Aktepe
1993, p. 288–289). This overwhelming defeat prompted the Ottoman court to
carry out radical reforms in education, as well as in the navy.
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Explicit France, implicit Russia
In this context, I suggest this turning point as the beginning of a ‘long’ nine-
teenth century for the Ottoman Empire, which ended in 1895 with its establish-
ment of a modern unit for cartography within the ministry of war. In fact, the
Ottoman Empire had already initiated a modernization project within its army
in the second quarter of the eighteenth century, but was unable to maintain it
due to diverse political and economic reasons, and the lack of a qualified
labor force (Kaçar 2008, p. 71). The Ottomans undoubtedly needed help in
order to realize the modernization of their army and education system. An oppor-
tunity thus arose, and the first actor to take the stage was France. They lent a
hand to their old friend in organizing and servicing the institutions needed to
prevent Russia from emerging as a power. They deployed French engineers
and cartographers to the newly established military schools in Istanbul, and pro-
vided those schools with educational materials and instruments (Günergun /
Üçsu 2016, p. 148).
One of the first outcomes of this new collaboration was a map of Princes’
Islands, which was made by copying a Turkish map acquired in 1772 (BnF, GE
SH 18 PF 98 BIS DIV 6 P 6D). In the same year, a French engineer named Bellin
produced a map of the Black Sea in which its southern part is excessively distort-
ed (BnF, GE SH 18 PF 99 DIV 0 P 18). It appears that he had not used Turkish
maps, since one that represented the southern region and the Sea of Azov far
more precisely had already been published by Ibrahim Muteferrika almost 50
years earlier, in 1724. In fact, Müteferrika’s map had already been copied and
translated into French in 1768 by a French dragoman named Chabert, in the serv-
ice of a Neapolitan diplomatic envoy (Ucsu 2017). Apparently, a patron of Müte-
ferrika named Mehmed Said Pasha did not give this map as a present to the royal
library of France during his mission to Paris in 1742, presenting instead the ‘of-
ficially’ published books, including Katip Çelebi’s Cihannüma (Aubaile et
al. 1999, pp. 326–327).
Likewise, Müteferrika’s had not reached the Russians either. Thus, Bellin’s
chart was probably the one in greatest use among the Russian navy too (Scho-
kalsky 1907, p. 632). When war erupted in 1768, Catherine the Great (1729–
1796) ordered her ambassador to obtain maps. Thereupon, the Russian ambassa-
dor in London, Count Ivan G. Chernyshov (1726– 1797), had a famous London-
based map seller called Andrew Dury prepare a map of the Black Sea in 1769,
using the maps Chernyshov provided him (Zaytsev 2000, p. 114; Bulatov / Dela-
no-Smith / Herbert 2001, pp. 72–76). Although we do not know which maps the
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ambassador gave Dury to work with, we can conclude from the resulting map’s
inadequacy that they did not include Müteferrika’s.
Towards the end of the war, in 1773, Russia sent a small squadron to survey
the northern Black Sea, of which a map did not reach their Admiralty until 1782.
While serving in the Russian navy during the war, Dutch officer Jan-Hendrik van
Kinsbergen produced a map of the Crimean peninsula and the Sea of Azov,
which was then the most reasonable map of the related area despite its lack
of detail concerning the bay and inlets west of Balaklava, where the harbor of
Sevastopol would later be located (Zaytsev 2000, pp. 114– 116).
Meanwhile, Russia began in 1769 an expedition in the Aegean Sea, which
was their “first large-scale strategic naval campaign conducted at a distance
from Russian shores” (Bulatov 2000, p. 101), lasting until 1774. This expedition
was of great importance in terms of the ongoing war and the destruction of
the Ottoman fleet in Çeşme; it also “laid the foundation of the future Black
Sea fleet”. Russia most probably could not chart the Straits and the Sea of Mar-
mara during this expedition, since they lacked sufficient time to do so (ibd.).
Nevertheless, immediately following the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca,
Russia made a considerable number of charts of the Sea of Marmara and the
Straits, which contravened the terms of the treaty. Its disguised surveying activ-
ities until late 1778, when their output was published as the Atlas of the Archipe-
lago (Bulatov 2000, p. 108). Over the course of these voyages, as well as using
French and English charts, Russian surveyors acquired and used Ottoman charts
unhesitatingly, despite their Admiralty’s contempt for Ottoman scientists (Postni-
kov 2000, p. 86).
Out of gratitude to the French government for their aid during the war and
for the foundation of new schools, the Ottomans provided French scientists with
the privilege of surveying the Straits and the Sea of Marmara. Choisseul Gouffier
(1752–1817) in particular was employed as ambassador to Istanbul in 1784, and
the officers he patronized made many measurements and maps of those waters.
The scientists in his team—most notably Achille Tondu, Jean François Truguet
(1752–1839), Jean Baptiste Lechevalier (1752– 1836) and François Kauffer
(c1751–1801)—taught at the new Ottoman engineering schools and published
works in Turkish as well (Vagnon / Hofmann 2016, pp. 39–47; Zorlu 2011,
pp. 79–80).
François Kauffer merits special mention here for the sake of this paper. He
had come to Istanbul in 1776 for no more than a month in the entourage of Gouff-
ier’s famous Voyage Pittoresque de la Grèce. From his map of Istanbul published
in 1786, it can be understood that he had also prepared a map in 1776. However,
considering the limited duration of his visit, the earlier one must have been a
cursory map. His second venture to Istanbul occurred in 1784, when Gouffier
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was appointed ambassador. This time, Kauffer conducted a six-month triangula-
tion survey of Istanbul in collaboration with Lechevalier, beginning in December
1785. As a consequence, a revised version of abovementioned 1776 map was pub-
lished (Pedley 2012, pp. 32–36) In 1788 he published a map for the Ottomans of
the northern part of their territory, annotated in both French and Turkish.
When his patron returned to France due to the French Revolution in 1789,
Kauffer was stuck in a difficult situation. In 1792, after losing the Grand Vizier’s
letter to his patron, he was arrested and imprisoned for some time. Upon his re-
lease, he returned to Istanbul to serve the Ottoman court. However, according to
recently discovered information, it appears that Kauffer served not only the Otto-
mans: he also sold spatial knowledge about Ottoman domains to the Russian
ambassador in Istanbul for six times more than his Ottoman court earnings.
Kauffer’s service to Russia was not limited to his own maps and surveys—he
also used his position to offer Turkish government maps and surveying reports
to the Russian Empire (Frumin 2016, pp. 95– 102). Meanwhile, Kauffer’s former
patron Gouffier was exiled to Russia, where he was warmly welcomed by Russian
officers in St. Petersburg. Their excessive hospitality has raised suspicions that
Gouffier may also have provided Russians with spatial knowledge. Taking into
consideration that Russia and the Ottoman Empire formed an alliance in reac-
tion to the invasion of Egypt by France in 1798, it is hard to say whether these
activities constituted espionage or diplomatic maneuvers (Pedley 2012, p. 37,
note 23).
The invasion of Egypt and
new mapping activities
The French invasion of Egypt also gave an opportunity to the British, who sent a
military mission to Istanbul in 1799 to assist the Ottomans. During this mission,
the British navy examined the defensive capacity of the Dardanelles (Chasseaud /
Boyle 2005, p. 50). According to the report filed by Major M. Hope, the situation
was quite poor to defend the Dardanelles and, accordingly, Istanbul (Hope 1918,
pp. 118– 119).
The Ottoman-Russian coalition against France did not last long, and a new
war between them erupted in 1806. Russia and France came together to negoti-
ate plans to share the Ottoman domains. The Ottoman Empire in turn approach-
ed Britain, and signed the Treaty of the Dardanelles in 1809.With this treaty, Brit-
ain accepted that the Ottoman Empire had the right not to permit warships to
pass through these straits (Beydilli 1992, p. 266). This treaty granted Britain its
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invitation to appear onstage—and their entry heralded France’s exit. French ex-
peditions in Ottoman territories dramatically diminished. One of their few impor-
tant mapping activities that warrants mention here is Antoine François Andreos-
sy’s (1761– 1828) book, which was translated into English in 1818 (Lebouteiller
2016, pp. 85–87).
Meanwhile, Russia’s keen interest in the area continued apace. The Ottoman
Empire had abolished its Janissaries in 1826 and had been trying to reorder its
army. Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839) was thus inclined to make an agreement
with Russia, so as to gain time and to prevent a probable Russian assault. The
Akkerman Convention treaty was signed in this context, re-asserting the right
of Russian ships to pass through the Straits and sail on the Black Sea for com-
mercial reasons (Beydilli 1992, p. 266). Russia launched an expedition under the
command of Captain Egor Pavlovich (1796– 1859) in the Black Sea in 1826, which
lasted ten years. This expedition’s output, titled Atlas of the Black Sea, was pub-
lished in 1842, and was subsequently used for more than 30 years thereafter (Gri-
nevetsky et al. 2015, p. 59, 511–512; Komaritsyn / Miroshnikov 2002, p. 105).
In the meantime, Britain was eager to survey the Sea of Marmara and the
Black Sea after establishing their presence on the region’s stage by their alliance
with the Ottomans. British intellectual Edmund Goodenough, writing of the Brit-
ish expedition conducted in 1829 on the Black Sea, noted that “Of all the waters
of the deep which have been penetrated by the enterprise of British sailors, there
are none so little known to us, by actual observation, as the Black Sea” (Good-
enough 1831, p. 101). The situation was slightly better regarding the Sea of Mar-
mara. In 1833, a British expedition had started in the north of the Aegean Sea
under the tutelage of Thomas Graves (1802– 1856). Among its team was Thomas
Abel Brimage Spratt (1811– 1888), who was later charged with a crucial survey of
the Dardanelles and of Troy in 1840, which resulted in a map published in 1844
(Chasseaud / Boyle 2005, p. 50).
Another map of the Sea of Marmara, with the inlets of the Dardanelles and
the Bosporus marked, was printed on 29 August 1840 by the publishing house of
the Ottoman Navy (Günergun / Üçsu 2016, p. 154). Considering that, according to
the extant records, the Ottoman navy did not conduct an independent expedition
on the Sea of Marmara at that time, and that the Sea of Marmara had then yet to
be adequately surveyed, we could infer either that some Ottoman officers had
participated in aforementioned British expedition, or that they had acquired
its results immediately thereafter and compiled this map. The Ottomans’ first in-
dependent expedition on the Sea of Marmara took place under the command of
Ahmet Hoca in 1841 and was completed in three years, resulting in a map in 1844
(Algül 1985, p. 64). Immediately following this expedition, Russia made an offer
to the Ottoman Empire to survey the Sea of Marmara together. This survey, of
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which the commander was E. P. Manganari, began in 1845 and lasted three years.
The results of this expedition were published in the Marmara Guide and used by
seamen and navies for a considerable time thereafter (Aygün 1936, pp. 63–64).
(Fig. 1a and 1b)
Fig. 1a State Archives of Prime Ministry BOA HRT 706
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Fig. 1b State Archives of Prime Ministry BOA HRT 706
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Mapping during the Crimean War
This quiet period came to an end in 1853. Russia declared war against the Otto-
man Empire on the pretext that they would protect the Christian people living in
the Balkans. The deteriorating Ottoman State would not have been able to resist
Russia alone. Thus, Britain and France began preparing to support the Ottomans
against Russia once more. At the beginning of 1854, allied navies began survey-
ing the Gallipoli Peninsula with the thought that they would stop Russia there.
However, they were unaware of maps made previously by French and British car-
tographers, and made no request for Ottoman maps, since they did not appreci-
ate the Ottoman surveyors’ work. In fact, those were quite good pieces of work—
thus, the allied navies’ ignorance and arrogance caused them to repeat work un-
necessarily (Débarre 2016, pp. 141– 142). Ottoman officers, on the other hand,
were keen to acquire the maps that their allies had made. For instance, during
the Crimean War they immediately adapted a British map into Turkish, and
translated an atlas showing the Bosporus and the fortresses along it (Istanbul
University Library, 92688 and 92924). They also ordered cartographic instruments
from Vienna, with a view to mapping Crimea (BOA, A.} AMD 60.12.01).
British seamen played an important role during the Crimean War. Thomas
Spratt and his team surveyed Balaklava and noted the positions of the allied
fleet for the bombardment of Sevastopol (Chasseaud / Boyle 2005, pp. 50–51).
Since the Russians assault on Varna instead of the Gallipoli peninsula was con-
trary to expectations, the surveying work finished earlier. Russia was defeated
with the aid of France and Britain, and a treaty was signed in Paris in 1856. Ac-
cordingly, the Black Sea became neutral. The political atmosphere was again
calm, despite Russia’s dissatisfaction.
On the occasion of this peace, the Ottomans fortified the Straits and pro-
duced new maps. A manuscript map made by senior captain Nuri Efendi in
the military school in 1863 combined all the cartographical resources I have men-
tioned so far (BOA, HRT 706). (Fig. 2a and 2b) Evidently, this map showing the
Bosporus and the Dardanelles, along with Tenedos Island and Troy, is a copy
of the map produced after the Ottoman-Russian joint expedition of the Marmara
Sea. The depths are given in the Russian measurement unit sazhen as in the orig-
inal map—an unusual choice since their equivalent values in British feet was
more useful. In the legend, some symbols are also written in French. As it
turns out, Nuri Efendi did not want to lose time by calculating all of the
depth values in another unit, so he instead stated the foot equivalent of one saz-
hen. This was probably intended to ease the map’s reading and comparisons for
Ottoman naval officers, who were presumably using British maps, since they had
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their education from British officers. As for the French symbols in the legend,
this is likely because the first modern cartography teachers of Ottoman officers
were French, and as such they had learned the basic rules and technical
terms of map-making from them.
Fig. 2a State Archives of Prime Ministry BOA HRT 706
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Fig. 2b State Archives of Prime Ministry BOA HRT 709
264 Kaan Üçsu
Preparations for a new concept
The Russian Empire took the opportunity to deny the conditions of the Paris trea-
ty by exploiting the instability caused by the German-French war 1870. In re-
sponse to this, the Ottoman Grand Vizier Âli Pasha (1815– 1871) approached Brit-
ain and a conference was organized in London in 1871, which abolished the
neutrality of Black Sea and gave the Ottomans the right to permit ships of allied
navies to sail on it whenever they wished. This was a very important advantage
for the Ottoman Empire and a new threat for Russia (Beydilli 1992, p. 267). Sub-
sequently, British commander William J. L.Wharton (1843– 1905) led his ship to-
wards the Sea of Marmara, surveyed a small portion of its western part and ex-
plored the strong under currents running counter to the surface currents
(Dawson 1885, p. 153).
In this context, a second international geographical congress was organized
in 1875. All the actors in the ‘play’ were there to exhibit their geographical pro-
ductions. However, Russia was the only country exhibiting artifacts concerning
the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara. They exhibited Manganari’s aforemen-
tioned atlases and maps, alongside some earlier maps (Fournier 1875, p. 16).
The absence of newly produced maps at this congress seems to imply that
they tried to hide their recent knowledge of those seas in the lead-up to the ap-
proaching war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. This war erupted in 1877
and lasted almost one year. France and Britain only tried to stop this war from
afar. The Ottoman Empire was overwhelmed. Russia sought advantages from
their absolute victory, but Britain’s position ensured the conditions of 1871 Lon-
don Congress (Beydilli 1992, p. 268).
After this war, the Ottoman State was now well enough aware that its exis-
tence was at risk. Hence, it produced and copied new maps of the Sea of Mar-
mara, the Black Sea, and the Straits. An atlas of the Sea of Marmara and the
Black Sea consisting of 47 charts was published in the publishing house of
the Ottoman Navy in 1878 (Ülkekul 2009, pp. 80–82). Meanwhile, a new British
expedition on the Sea of Marmara was run by Captain William Wharton from
1879 to 1880 (Dawson 1885, pp. 188– 189). He elaborated the map made in the
early nineteenth century by Thomas Graves and Thomas Spratt (Istanbul Univer-
sity Library, 93432). The rocks he circumnavigated in the Sea of Marmara are
named after him as the ‘Vortonoz Rockies’.
From then on, Britain shifted its attention from the Ottoman territory to the
emerging power of Germany,while nevertheless continuing to keep an eye on the
‘Eastern Question’ (Chasseaud / Boyle 2005, p. 55). The Russian Empire conduct-
ed a physical exploration of the Black Sea in 1890 and 1891 and produced charts
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(Andrusoff 1893, p. 49). In 1892 the Ottoman government sent a team to survey
and fortify the Straits under the direction of Henri Alexis Brialmont, a Belgian
general—but this mission produced no maps (Kış 2015, pp. 365–373).
Concluding/opening remarks
The year of 1895 was another landmark for Ottoman cartography: an independ-
ent cartography office was founded within the army. Additionally, the political
atmosphere changed in a way that would eventually lead to the First World
War. These two phenomena combined to herald a different era in cartographic
production (Özkale ve Şenler 1980, p. 51).
In essence, the ‘long’ nineteenth century that I have highlighted here wit-
nessed many alliances, treaties and enmities in the context of the ‘Eastern Ques-
tion’. All of the actors taking part in the ‘Balance of Power’ play that dealt with
this question needed profound knowledge of the Marmara Sea, the Black Sea
and the Straits. Motivated by a lack of knowledge of this geographical unit,
and powered by progress in modern science and technology, a hefty production
of cartographical knowledge was accomplished throughout this period. Howev-
er, these productive map-making activities entailed their share of coalitions and
hostilities. The production output of each country fluctuated according to their
relations with the other actors. Therefore, even though I have given an overview
of this ‘long’ nineteenth century by touching upon its essential activities and the
fruits it bore, this period in history nevertheless serves to corroborate Yves La-
coste’s famous statement ‘La géographie, ça sert, d’abord, à faire la guerre’ (‘Ge-
ography is used, first and foremost, to make war’).
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Rıdvan Turhan
The Effect of Dependency Theory
on Discussions of ‘Underdevelopment’
in Turkey
Abstract: Since the establishment of the Republic regime in 1923, one of the main
discussion topics of intellectuals and of people who govern in Turkey has been
‘development’. Even though these two groups mostly had different approaches
with respect to development strategy, they had a common belief that develop-
ment would be achieved through industrialization. In a similar manner, the sug-
gestions for development strategy put forward by different intellectual circles
were not homogeneous. Despite all their differences, the clarity of Western para-
digms forms the common point of these suggestions. Even the theoretic endeav-
ors that have the claims of authenticity and of being domestic are not free from
this effect. Approaches that try to understand and explain underdevelopment in
Turkey within the theoretical frame of ‘dependency theory’ constitute one of the
most typical examples of this.
Introduction
In this essay, I aim to examine the approach of Turkish intellectuals to the prob-
lematic assessment of underdevelopment and development that has been one of
the main discussion topics throughout the history of the Republic, with respect
to its relation with ‘dependency theory’, which was popularized in Turkey after
1960. The essay consists of three sections. In first chapter, the main claims of de-
pendency theory, which are manifested in the context of historical studies in
Latin America, will be presented with respect to their criticisms of existing prog-
ress/development strategies. Even though dependency theory was effective in
1960s, it is predicable that the theses (about underdevelopment, dependency
and development strategies) of the authors of Kadro Dergisi (Kadro [Cadre] Jour-
nal) in first half of 1930s in Turkey foreshadowed the theses of dependency theo-
ry in some ways. Hence, the second section will deal with the resemblance be-
tween the theses of dependency theory and of Kadro Journal and the possible
sources of this resemblance. In the third section, I will discuss the effect of de-
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pendency theory on the literature of underdevelopment and development in
1960s Turkey.
A brief history of dependency theory
During the post World War II era, ‘modernization theory’—the theoretical frame
of the USA’s process of organizing intersocietal relations—defined the status of
being underdeveloped not as the opposite of being developed/advanced, but
as the state of not entirely appearing as such. According to this theory, the differ-
ence between underdeveloped societies and developed societies was just one
phase; underdeveloped societies could also develop if they carefully analyzed
the phases that developed societies went through and followed the same
route.¹ This theory, which had held influence in the 1950s and 60s, was the sub-
ject of staggering criticisms after the late 60s, and lost its being dominant appeal
soon thereafter. In this period, hectic criticism was being leveled at the negative
sides of capitalist industrialism and development plans, which failed to ensure
economic growth. These criticisms, which were intensely salient in the texts
first of several Latin American authors, then of social scientists such as Andre
Gunder Frank and Paul Baran, uncovered the frame that became known as ‘de-
pendency theory’ (Altun 2005, p. 13).
Dependency theory, which can also be identified as harmonically increasing
the voice of the Third World, became the dominant point of view in many coun-
tries that are identified as underdeveloped—particularly Latin American coun-
tries in the 1970s. The main objective of the theory is to put forth the idea that
the dependence of Latin American countries (or more generally, countries iden-
tified as underdeveloped) on other countries cannot be overcome without a qual-
itative change in the former’s microstructures and foreign affairs. Dependence
indicates that certain countries’ economies are conditioned by the development
and expansion of economics to which they are subjected. According to the theo-
ry, while two or more economies and the relationships of dependence between
them and world trade evolve for the benefit of the dominant ones, the dependent
ones can only execute this development as the reflection of others’ evolution
(Dos Santos 1970, p. 231).
It can be asserted that the dependency theory, as briefly identified above
within the scope of its objective and key notion, is fundamentally nourished
 W.W. Rostow’s work titled The Stages of Economic Growth (subtitled “A Non-Communist Man-
ifesto”) is the presentation of this belief with the claim of being scientific.
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from two different sources: structuralism and Marxism. The approach of structur-
alism was developed by Raul Prebisch and Celso Furtado. Both philosophers
agree that de facto economy is not proficient enough to explain the Latin Amer-
ica truth. Prebisch, who held the presidency between 1950 and 1963 of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) subsidiary to United Nations, states
that the international division of labor scheme is not valid in its indication that
the specific role of Latin America among the order of world economies is produc-
ing raw material for industrial centers. Prebisch presents that center and periph-
ery countries don’t benefit from technical developments equally, and demon-
strates with empirical data that there was a decreasing ratio of end item price
to raw materials price from the 1860s to the end of World War II. Thus, he claims
that in this relationship, industrialized countries are always the main beneficia-
ries and international trade always works against underdeveloped countries.
Briefly, according to Prebisch, who handled the developing problem associative-
ly with international trading, there is a close link between economic progress
and foreign trading. This economic situation in which Latin America finds itself
can be only understood through this relationship (Prebisch 1950, pp. 8– 14).
The main concept of Paul Baran, who is one of the most important represen-
tatives of the Marxist approach that influenced dependency theory, considers the
reason for underdevelopment is exploitation. According to Baran underdevel-
oped countries that provide raw materials and investment areas to developed
capitalist countries always represent an essential hinterland for the West. That
is the exact reason why the exploitation of underdeveloped countries played a
vital role in the development of capitalism in West. Baran openly identifies West-
ern European countries as looters and freebooters when he explains this exploi-
tative relationship. This exploitation was hidden behind the curtain of trade
while the West stole the world’s treasure from everywhere within its reach
(Baran 1957, p. 142). In this way, a big portion of the economic surplus created
in those countries that were exposed to exploitation was transferred to the
West, and the exploited countries’ chance to build up an accumulation of capital
was taken away (Baran 1957, pp. 142– 143). In this framework, Baran states that
economic development in underdeveloped countries contrasts with advanced
capitalist countries’ economic interests. In other words, according to Baran the
price of capitalist development is the others’ not being able to grow (Baran
1957, p. 162).
Thanks to the work of Andre Gunder Frank, who shared Baran’s point of
view on development and underdevelopment topics, dependency theory became
popular worldwide in the 1970s. Frank was impressed by Baran’s conceptual
framework correlating the feature of being developed and underdeveloped di-
rectly with capitalism. According to Frank, the historical development of capital-
Discussions of ‘Underdevelopment’ in Turkey 271
ism as a whole system has a critical importance for the comprehension of these
facts. In other words, the reasons for these facts of development and underdevel-
opment should be sought through the dialectic of this total system.When the his-
torical development of capitalism is inspected in this frame, it can be seen that
cases of development and underdevelopment came to light as a result of some
inner contradictions. The West’s development and others’ underdevelopment
throughout historical processes arose because of the West’s exploitation others
and usurping economic surplus values. In other words, capitalism rose on oth-
ers’ devastation. This situation is the first contradiction that Frank underlines.
The second contradiction to which he drew attention is the hierarchical structure
on the world scale that capitalism created. He explains this hierarchical struc-
ture with metropolis and satellite concepts, and links the development of the
metropolis to its withdrawing of the economic surplus from satellites and
using it for its own development. As a result, satellites can’t use their economic
surplus for their own development and hence remain underdeveloped. Frank
didn’t limit this analysis of metropolis-satellite to international relations—he
says that capitalism embeds this contradiction into each satellite’s internal econ-
omy and hence a similar polarization is also created within the satellite (Frank
1966, pp. 17–31).
Dependency theory, which takes its shape and main theses from its afore-
mentioned important representatives, develops a method of analysis that plots
broader external factors and the international capitalist system against the prog-
ress perspective, which links the reasons for underdevelopment to internal, spe-
cific conditions. It draws attention to the imperialist relations between countries,
asymmetrical relations between classes and unequal trading relations. Depend-
ency theory was effective in the 1960s and 1970s, especially in third world coun-
tries defined as underdeveloped, and deeply affected the analyses put forward
by intellectuals in those countries in the context of subject matters like depend-
ency on imperialism, problems of development and the reasons for underdevel-
opment.
In this context, dependency theory was also effective in Turkey as an ac-
count of the global capitalist system, and as a challenge to that system, or at
least an endeavor of changing the balance of power within it. In the 1960s,
the theory led the searches by various Turkish intellectuals for a strategy by
which to understand their country’s economic and social structure, and to over-
come underdevelopment. But even before the 1960s—in fact, already at the be-
ginning of 1930s—a group of intellectuals who had started to publish the Kadro
Journal, asserted theses very similar to dependency theory on subject matters
like the development of capitalism, development, underdevelopment and de-
pendency on imperialism. In the following chapter, the similarities and differen-
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ces between the theses of dependency theory and those asserted in Kadro Journal
will be discussed.
Discussions of imperialism, dependency theory
and Kadro Journal ²
The modern Republic of Turkey was established in 1923 after the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire. One of the main problems facing the new government, which
retained no economic legacy from the Ottoman one, was how economic develop-
ment would take place. When the effects of the Great Depression—which mani-
fested before even 10 years had passed since the establishment of modern Tur-
key—added to the existing economic problems, and the problem of economic
development became the most important discussion topic of the intelligentsia
and the people who governed. While trying to construct a new ideological
frame for the Turkish revolution according to the genuine conditions of the
era, a group of intellectuals who started to publish Kadro Journal in the first
half of the 1930s emphasized the need for a new development strategy and al-
leged authentic and extensive opinions about this matter. Their theoretic
frame didn’t just include Turkey, and they discussed the facts that had universal
aspects—such as national liberation movements, the crisis of 1929, capitalism,
colonialism, dependency on imperialism and the historical reasons for underde-
velopment—with respect to their endeavors of determining Turkey’s position
within the international system. It is thus predicable that there are critical resem-
blances between their theses and those of dependency theory.
While a total overlapping of these two doctrines is beside the point, their de-
livered perspectives on the subjects of dependency on imperialism, reasons for
underdevelopment, progress of capitalism and the exploiter-exploited contrast
 Kadro Journal was published between 1932–1934 by an intellectual group whose founding
members were Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, Vedat Nedim Tör, Burhan Asaf
Belge and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu. Apart from Karaosmanoğlu, the mentality of the group’s
members was significantly influenced by Marxism. The Journal, which was published in the
times when discussions of development and statism were most intensive, didn’t just join the
ideological and economic discussions, but also undertook as its agenda to give Turkish revolu-
tion a theoretical frame by interpreting it. Kadro was shut down by Atatürk, who didn’t lean to-
ward any idea of modernization other than his own. Hence Kadro Journal passed into history as
a concrete example in which the pathological relation between Turkish intellectual and state can
be traced. For further information about Kadro Journal, see: Türkeş 1998, pp. 92–119; Türkeş
1999, pp. 47–68.
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are all analogous to one another. All these facts are the cornerstones of the the-
oretic frame of the Kadro movement. In its totality, this theoretic frame considers
each fact as taken on the basis of its causal relation with the other. The interna-
tional aspect of this approach—which can also be seen as a macro theoretical
endeavor—is built on the qualitative differences and contradictions between in-
dustrialized countries and non-industrialized ones. In this contradiction, defined
by Burhan Asaf Belge³ as the relation of metropolis-exploited, non-industrializa-
tion/underdevelopment of some countries relates to exploitation by Western im-
perialism, just as in dependency theory (Belge 1934, p. 38). At the center of the
doctrine’s national aspect were the national independence wars. Kadro claimed
to offer the scientific explanation of all national independence wars, including
the Turkish one. In this context, its authors claimed that the theory of revolution
in Turkey hadn’t been established, and that for the revolution to reach success
required that the objective acts of this movement must be known and its ideol-
ogy created. According to Şevket Süreyya Aydemir,⁴ who was the lead ideologist
of Kadro, Turkish revolution was a national independence movement, and na-
tional independence movements were the main decisive progresses of twentieth
century (Aydemir 1932, pp. 6– 12). The future of both the Turkish revolution and
the international order was bound to the scientific explanation of these move-
ments. This is the main object and claim of the Kadro movement.
 Belge was one of the students sent to Germany in service of the Turkish-German Friendship
Association established in the atmosphere of World War I.While studying architecture there, he
met with the Spartacist movement led by Rosa Luxemburg and leaned toward socialist thought.
In 1923, he returned to Turkey for good. In 1928 he wrote columns in the Hakimiyet’i Milliye news-
paper that had an organic connection with the new regime. In 1931, at the same newspaper, he
met the other authors of Kadro—Aydemir, Tör and Karaosmanoğlu—and while analyzing the
huge economic collapse of 1929, he began to search for ways to get out of the crisis. Eventually,
this endeavor turned into the idea of publishing a journal: this journal was Kadro (Yıldız 2011,
pp. 29–59).
 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1897–1976) was the child of a landless peasant and studied to be-
come a teacher. In 1919, upon the Azerbaijan government demanding teachers from Turkey,
he went to the Nuha district. He attended the Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku in
1920, and as a Nuha teacher representative he met with members of the Turkish Communist
Party based there. Influenced by their anti-colonialist vision, he began to lean toward socialism.
From 1921– 1923, he studied at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow.
During his time in Baku and Moscow, he followed the discussions (that included names like
Lenin, Trotsky and Zinoviev) about how to struggle against Western imperialism. Throughout
this process, one of the most important issues that bothered Aydemir was how the peoples of
the east would be freed of Western imperialism’s oppression. For Aydemir’s biography and
the progression of his thoughts, see: Aydemir 1965; 2003.
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The authors of Kadro used historical materialism as a method while building
such an assertive and extensive theory, and brought it into connection with
Marxist theory. But it must be said that this connection is a limited one. The the-
oretic authenticity of the authors of Kadro becomes evident at this point. Accord-
ing to Kadro, even though the historical materialism based on the class struggle
was functional for understanding Western European societies in nineteenth cen-
tury, it is insufficient for understanding national liberation wars. Hence, histor-
ical materialism is taken as a method independent from Marxist theory. Even
though this approach doesn’t mesh with the main principles of Marxist theory,
this did not concern the authors of Kadro. Besides, this is not the only point
on which they differ from Marxist theory. Even though they accepted that
Marz had made the most thorough analyses of capitalism (Belge 1932, p. 29),
they nevertheless criticized those analyses. They contended that Marx was
wrong to say that capitalist accumulation occurred by means of exploitation
of the working class. The Kadro authors instead primarily base the development
of capitalism upon colonialism (Tökin 1934c, p. 17–21; Aydemir 1933, p. 5– 10). In
other words, accumulation of capital is based upon the exploitation of other
countries before the exploitation of the immediate producer, who turned into
the wageworker. In this process, capitalist accumulation took place in Europe be-
ginning with the exploration of America in fifteenth century (Aydemir 1933,
pp. 5– 10). This emphasized precedence of colonialism with respect to the devel-
opment of capitalism is the second main point shared by the theses of Kadro and
dependency theory. Accordingly, the development of capitalism didn’t cause in-
terclass contradiction to become universalized, as Marx claimed, but instead
caused colonialism to locate itself across the world, and the contradiction be-
tween exploited countries and exploiter countries to become universalized. So
according to the Kadro authors, the national independence movements of the
twentieth century emerged as a result of this contradiction.
As can be seen, the Kadro authors adopted a dialectical approach when ex-
plaining historical progress; but on the other hand, they construct their theory
on the axis of their discussions—implicit or explicit—of Marx. In this context,
they claim that the contradiction between exploited and exploiter countries
(which they determine as the decisive element of twentieth century) wouldn’t re-
solve with class struggle, as Marx had alleged. The Kadro authors replace the
class struggle—a key concept of Marxist theory—with national independence
wars (Aydemir 1932, pp. 7– 12; Belge 1934a, pp. 28). In developing an alternative
approach to Marx with regard to explaining historical progress, they again fore-
shadowed dependency theory. The unequal distribution of modern technology
that emerged worldwide with industrial revolution is one of the main points
that the Kadro authors underlined, as would dependency theory three decades
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later. According to the Kadro authors, unequal distribution of modern technology
changed the structure of production and international tradership, after which
the economies of non-industrial countries began to be transferred to the metro-
polises of Europe. This process not only hindered the progress of non-industrial-
ized countries, but also began the process of exploitation (Tökin 1932, pp. 19–32;
Belge 1933, pp. 22–28).
Aydemir emphasized that for this unequal structure to be destroyed, ‘the re-
lations of dependency’ between industrialized and non-industrialized countries
should first be destroyed (Aydemir 2003, pp. 43). According to the Kadro authors,
this unequal structure can be made to disappear by establishing modern techni-
ques in countries that succeed in their national independence wars (rather than
by class struggle within the capitalist system), and the main contradictions that
emerge at the international level can thus be resolved.⁵ The suggestion of the
Kadro authors for establishing modern techniques in these countries is clear: in-
stead of the chaotic production structure based on the private enterprise system
of capitalism, a planned development model in which the government is the en-
gine should be adopted as a development strategy that won’t cause any class dif-
ferentiations or class struggle. More clearly, they suggested a development strat-
egy that wasn’t capitalist. But it should be mentioned that it was not socialism
either. Among the Kadro authors, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin,⁶ who evinced the most
advanced analyses of class structure in Turkey, clearly mentions that a socialist
development model can’t be applied to Turkey because it didn’t have a devel-
oped working class like those in the West (Tökin 1934a, pp. 34–37; Tökin
1934b, pp. 20–26). Another Kadro author, Vedat Nedim Tör,⁷ took things one
 They also mention that the 1929 economical crisis created a good opportunity for non-indus-
trialized countries like Turkey: it prompted industrialized countries to undersell their compa-
nies, the purchase of which could help Turkey to make a move to become industrialized. Accord-
ing to Mustafa Türkeş, the Kadro authors expressed these theses thirty years in advance of
dependency theory (Türkeş 2001b, pp. 464–476).
 İsmail Hüsrev Tökin (1902–1994), who was a child of a middle class family, had graduated
from an Austrian high school in Istanbul. In 1922, he decided to study in Moscow with a scholar-
ship granted by the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Turkey, and enrolled in the Communist Uni-
versity of the Toilers of the East. There he met with Marxist concepts like historical materialism,
capital and surplus value, and with the works of Marx, Lenin and Buharin. After graduating, he
stayed in Moscow until 1926 and continued his education in economics (Tökin 1990; Türkeş
2001a).
 Vedat Nedim Tör (1897–1985) graduated from Galatasaray High School in 1916 and went to
Germany to study economics. In 1922, he wrote a PhD dissertation titled Turkey, Being Subjected
to Imperialism. Tör mentions in his memoirs that he met with the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin,
Kautsky and Sombart during his time in Berlin.
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step further, claiming that Turkey would build a classless society by overcoming
the capitalist and socialist experiences (without living these experiences), and
stating that history refutes Marx (Tör 1933, p. 24). If we remember that depend-
ency theory saw socialism as its development model, it should be noted that this
is the most essential theoretical point on which the Kadro authors and the ‘de-
pendency school’ differ.
With respect to this endeavor, the Kadro authors, who were ultimately trying
to create the ideology of the Turkish revolution that took place after the national
war of independence, built an extensive and complicated theory around how
Turkey would develop away from being an underdeveloped country dependent
on imperialism, and how the economic development would be established.
The Kadro movement can be seen as an endeavor to understand the world sys-
tem and Turkey’s place in it; for them, dependency on imperialism as a critical
factor in the matter of development constituted the central problem of an exten-
sive and systematic theory for the first time in Turkey. In this context, it can be
claimed that the Kadro authors alleged in the 1930s rather similar theses to those
of the dependency school (which appeared in 1960s), with regard to subjects like
the progress of capitalism, colonialism, underdevelopment, unequal distribution
of modern technology, metropolis-exploited contradiction and dependency on
imperialism.⁸ In the 1930s, the Kadro authors contributed new topics of discus-
sion to development literature, especially in Turkey. Their ideological approach
became a source for understanding socialism in various underdeveloped coun-
tries in that particular era. In the 1960s, this ideology found its counterpart in
Turkey in the Yön hareketi [‘Yön movement’], lead by Doğan Avcıoğlu. In the fol-
lowing chapter, the effects of dependency theory in Turkey between 1960 and
1980 will be discussed, placing the Yön movement at the center of this discus-
sion.
An endeavor of macro theory to overcome
underdevelopment: The Yön movement
In the 1960s, even though almost half a century had passed since the foundation
of modern Turkey, its development still didn’t measure up. Underdevelopment
and the problem of how to develop were still the most important discussion top-
 The main reason for these theoretical similarities can be shown to be that both the Kadro au-
thors and those of the dependency school read and were influenced by the same intellectual
sources, such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, Buharin and Luxemburg.
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ics occupying both social scientists and those who govern. This topic’s centrality
was of course related to more than just the condition of Turkey’s development
not measuring up. In the 1960s, the global rising of the left wing found its coun-
terpart in Turkey, and the political and financial dependency on West—especial-
ly on the USA—began to be questioned radically.⁹ This questioning also touched
on the huge social transformation occurring in Turkey during these years. Since
the 1950s, industrialization and urbanization in Turkey had been rapidly grow-
ing, and in parallel to this, contradictions between social classes (which are pe-
culiar to modern capitalism) were sharpening, and unfairness in distribution of
income was increasing. All these developments had turned Turkey into an un-
usual arena for social and political struggle. In these conditions, especially sub-
jects like development, apportionment and economic order, underdevelopment,
imperialism and dependency set the agenda in the social sciences.
In the 1960’s, dependency theory presented a convenient frame for Turkish
intellectuals who were trying to explain in details these matters that set Turkey’s
intellectual agenda. These effects can be clearly seen acting on the authors of the
Yön Dergisi [Yön Journal],¹⁰ also known as the ‘Yön movement’ in Turkish social
science circles. In his magnum opus titled Türkiye’nin Düzeni¹¹ [Order of Turkey],
Doğan Avcıoğlu,¹² who was one of the founders of the movement, makes connec-
 In the 1960s, one of the most important features of the Turkish economy was its dependency
on foreign capital. But it must be said that this dependency met the needs of the consumer
goods industry (Bulutoğlu 1970, p. 162).
 The Yön Journal, published weekly between 20 December 1961 and 30 June 1967, is seen as
one of the most important intellectual movements. The Yön Journal, published articles about
Turkey’s economical, social and political progress, covering two hundred years of progress
from the seventeenth century to mid-1967. Among its authors wide-ranging interests, it can be
said that topics like the historical reasons of underdevelopment, development strategies, third
world countries, dependency on imperialism and socialism in Turkey stand out. For further in-
formation on Yön Journal, see: Özdemir 1986.
 Türkiye’nin Düzeni [The Order of Turkey] incited reactions to its handling of economical, so-
cial and political subject matters. Published in 1968, it was a popular work that corresponds to
the search for a common left wing thought among young generations until the end of the 1970s.
The work, which reached its 13th printing within 10 years, argumentatively examines the histor-
ical roots of Turkey’s underdevelopment and its dependency on imperialism, and offers a rapid,
non-capitalist, nationalist-revolutionist development model by which Turkey might overcome
this dependency.
 Doğan Avcıoğlu (1926– 1983), after studying political sciences and economics in France, re-
turned to Turkey in 1955 and worked as a research assistant in the Public Administration Insti-
tute for Turkey and Middle East, which was founded based on a technical assistance agreement
between Turkey and the United Nations. He wrote for dissident media organs when the Demo-
cratic Party was in power, and participated in the group commissioned to prepare the 1961 con-
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tions between underdevelopment and dependency on imperialism, referring to
the works of Furtado and Baran, and presents analyses that correspond to the
theses of dependency theory. In this context, Avcıoğlu, who defines Turkey as
a country under the oppression of imperialism, links the growing difference
(in progress) between Turkey and the West to a couple of external historical
events. The West, with its geographical explorations connected to colonialist pil-
lage, expedited its accumulation of capital, and with the driving force of the
class that made this accumulation possible, the pre-capitalist order was dis-
solved and merchant capitalism (developed with in that order) gave way to in-
dustrial capitalism. Avcıoğlu stated that the balance of power between East
and West went in the West’s favor, and mentions that Turkey was affected by
this process: roles had changed in the world system, Turkey had lost its limited
supervision over international tradership and the structure of commerce within
Europe had shifted (Avcıoğlu 1969, pp. 105– 106). He highlights the trading deal
signed in England in 1838 as turning Turkey into Europe’s open market and raw
material store, and thus preventing development, which is only possible if the
economy moves along its own path (Avcıoğlu 1968, pp. 50–53). According to Av-
cıoğlu, if Turkey—as one of the most developed countries in its heyday—hadn’t
come under the oppression of imperialism, it possessed the features that could
have enabled it to initiate industrial capitalism before Western societies did (cf.
Baran 1957, pp. 139– 141). But Turkish society stumbled, restrained by the West,
and never had the chance to develop set against a Western capitalism entering
the imperial stage; and so Turkey created a semi-colonized order dependent
on European imperialism. Thus, Avcıoğlu clearly states that Turkey is not an un-
derdeveloped country but a country whose development was hindered by imperi-
alism (Avcıoğlu 1968, p. 106).
In the 1960s, the relation between dependency on imperialism and develop-
ment propounded by intellectuals in Yön Journal overlapped with the theses put
forward by dependency theory. In his efforts to enhance the perspective on de-
pendency and underdevelopment, Avcıoğlu especially used Baran’s The Political
Economy of Growth. Baran’s identification of economic surplus as one of the
most important elements determining underdevelopment also has critical impor-
tance in Avcıoğlu’s work. Avcıoğlu states that even though the crofter, the share-
cropper and the agricultural worker were the main creators of national revenue,
they were entitled to consume a very small portion of what they produce. The
stitution. He was the lead author of Yön Journal and one of the most influential intellectual per-
sonalities of the era. He passionately defended the idea of a socially and financially independent
Turkey and the principle of anti-imperialism—not just in his writings for Yön Journal, but
throughout his life (Macar 2001, pp. 162–169).
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bigger portion of the economic surplus went to the proprietors, usurers and mid-
dlemen. On this point, Avcıoğlu especially pointed towards the Rûm and Arme-
nian minority groups who exported Anatolian farmers’ products. Just like pro-
prietors and usurers, those Rûms and Armenians (Avcıoğlu defines them as
compradors) also used the economic surplus they gained by their mediation
for luxury consumption rather than for investment. According to Avcıoğlu,
these groups wasted the main sources of economy, thus obstructing the develop-
ment, and were the weak collaborators in the coalition of conservative powers in
cooperation with imperialism. The strong collaborator of this coalition was the
industrial bourgeoisie. The industrial class rising in Turkey, as distinct from
the one in Western societies, didn’t have the ability to play a progressive role
in development. On the contrary, it was in alliance with the abovementioned un-
developed class of the pre-capitalist order, which refused the change of order.
Hence a coalition of conservative dominant classes consisting of industrialists,
usurers, squires and comprador minority groups was detected as the prevailing
power of the Turkish economy (Avcıoğlu 1968, pp. 402–412).
Avcıoğlu’s analyses of imperialism’s class structure is rounded out by a def-
inition of the international aspects of dependency relations. Developed capitalist
countries (the USA foremost among them) and their companies were the strong
allies of this coalition that defended the status quo. For this coalition, the USA,
as well as being a source of enrichment through foreign capital and partnership,
was a safety fuse against revolutionist tendencies. Such alliances aimed at pro-
tecting the status quo were constructed within all the undeveloped countries
within the USA’s orbit. Avcıoğlu, referring to the works of Furtado, mentions
Mexico as one of the most brilliant examples of the American model of develop-
ment, and emphasizes that even though there were foreign investments and mil-
lions of dollars of capital transferred to this country, development was still not
achieved and Mexico remained an underdeveloped country (Avcıoğlu 1968,
pp. 466–473). Hence Avcıoğlu states that because of such dependency relations,
which appear both on the international and the domestic level, enterprises of
capitalist development weren’t and never will be successful—in Turkey or in
any other country.
Avcıoğlu’s views, summarized above, can actually be seen as a frame of an
analysis that emphasizes the historical perspective. He explains Turkey’s under-
development in terms of dependency on imperialism, while emphasizing the re-
lations between domestic and foreign structures. Avcıoğlu clarifies the national-
ist-revolutionist model of development that he believes should be adopted for
development to be achieved. According to this model, the capitalist development
model should first be abandoned and new colonialist dependency relations (in
which capitalist countries are dominant) should be terminated such that their
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bases within the country would fail. Thus, the sources that are wasted in the
hands of the coalition of conservative powers that is dominant in tradership
and industry should rapidly be nationalized. While agriculture should lean on
huge cooperative farms, non-agricultural land should be subjected to public eco-
nomic organizations (Avcıoğlu 1968, pp. 477–492). The details of his explanation
also clearly reveal Avcıoğlu’s understanding of development: by development,
what is meant is industrialization. According to this nationalist-revolutionist de-
velopment model, to be applied by a leading revolutionist party, a big portion of
the financial sources should be used for establishing heavy industries. Turkey
would thus develop, overcoming its dependency on imperialist countries by ach-
ieving economic independence within 15–20 years, and would reach the level of
contemporary civilizations that Atatürk—the founder of the Republic—had deter-
mined as the main goal (Avcıoğlu 1968, p. 508).
The relation between underdevelopment and dependency also has central
importance for other authors of Yön Journal. According to Erol Ulubelen, impe-
rialism makes countries that have yet to complete their industrialization fall
into its clutches by means of tradership and financial aid, and exploits them
in both material and nonmaterial ways. This exploitation is not just limited to
the transfer of economic surplus from underdeveloped peripheries to advanced
capitalist countries; it also includes the transfer of a qualified work force, speci-
alized in areas like medicine and engineering. The mission of the comprador
class in the aforementioned dependency relations in underdeveloped countries
is also an important and decisive element in Ulubelen’s analysis (Ulubelen
1966, p. 12).
İdris Küçükömer explains the reasons for underdevelopment in terms of in-
ternational tradership. After World War I, prices of industrial products rose to the
detriment of raw material’s prices, and the limits of foreign trading went in favor
of developed countries. Thus, world foreign trade turned into a mechanism for
robbing the undeveloped countries that were trying to become industrialized
by exporting raw material. Under these circumstances, the way of development
that was offered to undeveloped countries was, according to Küçükömer, both
utopic and to their detriment. He emphasizes that firstly, the dependency rela-
tions present in foreign trading should be annihilated. After that, he states
that an endeavor of industrialization with its trust placed in the domestic market
is necessary for Turkey to develop (Küçükömer 1964, p. 10).
Fellow Yön author Fethi Naci, who drew attention for his aggressive dis-
course, states that imperialism—which he defines as a special, historical
phase of capitalism and as a monopolist capitalism—turned Turkey into a
semi-colonized country (Naci 1965b, p. 16). According to Naci, this process had
started with the trading deal signed in 1838 in England, which opened the
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wide Ottoman market to Western European capitalism. The Ottoman Empire was
weakened politically and economically, leading to its collapse after World War I,
after which Western imperialist countries virtually occupied Anatolia. Even
though the Turkish national war of independence that began with this occupa-
tion had an anti-imperialist character, Turkey became a country dependent on
imperialist powers once again after World War II (Naci 1965c, pp. 8–9). Imperi-
alism was exploiting Turkey’s sources and by transferring economic surplus, it
was blocking the accumulation of capital. Also, by putting up the prices for
the goods sold to Turkey, and cutting down the prices of agricultural products
bought from Turkey, it was robbing Turkey and forcing it to trade only with cap-
italist countries (Naci 1965a, p. 5).
According to Naci, after World War II economical foreign aid from capitalist
countries to underdeveloped ones were a new form of imperialism. Naci, who
states that it seemed impossible for Turkey to overcome its dependency on impe-
rialist powers with the existing foreign politics and method of economy at the
time of his writing (Naci 1964a, p. 10), concludes that the only available way
to achieve true independence is through a development that isn’t capitalist,
and that trusts in its own resources rather than in foreign investments and
aids. He explains that the first precautions to be taken are the nationalization
of foreign monopolies, developing the public sector, planned economy, and in-
dustrial and agricultural reforms (Naci 1965d, pp. 8–9). However, Naci doesn’t
forget to mention that he doesn’t mean socialism by a development that is
‘not capitalist’—because socialism is only possible through achieving true inde-
pendence in underdeveloped countries, by democracy becoming functional in
society, and by the rapid spreading of advanced methods of production that
are not inherently capitalist. Thus, the development model that Naci suggests
seeks to both overcome dependency and to clear the way leading to socialism
(Naci 1964b, p. 6).
Niyazi Berkes emphasizes that examining the process of the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire should reveal the reasons for Turkey’s underdevelopment, mov-
ing the search’s frame back to the seventeenth century (Berkes 1965, p. 12). He
connects the underdevelopment of Turkey with the rise of modern capitalism
in the West. In this context, Ottoman history is defined as a process of decline
and dissolution under the effects of Western development. Like his Yön collea-
gues, Berkes considers the 1838 Trade Agreement as a breaking point. The agree-
ment led to the dissolution of many Turkish industrial branches, foremost
among them the cotton industry, and hence to Turkey’s dependence on imperia-
list nations (Berkes 1970, pp. 370–372). According to Berkes, the underdevelop-
ment of Turkey can’t be explained away as an idiosyncrasy of Eastern society, as
alleged by modernization theories, but must instead be understood as intercon-
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nected with dependency (Berkes 1966, pp. 12– 13). Therefore, he defines imperi-
alism as one of the fundamental determinants that restrained social and eco-
nomic progress in Turkey, rendering those endeavors inefficient or detrimental
(Berkes 1963b, pp. 7–8). Consequently, he states that Turkey must eliminate re-
actionist factors in the country that collaborate with imperialist powers, and
must abolish its dependency on those powers in international relations, in
order to actualize social and economic progress (Berkes 1963c, pp. 8–9).
Conclusion
As stated above, the subject of development has been of fundamental concern to
Turkish intellectuals since the constitution of Turkey. Associating Turkey’s un-
derdevelopment with imperialism was not an unfamiliar perspective, as evi-
dence by Kadro Journal’s authors. However, in the 1950s, development discus-
sions in Turkey came under the influence of modernization theory, the
framework of which was established by W. W. Rostow. This paradigmatic effect
can be observed clearly in the social sciences, especially in discussions of agri-
culture and urban planning. The left-wing intellectuals gathered in Yön Journal
criticized this linear/unilateral perspective for its emphasis on the effects and im-
portance of inner dynamics for development, in contrast to dependency theory.
They reinitialized discussion of underdevelopment and imperialism with their
synthesis of various approaches into the form of dependency theory. Avcıoğlu
—the most important theoretician of the Yön movement—reproduced the argu-
ments from both neo-Marxist and structuralist factions pursuant to Turkey’s un-
derdevelopment. The other Yön authors mentioned above were also diligent
agents of a similar endeavor of synthesis. Therefore it can be stated that the es-
sential references of their domain of thought come from Western paradigms,
even though they claim their analyses to be peculiar to Turkey.
The modalities regarding this phenomenon of rejecting underdevelopment
as a state of nature (explained by modernization theoreticians as simply a
‘delay’) have held an important place in treatises on left-wing development in
1960s Turkey. Nevertheless, it is an exacting task to find in this body of work
any radical investigation of development itself; analysis of the causes, factors
and historical backgrounds of underdevelopment or progression take center
stage. There is notable attitude of agreement among the writers of the Kadro
and especially of Yön journalson the subject of development and on the explan-
ation this phenomenon (industrialization); where they differ is on the proposed
methods to achieve the determined objectives. From this point on, development
gains a contested character and thus any interrogation of the subject becomes
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impossible. This situation, which can be called an epistemological imprudence,
resulted in the unquestioned acceptance of the hypotheses related to the subject
of development. Yön Journal authors in particular clearly express that their
means of development is through industrialization itself.
As detailed above, underdeveloped or oppressed Turkey was considered to
be able to reach the level of contemporary Western civilizations aimed at by Ata-
türk only based on its degree of independence from imperialism through indus-
trialization. At this point, the paradoxical structure of all these debates referring
to dependency theory becomes more evident. The theories that are put forward
are so contradictory: on the one hand, the ‘delay’ argument of modernization
theory is being criticized; while on the other hand, the competition metaphor,
the traditional-modern duality and a typology of societies sorted according to
their development levels within a linear course of history are preserved intact.
Then in all these analyses, just as in dependency theory, what is considered
undeveloped is still being defined according to the West. The main cornerstone
of these acts of definition is the perception of the phases of development and
social formation undergone by the West. In other words, in these analyses, a Eu-
rocentric approach dominates. It seems to have escaped these authors’ notice
that even characterizing one country as developed and another as underdevel-
oped means positioning them within the very same paradigm as the moderniza-
tion theory that they criticized, and accepting the same presuppositions of line-
arity/unidirectionality. Hence it can be said that both Kadro and Yön authors,
while they were producing ideas about Turkey’s economic and political depend-
ency, despite their claim of authenticity, were dependent on Western concepts
and paradigms, and so they reproduced the West’s economic and political dom-
ination at an epistemological level. Moreover, it is true that this epistemological
dominance is also one of the main problems of the Turkish intellectual world
today. So, it should not be forgotten that dependency is not just an economic
and political problem, but really begins when we need others’ concepts and cat-
egories of analysis to comprehend and to produce solutions for our own society
and social problems.
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Agnieszka Pufelska
The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism
and the Problem of Temporalization—on the
100th Anniversary of Witold Kula’s Birth
Abstract: The Marxist social historian Witold Kula (1916– 1988) demonstrated
more thoroughly than any other scholar that the changes in the conditions of ag-
ricultural production also changed ‘historical time’. Kula describes the period
between 1770 and 1880 as a transition zone in which an acceleration of historical
time occurs because it does not yet correspond to experience. The historical proc-
ess bursts open the old European continuum of experience, and the first catego-
ry in which the temporal difference between experience and expectation is con-
ceptualized is the term ‘progress’. He does not, however, consider this transition
from the feudal to the capitalist movement pattern to be fluent. According to
Kula, capitalism in most countries did not develop out of the feudal economy
or as a consequence of gradual changes within the system, but developed
above it as an autonomous system in the form of a superstructure.
Stability through cyclicity
In the last century, the transition from feudalism to capitalism has been the sub-
ject of a number of debates on both sides of the Atlantic. This was particularly
the case in the 60s and 70s when the topic served to position economic history
firmly within the historical sciences and philosophy. As part of this quest for the
realignment of economic history as a field of research, some historians favorably
disposed to philosophy were resolute in their insistence on the philosophical
roots of the economic sciences, in an endeavor to secure a firm place for philos-
ophy—or, to be more precise, for Marx’s philosophical categories—within histor-
ical studies (see as an example: Kittsteiner 1980). Those historians, on the other
hand, who favored researching socio-economic structures endeavored to estab-
lish the economic sciences as a subdivision of social history, and to strip them
of any budding historical-philosophical tendencies (cf. Wehler 1973).
If one were to ask today any scholar of modern history interested or involved
in these past debates whether he or she had been aware of an Eastern European
position on this discussion, the answer would most certainly be in the affirma-
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tive (in the case of Marx readers, not without a degree of cheer), and Witold Kula
would be named. His books, and first and foremost his An Economic Theory of
the Feudal System, were read, valued and criticized by both camps.Whereas so-
cial historians were interested in Kula’s analyses of the feudal social order, their
adversaries concentrated mainly on his universal historical model of economic
theory, or his dynamic functional model of the feudal economy.
But who was this Polish scholar,whose feudalism theory won recognition far
beyond the borders of Europe? Witold Kula was born in Warsaw in 1916 into a
Protestant family of German descent. After graduating in Economics and History
from the University of Warsaw, he lectured at a private university, where he de-
fended his doctoral thesis in 1939. During the Second World War, he was a mem-
ber of the Home Army and was taken prisoner by the Germans. In 1945 he re-
turned to Poland and immediately took up his academic career. He obtained
his post-doctoral degree (Habilitation) from the University of Łódź in 1947, fol-
lowing which he received a scholarship for two years in Paris, where he was in-
fluenced by the Annales school. Shortly after his return, he was appointed Pro-
fessor at Warsaw University where he held the Chair for Economic History until
1975. By then seriously ill, he had to give up his academic teaching at the age of
just 60. Witold Kula died in Warsaw on 12 February 1988.
Kula’s academic work consists mainly of studies on Polish economic history,
but he also worked intensively on the methodological and theoretical problems
of the historical sciences. His most well known work in this field is the book that
appeared in 1963 entitled The Problems and Methods of Economic History. It is in
this almost 800-page work of a universalist nature that Kula most clearly formu-
lates his methodology. He accepts, not only in a formal sense, the progressive
tenets of Marxist methodology and assumes the position of Marxist periodization
that is based on the development of socio-economic formations. “For the Marx-
ists,” Kula writes, “the periodisation of history is, therefore, equally a synthesis
of historical cognition and a tool thereof” (Kula 1963, p. 175).
One of the central problems in Kula’s work is the question of synthesis in
economic history. He emphasizes the essential differences between the courses
of many economic processes in diverse social orders and draws attention to
the limited comparability of these processes. The disparity between the socio-
economic systems necessitates a different methodological approach that, in
turn, should result in a synthesis determined by time and space. In the most re-
nowned of his works, the above-mentioned An Economic Theory of the Feudal
System, Kula uses the Polish transition from feudalism to capitalism to describe
how this research method could be applied. The book was first published in 1962
but only became known in Western Europe in the 1970s when it was translated,
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first into French and then into English. What, in Kula’s opinion, were the condi-
tions that such a theory should fulfill?
We can say that the task of every economic theory of a system consists in formulating the
laws governing the volume of the economic surplus and its utilization and that these prob-
lems have to be explained in the short-term and in the long-term. (Kula 1976, p. 27)
However, in order to speak of the conclusion or the climax of an economic theo-
ry, Kula argues that it has to be able to explain the transformation of one given
system into another (Kula 1976, p. 27).
Clearly, Kula attempts in his feudalism research to investigate what Marx did
not achieve—at least not as an independent analysis—and that he only analyzed
based on what was apparent to him from the viewpoint of the emerging capitalist
mode of production. It is not in vain that Kula’s temporal framework of the 16th
to the 19th centuries covers Marx’s history of ‘primitive accumulation’, i.e. the
history of the separation of the direct producers from their means of production
and nourishment, which was for Marx the core of the history of the transition
from feudalism to capitalism.¹
In Kula’s historical reconstruction, the first signs of economic decline in Po-
land are evident in the 16th century, otherwise seen as the ‘golden century’, char-
acterized by economic, cultural and political development. Kula sees the causes
for this in the strengthening of serfdom and the corresponding increase in the
power of the nobility. Their high standard of living was supported by an economy
that guaranteed Poland the position of a European granary and enabled the aris-
tocracy to import luxury goods from abroad. Whilst the aristocracy thus had
close connections with the international market, also through the ‘term of
trade’, the peasants remained excluded and increasingly tied to feudal depend-
encies. This process reached its climax in the so-called ‘crisis of the 17th centu-
ry’, which was heightened in Poland by external influences such as the wars
against the Cossacks and Sweden.
The country fell into a state of economic backwardness characterized by a
concentration of land ownership in the form of estates ruled by the wealthy no-
bility. All types of feudal dues, both ordinary and extraordinary, were fully devel-
oped and the peasants’ obligations had become very oppressive. An analysis of
surviving invoices showing income and expenditure of several feudal estates led
Kula to conclude that, when considering only monetary expenditure and income,
 Marx writes: “The economic structure of capitalist society has grown out of the economic
structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter set free the elements of the former.”
(Marx 1972, p. 743.)
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these estates must have produced a substantial yield, but that if the material ef-
fort (not measured in terms of money) in the form of corvées obligations was cal-
culated into this, the result would be a large deficit: “The average peasant does
not take into account the cost of family labor nor interest on capital because he
has not knowledge of such categories and does not know how to make accurate
calculations” (Kula 1976, p. 41). The farms were inefficient without knowing it.
In Kula’s opinion, this is not simply an invoicing problem: he derives from it
a ‘two-sector system’, i.e. the side-by-side existence of a monetary and a natural
economy. The peasants who belonged to the nobility had to pay them dues, most-
ly as payment in kind, but they were also obliged to perform certain services for
the nobility. The activities of the noble landowners on the other hand, were ori-
ented around a market where they exchanged the peasants’ dues for money,
such that their calculations were focused on increasing income from the mano-
rial estate. Under manorial rule, the production of commodities was successfully
developed: the ruling class used their privileges to secure cheap labor power,
raw materials and advantages in selling their goods. The feudal lords were
thus able to make good use of the economic advantages of peasant agriculture;
that is, of low labor costs, high labor intensity and low unproductive expenses.
The lower the intensity and productivity of agricultural labor, the more the
manorial lords attempted to reduce production costs by increasing feudal
labor obligations. Feudal labor service reduced production and transport costs
and secured the continued existence of the manorial estate even when market
prices for grain and other products were low. Even more to the point, Kula argues
that the income from grain was more dependent on the harvest yield than on the
actual price, because when harvests were poor the price increase only offset to a
limited extent the reduced amount of saleable goods. Lords and peasants both
benefited when they sold larger amounts of grain at low prices than when prices
increased and they were only able to sell less:
Under capitalism, an increase in prices is the stimulus that sets reserves in motion and
brings about an increase in national income. In the feudal system, on the other hand, a
reduction in the social income leads to an increase in price [generally due to non-economic
factors such as failed harvests or wars]. (Kula 1976, p. 110)
The material situation of a manorial estate and the serfs who lived there was
thus determined to a greater extent by the harvest than by price fluctuations
(Kula 1976, p. 56).
Bad harvests also had a negative effect on town-dwellers as they were then
forced to pay higher prices for food. In order to meet their needs for essential
goods, they had to do without other things, and the demand for the products
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and services of tradesmen sank accordingly. For this reason, and because the
peasants were not able to buy as much, trade and commerce stagnated. Hard-
ship abated when harvests improved. The prices of agricultural products went
down, the peasants’ income increased, and the tradesmen in the towns were
able to sell more of their products. The economic upturn continued until poor
harvests again brought crisis to the towns and country.
“The peasant,” Marcus Sandl writes in his essay on the concept of circula-
tion and the cameral sciences knowledge system in the 18th century, “did not
have sufficient means to control nature and thus was not able to autonomously
shape production processes, but was obliged to rely on ‘means with which he ar-
tificially supported nature for economic purposes.’ In this sense, there are almost
as many agricultural times as there were manorial estates” (Sandl 2002, p. 69).
Translated into temporal categories, this might mean: up to and even beyond
the mid-18th century, the alternating rhythm of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ years shapes
a concept of an oscillating history with a re-occurrence of the same or similar
situations. The long-term dynamics are subject to recurring short-term setbacks,
but people have no experience of any tendency that would indicate improvement
or continuous progress in their life situation as a whole. There is no overall his-
torical dynamic or development that can impress itself on experience. Expecta-
tions are determined by previous experiences. In 1797 Kant noted that most peo-
ple lived in a system of the ‘abderitism of history’; things do not move forwards,
nor do they move backwards—the ordinary run of things is marked by a haphaz-
ard up and down (Kant 1995, p. 99).
The peasants begin to move
Despite the feudal balance that, although subject to marked secular fluctuations,
stabilizes time and again on a barely altered level, Kula sees in feudalism (and
here he is closely following Labrousse’s crisis theory) a general weakness and
proneness to crisis.² Insofar as feudal society remains within the limits of an ex-
change of agricultural sector surpluses, its development is not compromised—
provided these surpluses are indeed generated and exchanged. It is only when
 The French economic historian Ernest Labrousse postulated, primarily for the 18th century, a
link between high prices of grain used for bread and market stagnation in the manufacturing,
pre-industrial sector: “La crise cyclique de sous-production agricole ne reste pas agricole dans
ses conséquences. Elle gagne toute la vie industrielle. La sous-production agricole déclanche
une crise de sousconsommation industrielle, de surproduction industrielle relative.” (Labrousse
1933, p. 528)
The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism 291
this system, by reason of its immanent long-term dynamics, reaches its produc-
tivity limits that its instability becomes apparent. And it is precisely this problem
that Kula observes in Poland from the middle of the 18th century onwards, when
the grain prices and ground rents in Central Europe began to rise and greater
profits were zealously generated. The burden on the peasants was too large
and far exceeded their production potential. This method of production, deter-
mined as it was by feudal appropriation, reaches an impasse. As does Marx,
Kula sees the changes in the dominant form of appropriation of the surplus prod-
uct as marking the transition from feudalism to capitalism.
In Kula’s feudalism model, however, the loss of efficiency experienced by the
farms in the 18th century is by no means unexpected or determined solely by ex-
ternal factors. On the contrary, he sees this as something that had persistently
accompanied the feudal manorial economy and which, as such, was testimony
to its instability: the short-term crises of feudalism that caused recurring slumps
in long-term dynamics are, for Kula, an inner component of the feudal system,
and are also transformed with the system. In a polemical attack on Fernand
Braudel’s concept of crisis, Kula asks: “Nobody doubts for a moment that a gen-
eral crisis is also a direct crisis of history. But is all this so new? Is crisis not a
permanent feature? Has it not always existed?” (Kula 1983, p. 236)
He expounds the transforming proneness to crisis of feudal manorial society
in his theory on the lord-peasant-struggle in Poland and, cum grano salis, in
Prussia between the 16th and 18th centuries. Kula assumes that the lord of the
manor had to exert pressure on the peasants—who dominated the production
process—in order to generate the surplus that determined his own level of exis-
tence. The reason for this, Kula argues,was the permanent resistance of the peas-
ants in the form of sabotage or flight. The lords’ greatest losses in collecting the
surplus were incurred, however, through the peasants’ contact with the market.
There was a bitter struggle as to the “market quota” between the peasant, who
was obliged to pay his dues in produce, and his lord. Whereas the peasant at-
tempted to sell a part of the surplus remaining over and above what he required
for subsistence, the lord strove equally resolutely to sever all the peasants’ mar-
ket relations. He attempted to achieve this by exchanging the peasants’ money
for goods produced on his own manor as well as by reducing the size of the
farms. From the 16th century onwards, the Polish peasants who were obliged
to pay rent to their lords in money and in natura were able to consume or to mar-
ket with profit their own harvest surplus. In order to stop the flow of money from
the estate and thus to compensate for the loss of natural produce sold by the
peasants, the lords began to create their own markets. Even though there were
new developments aimed at increasing the monetary income through direct
and indirect monetization of the peasants’ produce, it remained the goal of
292 Agnieszka Pufelska
the rulers to ensure that buying and selling continued to be in their hands. Mon-
etary revenue came primarily from the sale of the farmers’ own produce, such as
vodka. It should be borne in mind, however, that the peasants were obliged to
source their vodka from their lords. To illustrate this, Kula quotes a letter from
Prince Czartoryski who complained in about 1780 that, without propination,
he was unable to obtain a regular monetary income and that, particularly in
the ‘bad’ years, the distilleries had taken on the function of mints (Kula 1976,
p. 137). This letter shows more than simply the lords’ share of responsibility in
securing the Polish predilection for vodka. Above all, it draws attention to the
peasants’ money reserves, and thus also to their market connections, which per-
sisted despite the bad years and the lords’ attempts to prevent those connec-
tions.
Another method employed by the lords to isolate peasants from the market
was the above-mentioned reduction in the size of the farms. The nobility clearly
had no interest in the ruin of their subjects. But, the smaller the average farm,
the less use the peasant could draw from favorable market conditions. If the
good harvest years were used as a measure of this size, the number of bad
years increased for the peasant, because even slight harvest fluctuations
meant that his agricultural reproduction was no longer secure. Also, the lords
of the manor had to provide material support for the peasants to the extent
that they were unable to produce a surplus themselves. In the long term, this
conflict pushed the feudal system to its limits. The efficiency of manorial estates
sank continuously from the 16th to the 18th century, resulting in rising indebted-
ness. The estates, in turn, were unable to bear the burden of the amassed debts
of their owners.
The capitalization of agriculture slowly began to take over towards the end
of the 18th century. The Polish nobility chose to follow the ‘Prussian path’ and
gradually adopted the ‘rent system’, the consequence of which was the infamous
‘struggle for rent’. The lords fought to raise the rent so as to be able to assert
themselves in competition with their peers. For the peasants, on the other
hand, it was important to be able to appropriate for themselves a part of the sur-
plus they produced. The only means they had of doing this was through lower
rents, resistance, increase in the area of land they cultivated or greater labor pro-
ductivity. Peasant families also strove to use other means to make up for the in-
come deficit which arose from their agricultural labor. They generally supple-
mented their income by work in the various trades or other non-agricultural
sectors; this, in turn, tied them more and more closely to the market. The peas-
ants had spread their labor power as ‘entrepreneurs’ across several fields of work
that promised cash income, and this ‘obligation’ to become market players
doubtless widened their action radius. Over and beyond this, they developed
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their own strategies to avoid being subjected entirely to the constraints of the
market, or of their rulers, by pursuing mixed economic activities and allowing
themselves some flexibility. Farms now became businesses geared towards ach-
ieving an economic balance,while the lords of the manor became capitalist land-
owners who understood—as Kula noted ironically—that ‘money makes money’,
and that land is a commodity (Kula 1955, p. 34).
With these changes in the conditions of agricultural production, ‘historical
time’ also changed; that is to say there was a change in the ‘tempus’ of social
reproduction, and the income of the manorial estates began to depend on invest-
ments and market prices rather than on weather conditions:
Finally, we might risk a generalization: in precapitalist societies many economic indices are
subject to great fluctuations in the short run and only to very slow change in the direction
of the trend; in industrial societies, however, the range of short-run fluctuations is reduced,
but the trend of changes in direction is accelerated and becomes more pronounced (for ex-
ample, the demographic coefficients, returns to land etc.). (Kula 1976, p. 183)
The entire society becomes an accelerated society. The period between 1770 and
1880 can thus be considered a transition zone in which an acceleration of histor-
ical time occurs because it does not yet correspond to experience. The historical
process bursts open the old European continuum of experience, and the first cat-
egory in which the temporal difference between experience and expectation is
conceptualized is the term ‘progress’.³
Back to Kula
Kula does not, however, consider this transition from the feudal to the capitalist
movement pattern to be fluent. “There is no doubt,” he states, “that certain el-
ements change rapidly, others slowly or very slowly, and certain elements can be
 ‘Experience’ and ‘expectation’ are two central historical conceptual categories for Reinhart
Koselleck. Similarly to Kula, he sees what is new in modernity as the increasing gap between
experience and expectation. He argues (though without giving examples) that the reason for
this change is the transition from a circular to a linear view of history: “The peasant world,
which two hundred years ago comprised up to 80 percent of all persons in many parts of Europe,
lived with the cycle of nature. Excepting the structure of social organization, fluctuations in mar-
ket conditions, especially long-distance trade in agricultural products, and monetary fluctua-
tions, the everyday world was marked by whatever nature had to offer. […] Technical develop-
ments, which did exist, took so long to become established that they did not cause a rupture in
the pattern of life.” (Koselleck 1989, p. 360)
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regarded as constant” (Kula 1976, p. 182). The emphasis on the non-contempora-
neousness of change is related to Kula’s thesis on the various adaption options of
the respective systems to new conditions. This, in turn, testifies to the ‘elasticity’
of the feudal system, which allows it to retain its character although changes
have taken place. Kula divides the adaptation processes to which the feudal sys-
tem is subject into avoidable and unavoidable changes. He sees the latter as
being of a cumulative nature, whereby they triggered the transition of one struc-
ture into another or stretched the feudal system beyond its limits, only to replace
the old structure by a new one. In other words, in long-term dynamics, Kula dif-
ferentiates between elements that operate ‘periodically’ or ‘continuously’, and
that in their cumulative effect have led to structural transformations from the
mid-18th century onwards (Kula 1976, p. 118).
Following this line of argumentation, then, capitalism in Poland (as in most
other countries) did not develop out of the feudal economy or as a consequence
of gradual changes within the system, but developed above it as an autonomous
system in the form of a superstructure. “Feudalism was pregnant with capital-
ism,” Kula writes at one point (Kula 1983, p. 242).With the exception of England,
the industrialization of European culture resulted from the ‘pressure’ of an al-
ready existent capitalism:
Capitalism only emerged spontaneously once in the history of the world [: in England]. The
same is true of socialism. But there are various feudalisms around the world. They have
come about independently of one another in diverse societies and epochs. (Kula 1983,
pp. 68–69).
This thought is central to Kula’s development theory. He sees a twofold course
for the historical cultural process: it develops in one particular direction and
also in several different directions simultaneously. He calls this cultural theory
a ‘dialectic theory of unity and diversity for the course of time and for change’.
Contrary to the course of time, change never takes place in one direction only—a
position that contradicts those of Adam Smith and even Karl Marx. For this rea-
son, Kula also suggests that we should assume the multilinearity of the historical
process and regard its dynamics as a wide range of comparable changes:
It is only possible to develop an overall theory of feudalism if analyses of feudalism in
Japan, China or India are consulted […] Only in the light of such comparisons can we de-
termine what may be generally valid or meaningful for our [European] feudalism. (Kula
1958, p. 35)
As a reminder: Kula made this call for comparative global history at the end of
the 1950s, long before Jürgen Osterhammel’s groundbreaking work on universal
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history. The thesis that a number of trade capitalisms blossomed in various parts
of the world in the developing global economy of the 17th and early 18th centu-
ries runs through all of Kula’s economic analyses; capitalism functioned from the
start as a global economy—and globalization is thus a process that has been in
progress for centuries. Kula’s development theory of unity and diversity presup-
poses the global connectivity but concurrent fragmentation of trade, politics and
cultures. This principle was the reason for his appeal to historiography:
If the fundamental problem of our epoch is the unity of the planet in the face of industrial
civilisation, then it may be the duty of contemporary historiography to ask of the past what
leads us to this unity. Let us not hesitate, let us contemplate the long periods of time and
large spaces. (Kula 1983, p. 255)
In his plea for the ‘great narration’, Kula also attempts to point out the dangers of
using the concept of totality. Criticism of teleological historical concepts à la
Hegel plays a large part in Kula’s theory on the course of the historical process.
Extremely well-read in German philosophy of history, he now no longer assumes
that a perfect, but rather an imperfect ‘whole’ is mediated. For Kula, this imper-
fection results from the non-availability of history, and he thus places people,
who consciously act in and endure history, in a process of which they are not
conscious—one which results from their actions, but which is outside of their
control. Yet his criticism of purposive conceptions of development is in no way
contradictory to his conviction that the historical process takes a directional
course.⁴ He speaks of a “directional development without a teleological vision
of an earthly paradise” (Kula 1958, pp. 215–216). Such a statement from the
mouth of a professor living in the ‘best of all communisms’ was not a matter
of course. For Kula, Soviet-style Communism was an integrative component of
the prevailing capitalism.
To sum up: Kula sees a strong accumulation of century-long tendencies that
appeared insignificant as long as the feudal system remained intact and func-
 Heinz-Dieter Kittsteiner, a cultural historian who died in 2008, was of a similar view. Follow-
ing Kant and Marx, he assumes that people can extend their idea, but not their actions, to the
whole: “Man does not readily ‘make’ his history, history evolves—in the context of society, ad-
mittedly—unconsciously, so to speak, when uncoordinated actions encounter one another.”
(Kittsteiner 1997, p. 83) Unlike Kula, Kittstein has a distinct historical-philosophical approach.
He looks for non-teleological options in a philosophy of history that maintains insight into
the non-availability of events. To this end, he strives to subject certain key categories of the his-
tory of philosophy to a rational analysis; his last book, Die Stabilisierungsmoderne: Deutschland
und Europa 1618– 1715, represents such an endeavor. For an in-depth analysis, see: Pufelska
2010, pp. 173– 195.
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tional, but which played a decisive role in the period of its transition to capital-
ism. These include the advance of industrialization, cuts in interest rates for
loans, increasing mobility among the population, and the peasants’ attempts
at market involvement. Because the resulting changes arose from all previous ex-
perience, they gave reason to hope for continuous progress: and this hope was
great, for “if a structure is destroyed, nobody is in a position to predict what
the new structure which arises from the ruins of the old will look like” (Kula
1983, p. 296).
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Globalization and Crisis of Values:
Promise and Total Disappointment
Abstract: What should be called (at least according to the views supported by
modern moral philosophy schools) the ‘modern moral world’ can be depicted
nowadays as an environment in which we consider relations to the community
to be morally significant, even when the individuals within the reach of these
duties are in fact unknown. So we can blame or we can praise, even in the no-
torious absence of any identifiable subject of ‘moral obligation’. The fundamen-
tal difference is in perceived obligations, not in entitlements: duties versus
rights. At first glance, moral entitlement is nothing but an abstract right seeking
recognition. Not so the obligation, as the ‘right-bearer’ is waiting for the commit-
ment to be honored. The work of Onora O’Neill, Charles Fried and Thomas M.
Scanlon rounds out the argumentation of the normative frame that operates in
today’s strongly supererogatory moral world.
Men may seem detestable as joint stock-companies and nations; knaves, fools, and murder-
ers there may be; men may have mean and meagre faces; but man, in the ideal, is so noble
and so sparkling, such a grand and glowing creature, that over any ignominious blemish in
him all his fellows should run to throw their costliest robes. That immaculate manliness we
feel within ourselves, so far within us, that it remains intact though all the outer character
seem gone; bleeds with keenest anguish at the undraped spectacle of a valor-ruined man
[…] To meanest mariners, and renegades and castaways, I shall hereafter ascribe high qual-
ities, though dark; weave round them tragic graces; if even the most mournful, perchance
the most abased, among them all, shall at times lift himself to the exalted mounts. (Melville
1988, pp. 117– 118)
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Introduction: The Hero with a Thousand Faces
Let me, for argument’s sake, recall here a treasured memory of a prolonged and
enjoyable research stay in Berlin. I landed there in the early winter of 2010, when
journalists were especially attached to the term außergewönlich (‘extraordinary’)
—‘an extraordinary winter’. A born-and-raised Berliner (let alone a German col-
umnist) would not dare to use these words lightly. I remember leaving my apart-
ment in the frigid morning, flakes drifting here and there, to find my dorm’s
threshold clearly isolated from the world by means of a vast snow blanket. Flab-
bergasted, I looked around in search of help. Then I looked down—and there
they were, those thin layers of snow-soaked paper at my door that promised
the first solid step out of the cave. Day after day, the brochure left almost unno-
ticed on my doorstep helped me out into Berlin life, clearing the initial path to
tackling the day’s meetings and readings.
That very stitched-together set of pages constitutes to this day—or so they
tell me, as I’m now far from Berlin—the Boulevardzeitung (BZ). But don’t be
fooled by its described weight. A quick view of its history points out to those
of us who don’t yet know, that even in its slenderness we have before us a hun-
dred-and-forty-year newspaper in its prime. The BZ was awarded ‘Paper of the
Year 2016’—a well deserved prize, considering its half-million readership. On
12th October 2009, the merry people of Berlin woke up to a brand new social ini-
tiative within the pages of the 132nd anniversary edition: the Berliner Helden [Her-
oes from Berlin], devoted to good deeds and to be featured six times a week.¹ The
one-page feature is an homage to all those citizens who render service to the Ber-
lin community, who it names Ehrenamter (‘honorary civil servants’). It offers par-
ticular cases of unselfish civilian management, educational ventures for disad-
vantaged children, or social inclusion projects. In 2016, for example, the lists
of awards were crammed with references to the Syrian refugees. Other mentions
include recycling and sustainability initiatives, the implementation of new green
areas in the city’s neighborhoods. and people who out of sympathy help others
in need of medical aid, not to mention those who find animal shelters for our
four legged friends. The awarded are always among the aforementioned ‘merry
people of Berlin’—private citizens with some extra motivation and implication
in what makes a city a shared space. Space creates a ‘shared life’ beyond the mat-
ter of simply occupying it. Rather than a matter of mere presence, it is a space
thought to be administered in common, jointly—and these are its ‘heroes’.
 The project can be checked on-line at http://www.bz-berlin.de/berliner-helden (visited 23rd
December 2017).
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In German, this type of engagement is called Aktion(‐en), in a way that
would have made Hannah Arendt herself proud.² An action merits being called
an Aktion when it has as its aim a certain type of social or communal commit-
ment in which not necessarily disinterested altruism, but rather what could re-
call the phrase ‘the greatest good for the greatest number of people’, is accom-
plished. This tension between ‘private-public obligations’ is key here: not
entitlement, but obligation. Why do we sometimes bear such a burden for the
fashion of an impersonal need; a voluntary obligation to an allegedly joint
stock-company; and furthermore, one with whom we are not acquainted in the
least? For in most of the stories in Berliner Helden, the local heroes do not
know their beneficiaries. The supposed normative content carried on their
shoulders is intended to symbolize the living community in which they are im-
mersed. Publicity and transparency are virtues to be counted on, of course—
but they are not emblematic of the common behavior. ‘Knaves, fools and murder-
ers’ can equally live there in the imperium of homo homini lupus if they please, in
the open, recognizing that they live in the jungle and knowing that the game is
like that.
‘Berliners’ are not, on the other hand, called ‘heroes’ for nothing, since it is
implied that their endeavor is as private and as personal as that of the ‘knaves’,
but does not seek an outcome for the self. For some, this is just a special case of
craziness; their interest in the commonwealth ends here. Melville’s diagnosis
(quoted above) is perhaps apt for our times. It implies that as common individ-
uals, we live in some sort of ‘joint-stock company’. We are laden by our private
motivations, but none of them points to the particular fellow on the other side of
the table. If we get frustrated in our private goals, ‘with mean and meagre faces’
we always feel like we have at least the right to moan. Only in what we envisage
as ‘the ideal’ case are our better angels moved—an außergewönlich event, in any
 In The Human Condition (1958), Arendt displays her ontology of agency regarding human ac-
tivities in their various forms. ‘Labor’ is the craft by means of which we take care of our biolog-
ical needs, and ultimately serve the chain-of-being incarnated in reproduction. The genus, the
species, overlaps the individual. There is no end to it as activity; we are talking about ‘work’
if our labor has an end; a beginning impregnated by an idea, a purpose, some disposed
means and lastly an end. Here, the human world comes into play, as production transforms
the inertia of the natural realm. The genus is slowly substituted by individuality and its teleol-
ogy; ‘action’ is the highest and most significative activity a human can endeavor to undertake.
For by an ‘action’, we are individuals among other individuals, and for the sake of individuals in
a community. By ‘action’, we make a place for us as unique members of a shared res publica and
seek to recognize and be recognized. The 1998 edition of The Human Condition (University of Chi-
cago Press), with substantial text additions and an introduction by Margaret Canovan, is worthy
of consultation.
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case. In contrast, for Berliner Helden, ‘where some simply moan, they get in-
volved’ (‘Wo anderen nur jammern, packen sie an’), as the BZ chief board
urges. It is something of an ironic trope to use such a motto, since Berlin citizens
are famous indeed for their special way of moaning. They gripe so earnestly that
they have created their own special term for it: jammern. Its origins are in the
dumb gesticulations of the jaw while complaining—no word, all pose. Of course,
if you jammerst, you are playing the Berliner.
“The question of who must blame [versus] the question of who has standing
to do so” is a tricky one (Scanlon 2008, p. 175). As an analogy, consider the sim-
ilar question: who is entitled to praise and who is not? “A judgment of blamewor-
thiness is an impersonal one. It is a judgment that anyone can make, whatever
his or her relation to the agents in question,while blame, as I interpret it, is more
personal” (Scanlon 2008, p. 175). Both cases contemplate the presence of con-
ceptual judgment. There is a criterion to be held up against in order to judge,
and the judges wield it in cases of both personal and impersonal blame. You
can blame, in T.M. Scanlon’s view, if and only if you are first assuming the pos-
sibility of an identifiable ‘blameworthiness’. Equally, you can praise if and only if
you are assuming the possibility of an identifiable quality that makes something
or somebody ‘praiseworthy’.
I agree with Scanlon that anyone can make such judgments as a ‘private or
public citizen’, but my views differ on the conceptual independence of personal
bias. This is the very view in which the abovementioned Berliners are seen as
‘heroes’ for getting involved personally in something taken to be impersonal;
they went the proverbial extra mile. But is it not an assumption central to Scan-
lon’s argument that ‘whatever his or her relation to the agent in question is’,
what has changed is in fact a ‘morally (committal) binding’ relation of some
kind? Whether the situation seems personal or impersonal, we are affected by
our sense of the relation changing. If by ‘personal’ we mean ‘intimate’, then
Scanlon’s reasoning is well understood. If not, then he or she who shares the
judgment assumes they share a communal relation as well—something gewön-
lich (‘customary’). The difference regarding change is non-existent. Berliner Hel-
den consider morally significant their relation to the community, even when the
individuals comprising the ‘stock’ are unknown. So they can blame and they can
praise—but so too can Jammerers. The cognitive judgment always comes with a
performative effect, because it judges a human relation, with persons and sub-
jects. The fundamental difference is in perceived obligations, not in entitlements.
In what follows, I will address the problem intrinsic to that vision encapsu-
lated in the BZ’s motto. It seems to make plausible a discrepancy between ‘innoc-
uously moaning/praising’ and ‘being compromised’ by that moaning/praising. It
is a difference that passes almost unnoticed, but that I hold to have a significant
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normative drive.While both activities are personally driven in a sense, I will ad-
vocate for a strong normative drive, though one diffused into the community.
That is, I will defend a position in which there is in fact some means of explain-
ing what kind of moral force we assume or attribute to an Aktion, and how it can
be conceptually articulated. Onora O’Neill will have the floor in the first place;
Charles Fried and Thomas M. Scanlon will round out the argumentation.
‘Entitlements’, rights and utter suspicion
Apparently, we have and will always have a sovereign right to moan—or so we
are told. It is a perk attached to the position, unassailable, and perhaps even
an ontological fact of being individuals. If there is a shared space, or shared
life, it begins with the matter of occupying it and claiming one’s presence in
it. Blaming and moaning are the expressions of noticing someone trespassing
—the defense and call to order of the owned ontological niche. The trespassers
are also private persons with expectations that can be deceived by none but per-
sonally attributed entities. We perceive that their actions damage our rights.
In Berlin, whenever neighbors are too loud for our taste when brushing their
teeth, the oft-anthropomorphized U-Bahn or S-Bahn commits the sin of being late
(the außergewönlich Verspätung), our charcoal heating breaks on the coldest of
the evenings, or the local ice-hockey team (another type of ‘joint stock-compa-
ny’) loses an easy match against the eternal rival, we feel like moaning. Always
in the mood for blaming, we are triggered by these events. We gladly go along
with the game; it is so simple. The mere detection of a possible rights infringe-
ment is enough to satisfy the cognitive need to jammern. This ‘epistemic judg-
ment’—of ‘what should not be done’ and thus, in earnest, ‘what must not be
done’—is allowed to anyone. This creates an aggravated state of righteousness,
in which we defend what we think is and should be gewönlich (‘customary’).
Any explanation or verbal expression comes later—detection and reaction
comes first, and is sometimes overeager.
However, things being as they are, “by what metric are we to determine the
‘size’ of a right [or of its far-reaching violation,] or of the ‘territory’ that is con-
strained by the counterpart obligations the right imposes?” (O’Neill 1995,
p. 196) A right is defined according to the duties it imposes on others, indirectly,
on the basis of constraints and obligations. Both sides of the equation are blur-
red. Furthermore, we must also ask: who is the one that freely and voluntarily
picks up the imposed commitment, and why? The journey towards the exalted
amounts to the ideals of pretended warrants, and of due ‘entitlements’. A
‘right’ is here a positive interpretation of liberty that entails some kind of posses-
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sion: property. Its breach constitutes theft. But on what basis is this property rec-
ognized? Such a vision “construes rights as entitlements [and entitlements as a
contracted debt] to whatever goods or services [that is, promised and then ex-
pected actions], as well as forbearances [when][…] needed.” (O’Neill 1995,
p. 196) Property is in our right, and constitutes it, in the form of either goods,
services, or our merry fellows’ indulgence—matters in which we entertain expect-
ations. We must then ask: was there any promise made to begin with? Perhaps.
There must be; or at least when we struggle to find it, we should try to explain
where the error lies in that assumption. For a promise—a social contract—is what
seems implied in the demand.
The scope of the domain is uncertain, though; its description unclear. From
where should we draw the perimeter, the circumference: from the inside out,
positively; or from the outside in, based on constraints and counterpart obliga-
tions? What is the ‘size’ to such a right-thing (asks O’Neill), and how do we meas-
ure it in view of building frontiers, apart from out of complaints?
Unfortunately, without an idea of the metric or an awareness of its build, we
have problems with its accommodation of the rights of an imagined ‘fellow’. In
the ideal, one individual’s rights are an unsatisfactory abstraction, because
“there is no unique way of accommodating different rights” within this under-
standing of the issue (O’Neill 1995, p. 196).We can overwrite any possible conflict
by redefining the traits involved in the description to accommodate the tensions,
just as we can look for conflict by means of the same strategy:
There are indefinitely many ways of describing possible actions [and deducing counterpart
obligations], and hence indefinitely many ways of picking out sets of copossible, equal[ly
valid] rights. (O’Neill 1995, p. 196)
These rights may collide (or not), as in the case of our ‘moaner’. “Without a met-
ric for rights we could count a set of rights maximal [regarding liberties] only if it
dominated all other sets of rights” (O’Neill 1995, p. 196). As we are still talking
about ‘cognitive judgment’, the counting is nothing but a (rights) pretension—
a brute exercise of demanding recognition. It is no big surprise that the ‘moaner’
feels that his or her cause is just—the ideal immaculate one—and should be rec-
ognized as such. How could we dare to refuse? Who else can lay blame? Who has
the standing necessary for blaming? Only he or she who feels entitled to. Hence,
it approaches the ‘maximal’.
The negative expression of moaning, or of blaming, is the visible counterpart
of the metric we seek—a particular pole for the fence; the constraint. It is a pri-
vate normative drive, ascribed regardless of adoption. But for what alleged rea-
son can we ascribe an obligation to a fellow? ‘Men owe’; ‘society owes’—these
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are the basic assumptions of the ‘moaner’. “People is [sic] very angry… Believe
me, very angry”, pronounced Donald Trump in one particularly belligerent
speech before Election Day in November 2016. He set himself up as a unique
spokesman for ‘the people’. He adopted the most prevalent position of domina-
tion: symbolic representation of the extension of all possible subjects of rights.
His voice was the means by which ‘we the people’ moaned, and by which they
blamed. Trump provided the standing for their blaming, feeling entitled and es-
tablishing an ‘us-them’ divide, with the right-holders facing the right-bearers
with contempt. People were sovereignly entitled, and someone had to be held
accountable for pressing that logic further. Expectations had been let down
and amendments and retribution were demanded in response.
Onora O’Neill controversially describes this situation as generalized. Society
wanders on the higher planes of morality, on the exalted mounts—in the ideal. Of
the common yearning for retribution, O’Neill asks: “is it true that we have stop-
ped trusting? Has untrustworthy action made trust too risky? Is trust obsolete?”
(O’Neill 2002, p. vii) And what about its constraining counterpart? Are we prone
to cast doubt on the expected actions of others, so severely as to create a con-
stant expectation of failure? We are told constantly that we are living through
a so-called ‘revolution in accountability’, in which measures against mistrust
are set in motion. Control reaches all spheres of public life nowadays. The era
of evaluation and immediate feedback is in full flow.
Sadly, the fact is that we don’t “know whether we have a crisis of trust or
only a [promoted] culture of suspicion” (O’Neill 2002, p. 17). Suspicion leads
to blame, and blame leads to indignation and outrage—the usual reaction to a
damaged right. ‘Moaners’ do not run to their fellows to ‘throw their costliest
robes’ over their ignominy in the service of deeply-felt, ‘sparkling’ nobility. In-
stead, they enterprise an ascension of standards, a raising of the bar—indeed,
a pretended ‘moral ascension’. They do so by an escalation of both ‘moral obli-
gations’ and ‘moral duties’—that is, the deduced counterpart constraint. These
obligations are thus transformed. They suffer from supererogation both in qual-
ity and quantity, in intension and extension—but it is a special type of superer-
ogation. No one can bestow upon me any obligation beyond what is meant in my
positive duties, whatever they may be. Let us say that they have a certain con-
tent, and that they have a size. Supererogatory actions are (as their Latin
name points out) actions in which we ‘overpay’—supererogare. Goods, services,
and forbearances have a ‘price’, and we ‘pay’ over and above it, to whatever ex-
tent we deem proper. Supererogatory actions are and must always be voluntary
ones. Otherwise, they are compulsory by definition—they fall within our positive
duty or obligation, and are thus not supererogatory at all. As we might infer, this
subtle difference is what makes the extra mile a praiseworthy merit. When we
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walk the extra mile, we are praised for being ‘so noble and so sparkling’; for
being honorable. There is no counterpart here—no blaming if the supererogatory
action is not initiated—for it is necessarily considered as separate from due
rights.
Consider the notorious (to use an epithet already laden with bias) case of
Justine Sacco. It is December 2013. Sacco, a (now, alas, former) Public Relations
Consultant is about to board a flight to South Africa. Before boarding, she feels
like tweeting in the meager hundred and forty characters the app allows. Soon,
the ill-thought-out tweet passes from her 170 followers to almost fifteen thou-
sand: “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!” (Water-
low 2015, par. 2). During the eleven-hour flight, an emotional breeding ground
under the hashtag ‘#HasJustineLandedYet’ prepares a less than warm welcome
in Africa for the thirty-year-old publicist. The news spread rapidly, and by the
time Sacco’s flight landed, her job, reputation and privacy had been blown up
—worldwide. “I thought there was no way that anyone could possibly think it
was literal,” (Waterlow 2015, par. 12) Sacco later claimed. The reverence of liter-
ality—the suspicion and prohibition of any indirect use of language, of any trope
—amounts to a call for strictness.We are that serious: you will be held account-
able for the literality of your words. Joking or not, non-literal uses of language
have no moral quality. For many, chastising Sacco seemed a matter of ‘moral ob-
ligation’ (Ronson 2015). Her humiliation became a global task. Among the con-
sequences were not only the loss of her professional and personal credibility—
the foundations of any possible trust that could have been bestowed on her—
but also the forbidding of any attempt to characterize Sacco, at any stage of
the process, as a victim. Being deprived of the status of victim amounts to an
elimination of the rights that go with it, as well as of any right to appeal.
Indirect uses in speech, humor and even orthographic mistakes can become
statements bound to personal and impersonal ‘off the record’ legal claims. The
literal is equated with the positive—but it simultaneously invites suspicions, de-
mands and requirements. We are living an era ready and ripe for the newly-
coined term that some intellectuals already use as common currency: ‘post-cen-
sorship’ (Soto Ivars 2017). Global justice has a gloomy side when it comes to rep-
rimanding. What is supererogatory has its counterpart concept in a pretended
‘compulsory supererogation’—this being an obvious oxymoron. Escalating obli-
gations imposed on others lead to the hypertrophy of the size of positive rights
on the part of the right-holders. The scope of entitlement has reached global pro-
portions, of which there is no ‘outer’ part: no one is apart from it; there are no
limits. Nothing escapes the reach of that right, and so everything can be made
an obligation and everyone is obliged by its total nature. For some claims
(and some blames), there is then a correct way of behaving. There is a correct
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way in which one conducts his or her life and thus a strong recommendation im-
plicit in such practices. Actions deemed exemplary function as a form of ‘advice’
that, however blurry, had better be taken into account.
The boundaries between justice and animosity are also uncertain. Political
correctness is required and in social media instruments, ‘trigger warnings’ are
becoming more and more popular. They are letters of safe-passage; they are cau-
tionary posts at the beginning of articles, blog entries and other social network-
based forms of expressing personal opinions in public. These ‘warnings’ are in-
tended to prepare the reader, based on the assumption of particular paradigms
of moral correctness, and in this way end up criticizing them. They assume a dis-
proportionate ‘trigger effect’ of anger and self-righteous wrath that the expressed
opinion could cause. It is not hard to do the math and conclude the age of ‘post-
censorship’ goes hand in hand with the age of ‘auto-censorship’: the cognitive
judgment of the watchful global agora is assimilated and internalized. Of course,
no individual is off limits when pertaining to the universal community. The
‘world wide entanglement’—the so-called ‘revolution of accountability’—raises
doubts about whether we are not really in an ‘inquisitorial revolution’. Inquiry
and inquisition ask for responses. That is what we have here: the requirement
of an ‘all-encompassing responsibility’.
Morally speaking, when no one should be entitled to the supererogatory ac-
tion of other, and having no right to expect it, here this logic shatters. The last
frontier in responsibility is that in which one is unable to label him or herself
as a victim, or as a hurtable being, meaning a ‘being in an unassailable (sacred,
respected at all costs) position’—his or her last resort. One cannot adopt such a
label for her or himself, nor occupy such a position, nor be the recipient of that
right. And it is a fundamental right! ‘Man in the ideal’ can follow a slippery slope
to abstraction. Abstraction is sometimes tantamount to the vanishment of one’s
importance, and of one’s real position. In such an abstraction, no one merits
consideration as worthy of the terms ‘human being’ or ‘person’, meaning that
communities emerge as the real winners of the old ‘social ontology’ debate: com-
munities and not individuals are the main constituents, the real right-holders
and the real right-claimers. Men are those who are detestable, with ‘unbearably
mean and meagre faces’; joint-stock companies, on the other hand, are such
grand and glowing creatures as to be considered sacred entities. Juridically,
they are in fact the only right-retainers in these cases—they behave as real per-
sons, ‘real beings’.
But the real question here is: who has standing to label? In June 2015, Spain
witnessed the makings of one of these ideological crowds intent on defending
publicly via Twitter the honor of a victim—in spite of her own attitudes. In Octo-
ber 1991, twelve-year-old Irene Villa was severely wounded by a car bomb in Ma-
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drid planted as a terrorist attack by Basque nationalist terrorist group ETA. Now
a well-known journalist and writer in Spain and professionally active in numer-
ous media, Villa participated in a 2015 Twitter debate on the limits of humor,
which ended with her in the role of protagonist. Public personalities made
some jokes, intended as black humor, about Villa’s wounds, inciting outrage
among certain crowds of public opinion. Villa herself participated in an effort
to end the controversy for good: “My favorite joke is that which defines me as
an explosive woman” (La Vanguardia 2015, par. 2). Personally, she had not felt
dishonored or offended at all. Furthermore, she did not want others to represent
her as if in her absence. Nevertheless, some Twitter users thought otherwise.
They seized the opportunity to chastise the jokers and contested the validity
of their humor. Consider O’Neill’s assertion that:
[w]ithin an account of justice it may seem unimportant whether we adopt the perspective of
agents and their obligations, or of recipients and their entitlements. The set of obligations
and the set of entitlements will presumably be reciprocally defined. […][But] the perspective
of recipience and entitlement has other difficulties that obstruct the project of construction.
(O’Neill 1995, pp. 214–215)
She further states that even when, ideally, justice would guarantee reciprocity:
[i]n the tradition of the social contract theory but not in its contemporary descendants,
principles of justice define obligations rather than entitlements. A return to this perspective
is, I believe, required for a nonidealizing constructivism because obligations of justice, un-
like entitlements, can be constructed without assuming a metric either for liberty or more
generally for actions. (O’Neill 1995, pp. 214–215)
‘Obligations’, rights and trust
Are we building up and living in a global society populated only by fellows who
are not really fellows, but rather mere ‘recipients and their entitlements’? Is there
any ‘agent’, with his or her obligations, attentive enough to replenish the content
of such demanding rights? If not, it is dubious at best what the content if any
could be for the thing designated by the word ‘right’. Right-holders reciprocally
entail right-bearers—Hohfeld’s salva veritate.³ The perspective constructed from
 In the domain of classical rights theory, the work of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld is paradigmat-
ic. For Hohfeld, rights are in fact entitlements to perform certain actions and to be positioned in
certain legal states; and also for the contrary—to not perform certain actions and to avoid certain
states. His theory highlights the reciprocity between rights and duties, and proposes a logic of
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the easy-to-handle position of the right-holder leads to problems arising from the
would-be forbidden operation of idealizing, inviting gluttonous receivers with no
apparent duties to others. This fundamental idealization happens in the deter-
mining of ‘size’. Construction from this perspective grants access to an unprece-
dented unleashing of rights, and permits a ‘maximal set of copossible entitle-
ments’—one which, sadly, would reveal itself to be sometimes contradictory,
since no metric has been established to limit the reach of those rights. “Abstrac-
tion, taken strictly, is unavoidable and in itself innocuous” (O’Neill 1995,
pp. 214–215). It is a formal operation of selection for the purpose of highlighting
certain traits, and is dependent on the simple selection of characteristics. On the
other hand:
Idealization is another matter. Objections to supposedly ‘abstract’ ethical principles and
reasoning are often objections to idealization. The objection is not to reasoning that is de-
tached from certain predicates that are true of the objects discussed, but to reasoning that
assumes predicates that are false of them. Reasoning that abstracts from some predicate
makes claims that do not depend on the predicate’s either being satisfied or not being sat-
isfied by the objects to which the reasoning applies. Reasoning that idealizes makes claims
that apply only to objects that live up to a certain ideal. (O’Neill 1995, p. 209)
The ‘metric’ being sought is disappointingly ‘ideal’ in this case. The predicates in
question –’supererogatory predicates’, ‘higher duties’ and ‘shortly-expected
predicates’– are ideal: they do not yet exist; are imagined, pretended and (in
most cases) desired. This is the positive moment that reciprocally urges for the
consideration of its counterpart obligation—the ‘entitlement’. But beyond this
point, this construction is founded on a house of cards, applied and attributed
—‘attribute’ here meaning that essential predicate ascribed in ontology, which
functions as constitutive of the being—by force, independent of satisfaction.
Evidently, attributed responsibility is a precondition for blaming (Holgado
González 2015, p. 79). The ‘moaner’, the ‘blamer’ and the ‘hater’ in social net-
works all feel an entitled urge for satisfaction after the target of his or her
anger fails to honor their commitment. For Scanlon, as ‘rational beings’ we
are in a necessary ‘relationship’ with each other. It is a class of shared respon-
sibility in a shared ideal community, in light of all that we have the capability
or possibility of reasoning. This relation among recognized peers is described
in terms of care. There is a preference, concern and care for those identified as
legal relations ordered into eight categories: jural opposites – ‘right-no-right’, ‘privilege-duty’,
‘power-disability’ and ‘immunity-liability’; and jural correlatives – ‘right-duty’, ‘privilege-no-
right’, ‘power-liability’ and ‘immunity-disability’ (Saunders 1989– 1990, pp. 465–506).
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fellow members.We care in some sense for each other. Thus, recognition is com-
prehension, allowing in oneself attitudes, emotions, feelings and reactions—and
assumptions. In fact, it gives rise not only to assumptions, but to anticipation as
well. “A relationship, in the sense I am concerned with, is a matter not only of
what one does, or intends to do, but also of the reasons for which one does these
things” (Scanlon 2008, p. 173). I would change the order of elements. A relation-
ship implies a set of facts about the parties in it, which involve a shared experi-
ence: desire and its instance in intentions; expectations; and finally their justi-
fication in the form of reasons (Scanlon 2013, p. 86). The expression of this
relationship is just the propositional form; its explanation is constituted by
the very attitudes and dispositions involved. These are indeed the forms of
‘care’ in which Scanlon is interested. Relationships of this nature have a norma-
tive character, which is reciprocal. From shared facts in the past to expectations
of the future, there is an assumed standard of continuity., which is ‘prospective’.
Cognitive judgment is rooted in the moment at which the relationship has
changed—something expected does not happen, reciprocity fails and recognition
is broken. From what is gewönlich, we have moved to what is außergewönlich. ‘To
blame’ is nothing but the blunt restating of the old standards in the face of new
events, once the former balance of what is expected has been disrupted. Blaming
is a reaction calling for the modification of the intention (reciprocal balance) and
disposition (future forbearances) of the affronted. Scanlon borrows an expres-
sion from Peter F. Strawson: blaming—as is moaning—‘is the partial withdrawal
of good will’ (Scanlon 2008, p. 227).
And what about ‘impersonal blaming’? What type of conceptual articulation
are we constructing when it comes to fellows who do not have a direct or person-
al acquaintance with us? Let’s keep it simple: what standard is in play when we
blame, moan, or jammern every time neighbors are too loud, the U-Bahn is de-
layed, our heating breaks in winter, or the local ice-hockey team loses?
It may seem to make no sense to speak of our having attitudes toward people we have no
knowledge of, or about what their attitudes may be toward us, of whom they are similarly
unaware. But when we do become aware of others and are in actual or potential interaction
with them, we generally assume that even if they are strangers they will manifest at least
the basic elements of this ideal concern.We assume that this default relationship of mutual
regard and forbearance holds between us and the strangers we pass on the road or interact
with in the market. When someone does not manifest this concern, it is this relationship
that is the standard relative to which our actual relation with them is seen as impaired.
(Scanlon 2008, pp. 140–141)
Scanlon calls it a ‘moral relationship’. For him, this type of relation is ‘inescap-
able’. It is a fundamental condition: just as there is no explicit act by which we
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enter the relation, and thus no expression of willingness to do so, nor can there
be any way for us to abandon the community. For Scanlon, we are inside the
shared community by default, as we are humans, and as rational beings. It is
an unconditional compromise (Scanlon 2013, p. 87).
Let’s say for the sake of the argument that ‘rationality’ is a rather restrained
condition. If the arguments I have expressed here hold true, then perhaps a bet-
ter condition for ‘reasonable responsibility’ is expectation rather than rationality.
We are bound to those of our fellows who can expect something from us, and we
bind ourselves to those of whom we have expectations—to those whose actions
have implications for us in both respects.
Charles Fried will help me to conclude my argumentation, and to respond to
the moaner, jammerer and hater: “The promise principle […] is the moral basis of
contract law [the very core of social contract theory], is that principle by which
persons may impose on themselves obligations where none existed before” (Fried
2015, p. 1, emphasis added). There is an essential difference between the institu-
tion of ‘promise’ and the institution of ‘contract’. Fried’s ‘promissory logic’ states
that: (i) ‘to promise’ is a self-imposing practice, such that no one can promise in
my place, nor in my name; (ii) therefore, promise has some moral grounds, for in
spite its normative foundations, the difference between it and sheer obligation is
that its value is lost whenever I am forced to promise; and (iii) related to the lat-
ter, promise is the conventional instrument for utilizing trust. Promise in the form
of a linguistic artifact is an invitation to confidence, and confidence always takes
into account and envisions (i.e. assumes) future behavior (Fried 2015, pp. 7–8).
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Roberto R. Aramayo
Radical and Moderate Enlightenment?
The Case of Diderot and Kant
Abstract: I propose the hypothesis that, just as Hume woke him from his dogmat-
ic slumber, and Rousseau revealed the universe of morality to him, Diderot left
his mark on the political philosophy of Kant (as George Cavallar and Sankar
Muthu note) upon detecting the coincidences between the two authors regarding
their cosmopolitanism and anti-i.mperialism. Here, I begin with the distinction
between a radical Enlightenment and a moderate Enlightenment, in order to
show that in Kant both tendencies could have coexisted; which would explain
the different readings of his thought, as is borne witness to by Heine’s famous
parable or Kant’s continual dialogue with Spinoza. Despite having very different
styles, the Kant of the 1790s could have been strongly influenced by the anony-
mous Diderot of the Encyclopédie or the History of the Two Indies. It seems quite
clear that the critique of colonialism of Diderot-Raynal could have had a notable
influence on the Kant of that decade—he of Theory and Praxis, Perpetual Peace,
The Conflict of the Faculties and the Doctrine of Right (that is, the second part of
the Metaphysics of Morals).
Die Wesen, deren Dasein zwar nicht auf unserm Willen, sondern der Natur beruht, haben
dennoch, wenn si vernunftlose Wesen sind, nur einen relative Werth, als Mittel, und heis-
sen daher Sachen, dagegen vernünftige Wesen Personen genannt werden,weil ihre Natur ist
schon als Zwecke an sich selbst, d.i. als etwas, dass nicht bloss als Mittel gebracht werden
darf, auszeichnet, mithin so fern als Willkür einschränkt (und ein Gegenstand der Achtung
ist). (Imanuel Kant, Grundlegung, AA 04: 428).
Ces précepts singuliers, je les trouve opposes à la nature, contraires à la raison. Contraires à
la nature, parce qu’ils supposent qu’un être sentant, pensant et libre peut être la propiété
de’un être semblable à lui. Sur quoi ce droit serait fondé? Ne vois-tu pas qu’on a confundu
dans ton pays la chose qui n’a ni sensibilité, ni pensée, ni désir, ni volonté, qu’on quitte et
on prend, qu’on garde, qu’on n’éschange pas sans qu’elle souffre et sans qu’elle se plaigne,
avec la chose qui n’échange point, qui ne s’acquiert point, qui a liberté, volonté, désir, qui
se plaint et qui souffre, et qui ne saurait devenir un effect de commerce sans qu’on oublie
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son caractère et qu’on fasse violence à la nature? (Denis Diderot, Supplément au voyage de
Bougainville, OC 03: 555).
Two Enlightenments?
Authors such as Philipp Blom and Jonathan Israel note that one should distin-
guish two Enlightenment traditions, one moderate and another much more rad-
ical. This thesis has been presented in two relatively recent books, both from
2010. I am referring to AWicked Company: The Forgotten Radicalism of the Euro-
pean Enlightenment and A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the
Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy (by Blom and Israel respectively).
According to Blom, Kant and Voltaire are the representatives of a moderate
Enlightenment (reformist and deist), while the Encyclopedists, led by Diderot
and D’Holbach, were committed to a materialist and revolutionary worldview
that encouraged an enjoyment of living and promoted the right to live with dig-
nity and in freedom, on the basis of a deeply immanentist philosophy. This sec-
ond current was inspired by the Western tradition of freethinking, which extends
from Epicurus and Lucretius up through Spinoza and Bayle, uses scepticism as a
philosophical method and takes the analysis of the passions as the best guide for
the understanding of human affairs.
Jonathan Israel further emphasizes that Bayle and Spinoza inspired the most
radical ideas of the Encyclopedists, highlighting the fact that Robespierre and
the Jacobins viewed the philosophes as being courtesans of absolutism, and in-
stead glorified Rousseau and Voltaire, buried in the Pantheon as champions of
the French Revolution. However, Israel notes that in reality, the change in men-
tality had been achieved by the Diderot of the Encyclopédie, together with other
works that had a huge media impact on that era. This was especially the case for
the Philosophical and Political History of European Settlements and Commerce in
the Two Indies—a true engine of war against the structures of the Ancien Régime,
particularly in the last section of the work, where its texts are both quantitatively
and qualitatively significant.
According to the readings that Blom and Israel propose, these two contrary
Enlightenment traditions had very little to do with one another, with the more
radical current having impeded the success of the more moderate path. Never-
theless, although I sympathize greatly with their historiographical strategy,
and even more with the effort to highlight the radical nature of the Enlighten-
ment project in its totality, it seems to me that this emphasis should not over-
shadow the role played by presumably more moderate thinkers.We must redeem
Diderot, who is without doubt the thinker that is the most contemporary to us
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among the philosophers of his age (Diderot 2009, p. 13–48)—but this should not
mean forgetting about the decisive influence exercised on our chaotic times by
such important authors as Rousseau and Kant.
As a result, it will be of interest to compare the possible confluences of these
two contrary Enlightenment traditions and ask ourselves, for example, whether
two of their most outstanding representatives, i.e. Kant and Diderot, are in fact
completely antagonistic thinkers, as would be suggested by the strict distinction
between the moderate and the radical currents of the Enlightenment; or is there,
as I venture to suggest in this inquiry into the possible traces left by Diderot’s
thought in Kantian philosophy, some family resemblance that reveals a common
ancestry?
Indeed, the intellectual circle close to Kant included Raynal, especially
thanks to the presence of the abbé at the court of Frederick II (Barcarel 2011,
p. 91). Kant himself cited the German translation of the History of the Two Indies
in one of the editions of his Physical Geography (Kant 1816, p. 223: AA 26.1: 280),
commenting on the Dutch East Indies Company, which he criticized so much in
Perpetual Peace. Reconstructing Kant’s access to the work of Diderot-Raynal is a
tremendously arduous task—one already begun in Jean Ferrari’s work Les sour-
ces françaises de la philosophie de Kant (Ferrari 1979). Simone Goyard-Fabre calls
it a mysterious path, and suggests that the researcher will need the investigative
skills of a detective due to the very few precedents we have (Goyard-Fabre 1996,
p. 127; Quintili 2009, p. 75–89).
Spinoza inside both Enlightenment traditions
Just as many authors of the radical Enlightenment did, Kant maintained a con-
tinual dialog with Spinoza (De Flaviis 1986), beginning with his pre-critical writ-
ings and continuing through the Opus postumum, and featuring in his Lectures
and in the Reflections he noted down for himself. Spinoza, the alma mater of the
radical Enlightenment, remained for Kant the example of the virtuous atheist,
the possibility of whose existence Pierre Bayle had upheld, as we read in the
87th paragraph of the third Critique—a paragraph added to its second edition
(KU, AA 05, p. 427). On many occasions, Kant described Spinoza as someone
of a good heart who behaved as a religious man would do; an atheist who
acted morally despite not believing that any superior being would reward his
good behaviour with the gift of the supreme good.
On the other hand, that substrate of nature that goes beyond the sensible,
and which would be common to mechanism and teleologism, that Something
(Etwas,with the capital letter; KU, AA 05, p. 466) that Kant referred to in the Cri-
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tique of Judgment, would relax Kant’s famous dualism and bring him closer to
the monism of Spinoza (KU, AA 05, pp. 392–393). Indeed, he would recreate
the latter’s famous Deus sive Natura when, in the Opus posthumum, he identifies
God with self-legislating ethical-practical reason (OP, AA 21, p. 145), since the
moral law resides within us and merits worship comparable to that historically
rendered to divinity.
One of the sources through which Kant had access to Spinoza may have been
the article on Spinozism in the Encyclopédie, where Diderot ascribes his own ma-
terialism to modern Spinozism (which should not be confused with the older va-
riety, since for the modern thinker there is nothing but matter). Beginning in his
first work, The Skeptic’s Walk, Diderot uses Spinozism to mediate between deists
and atheists (Diderot 2016, p. 115). The deist reproaches the atheist for leaving
everything in the hands of chance; the atheist responds that one cannot describe
the author of an infinite composite whose beginnings, current and final state are
unknown; and the Spinozist seeks the origin of the universe within himself, via a
careful study of the place that we occupy in it, just as Kant would do with moral
law. One might also ask whether Spinoza’s Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical
Order isn’t one of the reasons that Kant wrote part of the Analytics of his Critique
of Practical Reason in a mathematical style, employing definitions, theorems,
scholia, problems, demonstrations and postulates (Aramayo 2013a, p. 22), even
when they led to a thesis completely opposed to that of Spinoza’s essay.
Spinoza does not seem to serve well as a criterion for distinguishing the rad-
ical Enlightenment thinkers from the moderates, given that both Diderot and
Kant share an admiration for and interest in him, as has been the case for a
good portion of modern thinkers. In some way, the case of Spinoza bears wit-
ness—as I stated earlier in regard to Raynal—to the fact that the walls between
the representatives of both tendencies of the Enlightenment project are quite po-
rous. It would thus be wrong to treat the thought of the thinkers on each side as
residing in sealed or even contradictory compartments.
Heine’s testimony
Of course, it would be difficult to make Kant fit entirely within the limits of the
moderate Enlightenment if one accepts how Heine describes him in On the His-
tory of Religion and Philosophy in Germany. The passage in question is well-
known, thanks to its extraordinary rhetorical appeal. Heine tells the French
that they are much more prudish than the Germans. After taking the Bastille,
the only thing the French managed to do was kill a king, who had in fact already
lost his head long before he had been decapitated. In reality, Heine continues,
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one does too much honour to Robespierre when one compares him to Kant. Ro-
bespierre could lose his temper in bloody fashion, but when it came to the Su-
preme Being, he washed his bloody hands and put on his Sunday clothes. In
contrast, the ruthless Kant was able to storm the heavens, annihilating their en-
tire garrison and even the soldiers of their ontological, cosmological and psycho-
theological corps. God himself, now lacking even a demonstration of his own ex-
istence, has succumbed, and there is no longer any divine mercy, nor a Father’s
goodness, nor even any future recompense for present-day privations. The im-
mortality of the soul is on its death bed. One hears nothing but moans and
death rattles. In the face of this spectacle, the faithful servant Lampe becomes
frightened and breaks out in tears. So Kant has pity on him and shows that
he is not merely a great philosopher, but also a good man, using the magic
wand of the practical reason to resuscitate the God that had been condemned
by theoretical reason. It is very possible, adds Heine, that Kant undertook that
resurrection not only because of compassion for Lampe, but also because he
feared the police.
To finish off his clever and instructive piece of satire, Heine noted another
subtle parallelism. Just as some had claimed that Robespierre was an agent of
the British prime minister, there were also those who, in a totally confused man-
ner, thought that Kant had made a secret pact with his adversaries, and that he
had destroyed all the philosophical proofs of the existence of God in order to let
the world know that one could never arrive at knowledge of God via one’s rea-
son, so as to imply that we should instead rely on revealed truth. This is the point
of Heine’s story that I wished to recall.
Family resemblance between Diderot and Kant
My hypothesis is that, while it might be very difficult to prove, it would not be
strange if the influence of Diderot on Kant were similar to that of Rousseau (Ara-
mayo 2015a, p. 53; 2005, p. 237–252; 2006, p. 17–54; 2016, p. 11–60; cf. 2017,
p. 123– 135), which Kant himself recognizes, and which is easy to trace in his
texts, as I myself have emphasized on various occasions. Indeed, I have become
ever more convinced that if the scepticism of Hume was able to wake Kant from
his dogmatic slumber (Prol, AA 04, p. 260) and Rousseau opened the moral uni-
verse to him (HN AA 20, p. 44; cf. Aramayo, 2013b, p. 16–36), Diderot might have
been the one who opened his eyes to the world of politics, through certain arti-
cles in the Encyclopédie and his anonymous contributions to the History of the
Two Indies. In this view, Diderot may have had a great influence on Kant’s polit-
ical and even legal reflections—despite the fatc that Kant did not cite him, be-
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cause he did not know of his role in the authorship of these two collective works
(which we nevertheless know that Kant read).
Recently more attention has been paid to the paradoxical intensity of this
indirect relationship. Georg Cavallar, in a recent book about Kantian cosmopoli-
tanism, relates that he was very surprised to discover that, in regards to hospital-
ity and cosmopolitanism, Diderot was so close to Kant, despite the fact that “his
publications did not form part of [Kant’s] library, and it is not clear that he in-
fluenced him” (Cavallar 2015, p. 60).
It was certainly not unusual that Kant lacked a copy of the Encyclopédie in
his personal library, given how much it cost, but it would have been highly un-
likely that he did not have access to it via the library of his university. The pres-
ence of the preliminary discourse attributed to D’Alembert, noted at the begin-
ning, offers proof of the attention dedicated to this immense collective work. It
is worth bearing in mind that as early as 1759, Kant had recommended to his stu-
dents and correspondents (such as Herder and Hamann) that they read Diderot
and the articles he wrote for the Encyclopédie—although he certainly lacked any
knowledge of his authorship—and even proposed that Hamann translate some of
them (cf. the letter of Georg Hamann to Kant of July 27, 1759, Br, AA 10, p. 9). This
exchange of letters indirectly tells us that Kant knew the first volumes of the En-
cyclopédie and might have had access to such articles written by Diderot as “Po-
litical Authority”, “Citizen”, “Eclecticism”, “Encyclopédie” and “Philosopher”—
and it is equally likely that he paid attention to the later volumes that appeared
up through 1765.
Let us take a look at these lines of the article “Eclecticism”:
The eclectic is a philosopher who, treading on prejudice, tradition, authority, in a word, ev-
erything that subjugates the masses, dares to think for himself, to trace things back to the
clearest general principles, examine them, discuss them, to admit nothing except what the
testimony of his experience and his reason tells him; and on the basis of all the philosophies
that he has analysed without partiality creates a philosophy that is his own. He is not at all
a man who plants or sows, but rather one who gathers and winnows [italics RRA].
This text is later echoed by Kant, beginning with that ‘winnowing’ that must sub-
ject everything to the sieve and strainer of reason itself (albeit without forgetting
experience) and putting aside the prejudices that arguments from authority in-
variably involve, since everything must be subjected to critique and to the tribu-
nal of reason.
Diderot and Kant explicitly share one of the principal goals of the Enlighten-
ment program. This daring to rely on one’s own understanding, which Kant iden-
tifies as the banner of the Enlightenment, corresponds closely to the ‘dar[ing] to
think for yourself ’ that Diderot had formulated some years previously in his En-
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cyclopédie article. Both Kant and Diderot want to free the human being from all
moral or political tutelage and to advocate an Enlightenment that allows us to
leave behind our ‘guilty minority of age’, to use the Kantian expression. Diderot
envisages the Encyclopédie as having this same objective: its mission is to
change the common way of thinking, promoting thinking for one’s self thanks
to those cross references that permit each reader to extract his own conclusions,
by combining different perspectives on a single problem (Aramayo 2012, p. 357–
385; 2015b, p. 319–338). InWhat is the Enlightenment?—a text from 1784, the year
in which Diderot died—Kant advocates an ‘authentic reform in our way of think-
ing’ that would annihilate prejudices. The dynamic of the public use of reason,
together with the Kantian consciousness of the pragmatic reality of our human
condition, could well reflect an attempt to compose something analogous to
what Diderot designed with the great project of the Encyclopédie.
In Pro and Contra, Diderot holds that “posterity is for the philosopher what
the other world is for the religious man”—something that, as I have maintained
elsewhere, Kant would subscribe to with his philosophy of history, where the
postulate of the immortality of the soul is translated to that asymptotic meeting
of the species with its destiny that marks the handover to the new generation
(Aramayo 1992, p. 114– 115). Similarly, the end of the Idea for a Universal History
with a Cosmopolitan Purpose proposes a ‘philosophical history’ with a clearly po-
litical purpose, i.e. the channelling of the ambition of the heads of State and
their servants towards the only means that can enable them to ‘conquer a glori-
ous memory in posterity’ (WA, AA 08. p. 31). Here Kant is speaking very like Di-
derot, who speaks of monuments carved in the memories of men, consecrated to
the champions of freedom and technical inventions, who he personifies at one
point in the figures of Las Casas and Benjamin Franklin respectively (Skrzypeck
1995, p. 79–88).
Another set of traits that might reveal a family resemblance between Diderot
and Kant are the esoteric and exoteric aspects of our two authors. After the trau-
matic experience of being imprisoned at Vincennes, Diderot decided to fool the
censors with the cross references of the Encyclopédie and his anonymous pages
in the History of the Two Indies, abandoning his novels and other writings in a
drawer, hoping that they might be enjoyed by posterity. Kant also used a differ-
ent style in his classes (in which, apart from his most lay-oriented courses, he
was obligated to follow a textbook) than he did in his published writings and
in the Reflections that he wrote strictly for himself. It is as though he had wanted
his Nachlass to find another kind of readership with the passage of time—some-
thing very much in agreement with his distinction between a public use of rea-
son (intended for an educated universe of readers) and a private use in the ex-
ercise of a trusted function (WA, AA 08, p. 37).
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Cosmopolitanism, anticolonialism¹
and the Rights of Man
Whatever the case may be, there is at least one author who has clearly highlight-
ed the Kantian debt to a Diderot immersed in political intervention. Sankar
Muthu, in his book Enlightenment against Empire, argues that Diderot’s radical
political and historical writings appear to have had an influence on Kant, and
goes so far as to hold that “in many regards Kant represents the spirit, and on
occasion the letter, of Diderot’s anti-imperialism” (Muthu 2003, p. 123)—so
much so that certain aspects of his political philosophy can be said to be cut
from the same cloth. Georg Cavallar, despite not providing any conclusive proofs,
also emphasizes the analytic coincidences between the idea of cosmopolitanism
in Kant and in Diderot (Cavallar 2015, p. 60–63). For the latter also distinguishes,
in his contribution to the History of the Two Indies, between a right of necessity, a
right of visitation, a right to be a guest and a right to establish oneself in a ter-
ritory, making the right of visitation a perfect right in the case that the traveller’s
life is in danger. In contrast, the right to be the guest of a foreigner would be im-
perfect and contingent, and would only be activated if there was an agreement
between the two parties. This is a classification very close to what Kant provides
in Perpetual Peace, where he distances himself substantially from the principles
of traditional international law, which tended much more strongly to legitimate
the right of European peoples to settle in the New World.
Another point at which Diderot and Kant fully coincide is their clear antico-
lonialism (Benot 1970), which in the case of the latter really began to flower be-
ginning in the second half of the 1790s. Furthermore, what Pauline Kleingeld has
called Kant’s second thoughts on colonialism—and, a little earlier, Kant’s second
thoughts on race (Kleingeld 2007, p. 573–592; 2014, p. 43–67)—which she sees as
a somewhat capricious change in approach on his part, could have been due to
his reading of the Diderot-Raynal work.
Of course, the symmetry of their approaches must be viewed through the
prism of two different styles that respond to equally diverse personalities and cir-
cumstances. This occurs when Kant, in his Doctrine of Right, rejects as reprehen-
sible the colonization of new lands that had been previously occupied by force or
by fraudulent purchase, making use of European superiority, and without taking
into account their prior possession, in order to give the savage peoples a legal
 For a more extensive treatment of what I have noted here, I refer the reader to my forthcoming
work coauthored with Nuria Sánchez Madrid.
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status, something that would validate the use of any dishonourable means what-
soever, and which he judges to be a cloak for injustice, or ‘Jesuitism’ (MS, A 06,
p. 266). For his part, the Diderot of the Supplement refers to Jesuitism with a very
different style, offering this description of the Jesuits in Paraguay:
Those cruel Spartans in black habits behaved with their Indian slaves like the Lacedaemo-
nians with their helots: they condemned them to continual work, they gave them no right to
property, they kept them brutish and tied down with superstition, they demanded deep
veneration from them, walked among them with a whip in hand and lashed every age
and sex without distinction. (Supplement, OC II:, p. 542)
The critique that Kant directed at colonialist practices at the end of his life par-
allels in good measure the demand that should be made of the traders, mission-
aries and emissaries of European powers, i.e. that they behave in a respectful
way towards the law that should rule over their contacts with the so-called ‘sav-
ages’. In Diderot’s view, European nations should judge their behaviour by plac-
ing themselves in the place of the other. Just as Kant does, he criticizes the fact
that when European voyagers come to a region of the New World that is not oc-
cupied by any people of the Old World, they immediately decide that that land
belongs to them.
What would they think if some savages, upon landing upon their coasts, did
something similar? How can they claim any right at all over men who are similar
to them, or over the products of their lands?
For isn’t the nature of property the same in every land, based on taking possession through
work, and on a long and pacific enjoyment? Europeans, can you tell me at what distance
from your residence this sacred title becomes invalidated? At twenty paces? At ten leagues?
You say not.Well then, neither does it lose effect at ten thousand leagues. (Of the Colonies in
General, OC III, p. 697)
Subscribing avant-la-lettre to one of the pillars of Kantian cosmopolitan law, Di-
derot speaks to us of the ‘hospitality’ that voyagers have had the occasion to
enjoy, for instance in Brazil. He also coincides with Kant in holding that the spi-
rit of commerce is a guarantee of peace, since a war between nations of traders is
like a devastating fire, when bankruptcies become a question of State. Although
Kant is not as explicit in his theses concerning non-European cultures, it is per-
haps precisely for that reason that his reflections have a deeper theoretical basis
and have been as much or more fecund than those put forth by Diderot.Without
doubt, the Kantian approach pays more attention to the legal difficulties that the
European powers encountered in justifying their occupation and annexation of
territories on other continents, which leads him to emphasize the rights acquired
over their territories by peoples without States. As K. Flikschuh has emphasized,
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what is most characteristic of Kant’s legal cosmopolitanism is his attention to the
form, i.e. to the mere formality of the contact that should take place between dif-
ferent peoples, independently of their degree of civil maturity.
A final coincidence that I would like to emphasize, in this inquiry into a pos-
sible family resemblance between the political philosophies of Diderot and Kant,
is the enthusiasm they had for the American and French revolutions. In a famous
note to paragraph 65 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant refers to the French Rev-
olution as an example of the transformation of a political body into a true organ-
ism (although we do not have any evidence of any similar reactions to the Amer-
ican Revolution). Diderot, who could not opine on the French Revolution, since
he had died five years prior, did comment on the American one, which in his
judgment could provide:
… all the inhabitants of Europe with a refuge against fanaticism and tyranny, and instruct
those who govern men on the legitimate use of authority, aiding in the prevention of an
extremely unequal distribution of wealth and the corruption of morals. (Essay on the Reigns
of Claudius and Nero, OC I, p. 1197)
For his part, as is well known, the Kant of the Conflict of the Faculties makes the
French Revolution into a landmark of the moral progress of humanity; and he
goes on in even more depth in Reflection 8077, but I will refrain from going
into greater detail regarding these well-known texts.
Conclusion
In my view, the Kant of the 1790s, i.e. the author of Theory and Practice, Perpet-
ual Peace, The Metaphysics of Morals and The Conflict of the Faculties, becomes
more intelligible if we postulate that he knew (though in what was surely an un-
conscious manner) the battle writings of Diderot—those two intellectual engines
of war that are the Encyclopédie and the History of the Two Indies.
I would like to say that Kant read Diderot, without knowing he did so, and
that the latter revealed to him the global condition of politics, just as Rousseau
had done for him regarding the moral universe. Thus, I believe that it is plausible
to claim that Diderot had an impact on the political thought of Kant. “Force me
to be silent about religion and government, and I will have nothing else to say”,
says Diderot in The Skeptic’s Walk, and it is precisely to these two topics—the
throne and the altar—that Kant dedicates his writings of the 1790s, probably
under the unknown influence of Diderot.
324 Roberto R. Aramayo
Bibliography
All references (unless otherwise indicated) to Denis Diderot’s Works are in accordance with Di-
derot, Denis (1994–1995): Oeuvres. Laurent Versini (Ed.), Paris: Garnier Robert Laffont, 1994–
1995. References indicate OC and volume followed by page number
All references (unless otherwise indicated to Immanuel Kant′s works are in accordance with
the Akademie Ausgabe (AA), Vol. 1–29 of Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin/Leipzig, 1902-.
References indicate volume followed by page number. Unless otherwise indicated, the English
translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Ca) (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1992–). The follwing abreviations are used along the paper.
Br Briefe, AA 10–13.
HN Handschriftlicher Nachlass, AA 14–23.
KU Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790), AA 5: 167–485.
MS Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797), AA 6: 205–492.
OP Opus postumun, AA 21–22.
Prol Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysique (1783), AA 4.
WA Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? (1784), AA 8: 35–42.
Aramayo, Roberto R. (1992): Crítica de la razón ucrónica. Madrid: Tecnos.
Aramayo, Roberto R. (2005): “Las claves rousseaunianas del concepto kantiano de
Ilustración”. In: Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, vol. XXXI, No. 1, pp. 237–252.
Aramayo, Roberto R. (2006): “Carta preliminar en torno a la correspondencia de Rousseau y
su apuesta ‘kantiana’ por una primacía moral”. In: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Cartas morales y
otra correspondencia filosófica. Madrid, México: Plaza y Valdés, pp. 17–54.
Aramayo, Roberto R. (2012): “Diderot y su revolución del pensar por sí mismo”. In: Birulés,
Fina / Gómez Ramos, Antonio / Roldán, Concha (Ed.), Vivir para pensar. Homenaje a Manuel
Cruz. Barcelona: Herder, pp. 357–385.
Aramayo, Roberto R. (2013a): “La biblia de la filosofía moral moderna y contemporánea”. In:
Immanuel Kant, Crítica de la razón práctica. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, pp. 7–63.
Aramayo, Roberto R.(2013b): “La política y su devenir histórico en el pensamiento de Kant”.
In: Ideas y Valores, Suppl.1, pp. 16–36.
Aramayo, Roberto R. (2015a): Rousseau: Y la política hizo al hombre. Barcelona: Bonalletra
Alcompas.
Aramayo, Roberto R. (2015b): “Diderot, l’Encyclopedie et l’opinion publique”. In: Revue
Roumaine de Philosophie 59/2, pp. 319–338.
Aramayo, Roberto R. (2016): “Los Ensueños de Rousseau: una cartografía de nuestra
conciencia moral y civil”. In: Rousseau, Jean-Jacques: Ensoñaciones de un paseante solitario
y otros escritos autobiográficos. Madrid: Plaza y Valdés, pp. 11–60.
Aramayo, Roberto R. (2017): “Spuren Rousseaus in Werk Kants. Erziehung, Gesellschaft,
Kosmopolitismus”. In: Wagner / Astrid, Asmuth, Cristoph / Roldán, Concha (Eds.): Harmonie,
Toleranz, kulturelle Vielfalt. Aufklärische Impulse von Leibniz bis zur Gegenwart. Würzburg:
Könighausen & Neumann, pp. 123–135.
Aramayo, Roberto R. / Sánchez Madrid, Nuria (forthcoming): “Ambigüedades del
cosmopolitismo. Kant y Diderot frente a los abusos del colonialismo”. In: VV.AA: Legados del
cosmopolitismo ilustrado -forthcoming
Radical and Moderate Enlightenment? The Case of Diderot and Kant 325
Barcarel, Gilles (Ed.) (2011): Raynal et ses réseaux. Paris: Champion.
Benot, Yves (1979): Diderot, de l’athéisme à l’anticolonialisme. Paris: Maspero.
Cavallar, George (2015): Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism. History, Philosophy and
Education for World Citizens. Berlin, Boston: Walter de Gruyter.
Diderot, Denis (2009): Pensamientos filosóficos. El combate de la libertad. Introduction by
Roberto R. Aramayo. Barcelona: Proteus.
Diderot, Denis (2016): El paseo del escéptico. Epilog by Roberto R. Aramayo. Pamplona:
Laetoli.
De Flaviis, Giuseppe (1986): Kant e Spinoza. Firenze: Sansoni Editore.
Ferrari, Jean (1979): Les sources françaises de la philosophie de Kant. Paris: Klincksieck.
Flikschub, Karin: “Colonial Mentality: Kant’s Hospitality Right Then and Now”, in Flikschuh,
K. / L.Ypi (eds.), Kant and Colonialism. Historical and Critical Perspectives, Oxford, OUP,
2014.
Goyard-Fabre, S. (1996): La philosophie du droit de Kant. Paris: Vrin.
Kant, Immanuel (1816): Immanuel Kants physische Geographie. Vol. 2 (1), 2nd ed., Berlin.
Kleingeld, Pauline (2007): “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race”. In: The Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 57, no. 229, pp. 573–592.
Kleingeld, Pauline (2014): “Second Thoughts on Colonialism”. In: Flikschuh, Katrin / Ypi, Lea
(Eds.): Kant and Colonialism. Historical and Critical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 43–67.
Muthu, Sankar (2003): Enlightenment against Empire. New Jersey: Princeton University.
Quintili, Paolo (2009): “Ëthique universaliste, politique révolutionnaire. Un rapport, un
problème ouverte. Diderot, Raynal, Kant”. In: Bloch, Olivier (Ed.): L’idée de révolution: quelle
place luir faire au XXI siècle? Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, pp. 75–89.
Sánchez Madrid, Nuria (2014): “Kant y la crítica en clave jurídica del anticolonialismo”.
Isegoría 53, pp. 727–736.
Skrzypeck, Marian (1995): “Comment l’homme s’eternise-t-il? Le Pour et le contre de Diderot
et l’ Histoire des deux Indes”. In: Lüsenbrink, Hans-Jürgen / Strugnell, Anthony. L’Histoire des
deux Indes: réecriture et polygraphie. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, pp. 79–88.
326 Roberto R. Aramayo
Efraín Lazos
Hospitality, Coercion and Peace in Kant
Abstract: In this essay, I discuss Kant’s right of hospitality in Toward Perpetual
Peace. In the proposed reading, the right of hospitality protects foreigners
from the xenophobic practices of the locals, while protecting the locals from
the colonial practices of foreigners. The main question guiding this paper is
whether hospitality is for Kant a moral injunction calling for a ‘humane’ treat-
ment of foreigners; or whether it is rather a right senso strictu—namely, one
that entails full coercive authority against violations. I argue that once the con-
nections between the dilemma of coercion and the so-called ‘institutionalization
dilemma’ are properly understood, they may be resolved in favor of the first op-
tion, namely, coercion. Additionally, by examining the notions of non-central-
ized coercion and transnational political participation, this paper explores a
way to match hospitality’s need of coercion with Kant’s federalist proposal.
Hospitality, as we know, is about what is due to strangers. By its very nature,
hospitality lives at the threshold of the polity; it appears at the geographical
and political borders, at the fringes, and overlaps between those who share a
civil space and those who are alien to it, between resident communities in a
given territory and the individuals who show up in that space. Thus, hospitality
occupies the space between what is due to persons as members of a specific
community, and what is due to them independently of that, merely as human
agents. It is precisely this interstitial character of hospitality that opens it up
to a decisive ambivalence. Is hospitality a sort of moral obligation that is some-
how grounded in our common humanity, or is it a strict right, a coercive norm to
which individuals, groups, and—notice—autonomous political entities are sub-
ject? This interrogation is the subject of this essay.
The right to hospitality
That strangers ought not to be treated with hostility is perhaps the least one can
accord to the concept of hospitality. That they should be given rights, even polit-
ical rights, is not, however, what most people in today’s nationalistic times
would grant. Although Kant said relatively little concerning the nature of hospi-
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tality in general, the right to hospitality is, for him, what defines cosmopolitan-
ism as a world political project (ZeF 8:349).¹ Indeed, Kant found a normative void
in the relations between foreigners, considered individually, and collective polit-
ical entities, or receptor states. This void, as he saw it, could not be filled by the
traditional law of peoples, centered as it was on the conditions for just war.
Kant’s focus is not on just any form of hospitality, but on that arising in the clear-
ly asymmetrical situation in which foreign persons individually encounter the
authority and power of national states. The philosopher’s proposal to the Euro-
pean powers of his time (in his 1795 philosophical masterpiece, Toward Perpet-
ual Peace) was not to have them agree on certain by-laws for waging war and for
a new balance of power (MdS 6:352).² Rather, it lay in the idea that peace and
hospitality must go together. For Kant, as is well known, perpetual peace is
the idea of a peaceful, ‘even if not necessarily friendly’, community of peoples.³
It is precisely this sort of peace that demands the protection of strangers.
Here, however, Kant’s text opens itself up to two diverging interpretations as
to how exactly the protection of strangers is to be understood.⁴ In one interpre-
tation, his proposal would be a sort of moral call on the powers of Europe of his
time not to treat foreign visitors with hostility, and perhaps to grant material as-
sistance (asylum and refuge) to those persons who were displaced by the wars
those same powers undertook. In this reading, more generally, this is not a
call for the full, legal protection of foreigners, but an attempt at encouraging ‘hu-
mane’ treatment of foreigners in disgrace.⁵ Compliance or non-compliance, if it
 (See bibliography for abbreviated references) From Francisco de Vitoria to Hugo Grotius, Kant
is far from being alone in considering hospitality as some sort of right of strangers. See also:
Cavallar 2002.
 Perhaps the main historical reference of Kant’s political intervention in this text is the peace
treaty between France and Prussia, known as the Peace of Basel, signed in April 1795. As a re-
sult, Prussia lost territory on the left bank of the Rhine, and post-revolutionary France became
recognized as a contending party in the power game of the European monarchies of the time.
Toward Perpetual Peace was published in Königsberg in August 1795.
 In contrast to a truce or an armistice, perpetual peace is not conditioned by the satisfaction of
certain demands and claims. It is, furthermore, the earthly peace of the living, not the eternal
peace of the dead. As an idea of reason, perpetual peace has normative force for individual
and collective agents even if the political state of affairs it purports to represent is never fully
attainable. See: Anderson-Gold 2010.
 To my knowledge, Kant’s right of hospitality as such has not received the attention it deserves
among Kantian scholars, nor among those in the orbit of international law theories and ‘human-
itarian’ studies.
 Although he does not talk directly about hospitality as such, Jürgen Habermas suggests that
Kant is here “forced to rely exclusively on each government’s own moral self-binding” (Haber-
mas 1997, p. 118).
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is at all a consideration, is always up to the agents’ will. An alternative interpre-
tation takes the call to protect foreigners as a call to design and erect the political
institutions that would realize that protection. Such a realization would include
encouragement and active recognition of hospitality (e.g., in public programs),
as well as a legal expression, with coercive authority over violators.
These two interpretations may also be put in the form of a dilemma. Let us
bear in mind that for Kant, although any strict right (jus strictum) is “connected
with an authorization to use coercion”, sometimes people think of a right in a
wider sense (jus latium), such that “no law by which an authorization to use co-
ercion can be determined” (MdS 6:234). Thus, we see the dilemma of coercion:
hospitality is either a right merely in a manner of speaking, so that a violation
of it would not carry punishable consequences (it would instead be up to the vi-
olating agent’s conscience to recognize the damage and to repair it); or it is a
strict right, in which case a group of competent judges (together with a whole
juridical system) is required to enforce it.
It is not to be assumed that the issues raised by these mutually exclusive
readings of Kant can be settled only by textual evidence. This paper aims to
show that, despite their historical limits, Kant’s thoughts on cosmopolitan rule
are fully consistent with the second horn of the dilemma—namely, the idea
that hospitality requires foreigners to be legally protected. Furthermore, I
argue that the way in which Kant conceives of such legal protection has impor-
tant lessons to teach us for today’s planetary politics of peace. While the role
of the right to hospitality may appear on the surface to be merely to enable
the legal protection of strangers, the theoretical complexity required to design
the institutions that would provide such protection is enormous.While these in-
stitutions—the institutions of peace—are meant to be expressions of practices
that are in line with categorical morality and republican political ideals, they
must inevitably be erected in conditions of intersubjective and collective vio-
lence. Here, too, Kant’s contribution remains wide and deep. In particular, Kant-
ian hospitality points at a mode of cosmopolitan institution-building that com-
bines full coercive authority with clear respect for the autonomy of peoples. As
we shall see, his proposal continues to challenge received ideas about state bor-
ders, political power and what is due to strangers.
Neither xenophobia nor colonialism
In Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant refers to hospitality as a general restriction
(Einschränkung) that applies to certain agents within a cosmopolitan right.
Those limits combine, at least potentially, the possibility of an immense variety
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of hospitality practices, with principles that cover the treatment of foreigners by
public authorities and private citizens. Such principles concern both the objects
of hospitality (foreign nationals as well as stateless persons) and the subjects of
it (states or political collectives, and individual agents acting in their name).
Under the general principle of hospitality, foreigners have the right to appear,
to present themselves, in the space of another people and not to be treated
with hostility; the receptor state, in turn, is endowed with the power to refuse
admission. This power, however, has limits: if the foreign person has fallen
into disgrace and presents herself as being in a precarious situation, it is not per-
missible for the receptor state to reject admission, nor to undertake any action
which would increase the person’s vulnerability. Put otherwise, the foreign per-
son enjoys certain immunities vis-à-vis the power of the state—not to be treated
with hostility, and not to have her vulnerability increased. Although this immun-
ity is limited to her attempt to make contact with the local community, the state
in turn has a limited power to expel foreigners, namely, to use violence and force
them out. One can see here, in a nutshell, the sense in which a cosmopolitan
right may be seen as limited to conditions of hospitality (ZeF 8:357).
Notice that such a restriction has momentous implications in understanding
the status of foreign individuals, as well as the nature of state power under a cos-
mopolitan world order. And notice that, within the framework of Kantian hospi-
tality, the admission of a foreign person is mandatory in those cases (at a phys-
ical border such as a river or an ocean) where rejection would likely lead to her
demise. Hence, in that case admission is enforced—at least until the circumstan-
ces change. Now the principle of hospitality also limits the right of access to a
territory, for no foreign individual or collective has an a priori right to establish
itself in a foreign territory—unless there is an ex professo treatise or contract. In-
terestingly, this includes, for Kant, the territories of so-called stateless peoples.
In other words, the establishment of foreign colonies in the space of a people
is only possible under conditions of mutual consent. Otherwise, the situation
is colonialism, and colonialism is evidently opposed to perpetual peace.
At this point, one might already appreciate that hospitality is a dual princi-
ple: on the one hand, a people’s political autonomy draws a limit for the foreign
cosmopolitan traveler; on the other, the autonomy of persons (and presumably,
such universal properties of human agency as rationality and dignity) puts a
limit on the treatment of foreign persons by state power. Hospitality as a cosmo-
politan principle is at once a protection for foreign persons against the xenopho-
330 Efraín Lazos
bic practices of the locals, and a protection for the locals against the colonial
practices of foreigners.⁶
Two grounds for Kantian hospitality?
How is this unique principle of a cosmopolitan right justified, according to Kant?
One direct, yet complex answer is twofold: by the rational nature of human agen-
cy, and by the planetary condition of human life. The former explains the innate
right to freedom, which in turn is the basis of any justified claim to a right; the
latter explains the contingent fact that, ultimately, we are all neighbors, so that
sooner or later we are bound to interact with those who are different from us—
strangers. Here we have a combination of two important and complex theories
whose details we cannot delve into in much depth here: Kant’s moral theory,
and his historic-geographic theory of the human species on planet Earth.
Concerning the former, let us briefly recall that, for Kant, our moral duties
are not derived from our somewhat incidental, personal bonds with others,
even though they apply to our coordinated actions with others. Furthermore, re-
call that the source of moral bindingness lies only in human rationality. This is
not only the capacity for setting oneself certain ends and acting accordingly, but,
first and foremost, a capacity for self-governance in acting purposefully: autono-
my. In the Doctrine of Right, Kant gives this idea of human agency a particular
expression:
Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can co-
exist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original
right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity. (MdS 8:238)
Given that human action, by its own nature, presupposes the capacity of the
agent for setting and pursuing ends in a self-governed way, an absence of coer-
cion may be seen as a non-acquired right of all human agents. Coercion—being
forced to act for the ends and maxims of others—is a threat to what humans are,
namely, creatures capable of autonomy. This is why the right to freedom, under-
stood as an absence of coercion, may be seen as a pre-contractual right—and in
this sense, as an innate or non-acquired right. In other words, human agents
have the right to freedom just by virtue of being the rational, autonomous beings
that they are. Freedom in this sense—lawful non-domination, one may say—is
 Kleingeld has emphasized the anticolonial aspect of Kant’s hospitality in Toward Perpetual
Peace, but she appears to miss the anti-xenophobic one. See: Kleingeld 2012, p.72.
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the source of all other (acquired) rights. We may say, then, that our rational na-
ture is the source of all duties and all rights for human agents.
On the other hand, in Kant’s work on history, as well as in his lectures on
pragmatic anthropology and physical geography, there appears the important
notion of a planetary condition: the fact that the surface of the Earth is round
needs to be taken into account as an indispensable element in the social ar-
rangement leading to peace—what could be called the ‘civil condition’, in
which social coordination enjoys a maximum of freedom for individual agents,
together with a maximum of order or security. In Toward Perpetual Peace, the
fact that the extension of the Earth that is adequate for human life is finite,
and the fact that humans cannot just indefinitely disperse themselves along
the surface of the planet, are grounds for the belief that, sooner or later, we
are bound to meet human difference. Hence a possible motto for the planetary
condition could be: In the end, we are all neighbors. In the Doctrine of Right
(1797), the planetary condition shows up in the idea of an original community
of the land (urspüngliche Gemeinschaft der Bodens). This ought not to be under-
stood as a communal possession of the surface of the Earth, but rather as the
idea that all humans “are originally (namely, prior to any act of choice that es-
tablishes a right) in legitimate possession of land, that is, they have the right to
be wherever nature or chance (apart from their will) has placed them…” (MdS
8:262)⁷
In another paper, I suggested that Kantian cosmopolitanism may be under-
stood as an answer to the question of how autonomous agents deal with differ-
ence and, ultimately, with violence.⁸ Here, in the discussion of the right to hos-
pitality, one may find another example of such an idea. Freedom—the innate
right of human agents to act independently of another’s choice—together with
the planetary condition, warrants the derivation of the two previously identified
aspects of Kant’s right of hospitality: anticolonialism and anti-xenophobia. It is
clear that, under the planetary condition, there is bound to be interaction, or
commercium, among individuals and peoples. Non-domination, in turn, provides
the theoretical space for the notion that persons (and groups) need not stay in
the same place of residence in which the contingencies of geography and history
have put them, and have the non-acquired right to seek the satisfaction of their
needs and goals wherever their talents and resources may take them. From the
planetary condition and the innate right to freedom, individual persons have the
 This is sometimes referred to with the expression ‘the right to have rights’, covering stateless
persons and peoples. See: Derrida 2001; Höffe 2006.
 See: Lazos, “Contextos del cosmopolitismo kantiano”. In: Rivera, F. / Rodríguez Aramayo, R.
(Eds.): La filosofía práctica de Kant. México, Bogotá: UNAM / UNC (forthcoming).
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right of visitation, namely, the right to present themselves in the space of another
people and not to be treated with hostility. Visitors, in turn, are not therefore au-
thorized to interfere in the sphere of freedom of the hosting people, just as the
receiving individuals and collectives are not authorized to reject visitors when
such rejection would endanger them. In the latter case, Kant goes as far as say-
ing that receiving states have the duty to accept them as visitors for as long as
the external conditions remain, no matter what the material costs are. There is
little doubt that Kant is here pointing to what we now know as the right of asy-
lum.
Utopianism and the dilemma of coercion
In the text of the third definitive article of Toward Perpetual Peace, there seems to
be little doubt that the practical principle of hospitality bears the possibility of
coercion of certain types of actions. In this, hospitality seems to be like any other
right in the narrow sense. It is true, however, that Kant aims at distinguishing a
right that is created by a contract (e.g., at a hotel’s front desk) from the right of
hospitality understood as a right of visitation. It is relatively easy to jump from
there to the conclusion that hospitality is a right without the possibility of claim-
ing it [ohne Anspruch]; and from there in turn it is easy to draw the conclusion
that hospitality is a right latio sensu, namely, a right without coercion.
There is an answer—or, better put, a glimpse of an answer—in these celebrat-
ed and perhaps moving words:
Since the (narrower or wider) community of peoples of the earth has now gone so far that a
violation of right in one place of the Earth makes itself felt in all others, the idea of a cos-
mopolitan right is no fantastic and exaggerated way of representing that right; it is, instead,
a supplement to the unwritten code of the right of the state as well as that of peoples for the
sake of any public rights of human beings and so for perpetual peace. (ZeF 8:360)
It must not be forgotten that, in this passage, Kant has already denounced ‘the
litany of evils’ inflicted by European powers on the colonized peoples of America
and Africa. This indicates that Kant was not naïve at all in his political-philo-
sophical proposal, and that he clearly recognized asymmetries in power relation-
ships. In one of its aims, the quoted passage is directed at preventing a possible
accusation of utopianism in the proposal of cosmopolitan hospitality. Utopian-
ism in this context would consist of imposing the satisfaction of certain goals
or duties without giving a clue as to how to reach them. Hence, the Kantian cos-
mopolitan proposal would be utopian if it proposed a planetary juridical order
restricted to hospitality without giving a clue as to how to reach it—especially
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in those situations in which the colonial European powers impose their condi-
tions on the rest of the world. Kant’s answer is what could be called the ‘political
condition’ of perpetual peace.
Not only does this political condition refer to the necessary coordination be-
tween rational agents (i.e., as legislative members of a kingdom of ends), but
also, and above all, to the requisite of building up a world community on the
basis of the active political participation of cosmopolitan citizens. In other
words, the political condition is composed of the idea of the community of peo-
ples of the Earth, and of the idea of cosmopolitan political participation. For
Kant, it is this community of peoples—one in perpetual construction—that
may counteract the colonialist and expansionist undertakings of European pow-
ers; and it is the existence of this community that allows for a certain historical
optimism. Sooner or later (this may be Kant’s hidden optimistic reasoning), the
right of hospitality will be backed by the possibility of effective coercion by cos-
mopolitan authorities that are fully legitimized by the community of peoples.
This is what would constitute the project of making explicit the implicit code
generated by the human right to freedom, and what would complete the project
of creating peace through rights.
Kantian optimism in relation to the political condition springs, at least in
part, from the conviction that, being more visible for free citizens and self-gov-
erned peoples, violations of a public cosmopolitan right will tend to decrease.
The extent to which moral indignation in the face of violations of the right of per-
sons and of peoples move the citizens of the world to political participation, and
to force their authorities to take an active role in the prevention and punishment
of those violations, is the extent to which we may expect the rise of cosmopolitan
institutions that promote a peaceful future.
It would be anachronistic to share Kant’s optimism on his same historical
grounds. He may well have been allowed to be optimistic in his own times, so
as to think that extraterritorial political participation (which is the ultimate
meaning of the construction of a community of peoples) could attenuate and
counteract the unmeasured ambitions of European powers. The political and
moral violence of the last century may or may not warrant skepticism vis-à-vis
Kant’s historical optimism.
In retrospect, the groundbreaking idea that the violation of a right in one
part of the world is felt everywhere seems to presuppose that there is no distance
between what agents feel (e.g., moral indignation in the face of an atrocity) and
what they actually do (i.e., actively participate in the defense and expansion of
political freedom for persons and peoples all over the world). Indeed, the innate
right to freedom, which dictates the unwritten codex of the rights of humanity,
finds its political expression in the republican mode of governance by a people.
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The republic, understood, as Kant does, as collective self-governance, is the
mode of social coordination that makes political freedom possible. Political free-
dom is freedom under external laws. This is then how the idea may be under-
stood that the violation of republican law in one place is felt in all other places:
if the right of a single human is injured, the rights of all others are also injured—
an instant generalization, through political means, of the effects of an attack on
human freedom. Presumably, although this is more conjectural, a successful de-
fense of, or even an advancement in the expansion of human freedom would
make itself felt in all places.
If the latter is correct as a sketch, in the details we find important difficulties.
The republican mode of social coordination allows the communicability of feel-
ing in the face of a violation of the right to hospitality. This means that only those
agents living in and organized under a republic are able have that feeling. The
republican feeling, as it may be called, is not of course a natural feeling; it is cul-
tivated and, in part, a product of a revolution or turn in the self conception of
persons, of peoples, and of the community of peoples. It becomes evident,
then, that for Kant, the republican institutions—with their separation of powers,
their principle of publicity and their equalitarian conditions of membership and
participation—are the ones that can uphold the principle of hospitality. What,
then, is the problem of institutionalization?
Jürgen Habermas has clearly described this situation: at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, there are international institutions that enjoy relatively high
moral authority and consensus among peoples, but have very scarce capacity of
enforcement, while at the same time the logic of the equilibrium of forces pre-
vails among military powers that have a high capacity of enforcement (Borradori
2003). Briefly, the problem of the institutionalization of cosmopolitanism lies in
the fact that the possibilities of execution of the right to hospitality are manifest-
ly insufficient vis-à-vis its reiterated and systematic violations by military pow-
ers.⁹
It should be obvious that, for Kant, cosmopolitan rule is not meant as a sub-
stitute for national rule, but to supplement it. Supplementation, however, leads
directly to the institutionalization dilemma: either an expanding federation of re-
publics is the way to reconcile the national and the cosmopolitan orders, and no
public law is established; or a world state is instituted, but law is not realized on
the basis of the right to freedom (Höffe 2006, p.140). It is well known that Kant,
 See: Kleingeld 2012, p.86. Habermas is currently an advocate for the ‘constitutionalization of
international law’; i.e., for “the process of extending democracy and the rule of law beyond na-
tional borders” (Habermas 2014, p.5).
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in the second definitive article of Toward Perpetual Peace, adopts the first horn
of the dilemma. Thus, federalism is a way of avoiding the need for special cos-
mopolitan institutions—judges and enforcement apparatuses with transnational
jurisdiction. Sometimes this is seen as a sort of concession on Kant’s part to po-
litical realism or expediency; he was so keenly aware of the barriers to cosmo-
politan institution-building erected by national sovereignty, that “he conceived
of the cosmopolitan community as a federation of states, not of world-citizens”
(Habermas 1997, p. 117).
At this point one can appreciate that the dilemma of coercion arises from the
first horn of the institutionalization dilemma. Notice that here, the right to hos-
pitality cannot be enforced, because there is actually no institutional authority to
do so. This encourages the following reasoning: since under federalism there are
no special cosmopolitan institutions to appeal to in case of a warranted claim to
hospitality, hospitality is not enforceable; but if it is not enforceable (the reason-
ing continues) then it cannot be a strict right, and the cornerstone of cosmopo-
litanism amounts to nothing more than a moral injunction directed at otherwise
unchecked state agents.
Things are, however, more complex. It is evident that from the contingent
fact that a certain law cannot be enforced at a given point of time, it does not
follow that the law is invalid, nor that it carries no coercion. The link between
the two dilemmas—that of coercion and that of institutionalization—hangs fun-
damentally on how federalism and cosmopolitism are seen to be articulated in
Toward Perpetual Peace.While federalism is the answer to the question of lawful
interstate relations, cosmopolitanism answers the question of the lawful rela-
tions between states and foreign individuals. The usual understanding of that ar-
ticulation takes states (in the sense of unified peoples under republican laws) to
be the basic agents of federalism, and takes cosmopolitanism to be only a sup-
plement of federalism, covering a residue of normativity that was not previously
contemplated. Note, however, that if Kant’s second definitive article does not
solve the question of the legitimacy of interstate coercion, then there will evi-
dently be a pending problem with cosmopolitan coercion in the case of a viola-
tion of hospitality. In such a case, the dilemma of coercion insists and persists.
There is another possible understanding of such an articulation—if one
takes individual persons to be the basic agents of the process towards perpetual
peace.While it is true that federalism grapples with the problem of the legitima-
cy of coercion among states, in this reading, however, it is federalism that re-
quires cosmopolitism. In other words, the legitimacy of coercion under a feder-
ation of republican peoples—a faedum pacificum—depends on the possibility of
fully exercising the right to hospitality. On the path to perpetual peace, there
would be little sense in declaring interstate relations lawful and peaceful
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when individuals coming from outside the community have no protection from
natural or human-caused disasters, and when there is no cosmopolitan restric-
tion to the exploitation and private appropriation of the resources of other peo-
ples. Federal coercion, under this reading, depends on cosmopolitan coercion. In
other words, interstate coercion can only be legitimate if the rights of foreigners
as such enjoy some sort of warrant.
Non-centralized coercive power and
transnational political participation
My own position is aligned with the latter understanding of the articulation be-
tween federalism and cosmopolitanism. The problem of the legitimacy of coer-
cion, under republican conditions, does not get solved once and for all. On
the one hand, this is due to the desideratum that the republic may be perfected
by learning from its errors; on the other hand, and most importantly, legitimacy
is not a totalizing concept referring to a property that something has or has not,
once and for all. Kant considers this problem from different angles in his polit-
ical thought. One may say that legitimacy lies in the simultaneous realization of
the idea of self-government in diverse contexts or frameworks. In the context of
what is true about the individual agent, legitimacy is present as a process by
which a given inhabitant of the Earth becomes a world citizen; in a collective
framework, as the transformation of a mere aggregate of persons and groups
(sustaining among themselves a war with some degree of intensity) into one re-
publican people; in the context of the community of peoples, by the transforma-
tion of permanent interstate war into a cosmopolis—a political and juridical order
that is structurally able to admit conflict and dissent, and which potentially in-
cludes all the peoples of the Earth. There is a logic of this sort in the three de-
finitive articles of Toward Perpetual Peace—a logic that leads to two quite inno-
vative elements of political philosophy in Kant′s time, and are perhaps
uncomfortable in our times: the idea of a non-centralized coercive power, and
the idea of transnational political participation. I will now take up these two
ideas in turn.
The idea of a non-centralized coercive power springs from the break of the
republican reductivist maxim according to which many peoples under one law
are one people (ZeF 8:354; MdS 6:343). In a republic, political power (Gewalt)
comes from the unified will of the people, so there is a vertical relation (one
of subordination) between individual agents—the citizens with political privileg-
es—and the republican power whose purpose is to uphold those privileges. Ver-
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ticality, however, becomes a serious problem for interstate relations. This is one
of the reasons why the formula of a Weltrepublik—a republic of republics—is ul-
timately unable to capture the desired, peaceful relations among peoples. The
main problem with that proposal is not that, given its long-term dimensions, a
world republic would become unmanageable (scientific and technological devel-
opments have already answered to that objection), nor that a world republic
would run the risk of becoming a ‘heartless despotism’, for in any case, that dan-
ger is also present at the local, republican level. The deeper problem is that dif-
ferent and diverse unified collective wills cannot transform themselves into one
single people. Using the rhetoric of the state of nature that Kant employs to de-
scribe situations of intersubjective and interstate violence, we may observe that
the analogy between the individual and collective contexts is maintained as to
the motivations to coalesce; but the analogy is broken regarding the structure
of coercive power. In interstate relations coercion cannot be vertical, for other-
wise the unified collective will of each people would disappear.
In my reading, federalism is presented by Kant as a solution to the problem
of verticality within the republican mode of political coordination. But verticality
is not the only condition under which coercion may occur. As has already been
pointed out, Kant was consistent throughout his work in pointing out that the
local problem of ‘how to administer justice universally’ (IzE) can only be solved
on the condition that interstate relations become lawful, namely, when humanity
abandons the planetary state of nature in which violence (intersubjective and
among collectivities and peoples) prevails. All forms of despotism belong, in
this sense, to a state of nature. This already indicates that Kant does not under-
stand that mode of political power which arises from the self-governance of a
people as self-sufficient, nor as absolute. It is not a feat that one lonely people
can realize on its own, and it is not a capacity that a collectivity may have or not
have, once and for all. Federalism, that surrogate of a world sovereign power,
solves the problem of the verticality of coercion among republican peoples,
which in the extreme would mean the disappearance of each people; but it
does not solve the problem of the legitimacy of coercion. Precisely that, I submit,
is the role of the second important idea—transnational political participation.
The notion of transnational political participation is an element of what I
have called here the ‘political condition’, which is an answer to the charge of uto-
pianism in the presentation of cosmopolitan hospitality. The political condition
has two mutually related components: the community of peoples, and transna-
tional political participation. The latter may take several forms; in accordance
with federalism, however, participation must be horizontal, in conditions of free-
dom and equality among persons and peoples. This means that political partic-
ipation, which for Kant is tied up with the feeling of indignation in the face of a
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violation of a right in any part of the world, is independent of the privileges of
local political participation. In turn, the formation of a community of peoples
must be understood as the process by which coercion is legitimized. Such a proc-
ess indeed includes an institutional scaffolding—but this does not constitute the
whole process. In particular, the sort of political participation that carries with it
the formation of world-citizenship is centered on the individual agent, contin-
gently located in a given space and time, and on what she can make for her-
self—in contrast to what nature has made for her (APS; MdS; ZeF). In other
words, the formation of world citizenship belongs to the same process by
which a community of peoples is formed: both call into question those impedi-
ments to political action that are due to the contingent origins of a person or of a
collectivity. This is relatively easy to understand in the context of foreign resi-
dents (people of foreign origin residing in a country)—of which there was no
lack in Kant’s Königsberg—but not so in the context of the participation of for-
eign nationals (persons and groups from foreign countries living in foreign coun-
tries). One should say that the forms that such a political participation could
adopt are only subject to speculation if attributed to Kant.
This being the concept of transnational political participation, why would
self-governed peoples give up power to it? Firstly, the group of agents involved
in the process (the citizens of the republic and the citizens of the world) is po-
tentially one and the same: so the group of people who would give up power
and the group of people to whom power is being given is one and the same. Sec-
ondly, the citizens would have republican control over local authorities through
local institutions and mechanisms, but also over cosmopolitan authorities
through planetary institutions and mechanisms. Cosmopolitan authority will
be answerable to individual citizens, but also to local authorities; and these in
turn will be answerable to cosmopolitan authorities and to their ‘own’ peoples.
In brief, what this means is that doubts concerning horizontal coercive power
among peoples may be dispelled by observing that state power, when conceived
under republican principles, is neither self-sufficient nor absolute. It ought to re-
spond to the will of the equals, so that it cannot be arbitrarily enforced, for ex-
ample, on foreign residents and on peoples or individuals in other parts of the
world; and it is not self-sufficient since, as we have shown, the legitimacy of ver-
tical republican coercion depends on that of a federation of republics; and, be-
yond this, they both depend on the horizontal coercion characteristic of a cosmo-
politan condition.
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Final remarks
The charge of utopianism regarding the right to hospitality may be answered in
one of two ways: with a story about the institutionalization of the moral and po-
litical ideals of cosmopolitanism; or with a story about the source of cosmopol-
itan coercion. The former responds to the problem of the execution or enforce-
ment of cosmopolitan law, the latter to the problem of the legitimacy of
coercion. While it is true that they both involve what I have here called the po-
litical condition—that form of social coordination that is characteristic of self-
governed agents roaming the finite surface of the Earth—it is important not to
confuse these two problems.
My claim in this paper may be understood as an attempt to critically evaluate
the last paragraph of the third definitive article of Toward Perpetual Peace. I have
argued that the right to hospitality is for Kant both an anti-xenophobic and an
anti-colonial principle, which carries with it full coercive force. Not only does
the right to hospitality stem from the unconditional command not to instrumen-
talize other agents (where noncompliance is sanctioned by the agent’s own
moral conscience)—it constitutes a cosmopolitan legal command whose breach
brings about systematic and negative consequences for the external freedom of
noncomplying agents. So the dilemma of coercion is solved by affirming the first
horn (justified coercion of external freedom) and denying the second (a moral
reprimand). It may be open to debate what are the proper jurisdictions and over-
laps of the institutions involved, but the validity of the right of hospitality de-
mands the possibility of effective coercion.
It is vital to stress here the role of transnational political participation as an
element of a global political condition with peaceful intent. This is crucial in
order to understand under what conditions coercion of state actions that violate
hospitality is justified. It is by virtue of the political condition that the implicit
code generated by lawful freedom can be made explicit; and this gives substance
to the project of creating peace through rights. That project is, as we saw, insep-
arable from a multileveled political participation of individuals and collectivi-
ties, and is the source of the legitimacy of cosmopolitan coercion of those
state actions that contravene the principle of hospitality. As we have seen, inter-
state coercion under federalism is only legitimate if the rights of foreigners as
such have some sort of generalized trans-border warrant.
The other component of the political condition in Kantian cosmopolitanism
is the construction of a community of peoples.We might find in Kant some clues
for such a construction in a kind of theory of republican political sentiments
that, in analogy with aesthetic taste, we hope to share with diverse and distant
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persons and peoples. Republican sentiments—including the feeling of indigna-
tion—are an important part of the process of constructing a community of peo-
ples. It is not enough, in such a process, to form groups or organizations with an
affinity of interests and relatively independent from state agencies—so-called
‘non-governmental organizations’. In every case, and especially when it comes
to corporations such as the religious and the military, the public use of one’s
own reason would have to be upheld if such organizations aspire to be part of
the community of peoples.
Finally, let us briefly turn to the question concerning the scope of cosmopol-
itan authority, and whether it supplements or substitutes national authorities.
The key seems to lie in one more sense in which cosmopolitan coercion may
be reduced to conditions of hospitality. It is true that, to the extent that republi-
can constitutions incorporate the cosmopolitan protection of foreigners into their
principles, the traditional difference between foreign and domestic policies will
tend to blur out. So the extent to which national jurisdiction ought to be supple-
mented by cosmopolitan law depends on the extent to which the local jurisdic-
tion protects foreigners. The idea here is: one clear domain in which national au-
thority needs to be supplemented is the enforcement of the principle of
hospitality. That is, even a perfect republic, in which power would be at once dis-
seminated (e.g., in the assembly of free agents) and concentrated (in the united
will of the people represented by the sovereign), is not self-sufficient when it
comes to protecting the rights of foreigners as such—including undocumented
and stateless persons and peoples. Since the treatment of foreigners is the
space in which national governments may be most evidently prone to a conflict
of political interests, it is precisely there where functioning cosmopolitan institu-
tions are needed.
Beyond interpretive matters, one possible lesson of this essay is that suspi-
cion is commendable in the face of the recurring attempts to bring up to date
Kant’s historical optimism. If cosmopolitan penal justice (e.g., the International
Criminal Court) had full coercive force to process the crimes against humanity
that have been committed for the interests and by the state agents of the stron-
gest military power in history, then perhaps Kant’s historical optimism could be
renewed. In the meantime, it is perhaps advisable to substitute optimism with a
sober critique of humanitarian reason.
Hospitality, Coercion and Peace in Kant 341
Abbreviated References
In this paper, all references to Immanuel Kant’s works are in accordance with the Akademie Aus-
gabe (AA), Vols. 1–29 of Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin, Leipzig, 1902). References indi-
cate the volume number followed by the page number. Unless otherwise indicated, the English
language translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1992). The following abbreviations are used throughout this paper.
APS Anthropologie pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798), AA 6:119–333.
IzE Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784), AA 8:17–31.
MdS Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797), AA 6:205–492.
ZeF Zum ewigen Frieden (1795), AA 8:343–386.
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New Perspectives on the Enlightenment
Abstract: Though doing so invites methodological problems, the concept of ‘the
Enlightenment’ is nevertheless in need of widening: it can no longer be reduced
to any one historical period; nor can it be restricted to Europe. As a process of
rationalization, scientification, technification, secularization, or democratiza-
tion, forms of Enlightenment can be identified in many periods and regions. I
wish to argue here that an expanded meaning opens up opportunities for an en-
hanced and interdisciplinary Enlightenment research. On the basis of two recent
approaches to the Enlightenment—by Felicity A. Nussbaum and Dipesh Chakra-
barty—I will try to show the interdependency of period and process notions, and
ponder the ways in which they inform one another. A combined reading of both
approaches shows how they might serve as models for a specific form of inter-
disciplinary global history in the heritage of the Enlightenment.
It has often been remarked that—more than other period concepts of history—the
concept of the Enlightenment is characterized by a semantic double structure: it
signifies on the one hand the historical period of the eighteenth century, and a
transepochal and still ongoing process of rationalization on the other. This dou-
ble meaning (or even double concept) was given its canonical formulation by
Jürgen Habermas’s notion of the ‘project of Enlightenment’ (Habermas 1990).
Whereas historians and philologists in recent decades have tried to narrow
down the concept and to radically historicize the Enlightenment by limiting it
to objects of the eighteenth century, the broader understanding of the Enlighten-
ment was left to sociologists, political scientists or the field of literary studies.
Robert Darnton’s attempt to reduce the Enlightenment to a specific movement
in Paris and a specific type of historical agent against an ‘industry of the Enlight-
enment’ (Darnton 2003)—or Quentin Skinner’s methodological remarks, already
formulated in the late 1960s against the myth of continuity of (not only Enlight-
enment) ideas (Skinner 1969)—are only the most prominent examples of these
attempts. In the decades after the 1980s, one often emphasized the distances be-
tween now and then in an attempt at warding off the danger of an ideological
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misuse of the Enlightenment: the non-Enlightened aspects of the eighteenth cen-
tury have been stressed, and occultisms, esotericisms, and the persistence of re-
ligions and superstitions have been examined to show the discontinuities, rather
than a simple scheme of plain modernization since the eighteenth century.¹
Nonetheless all these pleadings for historicization and contextualization
could not prevent the Enlightenment being understood in its broad meaning:
as a process of rationalization, scientification, technification, secularization, or
democratization. In this sense, forms of Enlightenment can be identified in pe-
riods or regions other than the European eighteenth century: one can speak of
Islamic Enlightenments in the eleventh century as well as considering that per-
haps, nowadays, the Enlightenment has its place in Latin America rather than in
Europe.² Especially the broader and science-transcending discussions in the
public sphere refer to a wide understanding of the Enlightenment and indicate
the ongoing social relevance of the concept of the Enlightenment as a project.
Indeed, despite all the methodological problems that professional historians
have with such a widening of the concept, they on the other hand know that
there are no naked facts that can be reduced to the eighteenth century, or any
historical period. Positivism might be a methodological presupposition, but
can also turn into an ideology of mere facts. Historization alone doesn’t prevent
ideology, and can be even more ideological than constructions that make explic-
it their cognitive interest and standpoint. From its questions posed to the past
about the theories that are applied, to questions of reception and impacts, his-
toriography is always transcending the narrow context of the examined period.
This is especially true when questions of intellectual history are touched upon,
and when the ideas of a period—as in case of the Enlightenment—have a norma-
tive surplus that transcends the end of the eighteenth century. It is not by
chance, that in the very last years, beneath a vivid positivist research on details
of the eighteenth century, some of the most inspiring approaches have been
based on a broad understanding of the Enlightenment that aims to think of
the concept of period and the concept of project together. The newly emerging
global history discourse has proved especially fruitful in this respect.
Authors from postcolonial, postmodern, and subaltern studies discovered
the Enlightenment. Jacques Derrida tried in some of his last essays to mediate
 See, for instance Neugebauer-Wölk (1999). Most recently, Luise Schorn-Schütte argued against
a plain narration of modernity (2009).
 In an interview with the New Left Review in January 2010, Eric Hobsbawm answered the ques-
tion if there are any vivid Enlightenment traditions with a reference to Latin America: “Certainly
in Latin America, politics and general public discourse are still conducted in the old Enlighten-
ment—liberal, socialist, communist—terms.” (New Left Review, 61, 2010, p. 13– 14)
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between a critique of Enlightened universalism and a salvation of reason
through the concept of an ‘Enlightenment to come’ (“Le ‘Monde’ des lumières
a venir”) (Derrida 2003). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak made a similar attempt
with her concept of the Enlightenment as an ‘enabling violation’ (Spivak 2008,
pp. 8–9). From a different perspective, Zev Sternhell tries to show in his engaged
study on The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition that there is not only a transtemporal
process of Enlightenment, but also a Counter-Enlightenment tendency that is de-
fined by a cultural and national essentialism, starting in the eighteenth century
with Edmund Burke and Herder and lasting until today (Sternhell 2006). Last but
not least, Daniel Fulda and his team at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Research
on the European Enlightenment (IZEA) in Halle have examined underlying ‘cul-
tural patterns of the Enlightenment’ emerging in the eighteenth century and last-
ing until the present day (Fulda 2010).
In my contribution, I wish to argue that the double meaning of the Enlight-
enment is not only a danger but at the same time opens up opportunities for an
enhanced and interdisciplinary Enlightenment research that goes beyond the
narrow borders of an academic historical or philological reconstruction of a
past period that is presumed to have nothing to do with our contemporary con-
cerns. On the basis of two recent approaches to the Enlightenment—by Felicity A.
Nussbaum and Dipesh Chakrabarty—I will try to show the interdependency of
period and process notions, and ponder the ways in which they inform one an-
other. Felicity A. Nussbaum pleads for an enhanced and globalized view of the
eighteenth century in order to overcome traditional Euro-centric interpretations
of that period. She argues that such a reinterpretation of the pre-history of glob-
alization in the period of the Enlightenment also allows us to modify our con-
temporary understanding of these processes in the direction of a pluralized
view of multiple ways to modernity (1). Whereas Nussbaum’s starting point is
thus a historical reinterpretation of the eighteenth century, one of the most
prominent current postcolonial critics of the Enlightenment’s Eurocentrism, Di-
pesh Chakrabarty, rediscovers certain universal notions of the eighteenth centu-
ry—namely the idea of a universal history of mankind as a species—in order to
face contemporary global challenges such as climate change, and tries to refor-
mulate them with respect to a modification of basic postcolonial methodological
assumptions. He argues that the cultural diversity and plurality axioms of post-
colonialism have to be mediated with an anthropological and biological deep
history of the human species as a whole (2). Both approaches can serve as mod-
els for a specific form of interdisciplinary global history in the heritage of the En-
lightenment.
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Felicity A. Nussbaum’s research program of
Critical Global Eighteenth Century Studies
In the introduction to her standard volume on questions of Enlightenment and
Globaliziation, The Global Eighteenth Century, Felicity A. Nussbaum gives an out-
line of the possibilities and limits of non-Eurocentric eighteenth century studies.
She develops her approach to what she calls ‘critical global studies’ in opposi-
tion to a linear narrative of globalization and modernization. She calls this nar-
rative—starting in the Enlightenment and ending up in today’s globalized world
—a kind of European victory history. Based on some insights taken from postco-
lonial studies and the postmodern critique of the Enlightenment’s universalism,
she pleads for a pluralization, specification, and modification of the traditional
triad of European Enlightenment, modernity, and globalization. This, she con-
tends, is a precondition for a critical view on imperial forms of globalization
and gender hierarchies, as well as for the acknowledgement of indigenous
forms of knowledge or for giving a voice to subalterns or minorities: “In partic-
ular, postmodern thinkers, Marxist theorists, and, more frequently, feminists and
historians of race, have significantly complicated our understanding of the ge-
nealogy of human difference.” (Nussbaum 2003, p. 6)
What makes Nussbaum’s approach an important argument in our context is
her assumption that it is just such an enhanced understanding—a broader his-
torical reconstruction of the eighteenth century and the Enlightenment—that en-
ables at the same time a genealogical deconstruction of monocausally structured
Eurocentric understandings of globalization:
Critical global studies helps us to understand that the unmodified term ‘globalization’—like
‘modernity’—is inadequate in reflecting its many historical meanings, and imprecise in con-
veying the complexities of varied social, economical, and cultural conditions in their spe-
cific geographical locations. (Nussbaum 2003, p. 5)
The tasks of such a program of enhanced study of the eighteenth century would
be:
[to] analyze the European encounter with other populations throughout the world and offer
ways to think critically about the imperative of that [European] imperial project… [and to]
query the boundaries of national histories and literatures that have limited our understand-
ings to reconsider sexual and racial intermingling, religious encounters, the exchange of
goods and diseases, indigenous knowledge, and the real and imagined mapping of the
earth’s domain. (Nussbaum 2003, p. 1)
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These global crossings, encounters, exchanges, transfers, appropriations and dif-
fusions are at the root of the European Enlightenment, which can itself be de-
fined as an accelerated and enhanced “movement of ideas across borders and
over time” (Nussbaum 2003, p. 2), rather than as a fixed set of genuinely Euro-
pean ideas. European travelers, emperors and scientists didn’t come to the extra-
European world with ready-made models of an Enlightened society, but rather,
the global experience is at the root of concepts that are generally seen as genu-
inely European and/or Enlightened. World travelers such as James Cook, Louis
Antoine de Bougainville, Georg Forster, or Alexander von Humboldt and their re-
ports initiated broad debates about the state of nature and the critique of Euro-
pean societies that otherwise would not have taken place. In addition, ‘defining
elements’ of the Enlightenment such as state sovereignty, nation-based citizen-
ship, and modern economic institutions were, even in eighteenth-century Eu-
rope, far from being fully elaborated, and even farther from actual implementa-
tion.
Examining these exchanges can show that distinctions between centers and
peripheries, European and non-European, and modern and premodern societies
are often retrospective divisions that have no reference to the specific historical
situation. For example, as Jürgen Osterhammel has remarked, eighteenth centu-
ry agricultures and so-called premodern societies in Europe as well as elsewhere
(his example is China) are based on similar structures, and may have had more
in common then than they do in the era of industrialization and capitalism (Os-
terhammel 2009, p. 21). Often the borders are drawn within Europe—e.g., in re-
spect to Ireland or Eastern Europe where ‘savages’ were identified in one’s own
country—but also, Great Britain was often not seen as part of Europe.
Since ideas about Europe have never been homogenous or uncontested,
there are no fixed borders between Europe and non-Europe, but always, histor-
ically as in the present, constructions against the background of specific inter-
ests. In the eighteenth century, the world was not composed of essentially dis-
tinct cultures—of a European or western center and a non-European periphery.
Rather, it would be much more precise to speak of hybrid and transeuropean cul-
tural spaces, such as the Eurasian Russian or the Ottoman Empire in the East,
the United States or Latin America as transatlantic spaces, or Mediterranean re-
gions such as the Maghreb, with its mixture of Turks, Christians, and Jews, or of
Moors, Arabs, Bedouins, Berbers, and Kabyles in the South.
In this way the center-periphery distinction and traditional forms of empire-
and world systems-theory can be shown as Eurocentric shortcomings. Empire-
building has not been a European monopoly: there are and have always been
various forms of non-European empires, such as the Arab, Ottoman, Mughal
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and Qing empires (and many more), as John Darwin has shown in his recent
comprehensive history of global empires (Darwin 2008).
While the center-periphery formula is problematized, the concept of modern-
ity becomes pluralized within critical global studies. In the place of a single
model of progress, one can speak of different phases of globalization. In critical
global studies, the emphasis would be put on discontinuities and historical rup-
tures rather than on linear conceptions of progress. The models underlying this
approach are the concepts of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt 2002) and of dif-
ferent phases of globalization.Walter Mignolo and Ottmar Ette, for example, in-
terpret the Enlightenment as a second phase of European expansion after the
conquests of the 15th and 16th Centuries (Mignolo 1998). Following this periodiza-
tion, the Enlightenment can be defined as a specific form of reflection on—and
partly also a critique of—the earlier European expansion projects and of previous
forms of colonialism (Muthu 2003; D’Aprile). In addition, it can be seen as a not
only politically but also scientifically motivated measurement of a world that
had already been widely discovered before (Despoix 2009).
What Nussbaum formulates for eighteenth century studies has been under-
taken in a similar way by authors like Christopher Bayly, Jürgen Osterhammel
and John Darwin in the general field of global historiography (Osterhammel
2009; Darwin 2008; Bayly 2005). All these recent approaches can be seen as crit-
ical global studies following the insight that a non-Eurocentric perspective is a
crucial necessity in global history.
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s research program
of Planetary History
Whereas Felicity Nussbaum applies insights from modern postcolonial theories
to the study of the eighteenth century in order to come to a modified understand-
ing of current globalization, historian Dipesh Chakrabarty goes the other way
around. In a series of recent articles, Chakrabarty, one of the most important
and prominent founding fathers of postcolonialism (along with Edward Said,
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak Homi Bhaba), tries to reformulate or even rehabili-
tate aspects of the Enlightenment’s historical thinking in the face of current en-
vironmental challenges and crises.
According to Chakrabarty, these challenges require a rethinking of the En-
lightenment’s project of a common universal history of mankind or of the
human species, first developed in the eighteenth century. In this respect, Chak-
rabarty claims that the Enlightenment’s universalism cannot only be seen as an
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expression of the Euro-Atlantic world’s claim to hegemony, but is at the same
time a very important means for criticizing the consequences of this hegemony
—among them, today’s Climate crisis as an effect of the industrializing the
world: “I’m against any ideas of hierarchies of civilizations but the idea of one
common civilization of humanity on this planet seems to me an important
part of our anti-colonial heritage.” (Chakrabarty 2010, p. 10, my transl.)
In his article on Humanism in an Age of Globalization, Chakrabarty points to
a crucial difference between the 20th and the 21st Centuries (Chakrabarty 2008,
pp. 74–90): whereas the 20th Century was characterized by the question of
race, the 21st will be shaped by the global challenge of climate change. Because
of this new situation, he claims, every reflection on globalization processes has
to take into account questions of planetary history.Whereas (postcolonial) think-
ing on globalization is concerned with the historical and cultural differences,
questions of colonialisms, racisms, and classisms on the one hand and toler-
ance, cosmopolitisms and intercultural dialogue on the other, planetary history
instead always thinks of humanity in the sense of a unity of the species. Human
beings are construed in the latter as members of a species who are characterized
by a general—even if unequal and diverse—pursuit of happiness, through which
they destroy their own biosphere and thus the foundations of their existence
(Chakrabarty 2010, p. 146). This leads Chakrabarty to the conclusion that his for-
mer theoretical approaches to globalization, such as “Marxist analysis of capital,
subaltern studies, and postcolonial criticism over the last twenty-five years,
while enormously useful in studying globalization, had not really prepared me
for making sense of this planetary conjuncture within which humanity finds it-
self today.” (Chakrabarty 2010, p. 199)
In his 2009 article in the journal Critical Inquiry, bearing the title The Climate
of History, Chakrabarty gives the most explicit outline of his program of a new
planetary history (Chakrabarty 2009, pp. 197–222).What makes our current situa-
tion different from all other periods in history, according to Chakrabarty, is the
fact that humans are able to destroy the foundations of their own existence,
and thus that the old distinction between natural history and human history
cannot be upheld any longer. Humans are no longer simply part of nature, or ‘bi-
ological actors’, but have now gained the status of ‘geological actors’. Therefore,
it is not enough to write an environmental history (Umweltgeschichte) in which
the interdependencies between humans and their environment are described;
rather, what is needed is a new kind of planetary history. Chakrabarty calls
this new period of history, in which mankind has become a geological actor, ‘An-
thropocene’—a term that is intended to convey its planetary significance through
analogy to geological periods like Holocene or Pleistocene. Earth processes and
questions of human or cultural history have gained a new status of interdepend-
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ence in this new era. This different situation requires us to bring together deep
structures of history with cultural and often very short-term developments,
thus compelling a collaboration of the natural sciences (such as biology or an-
thropology) with history. The traditional categorical separation between them
two cannot be kept up any longer:
‘Human behavior is seen as the product not just of recorded history, ten thousand years re-
cent, but of deep history, the combined genetic and cultural changes that created humanity
over hundreds of [thousands of] years.’ […] Without such knowledge of the deep history of
humanity it would be difficult to arrive at a secular understanding of why climate change
constitutes a crisis for humans. Geologists and climate scientists may explain why the cur-
rent phase of global warming—as distinct from the warming of the planet that has hap-
pened before—is anthropogenic in nature, but the ensuing crisis for humans is not under-
standable unless one works out the consequences of that warming. The consequences
make sense only if we think of humans as a form of life and look on human history as
part of the history of life on this planet. (Chakrabarty 2009, pp. 205–6; quoting Wilson, Ed-
ward O. [1996]: In Search of Nature)
Chakrabarty uses two arguments to refute the objection advanced by historians
that culture and nature (the history of mankind and the history of nature) are
categorically different things since the former is based on freedom and agency,
whereas the latter is not—an argument that has been part of the basic assump-
tions of the theory of history since Vico’s axioms. In the amalgamation of biolog-
ical and cultural models, they see a biologist reduction and essentialism of cul-
tural and social processes. Firstly, Chakrabarty (quoting Daniel Lord Smail)
points out that the historical deep structure models of natural sciences are not
determinist models, as can already be shown in the most prominent example,
the Darwinian evolutionary model:
Species, according to Darwin, are not fixed entities with natural essences imbued in them
by the Creator. … Natural selection does not homogenize the individuals of a species. …
Given this state of affairs, the search for a normal … nature and body type [of any particular
species] is futile. And so it goes for the equally futile quest to identify “human nature.”
(Chakrabarty 2009, pp. 214–215)
Secondly, natural scientists also concede that the capacity of reflection changes
with changing environments. Just as Karl Marx and others assumed that with
changing classes in society, a class consciousness would develop, these natural
scientists think that the same is true for changing geo-biological environments.
They are convinced that on the basis of environmental change, different learning
processes and experiences of failures and catastrophes, humans will learn to de-
velop a self-consciousness of species. In this respect, natural scientists also
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speak the ‘language of Enlightenment’, as Chakrabarty calls it (Chakrabarty
2009, p. 215).
Nonetheless, Chakrabarty’s aim is not that we should all become natural sci-
entists. Rather, he believes that the contribution of natural scientists to the un-
derstanding of deep structures of species history has to be accompanied by a
critical genealogy of global capitalism since the eighteenth century. After all, it
was the process of capitalized and industrialized globalization that led to climate
catastrophe, without being planned by a specific actor. So global reflection on
the height of the challenges has to bring together planetary history with a critical
history of globalization. As it is sketched by Felicity A. Nussbaum, one could
add:
The task of placing, historically, the crisis of climate change thus requires us to bring to-
gether intellectual formations that are somewhat in tension with each other: the planetary
and the global; deep and recorded histories; species thinking and critiques of capital. (Spi-
vak 2003, p. 213)³
At the end of his article, Chakrabarty outlines his program of a new global reflec-
tion, which he calls ‘negative universal history’. Even if we don’t have any histor-
ical experience of mankind as a geological actor, we have to face the fact that we
have become one. Despite all inequalities in dealing with the costs of climate
change, and even if it is an unintended consequence of human actions, climate
change is characterized by the fact that everyone will be affected by it. In con-
trast to the universal history of the eighteenth century, we have come to know
that there is no “Hegelian universal arising dialectically out of the movement
of history, or a universal of capital brought forth by the present crisis.” We al-
ways have to start with the perspectives and experiences of local actors and
thus the universal that ‘cannot subsume particularities’ exists only in a negative
way: in the common consciousness and knowledge that take the form of a
‘shared sense’ of the possibility of a geological catastrophe. In this situation,
the Enlightenment becomes increasingly significant: “in the era of the Anthropo-
cene, we need the Enlightenment (that is, reason) even more than in the past.”
(Spivak 2003, p. 211) Only through scientific analysis—meaning the collaboration
of natural and cultural sciences—can the effects of the actions of the species as a
whole be understood.
 For the difference between ‘globality’ and ‘planetarity’ from another perspective, see also Spi-
vak’s concept of ‘planetarity’ in: Spivak (2003, pp. 1–102).
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Conclusions
Nussbaum and Chakrabarty both operate with a wide concept of the Enlighten-
ment, and both approaches show interesting and promising ways of overcoming
the fruitless opposition in Enlightenment research of historical-philological to
theoretical-systematical approaches. Nussbaum elaborates to what extent a dif-
ferentiated, widened, and more complex study of the eighteenth century can
lead to a modified understanding of our own ideas of globalization. Chakrabarty,
in his model of planetary history, outlines an overarching conception combining
postcolonial theory with geo- and life-sciences.
Both open up interdisciplinary fields for Enlightenment research. As Peter
Reill has shown, the “close correspondence between nature and humanity” (be-
tween nature and culture) is one of the crucial significances of Enlightenment
thinking and acting, from the beginning of the paradigm of mathematics and
physics in the late 17th century up to the vitalist theories at the end of the eight-
eenth century (Reill 2005). The key concepts and main projects of the Enlighten-
ment—such as the history of species, holistic models of natural and human his-
tory, pre-evolutionary theories, or conceptualizations of world markets, political
economy, or of a society of knowledge, as developed by Maupertuis, Buffon, Di-
derot, Herder, Kant, A. Smith and many other Enlightenment authors—could
thus be reread with respect to systematic questions related to what Chakrabarty
calls the Anthropocene. At the same time, these questions have to be combined
with a critical history of knowledge. The key concepts of the Enlightenment can
be shown in their genealogy as results of enhanced global circulations, as well as
of specific relations of power. Their presumed universality (in the sense of trans-
temporal truths) can be deconstructed in order to make way for a view of these
concepts as constructions and narrations produced in a specific historical situa-
tion. Models of natural history, natural philosophy or natural sciences can be
shown in their interdependency with social, cultural and economical interpreta-
tions as well as with leading metaphors and narrations of their times.
As one example for a critical genealogy and discourse analysis of current
challenges, one could refer to Joseph Vogl’s works on the poesis of capitalism,
of the homo economicus, and of global financial crises since the eighteenth cen-
tury (Vogl 2008; 2010). In a historical-systematical vein, Göran Therborn tries to
give an introduction to planetary thinking in his most recent publication, com-
bining insights from geology, biology, economy, sociology, and history to form
a ‘beginner’s guide’ to the world, addressed to all of us who are used to identi-
fying with our family, country or continent, but among whom “most of us are be-
ginners on the planetary terrain of humankind” (Therbom 2011, p. ix). Such re-
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flections pay tribute to what Eric Hobsbawm calls a ‘genuinely global history’ in
the spirit of the Enlightenment: “neither within the humanities nor the natural
and mathematical sciences, nor separated from them, but essential to both.”
(Hobsbawm 2002, p. 297)
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in Marx and Postone
Abstract: In this article, I intend to show that a categorical analysis of the Marx-
ian concept of wealth may prove useful for understanding the contradictory ef-
fects of globalization. Authors like Douglas Kellner point out that globalization is
a dual process, containing both positive and negative aspects. Moishe Postone
has developed an immanent critique of capitalism that contrasts the forms of
domination in modern society with its emancipatory potential. I intend to pursue
Postone’s categorical reading, addressing in particular the concept of wealth. I
will try to show that social wealth involves the possibility of a multilateral social
form, based on the universal spread of knowledge, and freed from the ‘unilater-
al’ form of production in capitalism.
Introduction:
critical theory of modernity and globalization
Douglas Kellner calls for a ‘critical theory of globalization’ capable of under-
standing its positive or negative aspects. He rejects optimistic visions, such as
that of Francis Fukuyama, who ignores negative aspects of globalization such
us wars, poverty and economic crises. On the other hand, unilateral Marxist in-
terpretations are equally reductionist, since they only analyze globalization in
terms of the imposition of capitalism. These views ignore the possibilities for
radical politics and alternative forms of globalization, embodied in a ‘globaliza-
tion from below’ (Kellner 2002, p. 286). A critical theory of globalization should
prove capable of understanding both its oppressive logics and liberating possi-
bilities.
I propose that Moishe Postone’s categorical reading of Karl Marx’s mature
work can provide the foundations for a critical theory of globalization. Capitalist
modernity as such can be interpreted as a form of domination (constituted by the
fetishistic mediation of labor) and as the source of emancipatory potentials
(since the alienated dynamic of value creates the possibility of its eventual over-
coming). The contradiction between wealth and value can give an account of the
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dialectic between domination and emancipation in global society. Capitalism is
based on a specific form of social domination, which is not based on personal
authority but on impersonal, abstract and quasi-objective compulsions. Capital-
ism contradictorily creates the possibility of what I will call ‘social wealth’. This
possibility aims towards a different form of production and social mediation—
one that would no longer be based on the reproduction of value as a fetishistic
compulsion imposed on individuals. Globalization, from this perspective, is both
the universalization of capitalist domination (based on the mediation of society
by the value form) and the ground for liberating possibilities.
Postone’s categorial reading of Marx
In Time, labor and social domination, Postone presents a reformulation of critical
theory grounded in the contradictory forms of social mediation under capitalism.
Labor as a specifically capitalist social form produces an alienated social univer-
sal, opposed to the individuals as an independent power. Capitalist social medi-
ation possesses an impersonal and objective nature: “[s]ociety, as the quasi-in-
dependent, abstract, universal Other that stands opposed to the individuals”
(Postone 1993, p. 159). Capitalism configures an oppressive society by its charac-
teristic ‘form of labor’, which generates alienated forms of social mediation.
Capitalist social relations mediated by labor compose a historically specific
totality governed by value and labor as self-mediating principles. Totality in-
volves the lack of freedom of its subjects, but also entails the inherent possibility
of its transformation. “The categories of the adequate critique, as I have argued,
must grasp not only the contradictory character of the totality but also the basis
of the sort of unfreedom that characterizes it” (Postone 1993, p. 125).
Labor as a social mediating principle imposes an alienated goal for human
activity that must be attained, disregarding the concrete needs of the subjects.
“Labor is separated from its concrete purpose and becomes a means toward a
goal given by the alienated structures constituted by (abstract) labor itself”
(Postone 1993, p. 325). Value-producing labor posits itself as a compulsive social
goal that disregards any other particular needs or purposes, constituting a self-
mediating totality.
Capital’s global dynamic is self-contradictory as well. It both undermines the
basis of its own development and creates the foundations for its possible over-
coming. Capital possesses a dynamic of transformation and restitution of the
labor hour. It constantly increases the productivity of labor. Thus, the social
labor hour becomes increasingly ‘dense’ in terms of the amount of commodities
produced. This is the ‘concrete’ aspect of the capitalist temporal process. Yet, the
358 Facundo Nahuel Martín
transformations in production do not lead to an increase in value; or rather, they
only bring about temporary increases (extraordinary surplus value). Value de-
pends ultimately on the labor time employed, not on its productivity: “although
increased productivity does result in more material wealth, it does not result in
more value per unit of time” (Postone 1993, p. 195). The ‘abstract’ aspect of the
capitalist temporal dynamic (empty, homogeneous time) is therefore restored
after every concrete transformation of the social labor hour. Once a productive
level is socially generalized, the magnitude of value created during the labor
hour remains stagnant, regardless of the amount of material wealth it represents.
Capitalism’s temporal dynamic leads to a growing discrepancy between
wealth and value. If capital must constantly increase the productivity of labor,
it also restores value, each time, as a uniform and abstract measure:
This process of the reciprocal determination of the two dimensions of social labor in cap-
italism occurs on the level of society as a whole. It is at the heart of a dialectical dynamic
intrinsic to the social totality constituted by commodity-determined labor. (Postone 1993,
p. 289)
The dialectic of transformation and restitution of the social labor hour also in-
herently makes capitalism increasingly anachronistic. As technical develop-
ments grow, ‘direct’ labor becomes ever less relevant in production. Instead,
the socially general powers of science and technique become the leading factors
of production. “[Capitalism] renders the production of material wealth essential-
ly independent of direct human labor time expenditure” (Postone 1993, p. 339).
The generation of material wealth and that of value enter into contradiction. This
opens up the possibility for the overcoming of capitalism.
In the following sections, I will attempt to show how the contradiction be-
tween wealth and value can shed light on some emancipatory potentials of glob-
alization. In order to do this, I will attempt a categorical analysis of the concept
of wealth in Marx′s Grundrisse.Wealth should not be defined only by the creation
of greater masses of goods, but by the social determinations under which those
goods are produced and consumed.
Unilateral social forms and wealth
I aim to show that Marx, in his Grundrisse manuscripts, provides a historically
determinate concept of social wealth. Marx, I will claim, regards both capitalism
and pre-capitalist societies as unilateral. The former is one-sided because it is
based on production for the reified goal of value. The latter appear as unilateral
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because they are based on determined forms of tradition and authority. The idea
of social wealth, as a multilateral development of human needs and capacities,
confronts both. Let us first consider Marx’s account of what social wealth could
mean:
But in fact, when its narrow [bornierte] bourgeois form is eliminated, what is wealth but the
universality of needs, capacities, enjoyments, etc. of individuals, generated by the universal
exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, both the so-
called nature and their inner nature? The absolute elaboration of their creative assets, with-
out any other presupposition than the previous historical development, which makes this
totality of development, that is the development of all human forces as such, not measured
by a previous standard, an end in itself.Where it dos not reproduce itself in a determinate-
ness [Bestimmtheit], but produces its totality. [Where] it does not seek to remain as anything
that has become [Gewordnes], but in the absolute movement of its becoming. In the bour-
geois economy—and the production era that corresponds to it—this complete elaboration of
the human interior appears as complete emptying; this universal objectification [Vergegen-
ständlichung] as total alienation [Entfremdung]; and the destruction of all determinate uni-
lateral ends [bestimmten einseitigen Zwecke] as the sacrifice of the end in itself [Selbstz-
wecks] under a completely external end. Therefore, on the one hand the childish old
world appears as the higher. On the other hand it is so in everything where closed
shape, form and given limitation is sought. It is satisfying from a narrow [bornierte]
point of view; while the Modern remains unsatisfying or, where it appears satisfied in itself,
it is vulgar [gemein]. (Marx 1983, p. 411)¹
Marx uses the expression ‘narrow’ [bornierte] twice in this passage. Firstly, he is
addressing capitalism (wealth in its narrow bourgeois form). Secondly, he refers
to the non-capitalist ‘old world’, which is only satisfying from a narrow point of
view (the point of view of closed shape, closed form and given limitations). The
idea of wealth beyond its capitalist form (or value) stands in opposition to these
two forms of narrowness. Marx is thus counterposing narrow social forms (cap-
italist and non-capitalist) with an idea of wealth as an open, multilateral and ‘to-
tally elaborated’ social form. This idea of wealth contains the emancipatory in-
tent of his social critique.
The contradiction between wealth and value involves four aspects of the
concept of wealth that have been posited by capitalism but are also blocked
by it: 1) the full development of human mastery over internal and external na-
ture; 2) the absolute elaboration of human creative dispositions; 3) the reproduc-
tion, not of a human determinate character, but of a totality of determinations;
and 4) the absolute movement of becoming, and the possibility not to remain in
a limited form that has come to be. These four qualitative determinations of
 All quotes from German-language texts are my own translations.
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wealth become understandable under a categorical analysis, showing that cap-
italism produces an abstract form of social mediation, based on value and inde-
pendent from previous qualitative forms of production and consumption.
Now, these four dimensions of social wealth (which I will summarize as the
concept of a ‘multilateral social form’) are confronted with both capitalist and
non-capitalist forms of one-sidedness. Non-capitalist societies appear as unilat-
eral as long as they are mediated by qualitatively determined social forms, such
as relations of direct domination and tradition. These social relations are unilat-
eral as long as they embed people under the very determinateness [Bestimmtheit]
of their particular and traditional forms of existence. Capitalism, on the other
hand, is also a form of social unilaterality, though it is based not on particular
traditions or personal authority, but on the tautological movement of self-repro-
ducing value. The mediating character of labor grounds modernity’s basic fea-
tures, as modern forms of social relations are based on quasi-objective, anony-
mous compulsions. Marx states that only in capitalism is the goal of the
reproduction of value imposed over social life. By contrast, in non-capitalist
forms, the satisfaction of needs stands as the goal of production. “So the old
view, in which man—whatever the narrow national, religious or political deter-
mination—always appears as the aim of production, seems to be very exalted
against the modern world” (Marx 1983, p. 411). Capitalism replaces the unilater-
ality of previous national, religious or political determinations [Bestimmungen]
with a new form of one-sidedness, based on production for the sake of produc-
tion itself.
The opposition between capitalist and non-capitalist forms of one-sidedness
can be analyzed categorically departing from the features of value and capitalist
labor.With the transition to capitalism, according to Postone, the very nature of
social mediation changes. This transition is associated with the passage from
overt social relations to a set of quasi-objective relations, which appear not as
social, but as objective and abstract. Social mediation in capitalism is structured
as a set of impersonal dynamics, alien to individuals and fundamentally self-
moving. In non-capitalist societies, Postone claims, labor as such does not me-
diate society, but is embedded in activities otherwise determined:
This is quite different from social formations in which commodity production and exchange
do not predominate, where the social distribution of labor and its products is effected by a
wide variety of customs, traditional ties, overt relations of power, or, conceivably, conscious
decisions. (Postone 1993, p. 149)
In non-capitalist societies, labor does not mediate social relations, but is de-
pendent on other aspects of practice such as tradition, customs and even con-
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scious decisions. Capitalist society, on the other, is articulated by forms of dis-
torted praxis in which the very activities of human beings appear as something
alien to them, governed by objective and impersonal laws:
Central to Marx’s analysis is the argument that the relations that characterize capitalist so-
ciety are very different from the forms of overt social relations –such as kinship relations or
relations of personal or direct domination—that characterize noncapitalist [sic.] societies.
The latter sorts of relations are not only manifestly social, they are qualitatively particular;
no single, abstract, homogeneous sort of relation underlies every aspect of social life. (Post-
one 1993, p. 153)
The transition to capitalism is also the transition to modern society, in which
overt social relations recede. Bonds of personal dependence sanctioned by tra-
dition lose their mediating nature. Now, labor itself (and its expression in its
products, commodities and value) comes to mediate society. This transformation
gives rise to a new, specifically capitalist form of social domination, which is
based not on bonds of direct dependence, but on a universal system of social in-
terdependence which assumes a set of reified and fetishistic forms:
The hallmark of modern, or capitalist society is that, because the social relations that es-
sentially characterize this society are constituted by labor, they exist only in objectified
form. (Postone 1993, p. 154)
When Marx speaks about ‘total alienation [Entfremdung]’ and ‘the sacrifice of the
end in itself [Selbstzwecks] under a completely external end’ with the rise of cap-
italism, he is addressing these new forms of social domination. He provides a
double-sided account of capitalism. Since it is based on a quasi-objective, ab-
stract form of social mediation, capitalism confronts individuals as a set of inde-
pendent social powers that it cannot control or change by political decision or
otherwise. Yet on the other hand, capitalism confronts other forms of social re-
production that are based on direct relations of personal domination with ‘qual-
itatively particular’ (Postone 1993, p. 153) forms of mediation.
Social wealth, as opposed to both the extant unilateral forms of capitalism
and non-capitalist societies, aims towards the development of a multilateral
form of social mediation and production, no longer based on determinate tradi-
tions or personal authority, nor on the abstract mediation of value and labor. So-
cial wealth should be regarded as an emancipatory potential of modernity—a pos-
sibility that has been created by the immanent dynamic of capitalism, but that
could only be realized through the overcoming of value and labor as social me-
diators.
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Social wealth and the emancipatory potentials
of modernity
The idea of social wealth not only involves the increasing accumulation of
goods, but is grounded in the dynamics of social interaction. This is related to
a process of universalization of human interaction by which the capacities
and needs of individuals come to be socially produced in a historically unprece-
dented manner. This movement of universalization is made possible by the dy-
namic of capitalism. Yet, its full realization would involve moving beyond capi-
talism and the objective compulsions of value and labor.
With the transition from overt social relations to the quasi-objective and im-
personal constrictions of labor and value, significant transformations take place
in the sphere of production. As Postone states, forms of social mediation and
concrete forms of production are intertwined. “Marx analyzes the basic social re-
lations of capitalism, its form of wealth, and its material form of production, as
interrelated” (Postone 1993, p. 27).What fundamentally changes with the capital-
ist form of production is that the creation of goods tends to rest ever less on the
direct expenditure of labor and becomes increasingly dependent on the produc-
tive use of socially generated knowledge. This new form of production, while it
makes labor more one-sided and winding for the worker, also creates the condi-
tions for a different form of wealth (capable of transcending value), which could
be grounded in universal social interaction rather than direct labor. The idea of
social wealth, qualitatively understood, aims at this transformation of the very
process of production.
Capitalism entails a dual transformation of the relation between individuals,
production and society as a whole. On the one hand, with the capitalist form of
mediation, the modern individual as an independent person appears, as previ-
ous forms of direct domination recede. On the other hand, production for self-
consumption or immediate subsistence tends to disappear. Capitalism makes
people both more independent (from direct forms of authority) and more de-
pendent (on the universal process of social exchange). This dual process is car-
ried out in an alienated form through the dynamic of capital, which people can-
not control. The overcoming of capitalism would involve the collective
appropriation of the productive forces created by capital itself.
The individual emerges socially under capitalist social relations. “The more
we go back in history, the more the individual (and also the productive individ-
ual) appears as dependent [unselbständig] and belonging to a greater whole”
(Marx 1983, p. 34). The modern, independent individual is a historical result:
“Man (…) is not only a social animal, but an animal that can individualize itself
Globalization and Modernity in Marx and Postone 363
only in society” (Marx 1983, p. 35). In non-capitalist social forms, the creation of
consumable goods or use values is the direct goal of production. In that context,
the individual appropriates his conditions of labor under the framework of the
community. Marx speaks of the “existence of the individual as a member of a
community—his nature-like existence [naturwüchsiges Dasein] as member of a
tribe, etc.” (Marx 1983, p. 409). In non-capitalist forms, there is a more direct
link between the individual and the community, which mediates between him
and his conditions of existence or property: “[s]o ownership means belonging
to a tribe (community)” (Marx 1983, p. 415). The origin of capitalism involves
the dissolution of the communal forms in which labor stands as the owner of
its conditions. “The behavior of labor towards capital, or towards its objective
conditions of labor as capital, presupposes a historical process that dissolves
the different forms in which the worker is an owner, or in which the owner
works” (Marx 1983, p. 420). The dissolution [auflösung] of communal forms
gives rise to ‘free’ labor –free of both communal direct bonds and of property,
confronted by capital as an alien power. The result of this historical process of
dissolution is the appearance of a mass of free and dispossessed workers,
“whose only property is their labor power and the possibility to exchange it
against existent values” (Marx 1983, p. 420).
Capitalism displaces a communitarian nexus and also produces a new form
of social mediation developed along with the social division of labor. Individu-
als, now independent from personal or communal ties, become completely de-
pendent on one another through exchange. Under capitalism, “my product is
only a product as long as it is so for others; so it is a superseded individual [auf-
gehobnes einzelne], a universal [allgemeine]” (Marx 1983, p. 143). Productive units
now work for a universal system of exchange. At the same time, new needs ap-
pear that are socially created by the global process of interaction itself.
When production for exchange (for the creation of value instead of use val-
ues) is thoroughly established, it also comes to modify the material process of
production itself. This becomes evident with the growth of fixed capital and ma-
chinery. Mechanized production entails the radical subordination of labor under
capital, but also lays the foundations for the possible overcoming of capitalism.
“Inserted into the production process of capital, the means of labor pass through
different metamorphoses, whose culmination is the machine or, rather, an auto-
matic system of machinery (…), set in motion by an automaton” (Marx 1983,
p. 610). This ‘automaton’ is created by the powers of socially developed knowl-
edge. The worker appears here as the ‘conscious organ’ of the automated ma-
chine, so he is no longer a mere manual worker. Yet, this does not immediately
turn his work into something less unilateral or unpleasant: he has been turned
into an appendix of the machine as an embodiment of capital. “The develop-
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ment of the means of labor into machinery is not fortuitous for capital, but is the
historical transformation of the traditionally established means of labor, convert-
ed into means adequate to capitalism” (Marx 1983, p. 612).
Traditional tools are subordinated to the worker in the labor process, since
they merely transmit ‘the activity of the worker to the object’ (Marx 1983, p. 610).
The means of production are formally turned into fixed capital when they con-
front labor as an alien property. Nevertheless, there are no material differences
between the traditional instrument as fixed capital and as a property of the work-
er. With the development of machinery, capital transcends formal domination
and comes to materially govern production. “The production process has ceased
to be a work process in the sense of being controlled by work as its dominant
unit” (Marx 1983, p. 611). Machines, far from being mere instruments of
human labor, turn labor into an instrument of their own self-generated move-
ment. Capital, in this way, comes to transform material production, positing itself
as its subject.
This process, nevertheless, also creates the possibility of social wealth as
outlined in the previous section. The development of machinery leads to a rad-
ical ‘socialization’ of production based on the general introduction of universally
formed productive forces into the process of production. While independent vil-
lages or communities may have local, traditional, particular and determinate
forms of production, production for exchange tends to homogenize, through
competition, productive techniques and methods. Now the ‘social and universal’
powers of science and technology become the dominant productive forces, while
direct labor loses importance. “The immediate work is both quantitatively re-
duced to a lesser proportion and qualitatively reduced to an essential, but sub-
altern moment against the general scientific labor [allgemeine wissenschaftliche
Arbeit]” (Marx 1983, p. 614, emphasis added).
With the development of machinery and automation: a) knowledge, science
and technology, and not direct labor, come to be the determining factors of pro-
duction; and b) the knowledge that grabs hold of production is inherently social
and possesses a universal character, since it is the result of the global develop-
ment of production for exchange and is not tied to particular traditions or cus-
toms. The idea of a total elaboration of human abilities and needs not only op-
poses unilateral forms of existence (whether determinate, based on direct
domination, or abstract, based on labor)—it also entails that every productive
unit now works with socially general means and resources, which have been creat-
ed through a universal process of human interaction involving knowledge and sci-
ence.
The social powers of knowledge and science, developed under the alienated
conditions of capitalism, could be the basis of a post-capitalist society. This so-
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ciety would no longer be based on labor time as the measure of value and would
therefore be free of the quasi-objective and impersonal compulsions this brings
about.Yet it would not recede to previous forms of personal domination. Instead,
it would be ‘free’, structured neither by direct forms of domination nor by ab-
stract coercions. This possibility is also created by the development of wealth
under capitalism, which could dialectically go beyond value.
The social individual that arises with social wealth has multilateral needs
and capacities, since they have been produced by social knowledge in a univer-
sal process of social interaction. This process, while it has been made possible
under capitalism, points beyond it. “Real wealth is the developed productive
power of all individuals. It is then no longer labor, but disposable time that is
the measure of wealth” (Marx 1983, p. 622, emphasis added). The basis for this
shift is that the driving productive factor is no longer direct labor, but the socially
created power of science and technology, embedded in machines. In this way,
wealth can be understood categorically: it is not just determined by the growing
amount of goods produced, but also by the social characteristics of their produc-
tion and consumption. Social wealth is related to an individual whose needs and
capacities are universal, since they have been produced by social interaction,
knowledge and exchange.
Conclusion: globalization and philosophy
of universal history
Johannes Rohbeck, who is otherwise critical of Postone, has pointed out that
Marx attempted to ‘free philosophy of history from metaphysical assumptions’
(Rohbeck 2006, p. 83). Marx grounds world history in the global development
of ‘economic exchange’; in a ‘historical process that today is called globalization’
(Rohbeck 2006, p. 85). Marx could be regarded as ‘one of the first theorists of
globalization’ (Rohbeck 2006, p. 86). World history is not, in this reading, an
ahistorical and intemporal given in which capitalism can simply be located.
On the contrary, world history is determined under very specific historical con-
ditions—namely, those of the world market and the global production for ex-
change.
Rohbeck’s considerations may allow us to understand how a critical theory
of globalization could be developed from the foundations of the categorical cri-
tique. This critique is itself concerned with modernity as such. It understands
that social domination is embedded in the fundamental structures of the social
mediation of capitalist modernity. Globalization, from this perspective, involves
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the universalization of an impersonal and quasi-objective, alienated form of me-
diation.
Yet, capitalist modernity is nevertheless a form of domination as much as it
is creative and generative. It posits, along with its alienated movement, historical
possibilities that could transcend it. These possibilities are contained in social
wealth and in the social individual. While capitalist technologies are not eman-
cipatory in themselves, they involve emancipatory possibilities because they ren-
der direct human labor less and less relevant in production.
Social wealth and the possibility of the social individual arise from a process
of the globalization of knowledge, human capacities and needs. Under capital-
ism, productive units tend to lose their independence. This means that the
goal of production and consumption involves the whole world. Productive forces
become social: they are no longer specific to a single productive unit, nor based
on a particular custom or traditional method.
Finally, capitalist production also transforms human needs. The creation of
new needs by capitalism certainly involves forms of compulsive consumerism
with irrational sides, but their flipside is the fact that individuals are confronted
with the possibility of appropriating the historical results of cultures other than
their own. So production for value also brings about emancipatory potentials,
related to the idea of a multilateral form of human interaction and production,
based not on particular traditions nor on value and labor, but on universal
knowledge and the general growth—both quantitative and qualitative—of social-
ly created, universal wealth.
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Marco Kleber
The Metaphysics of Globalization
in Heidegger
Abstract: By referring to Heidegger’s understanding of metaphysics in his later
philosophy, a fundamental relationship between the tradition of metaphysical
thinking and the globalization of the principles of modernity may be considered.
Both metaphysics and globalization share the same concept of world, which
since the beginnings of modernity is understood as the accessibility of beings
in their entirety. The principles of modernity—such as world-accessibility, quan-
tification, energy-funding, accumulation and dominance—are grounded in a
metaphysical understanding of the human condition that is characterized by
the subject-object division. This metaphysical understanding of the man-world
relationship is considered to be the deeper rationale of all essential phenomena
of the modern age—such as philosophy, technology, natural science, economy,
politics of power, and even humanism—which all tend to globalize their funda-
mental principles. Investigating the Heideggerian criticisms of metaphysics helps
in understanding the deeper meaning of the notion of ‘world’, as this term is
used in the discourse about globalization.
Globalization and the concept of world
Metaphysics is in all its forms and historical stages a unique but perhaps necessary, fate of
the West and the presupposition of its planetary dominance. The will of that planetary
dominance is now in turn affecting the center of the West. (Heidegger 1973, p. 90)
Here, Heidegger connects the planetary dominance of the western hemisphere
(the globalization that originates from within Europe in the context of western
imperialism and colonialism, but which became a connected systemic order
and, therefore, turns back affecting its center) with a certain ‘way of think-
ing’—‘metaphysics’—that is meant to be the presupposition and deeper rationale
of global modernity.What metaphysics and globalization do have in common is
precisely this ‘will to domination’. Metaphysics ‘as philosophy’ is a discourse
about what is meta, ‘over’ the physis; the certain beings in the world, and
about what is ‘transcendent’ to those beings (Heidegger 1998, p. 93). What
goes beyond the certain ‘beings in’ the world was interpreted by the tradition
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of metaphysical thinking as ‘the world itself ’—the ‘totality’ of all beings. “‘World’
serves, here, as a name for beings in their entirety.” (Heidegger 2002, p. 67) Since
its beginnings in ancient philosophy, metaphysics has given thought to this to-
tality called ‘world’, and, by doing so, attempted to subordinate the totality of
beings to this thinking, to make it accessible to human thought. Otherwise, met-
aphysics would not have been able to think about beings in their entirety, and, if
so, there would be no metaphysical philosophy at all. It is indeed of necessity to
the logic of thought to refer to this entireness, and, therefore, metaphysics be-
came the ‘fate’ of the west. Though, thinking of the world as a whole at first
leads to ‘dominating’ it. Thereby, the same problematic reference to the totality
of all beings is inherent both to metaphysics and to globalization: the world as a
whole is affected by globalization and needs to be made available and connected
within the ongoing process of globalization.
Metaphysics and globalization do indeed have the same will to domination,
because they both share the same concept of ‘world’: as a totality that is acces-
sible to human will and thinking. The notion of world, precisely as this term is
used in contemporary discourse about globalization (world society, world mar-
ket, world trade, world bank, world system, world order, world currency, world
war, world fair, world citizenship, worldwide networking and orientation) is ac-
tually a metaphysical concept; it originates from the history of metaphysical
thinking. The history of the concept of cosmos (κόσμος),mundus and world starts
with Pre-Socratic philosophy (like Heraclitus) and can be retraced through the
Gospel of John and in Christian philosophy (Augustine, Thomas Aquinas) to
modern times (Kant) and, from its beginnings, shows certain kinds of ambivalen-
ces (Heidegger 1998, pp. 111–121). These ambivalences also concern the global-
ized principles of modernity. Modernity always tends to totalize the will to
make the world accessible: to expand towards all spots of the globe (including
the seabed), towards interplanetary space, as well as into the inner cores of
atoms and the biological micro-structures of life, and towards all aspects of
human society.
Phenomena of the age
Modern metaphysics, according to Heidegger, is based in the philosophical
principle of subjectivity and, therefore, is characterized by radical subject-ob-
ject division. The fact that man is now philosophically interpreted as a subject
(from the Latin subiacere, which means ‘to lie below’) says that he now under-
stands his own existence and reasoning as the instance in which all beings are
grounded:
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The word names that-which-lies-before, that which, as ground, gathers everything onto it-
self. This metaphysical meaning of the concept of the subject has, in the first instance, no
special relationship to man, and none at all to the I. (Heidegger 2002, p. 66)
Therefore, to understand oneself as a subject means to realize a specific relation-
ship to the world of beings: for those, ‘to be’ now means to be an object that may
be represented and known by the subject. All beings are (and the world is) now
defined by the principle of subjectivity and its corresponding principle of objec-
tification. “Beings as a whole are now taken in such a way that a being is first
and only in being insofar as it is set in place by representing-producing [vorstel-
lend-herstellenden] humanity.” (Heidegger 2002, pp. 67–68) Because the world is
now defined by its capability of being representable by the subject, and as far as
a ‘representation’ is synonymous with a ‘picture’, Heidegger can re-name mod-
ernity as The Age of the World Picture, which is the title of his famous essay
from 1938 (Heidegger 2002, p. 57).
This essence of modernity—that all beings exist as representable objectivity
and that the world itself is understood as such a representation—is the ‘ground’
of all so-called ‘essential phenomena’ of the age. That means, with regard to all
those basic “phenomena [Erscheinungen], their metaphysical ground must allow
itself to be recognized in them” (Heidegger 2002, p. 57). This recognition of the
phenomena must be the only argument to justify the assumption of a metaphys-
ical ground of an age, or, of modernity being the age of the world picture.What
are, according to Heidegger, these essential phenomena of modernity?
Firstly, there is metaphysics itself, as the philosophy of the 17th to up to the
20th century. It is precisely “the guiding thought of modern philosophy” that
“something ‘is’ only insofar as a founded cognition has secured it for itself as
its object.” (Heidegger 1991, p. 27) This can be found in Heidegger’s Interpreta-
tion of Leibniz’s principium rationis – the principle of sufficient reason—that is
essential to early-modern philosophy and which says that “Nothing is without
reason. The principle now says that every thing counts as existing when and
only when it has been securely established as a calculable object for cognition.”
(Heidegger 1991, p. 120) To say that everything exists only with reason, and noth-
ing without reason, implies that everything, every being is accessible to human
cognition (as the criteria of this being), which can always represent the reason
why this being exists. Metaphysics, which, throughout its history, more and
more tended to interpret ‘being’ at all as ‘being an object’, is understood by Hei-
degger as the effect of an ‘erroneous trend’ within western culture, with global
modernity as its final manifestation. Its preconditions go back to Parmenides
and his famous assessment “that, namely the same, is perceiving as well as
being” (Heidegger 1991, p. 73), but this seed sprouted only when it was “in the
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metaphysics of Descartes that, for the first time, the being is defined as the ab-
jectness of representation, and truth as the certainty of representation” (Heideg-
ger 2002, p. 66). Heidegger even includes his own philosophy of his earlier writ-
ings into his criticism of objectivizing metaphysical thoughts, when he, in 1929,
implicitly argues against his first major work Being and Time from 1927. This ap-
proach, by mistake, identified the ontological context of object-usage with the
phenomena of the world (cp. Heidegger 1998, pp. 121, 370, footnote 52).
Secondly: Because of metaphysics defining ‘world’ as the totality of beings,
which is ‘accessible’ to human thought, modern technology is the most consis-
tent realization and materialization of the essence of metaphysical thinking
(Luckner 2008, pp. 59, 93). What distinguishes ‘modern’ from ‘traditional’ tech-
nology—for example, a hydroelectric power plant from a traditional watermill
—is that the mill indeed uses the water flow of the river, but that the power
plant represents the idea of ‘whole’ nature being an accessible resource for
the demand of accumulating energy. Modern technology, like the power plant,
“puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it suppl[ies] energy that can be
extracted and stored as such.” (Heidegger 1977, p. 14) Unlike the movement of
the mill that is built into the river, energy is—like money—an abstract category
that can, in principle, be accumulated infinitely (Luckner 2008, p. 114).
‘Whole’ nature, then, becomes primarily a resource for technology. Thus, modern
technology is, indeed, not essentially defined as a useful means to an end, but as
a (metaphysically determined) conception of what nature in its entirety is.
Thirdly: Insofar as modern ‘natural science’ understands nature in its entire-
ty as a calculable coherence of forces and energies (which can be anticipated by
referring to natural law and made controllable by experiments using measure-
ment and mathematical calculation as its basic methods) it totally complies
with the essence of modern technology (Heidegger 2002, pp. 61–66; 1977,
p. 21). By referring to ‘nature’ as quantifiable, mathematized and, therefore, se-
cured to human disposal, the world of natural sciences is nothing other than the
entireness of potential technological (and economic) resources. If anything can-
not be represented and imagined as a calculable coherence of forces and, thus,
cannot become open to technological and/or economical access, it is not at all
‘nature’ in the sense of modern ‘natural’ science.
Fourthly: Heidegger addresses the ‘economy’ as an essential phenomenon of
the modern age in the context of his reception of Marx and Hegel. He points out
that Marx’s concept of ‘dialectical materialism’ “does not consist in the assertion
that everything is simply matter but rather in a metaphysical determination ac-
cording to which every being appears as the material of labor” (Heidegger
1998, p. 259). The metaphysical background of labor was, before Marx, first
thought in “Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as the self-establishing process of un-
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conditioned production, which is the objectification of the actual through the
human being, experienced as subjectivity” (Heidegger 2008, p. 295). Every
being—the whole metaphysical world—appears as the material of labor, which
transforms natural being into technology and, by this, labor produces the
added-value which is needed for the self-establishing process of capital accumu-
lation in modern societies. Capitalism is exactly that kind of economic system
that can at its best execute the metaphysical objectification of world and the es-
sence of technology.
Fifthly: The metaphysical trinity of technology, science and economy effectu-
ates that politics have to give rise to the claim to make the world accessible to
objectification and technological access. Thereby, politics transforms itself into
‘politics of power’ and, from a global perspective, into ‘geopolitics’. The political
leaders of nation states, inside and outside, have to push forward mechanization
and technological progress, which causes the clash of nations and leads, accord-
ing to Heidegger, to geopolitical conflicts, including the world wars (Vietta 2015,
p. 163). The newly-published Black Notebooks by Heidegger deal, among other
things, with the global political power blocks after World War II—the Soviet
Union and the United States—which seem to have oppositional political ideolo-
gies, but are indeed driven by the same concept of power (Heidegger 2014,
p. 173– 174; Vietta 2015, p. 164).
The struggle between those who are in power and those who want to come to power: On
every side there is the struggle for power. […] This struggle is of necessity planetary and
as such undecidable in its being because it has nothing to decide […]. (Heidegger 1973,
p. 102)
There is a thinking related to spheres of influence and global supremacy in geo-
political situations, driven by technological and economical constraints, in
which this planetary struggle, with power being an end in itself and its object
being the entire world, has not necessarily anything to decide, because the cat-
egories of power itself and its ‘understanding’ of the world as accessible to men
—the ‘metaphysical’ approach of technology and economy—is never questioned
as such.
Sixthly: The aforementioned aspects and consequences of metaphysical
thinking about the world ultimately result from the self-understanding of man
as a subject and, therefore, relate to humanism and its anthropology. Humanism
intends to moralize man and, with this, to let him recognize his own dignity. In-
deed, all variants of humanism “presupposed the most universal ‘essence’ of the
human being to be obvious. The human being is considered to be an animal ra-
tionale.” (Heidegger 1998, p. 245) Regarding this definition, the subject-object
The Metaphysics of Globalization in Heidegger 373
distinction is repeated and duplicated within the human being itself. Man is ‘an-
imal’, i.e. a living creature understood as a biological organism; in addition to
this, man is rationale, with the ability to be rational and reasoning. In the formu-
la man = organism + rationality, ‘human being’ divides itself into being a subject
and being an object. Human existence itself is now understood as being-an-ob-
ject to a subject and enters the realm of accessibility to the metaphysical subjec-
tivity. Man himself becomes a resource on behalf of technology: “Man, who no
longer conceals his character of being the most important raw material, is also
drawn into this process.” (Heidegger 1973, p. 104) With this being an implication
of the humanist understanding of man, the basic ideas of humanism, such as
freedom and human dignity, are (not in an unproblematic way) simply opposi-
tional to the exploitation or even self-exploration of humans. Heidegger relates
these negative dialectics of humanism to the idea of the absolute value, which
is regarded as human dignity:
Rather, it is important finally to realize that precisely through the characterization of some-
thing as ‘a value’ what is so valued is robbed of its worth. That is to say, by the assessment
of something as a value what is valued is admitted only as an object for human estimation.
[…] Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings:
be.” (Heidegger 1998, p. 265)
The paradox of human dignity is that, by attributing an absolute value to him-
self, man attributes to himself and transforms himself into an object that is rel-
ative to this attribution, and, therefore, does not seem to relate to himself any-
more as absolute. On the contrary, this does not mean that it is possible to
deny human dignity, but rather that “Humanism is opposed because it does
not set the humanitas of the human being high enough” (Heidegger 1998,
p. 251). Furthermore, this means that we have to think about the essence of
human dignity in a new and more radical way, by considering the negative as-
pects that the ideas of humanism may have.
These abovementioned aspects of the phenomena of the age—modern phi-
losophy, technology, science, economy, politics of power and humanism—are re-
lated to metaphysics, because metaphysics refers to the world of beings in their
entirety, or to nature—and because this entireness is also addressed within the
phenomena that are essentially defined as concepts about what ‘being’ or
‘world’ actually means. Heidegger’s basic intention is to fulfill the so-called
‘Turning’ (Heidegger 1977, p. 36), which means to think both of beings in their
entirety and of the relation of human existence to this entireness in a new
way: to think the “transition from metaphysics to the thinking of being in its his-
toricality” (Heidegger 2012, p. 5). At first, this means to consider that the phe-
nomena of an age are grounded in a deeper understanding of the world. Be-
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cause, concerning the age of modernity, an understanding of the world as ‘acces-
sible’ to man appears as essential to all phenomena of modernity, modernity as
such tends to globalize its principles, such as power, quantification, mathema-
tization, technologization and energy production. The metaphysical concept of
the world is indeed inherent to modernity. The age of the ‘world picture’ is the
age of globalization.
Two concepts of world:
the universe and the globalization
According to the humanistic definition of man—which, according to Heidegger,
is ‘not false’ but ‘conditioned by metaphysics’ (Heidegger 1998, p. 246)—the
human being is an animal rationale; a definition that appears within ancient
and medieval philosophy as the Latin translation of the Grecian zoon logon
echon (ζϖον λογον εχον)—the living creature that is able to think and to talk.
To be rational means to be able to have thoughts, and this implies the ability
to form sentences and phrases, or, to use language. One of the most fundamental
logical principles of language is predication: the possibility to say that any being
is another determination, like, for example, a ‘quality’ of this being. What does
this ‘is’ mean? In contrast to the ‘certain’ being in the world (which is defined by
a summary of its actual or possible determinations and can be separated and
distinguished from other beings), the ‘is’—which appears within human lan-
guage and, by this, must be meaningful—has no certain qualities. That the
being is, must be something else than how and what it is.
This is what Heidegger calls the ‘ontological difference’: the distinction be-
tween “beings in their being, and being of beings” (Heidegger 1998, p. 105). Be-
cause man can understand ‘is’ or ‘to be’ within the usage of language, the ‘being
of all’ beings is related to his existence. And because this ‘being’ does not mean
something special—no particular fact or thing in the world—but that being is,
human existence is not limited to certain areas of beings, but has an essential
relationship to the entireness of beings, to the world. Indeed, this world is not
an object to a human subject, like ‘certain’ beings could be objectivized. This
marks the erroneous trend both within the tradition of metaphysical thinking,
and the cultural history that leads to the principles of modernity—to the age
of the ‘world picture’—that always tends to subordinate the entireness of beings
to an object of calculation and disposal. But the turning to a different way of
thinking concerning the world can be made throughout the metaphysical defini-
tions. To Heidegger, human being (Dasein) now stands in a relationship to world
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that is defined as the ‘transcendence’ to certain beings: “We name world that to-
ward which Dasein as such transcends, and shall now determine transcendence
as being-in-the-world.” (Heidegger 1998, p. 109) As the hyphens in Heidegger’s
new phrase indicate, ‘being-in-the-world’ is meant to be a structure in which
there is a fundamental unity concerning the relationship between human exis-
tence (which is called Dasein) and being of beings, called world. The emphasis
of this unity avoids the subject-object division of early modern philosophy up to
the 20th century, which complies with the problematic principles of modernity as
such. Again: what is the problem concerning the modern understanding of
‘world’?
Heidegger explains why there always appears a problem when the essential
human-world relationship—the ‘being-in-the-world’—is divided into subject and
object, or, equally, when the unity of the world is ‘abstracted’ atwain:
It is therefore equally erroneous to appeal to the expression world either as a designation for
the totality of natural things (the natural concept of world), or as a term for the community of
human beings (the personal concept of world). Rather,what is metaphysically [52] essential in
the more or less clearly highlighted meaning of κόσμος, mundus, world, lies in the fact that it
is directed toward an interpretation of human existence [Dasein] in its relation to beings as a
whole. […] World belongs to a relational structure distinctive of Dasein as such, a structure
that we called being-in-the-world. (Heidegger 1998, pp. 120–121)
The fundamental man-world relationship is undermined by subject-object divi-
sion, and by the understanding of world as representational. This leads to an un-
derstanding of ‘world’ in which there are actually two totally different usages of
the notion: the natural concept of world and the personal concept of world. The
two are equally erroneous—the former as a designation of the totality of all nat-
ural objects (without the human subject), and the latter as a name for the com-
munity of human beings (to which nature is accessible).
We can recognize these two usages of the notion of ‘world’ in the discourse
about modernity and globalization. Modernity, firstly, describes the ‘natural’
world in its entirety, including its most distant phenomena, which can only be vi-
sualized due to the invention of the astronomic telescope, and which are meant to
be explained by referring to the basic principles concerning the behavior of matter.
This understanding of the world is named the ‘universe’. In this so-called universe
there is nothing like the phenomena of humanity. The universe is not the human
world. Human existence—Heidegger’s Dasein—is not a relevant object to those sci-
ences that have the authority to define the concept of the universe.
In his book Mind and Cosmos, Thomas Nagel points out that the “great ad-
vances in the physical and biological sciences were made possible by excluding
the mind from the physical world. This has permitted a quantitative understand-
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ing of that world, expressed in timeless, mathematically formulated physical
laws.” (Nagel 2012, p. 8) The main thesis of his book is that this leads to an apo-
ria, “since mind is the product of a partly physical progress”—even the mind of
the scientist who works with the theory—but these physical sciences “have been
developed for a mindless universe” (Nagel 2012, p. 12). Opposing the supreme
paradigms of Neo-Darwinism and materialism, and for the sake of the future de-
velopment of our scientific culture and theory, the question should be asked of
how a more comprehensive understanding of the physical reality, which includes
the mind (phenomena such as consciousness, cognition, value, conclusion),
might be possible (cp. Nagel 2012). It could be true that it is the most important
characteristic of matter or of the physical universe that it can bring mind into re-
ality and that matter should be re-thought in categories of the mind.
While the paradigms of modern natural science are only made possible by
excluding fundamental aspects of existence and life from these sciences, the
human self-understanding is always implicitly in the background. The universe
that is defined as pure objectivity is determined by man who, since the begin-
nings of modernity, exists as a subject. The ‘natural’ world is defined as the en-
tireness of the behavior of pure matter. This is the metaphysical world, accessible
to human disposal. The universe, a concept that ‘underdetermines’ human being
in the world by excluding the principle of subjectivity, is actually linked to an
‘overdetermination’ of the human will within the modern understanding of
‘world’. Then, man suddenly stands above all other natural things, which are re-
duced to their capacity to be objectivized and manipulated as energy resource,
as experiment, and as commodity. This is expressed by a different usage of
the notion of world: the world that is connected and made accessible by or with-
in the world society, the world market, the world trade, the world bank, the
world system, the world order, the world currency, the world wide web, etc.
This concept of ‘world’, which defines it as the summary of all human involve-
ments, is the world-concept of globalization, which is without doubt present in
all current discourses about what globalization might be.
While the ‘natural’ concept of world excludes human activities and relation-
ships from its definition of the universe, the second concept of world, by con-
trast, excludes nature from what is meant to be the world. However, this is so
only if ‘nature’ is understood in the old, Aristotelian way—as that which is in-ac-
cessible to human disposal and manipulation, because it exists and moves on its
own, a concept which is remarkably different to the understanding of ‘nature’ as
a resource for energy production and economic growths (cp. Luckner 2008,
pp. 103– 104).With this, the two concepts of world are obviously linked; they re-
sult from the same abstractness that divides the essential relation and openness
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of human existence to the cosmos—a relational structure that is named being-in-
the-world by Heidegger— into a pure object-side and a pure subject-side.
Globalization’s understanding of the world arises during the beginning of
European modernity with the exploration of North America, the decentralization
of the globe in the Copernican revolution, the development of the central per-
spective within art, and the Cartesian philosophy. All these events have in com-
mon that the world (which is quite often imagined as the planetary globe) is ob-
jectivized by an external perspective. Since this, globalization expands towards
all areas of the natural world, including man’s own bodily nature and life, tend-
ing to make this world accessible. This process of globalization is understood by
Heidegger as the quantification of the world, which can be seen in the “destruc-
tion of great distances by the airplane, in the representations of foreign and re-
mote worlds in their everydayness produced at will by the flick of a switch” (Hei-
degger 2002, p. 71).
As shown, global modernity and metaphysics share the same concept of
world. With this, metaphysics is the necessary presupposition of the planetary
dominance of the West (the globalization of the European principles of world-ac-
cessibility) and the rise of a connected systemic order that in turn affects the cen-
ter of the West.
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Lucas von Ramin
Globalization as a Symbolic Form: Ernst
Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Form
as the Basis for a Theory of Globalization
Abstract:The aim of this paper is to investigate and problematize the present sta-
tus of theories of globalization. Because of the actual diversity of these theories,
a philosophical definition must be able to include this diversity without becom-
ing meaningless. This paper claims that Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of culture—
especially his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923– 1929)—is particularly suitable
for providing a uniform access. The first part therefore examines an understand-
ing of such symbolic forms; it shows on the one hand the problems of classical
theories, and on the other hand the advantage of a functional access of cultural
production, provided through the concept of Cassirer’s elaboration of the condi-
tions of possibility of culture and meaning. The paper then identifies the differ-
ent aspects of globalization as a symbolic form, including the way it became a
picture of the world, changed the understandings of space and time, is an inter-
pretive paradigm and myth, and finally has consequences for the construction of
subjectivity and identity. In a summarizing section, the paper highlights the par-
adoxical structure of globalization as its constituent moment. With the concept
of symbolic forms, this awareness of contingency can be understood as a specific
way of comprehending, related to our time and its cultural processing and man-
aging strategies. In conclusion, there is much to suggest that the concept of glob-
alization should be treated as a world image. Only then can one understand why
globalization has become a symbol of our time: on the one hand, it occupies it-
self with universalistic claims; on the other, it is permeated by particular anxiet-
ies.
It has become difficult to escape the concept of globalization. Not only does it
consistently shape the media and academic discourse—our lives are also directly
affected by the consequences of globalization. However, more detailed inquiries
reveal that the phenomena to which globalization relates vary widely. This is true
for everyday use, as well as for scientific use: a uniform definition of globaliza-
tion does not exist. Therefore, the aim cannot be to search for a unique definition
or something that all things meant by globalization have in common. Equally,
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the use of this term in philosophical approaches is not self-evident. Instead, the
question arises: what are the conditions of the possibility of a common meaning
of globalization?
An author whose life’s work and philosophy are in exactly that relationship
of epistemology, conceptual theory and cultural philosophy is Ernst Cassirer. He
was the first Jewish director of a German university, and he subsequently escap-
ed from National Socialism, went into exile and died in New York; he fell into
academic oblivion for a long time, until his theoretical approach saw a revival
from the 1980s on. This is due to his magnum opus, Philosophy of Symbolic
Forms (Cassirer 2010). The aim of this project was to develop a theory of the cog-
nitive functions and expressions of human beings. Cassirer’s approach is thus
predestined to on the one hand, fill the methodological gap of the formation
of a concept of globalization, and on the other hand, to build a bridge between
cultural philosophy and ethics. The question was no longer how we recognize
the world, but: how do we understand it?
From a functional theory of experience
to the philosophy of symbolic forms
Cassirer’s starting point was a critique of the classical and formal process of ab-
straction, which also forms the starting point of knowledge for the concept of
globalization. The common understanding was that a definition or essence
could be made or found by finding commonalities and differences between
the term-related objects, which are then constitutive for the term itself. In
order to enrich the criticism in content, it is helpful to show that ‘classical ap-
proach’ in reference to globalization. Roughly understood, globalization is the
intensification of worldwide relations in the fields of politics, economy and cul-
ture.
Whether concerning provisions of the European Union, the Böhmermann-Er-
dogan debate in Germany or the international refugee crisis, for all examples it is
true that they cannot be explained without supranational influences. Due to
growing interdependencies, the autonomy of the nation state has reached its lim-
its (Osterhammel / Petersson 2007). Jürgen Habermas described this as the ‘post-
national constellation’ (Habermas 1998, p. 91). He argues that the national state
alone cannot fill the new gaps of legitimacy. Global and trans-national institu-
tions such as the UN and the EU should undertake this task. The hope was an
increasing legalization. The most obvious discussion was the tendency towards
universalization in terms of human rights. For example, Martha Nussbaum as-
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sumes that pre-state claims provide a plausible foundation for a global human
rights regime (Nussbaum 1999).
This is even more noticeable in the area of economics. Production, price de-
velopment, employment relationships, etc. can no longer be understood without
global references. In every book about globalization, the claim is made that the
economic constraints comprise the driving force behind the delimitation move-
ment, and that the market is the determining factor over all other existing sys-
tems (politics, social affairs, culture). It is not without cause that the renowned
economist Jagdish Bhagwati defends himself against globalization critics when
he highlights globalization as the “most powerful source for social good in the
world” (Bhagwati 2007). For example, pertaining to the issue of child labor, in-
stitutionalization can be a helpful way to end it. Border crossing is not only evi-
dent at the level of organizations such as WTO or large global corporations, but
also on a small scale. Most products we buy were produced under completely
different conditions in other countries. Not only does the western market depend
on extra-state production—it furthermore influences the living conditions in
Third World countries, as scandals about productions in Bangladesh (for exam-
ple) show. Exploitation, cheap labor, child labor and poverty are consequences
of global production. Hence, it seems that the economy has developed its own
dynamics and logic. Under the term ‘capitalism’ and in the context of the eco-
nomic crisis of 2008, the problem of such trends was revealed. However, it be-
came clear that these problems can only be controlled and addressed on a global
level.
In the field of culture, the rapid development of information and communi-
cation technologies blurs the self-containment of cultural identities. Like the ap-
propriation of mangas in the west or the takeover of Bavarian beer house culture
in Asia, cultural products are detached from their context and free for adapta-
tion. Byung-Chul Han therefore speaks of ‘hyperculture’: “The limits or fencing,
to which the appearance of a cultural authenticity or originality is imprinted, dis-
solves. Culture is bursting at the seams.” (Han 2005, p. 16) Rather, cultures coex-
ist and change each other at the same time. Nevertheless, attempts to speak of a
‘world society’ are common (Beck 1998; Luhmann 1975). The coincidence of the
two viewpoints leads not only to productive mixing and pluralization, but also to
severe cultural conflicts (occident/orient), as well as to reciprocal transformation
of cultures.
Overall, the lowest common denominator is that all definition or description
of globalization focuses on the delimitation thesis. They only differ in that some
see this as a weakening (interdependence, globalization as a network) or
strengthening (homogenization, universalization) process. The examples given
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here are only a fraction of the current discussion, but sufficiently serve the pur-
pose of giving an empiricism of the delimitation of boundaries.
However, it would not be sufficient to simply follow Cassirer’s critique of the
‘classical’ approach of abstraction. In his view, the most general terms are those
with the least content, and thus the importance of the phenomenon cannot be
grasped. Globalization is not simply a generic term, but is only understandable
in the context of different concepts and theories like trans-nationalization, dena-
tionalization, capitalism, economization, multiculturalism or deterritorialization.
Concepts, as Cassirer quite Kantianly says, “cannot be taken from the realm of
subject matter that they are supposed to explain.” (Paetzold 2008, p. 29) The phi-
losophy of the symbolic forms seeks to clarify this overall connection between
constitution (what characterizes the concept and makes it functional) and con-
struction (the function that the concept itself takes over). Therefore, terms are
representations and parts of an overall system. Following Gerald Hartung’s anal-
ysis of Cassirer: “Instead of a theory of scientific thinking, an analysis of all
paths is necessary on which reality is merged into a cognitive cosmos [i.e. glob-
alization].” (Hartung 2006, p. 219)
Symbolic forms are forms that help us to understand and to create an under-
standing of the world. Man becomes the creator of the world through his own
mental activity. The comprehensive approach of the project is reflected in the de-
termination of the human being as an ‘animal symbolicum’. Then, culture is un-
derstood as an organic whole: “Whenever man becomes aware of and perceives
the world, things and oneself, it requires mediation through symbolic forms.”
(Müller 2010, p. 15) Therefore, the philosophy of symbolic forms, understood
as ‘cultural criticism’, allows us to understand different spaces of experience;
in the specific language, these are myth, religion, science, technology and lastly
politics. Returning to the concept of globalization, it is true that with the concept
of delimitation, the core of that movement is grasped—but this explanation is
one-dimensional. That means, the moments of globalization “cannot be listed
in isolation or even divided into different kinds of globalization which we
then work through accordingly.” (Gedinat 2015, p.7)
Globalization as a symbolic form
It is no small claim to understand globalization as a ‘symbolic form’. As part of
the Cassirer-examined forms like language, myth, religion, science and technol-
ogy, globalization seems not to be taken for granted. Nevertheless, so the thesis,
the basic functions can also be found. Globalization has become a form between
constitution and construction, through which specific phenomena of economy,
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technology, politics or society can be interpreted. In other words: globalization
comes necessarily to one’s mind when thinking about such spheres. The term
is used to explain everything and thus has become a non-explanation. Every-
thing would actually already have been said with the answer: ‘It’s all about glob-
alization’—but nothing would have been understood.
We live in the ‘age of globalization’ (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und
Energie 2016), the dawning of which the BMWi dates with the year 1998, and in
which processes of internationalization, acceleration and interdependence are
omnipresent. However, reference is not made to concrete forms of globalization,
nor to the necessity that arises due to it—a necessity that already created a dis-
course about the end of this era (Straubhaar 2016), because internationalization
set countermovements in motion, which undermine the original processes of
globalization (nationalism, protectionism). Nevertheless, maybe this is not the
end, just the other side of the coin. If globalization is a symbolic form, both
sides can be connected in a productive way. It is no longer about the search
for the core or similarities of all the things related to globalization, but rather
the attempt to understand the meaning of the term. Such an attempt is analo-
gous to Cassirer’s investigations and can be roughly divided into four levels:
Globalization as a worldview, void, myth and the consequences for the subject.
Globalization as a worldview
Firstly, it must be discussed which function the term ‘globalization’ has besides a
reduction to the lowest common denominator. It is important to ask how the
meanings of specific phenomena were changed by globalization, and thus
also changed the meaning of the term itself. Globalization is therefore not
only determined through its differentia specifica, it is furthermore a normative
pattern of interpretation—a worldview. This view is especially characterized by
its paradoxical structure: “Depending on the perspective, it appears either pos-
itively as a de-ideologizing, liberating tendency, or negatively as a violence
which infiltrates the remnants of human life and completely changes social sys-
tems and cultures.” (Schweppenhäuser / Gleiter 1999, p. 6) This can be easily
shown by looking at the aforementioned areas of politics, economy and culture.
There was the hope that through the processes of globalization values such
as democracy and human rights would spread worldwide. ‘Cosmopolitan city’,
‘world system’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ were the terms on which such a debate fo-
cused.Worldwide entanglements were considered as possibly producing the civ-
ilization of the world. Thus, with the statement of the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama
1992), Francis Fukuyama represented the thesis that with democracy, liberalism
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and market economy, the dominant models of world order had prevailed, and
alternatives no longer seemed plausible. That lack of alternatives only leads to
gradual distortions within the dominant system. The core of these theses can
be pinpointed, on the eve of the popularity of globalization, to the prevailing
dominance of modernization theories. These theories assumed that history has
to be understood as a progressive and rational process,which leads to social, po-
litical and economic improvements; and furthermore, that the movement of de-
limitation and globalization are among the categories of modernity itself (Gid-
dens 1995). It is stressed as a criticism of these concepts that on the one
hand, they hide the dark sides of globalization, like poverty or the rapid degra-
dation of the environment, while on the other hand, an increasingly Eurocentric
perspective legitimizes western hegemony (from colonialism to capitalism).
That, 25 years after the appearance of Fukuyama’s thesis, the world has not
developed into unity illustrates the problem of such a project. The crises are
striking: whether politically, such as the Ukraine crisis or the conflicts in the
Middle East; economically, such as the finding that the living conditions “be-
tween and within individual world regions and societies have remained extreme-
ly unequal or even diverging” (Debiel / Roth / Ulbert 2010, p. 16); or culturally,
such as the lack of equality between men and women. Therefore, current global-
ization theories try to thematize that contradiction.
In this sense, it is not accidental that Ernst Bloch’s description of the ‘simul-
taneity of the non-simultaneous’ (Bloch 1985, p. 104) got a revival in the context
of globalization. The sociologist Armin Nassehi expresses this interaction in
terms of ethical questions:
It [globalization] denotes both a specter, which threatened our beautiful social peace and
the reasonably functioning model of tamed capitalism, and the possibility of reversing re-
gional particularisms in favor of that state two hundred years ago, as mankind as an inclu-
sion formula should provide those forces that can liberate us from self-inflicted immaturity.
The talk of globalization legitimates both social atrocities in political decisions and the
hope that the One World, of which the 1970s alternative and third world movements
spoke as a provocation, have now become reality. (Nassehi 1999, p. 21)
In Robert Robertson we can find a similar representation. In his article “Glocal-
ization: Homogeneity and heterogeneity in space and time” (Robertson 1998), he
said that globalization mainly comes from a coexistence of different effects and
dimensions. For example, smartphones and internet access are now widespread
worldwide, even in the poorest regions. Simultaneously, much of the production
of these devices is based on the exploitation of raw materials in developing
countries. Ironically, amazement at the image of a refugee with a smartphone
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shows how much western thinking is still arrested in the modernization para-
digm.
Ulf Engel and Matthias Middell therefore used the term ‘fracture zones of
globalization’ (Engel / Middell 2010, p. 23) in their book about the similarities
and differences among 26 globalization theorists, to represent the doubt that
all the different phenomena can be meaningfully brought together. It shows a
differentiated picture of delimitation, which can be only understood in its plural-
ity and contradictoriness:
[The] world in the sense of shared values and universally accepted principles and standards
for tackling global challenges only exists in a rudimentary state. Despite global communi-
cation, transnational migration, technology transfer and the proliferation of Western con-
sumption patterns, the worlds still remain alien to one another. (Debiel / Roth / Ulbert
2010, p. 25)
In recent years, the opposite trend has been particularly clear in the rise of pop-
ulist movements in the western world. They are considered as the voice of ‘glob-
alization losers’ (Titz 2016)—people who understand their loss of work, reduced
income or general slipping into precarious situations as an outcome of globali-
zation. As the example of the smartphone and, furthermore, research on conse-
quences of global warming make visible, vulnerabilities are unfairly distributed
(Reder 2009, pp. 130– 131).
It is useful to ask whether this type of ‘western globalization loser’ is not in
fact a special cohort, since it is located within the large cohort of globalization
winners. If this thesis is correct, it reveals more obviously the changed meaning
of globalization. A recently published study by the Bertelsmann Foundation
shows that about half of the citizens of Europe fear globalization. The word
has become a cipher for ‘automation, migration and international banking’
(Titz 2016). It is no longer a principle of hope, but a threat. The same can be
said for the United States, if the election of Donald Trump can be referred
back to his critical positions on globalization. These examples show that global-
ization also includes movements back to the local, to nationalism and protec-
tionism.
As mentioned above, not only are the experiences of globalization different,
but so too are the associated normative criteria. Globalization is thus not only
local, in terms of a center-periphery thesis, but also temporally and normatively
contradictory. Even more striking is the desire previously associated with this
process of control and security, now changed to the experience of fear of
being out of control. Globalization stands symbolically for a worldview at the
end of the expiring twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Overall, the commonality is based on the experience of helplessness and of
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being exposed to a structure—one that obeys only its own logic and is beyond
the control of human powers. Gedinat states: “We do not control the process
of globalization. For us it is out of control. At the same time it determines our
living conditions in principle.” (Gedinat 2015, p.16)
Globalization as a void
Secondly, this implies that globalization contains a kind of surplus or transcen-
dental moment. It is not just the reservoir of individual phenomena—it is also in
its entirety beyond our reach. This becomes obvious when looking at the explan-
ations of the global financial crisis of 2008. Despite attempts to make the inter-
relations comprehensible to everyone through the use of words like ‘financial
bubble’ or ‘hedge funds’, the concrete mechanisms remain understandable to
only a very small percentage of experts. Rather, the traceability of whatever pro-
voked the crisis is no longer be achievable.
The aforementioned complexity and diversity of using the term ‘globaliza-
tion’ now becomes a problem. The empirical process itself is withdrawn or un-
available to us. If the concept of globalization remains unavailable, why do we
need and use such a term at all? At this point, many assertions about anthropo-
logical questions and questions of transcendence can be made. However, with
Cassirer’s functional theory of experience and aspect of meaning, two theses
can be highlighted.
On the one hand, Cassirer emphasizes that human beings are dependent on
something like meaning. Although it is initially a circular argument, since the
search for meaning is proved by the elaboration of symbolic forms, evidence
can nevertheless be found in psychology and philosophical anthropology. Pas-
sive perceptions must primarily be transformed in reality. Acting is not just a re-
action; it assumes a meaningful understanding. On the other hand, it should be
noted that the functional necessity of a superordinate phenomenon such as
globalization is simply a response to the rampant excess of information.
Changed material conditions and the ever-increasing de-bordering and intercon-
nectedness of the world lead to the development of a term like globalization, in
order to be able to understand and order them. As a ‘historical a priori’, the term
then affects the interpretation of the singular phenomena.
According to Cassirer, precisely this is the function of meaning of symbolic
forms:
In the meaning function these two moments, the constant change and the constancy of
things, become dialectical counterpoints. […] The meaning structure relates no longer to
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objects of the illustrative world, but their constancy underlying links, to their intrinsic
structure. (Kralemann 2000, p. 47).
The definitions of globalization and the emphasis on its paradoxes outlined
above strikingly match Cassirer’s conception. Theoretically, Hartmut Rosa’s no-
tion of ‘acceleration’ is an analogy in which he describes the ‘silent, normative
violence’ of modern life (Rosa 2005, p. 481).
Globalization as a myth
Thirdly, Cassirer provides analogies of globalization and the concept of myth.
This does not mean to show that globalization is a myth, which would ‘negate’
the mythical understanding by looking at these things from a scientific stand-
point (Cassirer 1990, p. 119). Rather, to understand myth means to develop an un-
derstanding within the mythical framework. This is also true for globalization.
Utilizing a strictly scientific perspective, we only grasp a part of its purpose.
Even if the concept itself is empirically a myth, the actual use of the term is
not.Without giving a detailed summary of Cassirer’s theory of myth, some points
can be highlighted.
In the first place, Cassirer identifies the same goal in myth as in science.
Both try to develop an appropriate and reasonable understanding of the
world. “For even magic argues and acts upon the presupposition that in nature
one event follows another necessarily and invariably without the intervention of
any spiritual or personal agency.” (Cassirer 1972, p. 76) It is also possible to view
globalization as a result of forces and actions beyond the realm of human influ-
ence. Especially in the case of economics, an independent process can be iden-
tified. If Elmar Altvater writes that “the inner pressure of global market is relent-
less” (Altvater 2009, p. 206), then his criticism is directed against an apparent
necessity or naturalness that connects globalization with a lack of alternatives.
Furthermore, essential for mythical thinking is the emotional nature of per-
ception. Instead of the experience through senses, it is primarily the experience
of passions. ‘Physiognomic qualities’ are in opposition to ‘qualities of perception’
(Cassirer 1972, p. 77). The usual explanations of globalization inevitably fall
short, because they do treat the emotional part of this debate seriously. The po-
litical approach toward globalization in particular is in itself evidence that emo-
tional understanding has priority. “The world of myth is a dramatic world—a
world of actions, of forces, of conflicting powers” (Cassirer 1972, p. 67)—much
like the reactions to globalization. It also seems to be an interplay of forces:
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we do not judge from an observer’s perspective; rather the effects of globaliza-
tion are directly experienced.
According to Cassirer, the most important point of mythological thinking is
the dissolution of the interplay of forces to form a picture of the whole. Myths
integrate all things from social to natural phenomena:
Life is not divided into classes and subclasses. It is felt as an unbroken continuous whole,
which does not admit to any clean-cut and trenchant distinctions. The limits between the
different spheres are not insurmountable barriers; they are fluent and fluctuating. (Cassirer
1972, p. 81)
A similar description can be found in books about globalization. For example,
Giddens and Reder both show that the process of globalization is defined as a
process of border transgression or automatic leveling. It is more a perceived
than a factual dissolution.
However, by looking at Cassirer’s terms like ‘solidarity of life’, ‘unity of life’
and ‘society of life’ (Cassirer 1972, pp. 82–83), it can be doubted that myth and
globalization are the same. The former refers to forms of equality and support,
while the latter displays a lack of solidarity. Inequality increases even more.
The unity of globalization is a unity of differences.
Globalization and subjectivity
Lastly, it is necessary to ask which consequences can be drawn for the subject
from the previous. If Cassirer’s belief that our categories of knowledge and con-
cepts form the basis of our view of the world is true, then it has to be taken for
granted that the idea of globalization has an influence on our self-conception.
However, globalization not only means the dissolution of the forms descri-
bed above—it also puts conventional ideas of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘identity’ into
question. In the sense of postmodern diversity, the stabilizing unity of the subject
is in danger. The idea of always being and having to be at one with oneself in this
world only leads to disappointment and the feeling of failure. As shown in the
context of space and time, the increasing instability of the concepts leads to a
deterioration of values. Human beings are bound to physical abilities, and
thus when compared to technology are no longer in a competitive position.
Cases like this show that people start to feel helpless and overburdened,
which is the reason for a retreat into fixed identities. This is the attempt to pre-
serve the individual status quo with a greater awareness of the roots of the oc-
cident, the re-discovery of religion or the German discussion about a dominant
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culture—things that follow from a ‘disorientation of the subjective world’ (Figuer-
oa 2004, p. 11).
Interestingly, difference occurs less in already non-homogeneous cities than
in rural areas. Of course, economic factors and education still play a crucial role,
but roughly, through the expanded mobility and the inclusion of supraregional
cultural products, the appropriation of new perspectives is more widespread
than in history so far. Even if the media in the western world focuses on cultural
conflicts, the change is small by comparison to other world regions. The increase
of migration movements in particular show that with the consciousness of a glo-
balized world and the knowledge of the other, a life outside the regional frame-
work and under new and better conditions is possible.
The attempt to preserve the particular is not only found in a rising national-
ism—Colin Crouch speaks of a nationalism that is itself globalized (Crouch 2017,
p. 1)—but rather also as a tendency of globalization research. Due to the danger
of leveling and disorientation, it is important to emphasize the individual and
the special. Byung-Chul Han radicalizes the individual approach when he under-
stands the expanded and huge ‘fund of life forms and practices’ (Han 2005,
p. 55) as enabling a new dimension of individualization. Hence, the new open-
ness is not just a drive back to regional homogeneity—it is an extended possibil-
ity of freely living out one’s own ideas.
However, Cassirer’s adaptation of Ernst Kapp’s philosophical theses can be
read similarly. Kapp’s thesis of ‘organ projection’ describes technology as an out-
sourced form of human wish fulfillment (Kapp 1877, p. 30). As Cassirer states,
technology not only negatively changes the cognitive conditions of man—it
can also expand these conditions in a positive way. Technology creates new pos-
sibilities of self-experience. It forms the basis of an opening to the other by ex-
ceeding the otherwise limited communication radius. Globalization as a world-
view can be interpreted in two directions: on the one hand, as a thinking of
withdrawal and delimitation; and on the other hand, as a cosmopolitan attitude
and an appearance of equal individualization. This ambivalence becomes obvi-
ous in the political trench fights of western societies: management of contingen-
cy vs consciousness of contingency. However, both worldviews have delimitation
and associated powerlessness as a basis. They only differ significantly in their
handling of this.
Both are consequences of the break with the identity concepts proclaimed by
postmodern theories and the changes in the living world through globalization.
In this respect, it belongs to the modern or post-modern self-understanding to be
variable at the core: on the one hand, to keep it consistent to be one at that mo-
ment and another in the next moment; and on the other hand, this leads to rad-
icalization by maintaining and defending identity.Whether or not the individual
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faces the task, the question of the ‘self ’ is no longer taken for granted. A good
example is Richard Rorty’s description of the ‘liberal ironist’ (Rorty 1992,
pp. 14– 15). In this figure, self-creation and solidarity are equivalent and incom-
mensurable at the same moment.
Globalization as a consciousness of paradox
As the concluding result, all the different aspects of globalization have to be
brought together on an abstract level to understand globalization as a concept
as such. According to Cassirer, the importance of globalization can only be un-
derstood when we concentrate on its function in the overall system. Such a proc-
ess allows reflection on the constitutional conditions of such a term, and does
not simply interpret it as a collection of different phenomena.
Classically, with globalization it is said that everything is in some way con-
nected with everything. This is how Anthony Giddens formulates it in his book
Consequences of Modernity:
The term globalization can be defined in the sense of an intensification of worldwide social
relationships in that remote places are connected in such a way that events in one place are
influenced by events that are located many miles away and vice versa. (Giddens 1995, p. 85)
According to Hamid Reza Yousefi, globalization is thus the change of one con-
sciousness, by no longer assuming that singular areas can be understood on
their own. As he states, they instead “overlap in many ways, contradict, comple-
ment or combat.” (Yousefi 2010, p. 27) The striking conclusion began to spread
that a purely substantive definition of globalization cannot be given. Angelika
Epple recommends that we cease trying to use the concept of globalization uni-
versally:
Globalization is considered a pluralistic, non-linear, non-teleological and as a multi-layered
and asymmetric interconnecting process of different speeds, which is driven forward by in-
dividual and collective actors, slowed down, transformed and changed. To analyze the dif-
ferent layers, it makes sense to use the term in plural. (Epple 2014).
I have attempted above to characterize the definitions alluded to here. Even if
different authors agree in principle with the dissolution thesis, when trying to
formulate it they end up with an emphasis on overlaps and contradictions. As
banal as this may sound, a certain understanding of the world is evident. As
a ‘connection without contour’, the meaning of globalization lacks the order
that serves as a meaning-giving element. The concepts of border crossing and
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unification remain disordered. In more complicated terms, globalization is an
‘understanding network’ through which, as stated above, not a concrete or caus-
al relationship is understood. Rather, it gives us an awareness of what we are: on
the one hand, powerless against the contingency and the changing structures of
the world; on the other hand, through the freedom of contingency empowered to
act in and create the world.
The aforementioned contourlessness then becomes more precisely described
as a ‘consciousness of paradox’.Whether speaking about ‘condition and process’
(Osterhammel, Petersson), ‘Simultaneity of the non-simultaneous’ (Bloch, Nas-
sehi), ‘dismay without involvement’ (Reder), ‘overcoming the overwhelming’ (Ge-
dinat), ‘Glocalization’ (Robertson), ‘non-solidarity unity’, ‘space-dependent spa-
tial independence’ (Harvey) or ‘contourless connection’, it is always necessary to
refer to opposing elements to understand globalization. The emphasis on para-
doxes and contradictions has now become a scientific commonsense, and is pro-
moted as the end of the globalization paradigm. A singular concept dissolves ev-
erything in a comprehensive movement, which is why it only makes sense to
understand globalization as a ‘symbolic form’—a function of human world devel-
opment. Therefore, much can be said for treating the concept of globalization as
a worldview. Only then can one understand why globalization has become the
symbol of our time: on the one hand occupied with universalistic claims, on
the other hand permeated by particular fears. Globalization as a symbolic
form is not, as presented in the Encyclopedia of globalization, the mere “contin-
uation and continuity of a long-standing process” (Kreff / Knoll / Gingrich 2011,
p. 16). Rather, globalization—with the thesis of the ‘historical a priori’ and the
acceptance of Foucault’s adoption and further development of the philosophy
of symbolic forms—is a historically changeable condition of possibility of the
visible, the expressible, the knowable. It is a picture of our time. To refrain
from a uniform understanding of globalization, the benefit of the term must
lie in its linguistic and meaningful assistance in communicating and under-
standing a paradoxical structure. What remains doubtful is whether globaliza-
tion can retain the intention of enlightenment, as Cassirer hoped.
Nevertheless, as Cassirer puts it, it is a matter of philosophy to ask not just
what role globalization plays, but also what role it should play. Only in the anal-
ysis of a symbolic consciousness can globalization be understood and criticized.
Globalization can then be understood as a task itself. In the spirit of Cassirer, this
task means to take globalization as self-empowerment and to take responsibility
for shaping the world positively and seriously, in order to free oneself from pow-
erlessness through critical reflection. As paradoxical and contradictory as the fig-
ure of globalization may be, it is not only necessary, but also changeable. Rad-
ically speaking, by the obviousness of the contradictions, one must not seek
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them out for a long time. They are ready for modification. Viewed positively,
globalization can be understood—as a symbolic form—as a chance to convey
the idea of plurality.
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Theory and Practice of Historical Writing
in Times of Globalization
Abstract: In recent years, radical changes have taken place to the ways of think-
ing of historical writing, its methodology and its meaning as a specific field of
knowledge. These changes are connected with the historical situation of which
it is itself a part, and are also concerned both with a dispute within the discipline
and with the current ethical-political debates that cannot accurately be removed
from attempts to better understand today’s world. As part of these changes, we
are faced with a radical review of historiographical paradigms. These changes
concern not only the practice of historical writing, but also the role of history
as a source of political legitimation and as a way in which individuals under-
stand their belonging and commitment to the political-institutional frameworks
within which they lead their lives.
Like no other human science, history is an essentially interdisciplinary field
whose boundaries are hard to define. Its repertoire of concepts not only has to
do with the detailed and documented empirical reconstruction of what hap-
pened—it also has an interdependent relationship with other social disciplines
concerning the topics involved in each case, so that any innovations in the the-
ories of those disciplines have an impact on historical narratives (just as histor-
ical reconstructions can help to test and reconfigure them). On the other hand,
historiography itself is also situated in a historical context, which it tries to un-
derstand simultaneously with shaping its concepts.
The normative dimension of the historical account concerns not only the val-
ues a historian shares with her contemporaries, but also the secular role of his-
tory as a source of legitimation of power and of the identity policies for civic ed-
ucation. The changes in this role also entail modifications to the way individuals
understand their belonging and commitment to the political-institutional frame-
works within which they lead their lives.
While recent debate in historical theory has revolved around two main themes
—namely, the narrative structure of historical discourse and what we might call the
‘memory paradigm’—with globalization (and the thematization thereof in the con-
text of the new ‘global history’), we enter a postnarrativist stage of the debate, in
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which, as regards the first theme, the empirical character of historical research is
recovered. In this way, it becomes possible to exit the blind alley of historiography
understood as a purely linguistic construction, consisting in a matrix of timeless
rhetorical and narrative devices, independent of any cognitive claim. As regards
the second theme, by placing history in the context of the debate concerning a bet-
ter understanding of its own time, it is possible to account for its role in the explo-
ration of the past as well as in the diagnosis of the present and the attempts to
think of and act in future events. One of the consequences of the post-ethnocentric
‘global history’ project is a critical rehabilitation of key aspects of the vilified ‘spec-
ulative’ philosophy of history.
I
History has undergone, at least for the last fifty years, a crisis and successive
transformation of the traditional canons that used to dominate its self-under-
standing as a discipline and which had been established following its final ‘pro-
fessionalization’ (Iggers 2008, p. 108) in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Eu-
ropean university spaces. This current crisis can be compared to that of the
foundations of mathematics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Both in the case of historiography and in that of its epistemological theory, the
reasons for this transformation are not purely internal to the historian’s work-
shop, but have to do with changes in the structure of the contemporary world
to which her interpretation of the past belongs.
These changes cannot, in fact, be separated from the ongoing globalization
process, on which various factors converge and whose consequences are not yet
altogether clear. It is an epochal process that challenges the premises of modern
thought as well as those of the so-called postmodern narrativism, insofar as the
latter refuses—in its radical versions—to establish a cognitive connection be-
tween historical experience and historiography. Concomitantly with the ques-
tioning of traditional theoretical assumptions, there emerge paradoxically new
forms of historical writing that imply unconventional paradigms whose theory
is only beginning to arise.
The topics I will address next involve the historical situation of historio-
graphical practice under globalization, the changes concerning the subject or
theme of traditional history, and the changes brought about by all this regarding
its conceptual repertoire, as well as key aspects of its methodology and postu-
lates that used to be considered decidedly ahistorical. These changes, as we
will see, also involve historical metatheory and some rehabilitation, though
with strong caveats from the long vilified ‘speculative’ philosophy of history. Fi-
398 Daniel Brauer
nally, we should consider the consequences of the foregoing for the internal re-
arrangement of the discipline, the way of organizing how it is taught and, more
importantly, its cognitive and normative contribution in the context of contempo-
rary societies, with a view to an extended public sphere at the global level.
First of all, we should start by specifying the realm of history against other
fields of knowledge based on its specific object of study. As is generally known,
the term ‘history’ has many meanings. Usually a distinction is drawn between its
reference to the objective course of events, on the one hand, and its narrative
manifestation, on the other—but the polysemy does not end here (Brauer
2009, pp. 19–38). In any case, it is significant that the word ‘history’ should al-
ways be accompanied by a genitive—the ‘history of…’ – and it would seem that
any object or subject could take the place of these suspension points, from the
‘history of the Peloponnesian War’ to the ‘history of Roman painting’. It is this
flexibility of the term that has triggered the view that history, rather than having
a specific object of study is simply one approach to any object, perceived through
its changes over time. While there is certainly some truth in this, it is also true
that we mainly associate the word ‘history’ with a specific theme (though it is
usually taken for granted): the changes in collective life and its forms of social
and political organization.
A key example of this theme in the modern world (at least since the emer-
gence of history chairs at universities) has been that of the ‘nation state’, fulfill-
ing a similar role to those previously played by monarchies or religions. This is
shown by the fact that the need for constructing historical accounts and teaching
them went hand in hand with the demands for a retrospective legitimation for
the establishment of states, and that it ran parallel to the creation of archives,
museums and ‘sites of memory’ (Nora 2001, pp. 23–43). In the case of the his-
tories of states—like in those of nations, religions and the more or less vague
concept of ‘peoples’—there is usually (besides any theoretical interest in how
the events took place) a political mandate concerning the justification of
power, as well as the development of criteria for citizens’ belonging and identi-
fication (Berger / Donovan / Passmore 1999; Berger / Lorenz 2010). This can
clearly be seen in the role of history at school, beyond its claim of providing ‘ob-
jective’ knowledge of the past. Therefore, when we talk simply about ‘history’, we
tend to think of national histories or of human history in general, where the for-
mer would be protagonists in a wider context.
While it is true that history is implicitly associated with the transformation
of the collective life of nations and their political and social organizations, an-
other one of its non-thematized assumptions is some idea of a common frame-
work integrating the most diverse human activities, as belonging to the same ‘pe-
riod’. This assumption of totality may be a byproduct of the construction of
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History with a capital initial, but it should not necessarily be interpreted as sug-
gesting a hypostatized collective subject, but as a possible space for interaction
among various factors
This presupposition of a history common to humanity, shaped by the pres-
ence of multiple states organized around a limited territory with a horizon of
contemporaneity, remains at the basis both of the historiography of nations
and of teaching curricula, and is also shared by the view of history still held
by the reader of a historiographical text. Precisely this relationship with the pub-
lic is also an undeniable aspect of historical discourse, which distinguishes it
from that of other disciplines to the extent that understanding a historiograph-
ical text does not seem to require any specialized knowledge. Accordingly, histo-
ry has privileged access to public opinion—and it is no coincidence that most
disputes, particularly about recent history, have to do with contemporary politi-
cal struggles. However, over the last few years these assumptions have been
moving away from the central stage of historical narratives—which does not ac-
tually mean that they are no longer written.
This shift of the nation-state axis is due to several factors. These certainly
include the fateful experiences of the role of totalitarian and dictatorial states,
particularly after the Second World War, which have led us to question the
scope and limitations of state power as such and, at the same time, the global-
ization process under which they have in fact lost some of their sovereignty in
economic, military, communicational and political terms, given their growing in-
terdependence and international regulations. Simultaneously, academic history
has not only increasingly abandoned its role as a source of legitimation of
power but in many cases it has adopted a critical function that erodes identity
accounts, delegating to a discredited popular historical literature or an ‘official
history’ the various attempts to legitimize the present by the past.
If we now ask ourselves about the subjects that are today likely to replace
national secular exploits, we cannot avoid mentioning three—two of which
have a long tradition, though they appear with different features in contempo-
rary historiography. I am referring to the notions of ‘civilization’ (Fisch 1992,
pp. 679–774), ‘empire’ (Walther 1992, pp. 171–236) and thirdly – the main
topic I seek to address—to the concept of ‘global’ (Brauer 2016, pp. 51–65). A
multiplicity of subjects should be added, which go beyond traditional histories
(insofar as they include concepts previously considered ahistorical), such as:
childhood; insanity; women; death; ‘mentalities’ (Duby 1961, pp. 937–966);
and hence also the history of the very ‘concepts’ (Palti 2011, pp. 227–248) govern-
ing historical reconstructions, which were previously taken for granted. But also
worthy of addition to the list are geographical areas such as the Mediterranean,
the Caucasus, etc., or subjects such as bread, silk, wine, etc. However heteroge-
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neous these subjects may seem, they have in common that their historical path
transcends changing national borders and that they do not focus on states.
Some of these subjects have given rise to the development of new disciplines
such as ‘conceptual history’, ‘women’s history’ or later ‘gender history’, etc.; oth-
ers, such as ‘environmental history’, transcend the traditional division between
human and natural sciences. Concerning the first two subjects mentioned above,
the notions of ‘empire’ and ‘civilization’, both retain features of what Koselleck
calls ‘asymmetrical’ (Koselleck 1989, pp. 211–259) relational concepts insofar as
they inevitably establish a contrast regarding certain peoples or nations as infe-
rior to others, even when historians seek to adopt a neutral perspective or write
from the victim’s point of view.
But, before addressing these, we should mention a key subject matter that
emerged from the beginning of historiography and that implies by its nature a
‘transnational’ approach. I refer to ‘war’ as the subject of historical accounts—
even when it has generally been narrated from the winners’ point of view or
by those who believe they have been unjustly defeated. ‘War’ will undoubtedly
remain one of the main topics of historical narratives, but it is also possible to
verify here a major change precisely in that it is no longer a source of legitima-
tion in itself for states, empires and civilizations—a change in values that be-
comes apparent in the significant renaming in most countries of the ‘Ministry
of War’ as ‘Ministry of Defense’, around the end of the Second World War.
While the notion of ‘empire’ has recently undergone a revival because of its
reformulation in postmodern Marxist social theory by Hardt and Negri (2000),
still it has not inspired meaningful historical reconstructions, while the concept
of ‘civilization’ has, on the other hand, been rehabilitated in contemporary his-
toriography. We can notice a recent rebirth of the term ‘civilization’, which was
already present in Spengler and Toynbee’s metanarratives, and extensively dis-
credited by professional historians, from the points of view of both historiogra-
phy and political theory in the 1990s (Conrad 2016, pp. 175– 179). It is a some-
what vague notion that, on the one hand, was already designed by Herder to
avoid the aporias and constraints of a concept of ‘progress’ that held Europe
and the so-called ‘Western and Christian world’ as its main protagonists and
sidelined other cultures—but that on the other hand, regardless of its alleged de-
scriptive character, did not always expressly involve normative aspects that both
imply a positive assessment against opposing concepts (such as ‘barbarism’,
‘primitivism’, ‘savagery’, etc.) and grant its own ‘civilization’ a privileged status.
In its updated versions, the aim is to overcome the distortions of Eurocentrism to
the extent that ‘civilizations’ are portrayed as closed, incommensurable contain-
ers, with an untainted original identity—but at the same time they run the risk of
advocating the identity they consider their own as a standard, based on which it
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is sufficient to interpret global developments (e.g., Sinocentrism, Afrocentrism,
Islamocentrism, Latin-American-centrism). I think it is with good reason that Se-
bastian Conrad considers these variants nothing but “a response to current ex-
periences of globalization“ (Conrad 2016, pp. 175). As is generally known, global
and ‘glocal’ are merely two sides of the same phenomenon.
II
After around the second half of the twentieth century, besides (1) the shift of the
nation-state axis toward other collective entities, such as the aforementioned no-
tions of ‘empire’ and ‘civilization’, there has occurred a gradual but increasingly
rapid (2) fragmentation of the history field—like a cracked mirror into multiple
topics and problems which are hard to classify—and subsequently, (3) the at-
tempt to reunify that diversity around a main theme and to establish as far as
possible a general perspective, based on which internal connections might be
set up. It is precisely in this context that, along with other similar attempts, a
new historiographical field has taken shape—namely, ‘global history’.
To account for this phenomenon, we could start by contrasting two relatively
new disciplines, ‘global history’ and ‘microhistory’ (Ginsburg 1993, p. 10–35—for
a very different view closer to postmodernism, see: Szijártó / Magnússon 2013).
Despite first appearances, these are not diametrically opposed, but rather com-
plementary, genres. In both cases there occurs a ‘change in time scale’ vis-à-vis
traditional history. Regarding the former, it involves reconstructing (based on
short time fragments or portions of individuals’ lives in specific social and cul-
tural contexts) the way of life in a given period that thus becomes iconic. The
emergence of this type of approach converges with others, such as that of the
‘history of private life’ or of ‘daily life’, ‘oral history’, ‘history from below’, and
all of them with the emergence of the ‘memory paradigm’, the rise of which
has been led at least since the 1990s (judging by its impact on public opinion,
though its theoretical development began earlier) by the studies of the Shoah
and studies of ‘genocide’ in general.
But the extensive debates about the scope and limitations of the opposition
between the memory and the history paradigms (Tamm 2013, pp. 458–473)
should not lead us to ignore the impact of the studies of memory in historio-
graphical practice itself. What these new fields have in common is precisely
the increasing inclusion in their narratives of the first-person perspective—
both that of the victim (or victimizer) and of the witness, which used to go un-
noticed in traditional impersonal histories and even in social history.
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Of course, what is noticeable is the emergence of historical themes such as
those above, which establish new narration subjects such as ‘women’, ‘child-
hood’, ‘the Mediterranean’, ‘death’, ‘madness’, and ‘sexuality’ (not forgetting Mi-
chel Foucault’s pioneering works, even though they cannot be considered strictly
historiographical). Here, fragmentation has to do with historical subjects that
cannot be detached from contemporary political struggles claiming for rights,
or from certain nations, regions or minorities whose histories have been silenced
and are expressly or implicitly written from the standpoint of an emancipatory
project.
The emergence of ‘conceptual history’ has been established as a large, re-
cent field of studies that shows the temporal dimension of a repertoire of cate-
gories that were considered ahistorical, ‘natural kinds’, with which historians
used to read the past. Something similar can be said of the ‘history of the pres-
ent’ (Zeitgeschichte), whose emergence as a discipline is also recent. With its es-
tablishment as a research field of its own, the traditional canon of the necessary
‘historical distance’ is broken (Bevernage / Lorenz 2013, pp. 7–25). We should
add to this a series of historical narratives dealing with new historical fields,
such as the birth of ‘environmental-’ or ‘eco-history’, which straddles the boun-
daries between human and natural sciences.
Concerning ‘global history’, we should distinguish the emergence of at least
two subject areas: on the one hand, ‘globalization history’, about which there is
already extensive literature, involving a series of disputes over the criteria for es-
tablishing its periods and dates; and on the other, the birth of so-called ‘global
history’ as a genre of its own, different from ‘world history’ and its close relatives,
‘transnational history’ and the so-called ‘big history’, ‘intercultural history’, etc.
‘Global history’, as shown by the bibliographic boom over the last years, has es-
tablished itself as a specific discipline representing a new point of view of ‘world
history’ after the criticism of Eurocentrism and Poscolonilism.
However, unlike the notion of the nation-state, or that of imperialism, ‘glob-
alization’ means, rather than an entity, (1) a process, whose contours are difficult
to establish and, simultaneously, (2) a space for multicausal interaction. Unlike
the notion of ‘capitalism’ (which is undoubtedly one of its key aspects and about
which there have been many theories and discussions for at least two hundred
years), in the case of globalization, its theory—much like its objective develop-
ment—is a work in progress, and it would be unilateral to consider it merely a
phase of late capitalism. It seems to potentially hold forces leading to new
forms of dependence and marginalization, as well as to a new era of Enlighten-
ment and emancipation of a citizens’ network that covers the whole planet, with
both things being probably true at least at the current stage.
Theory and Practice of Historical Writing in Times of Globalization 403
But from the point of view of historiography and its theory, the aim is to es-
tablish a kind of system of interconnections covering various aspects of the so-
ciopolitical, military, technological, communicational and cultural scenarios,
which may in turn help to explain the increasing homogenization at the interna-
tional level, both of consumption habits and of the mainstream representations
of the ways of life considered appropriate for today’s world.
However, unlike the concepts of ‘universal history’, ‘world history’ or the
‘history of humanity’, whose sense is highly vague and seldom defined, ‘global’
history refers to objective processes involving changes in economics, in the mass
media and the means of transportation, in the available techniques for trans-
forming nature, in health systems, and in institutionalized standards in national
and international agencies, as well as in many NGOs— but it also involves the
standards of scientific knowledge and, in this case, of what may be considered
by consensus an ‘objective’ historical narrative. What takes place in labeling a
history as ‘global’ is not only a larger-scale, and hence more comprehensive, ap-
proach, but also a search for the explanation of processes that cannot be under-
stood solely from an endogenous perspective. This concept refers to a space of
interaction among many factors and differs from the notions of both ‘dialectical
totality’ in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition and from the notion of ‘world-system’
suggested by Immanuel Wallerstein (Wallerstein 1974–2011), insofar as in this
space there is room both for causality and for contingency, both for intentional
action and for dysfunctionality.
In any case, it is necessary to distinguish the discussion about the meaning
of globalization (and of ‘anti-globalization’ movements) from what constitutes
for historiography a subject area in itself, for empirically exploring changes
and events that are taking place in the world and which could subsidiarily
help either to confirm or to test theoretical approaches.
In fact, the larger the scale, the bigger the difference between historical dis-
course and literary narrative, since historical discourse involves anonymous
processes (such as the increase in birthrates, the increase in economic growth,
the changes in institutional forms, etc.), whereas literary narrative seems to be
associated with certain characters, their actions and their fate. While this hap-
pened already with social history, it is especially the case with global history.
While narrativism has contributed to the rediscovery of the narrative dimen-
sion of historical texts, it has failed to set forth, in its more radical versions, a
theory of the specific structure of historical narratives. In Hayden White’s school,
historiography is thereby deprived of its cognitive claim as an empirical disci-
pline. While history thus comes closer to literature (which proves, by some
quirk of thought, more useful in its more recent postmodernist versions—and
particularly in ‘docudrama’ (White 2014, p. 29)—for bringing us closer to ‘real’
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events), historiographical theory moves further away from historiographical
practice and its most recent developments. White’s metahistory of the historical
imagination in the nineteenth century does not seem to be able to find its equiv-
alent for twentieth- and twenty-first-century historiography, into which social
and political theory has burst, just as new genres have emerged that are increas-
ingly difficult to reduce to literary narrative. It seems to be more concerned with
establishing what history should be, rather than with accounting for its latest de-
velopments.
III
There have been attempts to characterize the historical situation of contempo-
rary man, both as regards the most significant changes in society and main-
stream ideas, using different terms such as postmodernism, postmetaphysics,
‘postnational constellation’, ‘post-traditional society’ or post-history. All these
epithets seek to show the new contours of today’s world for the purpose of ex-
amining its causes and consequences. Instead, the ‘globalization’ concept has
prevailed since the 1980s and exponentially more so since the 1990s (Mooney /
Evans 2007). In fact, today nobody hesitates to associate the notion of globaliza-
tion with an objective historical phenomenon and not with a specific theory that
may and must be discussed. Furthermore, we could still say that the aforemen-
tioned terms represent—along with others, such as, for instance, the ‘environ-
mental’ movement, the revival of ‘cosmopolitanism’ or ‘multiculturalism’, and
the rise of a culture of ‘human rights’—different attempts to understand and re-
define political alternatives in the context of a ‘globalized’ world. What appears
as controversial are the different ways of understanding globalization as such,
but not the fact that it designates a series of phenomena characterizing today’s
world and the irreversible scenario in which future generations will live.
From the perspective of historical theory, the ongoing globalization process
has many consequences. The first of these is (1) a return to topics belonging to
the classical philosophy of history as a concern for the objective path of world-
wide events. Of course, the aim here is not to advocate a ‘speculative’ philosophy
of history that used to interpret the past as a one way street toward a promising
(or eschatological) future, but simply to account for an increasingly interdepend-
ent world in which historical events cannot be explained in the limited context of
autonomous nation-states and in which (albeit for different reasons from those
Kant or Hegel had in mind) the globe assumes a common ‘destiny’. In fact,
the so-called ecological crisis, the destructive power of nuclear weapons, the
proliferation of social media (partly beyond governmental control), the homoge-
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nization of consumption habits and of forms of industrial organization and col-
lective institutions, as well as the advent of para- and supra-governmental insti-
tutions, etc., but also (and not least) the emergence of an extended public opin-
ion that is not indifferent to the process of critical review of the ways of
organizing social and political life, all portray a changed scenario that theory
cannot ignore. Incidentally, in fact, the idea of the nation-state had already
been a successful global export product from the West at an earlier stage, and
where state structures did not exist or were only partially present, the rebellions
against colonialism and imperialism were paradoxically part of its introduction.
Secondly (2), with the emergence of the new historical genres, a new form of
universalism also appears. On the one hand,what occurs in historiographical theo-
ry, as in many other areas, is a standardization of the forms of discourse—what
Sebastian Conrad calls the ‘formatting’ (Conrad 2016, p. 203)—of what is deemed
an acceptable historical narrative, as shown in the guidelines for the submission of
papers for international conferences and ‘publications’. On the other hand, disci-
plines such as global history, contemporary history or women’s history transcend
the scheme of national histories because of their very subject. This brings about
the gradual dismissal of a particularistic, endogenous perspective. It is significant
that, even in the histories of certain peoples, the fact that their author or reader
should be a foreigner may prove irrelevant or make them even more interesting,
to the extent that their point of view does not seem conditioned by prejudices
of belonging. The well-known precept about the necessary ‘distance’ as a require-
ment for the objectivity of the historical account (Salber Philipps 2013) is based on
two grounds that need distinction: the first has to do with the possible distortion of
the facts according to the narrator’s involvement; and the second is that events are
considered to be still in progress, so it is not yet possible to assess their consequen-
ces. (Of course, concerning this latter point, boundaries are really hard to define.)
But, as regards the former, the criterion of ‘distance’ can be applied not only chro-
nologically, but also simultaneously based on the ‘foreigner’s’ view, to the extent
that comparative history written from a global perspective relativizes the local rep-
resentations of the meaning of events.
Thirdly (3), the establishment of these new historical genres makes explicit
not only the link between theory of history and political theory and, hence, the
normative dimension of the historical discourse, but also of its cognitive and ex-
planatory claim. ‘Global history’ does not seek to be something like a synthesis
or point of convergence of different historical approaches, but proposes a space
for interaction and ‘integration’ (Conrad 2016, pp. 67–68) that expands the syn-
chronicity and diachronicity spectrum to explore possible causal relationships
among past events and helps to place them on a wider horizon.
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In conclusion, we can distinguish five levels for anchoring the process of
transformation of the field of historical studies. The first has to do with the his-
torical situation of the contemporary world in the context of the ongoing global-
ization process. The impact of this situation is directly shown by the emergence
of ‘global history’ as well as by the different attempts to establish the ‘history of
globalization’ or ‘globalization in history’. Also, we should mention the ‘global’
perspective of historical studies concerning the most varied subjects. The second
level involves the changes within the discipline of history itself—the emergence
of new subjects and fields that transcend nation-states, as well as the review of
basic concepts that used to dominate the canon of the professionalization of his-
torical studies.
The third level refers to a rehabilitation of a philosophy of history from a
planetary point of view, to the extent that the question arises again (based on
various developments, such as climate change, the nuclear threat, the emer-
gence of para- and supra-national organizations( about the global meaning of
events, without falling for this reason into a speculative or teleological theory
about an inescapable fate for humanity. Thinking from a global perspective
has become a must, given today’s challenges, as is an ethical commitment to fu-
ture generations. The fourth involves the recovery and redefinition of the notion
of ‘historical totality’, understood not as a substantive subject independent of
collective actions and institutions or as a ‘system’, but rather as a space for mul-
tiple possible causalities and interactions to be empirically examined.
The fifth and last level refers to the role of history in the ethical-political de-
bate vis-à-vis an enlarged, worldwide public sphere. As the discussion about the
so-called Holocaust (mentioned here because of its iconic ‘global’ role, as a neg-
ative ‘historical sign’ [Kant] of times that accompany the contemporary world as
a shadow) shows, the historian’s historical description of what happened not
only puts ‘the limits of our representation’ (Friedländer 1992) to the test, but pre-
cisely for that reason, it is part of a contemporary debate that leads to a review of
the normative assumptions that may go beyond their mere application.
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Elías Palti
Koselleck—Foucault: The Birth and Death
of Philosophy of History
Abstract: According to Reinhart Koselleck, the period he calls Sattelzeit, which
spans from 1730 through 1850, witnessed a crucial conceptual transformation.
It was associated with a new, ‘modern’ way of experiencing temporality, which
in turn gave rise to the emergence of the concept of History as a singular collec-
tive noun and, consequently, to the philosophies of history. Koselleck’s perspec-
tive converges, besides, with Michel Foucault’s view in The Order of Things, in
which Foucault also remarked on the great conceptual break that occurred
around 1800 and gave rise to the emergence of what he called the ‘Age of His-
tory’. However, our attempt at matching Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte with Fou-
cault’s archaeological perspective will also reveal why the former is not yet suf-
ficiently attentive to the diversity of the modes of conceiving of temporality
during the four centuries that modernity spans. Lastly, it will allow us to better
understand what was the intellectual ground on which the philosophies of his-
tory were founded, and also how it eventually became undermined, along with
the concept of temporality that was at its basis.
I am always terrified when I hear in a few words a whole nation or a time, for what a great
multitude of differences does not comprehend the word nation, or the middle ages or an-
tiquity and the modern epoch!
(Johann Gottfried Herder)
Reinhart Koselleck’s concept of Sattelzeit has become an inevitable point of ref-
erence whenever one seeks to understand the origin of modernity from the per-
spective of intellectual history. It offers a highly suggestive view of the great con-
ceptual transformation produced between 1750 and 1850—the period he calls
Sattelzeit. According to Koselleck, this conceptual transformation was closely as-
sociated with a given way of experiencing temporality, which gave rise to the
emergence of the concept of History, as a singular collective noun. As he
shows, that concept would have been incomprehensible before 1750. To speak
of ‘History’ without further ado, as if it were a kind of macrosubject, would
have been simply unintelligible for a person of the fifteenth or even the seven-
teenth century. The emergence of the philosophies of history was the conse-
quence of this conceptual transformation, as the two were closely tied: as Hein-
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rich Köster then said, “History means the same as historical theory or philosophy
of history or as the logic of history” (quoted in Koselleck 2006, p. 74). Historical
philosophy thus has a precise historical-conceptual basis, and becomes mean-
ingful only within that given intellectual configuration; it has no meaning out-
side of it. In short, what this reveals is the contingent nature of the foundations
of the philosophies of history, and of the concept of temporality that underlies
them.
Koselleck’s perspective converges with Michel Foucault’s view in The Order
of Things (Foucault 1970). In it, Foucault also remarked on the great conceptual
break that occurred around 1800 and gave rise to the emergence of what he
called the ‘Age of History’. Foucault associated it, in turn, with the appearance
of a certain concept of ‘Subject’. Both concepts (Subject and History) would be
closely linked. The latter would be no more than another translation of the for-
mer, and ultimately the two are the expression of the new way of experiencing
the temporality that both Foucault and Koselleck identify as distinctive of ‘mod-
ernity’.
However, our attempt at matching Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte with Fou-
cault’s archaeological perspective will also reveal why the former is not yet suf-
ficiently attentive to the diversity of the modes of conceiving of temporality dur-
ing the four centuries that modernity spans. Actually, it can discern only two
possible time-concepts, each of which will be separated by that great epochal
rupture that he calls Sattelzeit. This dichotomic perspective leads him to confuse
and place under the same category (that of ‘modernity’) many very different
modes of conceiving and experiencing temporality; and this confusion necessa-
rily has consequences in the historical-conceptual recreation he proposed. In
short, to perform the very goal of Koselleck’s project of a Begriffsgeschichte—of
preventing conceptual anachronisms and understanding the intellectual founda-
tions of the philosophies of history—a number of historical precisions are in
order.
Foucault was, besides, more emphatic in pointing out the contingent nature
of this ‘modern’ regime of knowledge, in the sense that, for him, it is not only
very recent, but also it will not last indefinitely. In fact, he believed we were
at the verge of its dissolution. That is what was implicit in his provocative an-
nouncement of the imminent ‘death of man’. In any case, as we will see in
this work, beyond the divergences of their contents, the convergence between Ko-
selleck’s conceptual history and Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge regarding
the nature of the conceptual break produced around 1800 is deeply significant,
and the attempt at matching their perspectives will allow us to better understand
what was the intellectual ground on which the philosophies of history were
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founded, and also how it eventually became undermined, along with the con-
cept of temporality that was at its basis.
The idea of Sattelzeit
and the new consciousness of temporality
According to Koselleck, the emergence of the philosophies of the history is indi-
cative of a fundamental break with respect to the premodern modes of historical
figuration articulated within the frameworks of the Ciceronian concept of historia
magistrate vitae. He points out the two premises upon which that pedagogical
ideal of history was based. The first of these is the idea of the iterability of his-
tory; that is, that the same basic situations are repeated at different times, since
only that assumption permits us to draw general laws applicable to every histor-
ical epoch. That assumption of the iterability of events made it impossible to
conceptualize the idea of ‘History’ in the singular. What existed, in the context
of that perspective, were ‘histories’, in the plural; that is, a series of situations,
events and phenomena, which are eventually repeated in different times, places
and circumstances, but which preserve their basic structures and meanings.
The second premise highlighted by Koselleck is that the era of exploration
(which opened the horizon of Europeans to the diversity of cultures on the plan-
et) and technological progress finally triggered the crisis of the pedagogical con-
cept of history. Both phenomena combined provide the historical basis for the
emergence of the modern idea of ’progress’. Time would then have a direction-
ality, which would make the iterability of history impossible. The future would
no longer be readable in the experiences of the past. A gap now divided the
‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon of expectation’. But the fundamental
fact that marked the definitive breakdown of the concept of historia magistrate
vitae was the outbreak of the French Revolution, insofar as it affirmed, for Kosel-
leck, the idea of the constructability of history; that is, it engendered a new
awareness of the subject’s agency. Temporality thus became an immanent di-
mension—something that subjects unleash with their own action.¹ As Koselleck
points out: “There always occurs in history more or less than that contained in
the given conditions. Behind that ‘more or less’ are to be found men” (Koselleck
1985, p. 212). The modern concept of history would thus arise from the combina-
tion of the ideas of progress of the Enlightenment with that of the constructed
character of it determined by the revolutionary event.
 See Hayden White’s “Introduction” in Koselleck 2002, ix-xiv.
Koselleck—Foucault: The Birth and Death of Philosophy of History 411
In turn, the temporalization of history would allow us to place in sequential
order the cultural diversity that the overseas expansion had revealed; that is, to
place diachronically that which appears synchronously. The notion of progress
would provide the objective parameter for establishing a ‘before’ and an
‘after’, situating each phenomenon as a particular moment in the immanent
logic of the development of History. It thus gave rise to the idea of the coexis-
tence of infinite temporalities at each single moment, the simultaneity of the
non-contemporary (Gleichzeitigkeit der Ungleichzeitigen). As Herder said in his
Metakritik of Kant (a text that Koselleck repeatedly cites as the best synthesis
of the ‘modern’ idea of historical temporality):
In actuality, every changing thing has the measure of its own time within itself…. No two
worldly things have the same measure of time. There are therefore (one can state it properly
and boldly) at any one time in the universe innumerably many times.²
Lastly, the dissolution of the old ideal of historia magistrate vitae forces historical
thought to its self-reclusion. To the extent that the temporalization of historical
structures prevents generalizations and extrapolations between different epochs,
regarding their contents, the idea of historical law can only now refer to the
empty forms of temporality; to the transhistorical conditions of change. It is
here that Koselleck introduces what he calls the fundamental meta-categories
that define the basic forms of historical temporality: ‘space of experience’ and
‘horizon of expectation’. The progressive distance between ‘space of experience’
and ‘horizon of expectation’ determines the acceleration of historical time,which
is the hallmark of modernity. This allows him to establish a fundamental histor-
ical law: the ‘law of acceleration’, which states that change “occurs at increasing-
ly shorter intervals of time” (Koselleck 1985, p. 314).
In this way, Koselleck reframed intellectual history, insofar as he made it
possible to establish a link between conceptual changes and concrete historical
experience. However, at this point some of his interpretations demand a number
of clarifications and precisions. The question arises of what led him to situate
that rupture at a so late moment, which in turn led him to leave out of modernity
the whole array of philosophies that emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. From this perspective, the line of thought that goes from Descartes
to Leibniz, through Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Smith, etc. should be considered
as ‘premodern’, since they are all placed before the Sattelzeit; that is, they
would be grouped together under the same category as the philosophies of St.
 Herder, J. G. (1955): Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 68; quoted in Koselleck 1985,
p. 247.
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Augustine or St. Thomas, which is clearly untenable. Furthermore, it contradicts
what Koselleck himself remarked in his doctoral thesis (written in 1954 and pub-
lished in 1959), Critique and Crisis (Kosellek 1988). Lastly, that chronological in-
congruity makes manifest much deeper problems of a conceptual order.
These conceptual problems send us back to the issue of historical temporal-
ity. Koselleck actually confuses two completely different concepts of it: the one
implicit in the Enlightenment’s notion of ‘progress’; and the idea of ’evolution’,
arising only later, during the nineteenth century. It is only along with this latter
that time became conceived as irreversible. On the contrary, the most character-
istic and determining achievement of the scientific revolution and of the Enlight-
enment, that many plainly associate with the coming of the so-called ‘Modern
Age’ (although Foucault prefers calling it the ‘Classical Age’, to distinguish it
from the ‘Modern Age’ whose origins he places, in coincidence with Koselleck’s
Sattelzeit, around 1800) was precisely the development of the notion of temporal
reversibility. This notion was perfectly formulated by Ferdinand Laplace (the
leading astronomer of the late eighteenth century, who completed the Newtonian
system) and symbolized in his idea of the ‘little demon’. He stated that one who
was able to know the whole universe in its present state “would have the entire
past and the entire future before his eyes.”³ With this idea, Laplace only led the
Newtonian astronomical concept to its ultimate logical consequences. According
to it, temporality is not a constituent element of the physical universe. If we
could know the exact current position of all planets and stars, we could perfectly
know where they were a thousand years ago and where they will be a thousand
years from now. The asymmetry between past and future here appears as merely
a subjective illusion resulting from the limitations of our cognitive capacities.
The kind of idealization that allowed seventeenth and eighteenth century
minds to conceive of the world as lacking a temporality of its own was the cul-
mination of a sustained and prolonged intellectual effort. Irreversibility was, in
fact, the most characteristic feature of the medieval-Christian notion of secular
time (a notion that did not rule out the possibility of the mutation of living spe-
cies or the spontaneous generation of new ones). Since every change in the
world required providential intervention that marked a radical difference be-
tween present and past, the idea of a homogeneous temporal flow was still in-
conceivable.
The Enlightenment’s idea of historical progress as an accumulation of
knowledge entailed, instead, continuity; that is, the assumption of a homogene-
ous human nature providing a unitary substrate for this process. The idea of rad-
 On Laplace’s idea of ‘little demon’, see: Cassirer 1956, pp. 3–25.
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ical mutation, both in animal species and in cultural processes, was completely
foreign to Enlightenment thought. The breakdown of this linear and homogene-
ous conception of time leads us, in fact, beyond the horizon of the Enlighten-
ment. Foucault’s analysis of The Order of Things is revealing in this regard,
and allows us to introduce a number of precisions into Koselleck’s perspective
of the Sattelzeit.
The archaeology of knowledge and the
emergence of philosophy of history
Although Foucault does not make it explicit, it is clear that the aim of The Order
of Things was to rebuke the standard view of the link between modernity and
subjectivity that was best synthesized by Heidegger in “The Age of the World Pic-
ture”, and to introduce into it a fundamental historical precision. Unlike Heideg-
ger, for Foucault the idea of ‘subject’ that Heidegger believes he finds in Des-
cartes is in fact a later conceptual construction—one that would emerge in the
nineteenth century, when the ‘Modern Age’ (or the ‘Age of History’, as he calls
it) actually began. Foucault’s perspective thus converges with Koselleck’s in lo-
cating the origin of modernity two centuries later than Heidegger does. However,
unlike Koselleck’s perspective, Foucault’s does not ignore the presence of a con-
ceptual break produced around 1600, as Heidegger affirmed, though Foucault
disagrees with the latter regarding its content and meaning. He thus introduces
a distinction between the two.
In short, Foucault’s archaeological perspective is more attentive than Kosel-
leck’s to the occurrence of a conceptual break before the Sattelzeit, but, unlike
Heidegger, instead of projecting this break back in time, he remarks on the pro-
found difference between the two systems of knowledge to which they respec-
tively gave rise. In this way, Koselleck compels us to revise the dichotomous
schemes—the either/or that articulates the entire tradition of the history of
ideas and permeates also the perspectives of both Koselleck and Heidegger (ei-
ther premodern or modern)—leading to the unification of very different forms of
thinking under a common label. Yet, as we shall see, we also meet here the fun-
damental shortcoming in Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge. If it is more per-
ceptive of the conceptual transformations produced before the Sattelzeit, it miss-
es other, no less radical, transformations that took place after it. That is, that not
all forms of thought and historical views that emerged after 1800 can be consid-
ered as equally ‘modern’—a lack of acknowledgment of which also leads him to
confuse and unify under a common category very different concepts of historical
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temporality. Yet, in order to observe this problem, we must first to go back and
see Foucault’s archaeological project and, in particular, his criticism of Heideg-
ger’s view that associates modernity with the emergence of the concept of ‘sub-
ject’.
In “The Age of the World Picture”, Heidegger elaborated on the etymological
roots of the term subjectum. As he says, it is the Latin translation of the Greek
term hypokeimenon, to which Aristotle referred in his Physics and Metaphysics.
It indicates the substrate of the predication; that which underlies and holds to-
gether all its predicates. In principle, all that (either a thing or a living being) of
which something could be said is a ‘subject’. The identification of the ‘subject’
with the ‘I’, initiated by Descartes, is precisely, for Heidegger, what marks the
emergence of the modern world.⁴ With modernity, man becomes the premise
for the intelligibility of the world,which is then reduced to the condition of mere-
ly a material for its action.
This entailed, for Heidegger, a fundamental conceptual rupture. Man then
separates from the world and becomes the one who represents it and provides
a meaning to it. In the Middle Ages, man and world were only different phases
in the plan of Creation; the two participated in the order of correspondences of
what is, which always referred back to their ultimate Cause (God). In antiquity,
the world was not something to which the subject represented, but something
that presented itself, which was shown to the subject and, ultimately, it was in
the act of disclosing itself that it was constituted as such. Man and world thus
co-belonged in the repraesentatio (etymologically, to become present) of what ex-
ists.
In The Order of Things, Foucault both discusses and takes on this concept,
introducing to it a fundamental distinction.What he calls the ‘classical’ episteme
(of whose emergence Don Quixote serves as a symbol and expression) was born,
in effect, out of the break of the order of correspondences. In the regime of
knowledge that dominated until the sixteenth century, all that existed (the
chain of being), including language, was conceived as the visible mark of that
hidden force that constituted them and rendered them visible. The space of sim-
ilarities would form a system of ‘signatures’ for the unveiling of the hidden plan
of Creation. As Heidegger said, in this system of knowledge the world shows it-
self, and “all that remains is to decipher it” (Foucault 1970, p. 27).
 “However, when man becomes the primary and only real subjectum, that means: Man be-
comes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and
its Truth. Man becomes the relational center of that which is as such” (Heidegger 1977, p. 128).
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By the end of the sixteenth century, that natural link—by which the visible
immediately refers back to its last, hidden source—is broken, and words are dis-
tanced from things. Language becomes an artifice to articulate the whole out of
the fragments deployed on the surface of the visible forms. The subject now has
the task of reconstructing the logic of their dispersion of forms in the play of their
similarities and differences. Things, then, no longer speak of anything beyond
them, but refer to each other, tied as they are to the ground of Order that distrib-
utes them in the world and connects them with each other.
However, within the framework of this episteme, Foucault points out, there
was still no place for any idea of ’subject’ nor, ultimately, for the notion of tem-
poral irreversibility (nor, therefore, of History in the singular). Foucault refers
here to the expression with which Hegel opens his Phenomenology of Mind: “ev-
erything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Sub-
stance but as Subject as well” (Hegel 2003, p. 9). The ‘subject’ referred to here
—which is no longer merely substance, as it was in classical times—is a reflexive
concept; an in-itself and for-itself.
Only in light of this could we properly speak of a modern Subject (and, ul-
timately, a modern episteme), at least in the sense attributed by Foucault: that
type of Being whose interiority gives rise to History, constituting a dimension in-
herent in it. It is, more precisely, the premise for the conceptual transformation
analyzed by Koselleck under the rubric of Sattelzeit. The Subject, unlike the Sub-
stance, is no longer merely the substrate of predication (that which remains im-
mutable below the changes of form imposed upon it) but a dynamic force; what
defines it as such is the fact of containing within itself the principle of its own
transformations. This conceptual redefinition is closely linked, in turn, to the
emergence of the idea of the living organism as associated with the capacity
for self-generation and self-development, which marks the transition from the
‘natural history’ of the classical age to modern ‘biology’. The point here is that
the emergence of this concept marks a rupture no less crucial than that which
occurred two centuries earlier with the break of the system of correspondences.
Heidegger thus confused two conceptions of subjectivity (and temporality) very
different from each other, placing both under the common label of ‘modern sub-
ject’. Lastly, he would project back towards the sixteenth century a concept that
would only emerge at the end of the eighteenth century. The passage from the
‘natural history’ of the Enlightenment to ‘biology’ illustrates how this later con-
ceptual transformation occurred.
The idea of the subject in the classical era was forged in a fixist-preforma-
tionist matrix of thinking, which was at the basis of the ‘natural history’ of the
Enlightenment. The preformationist concept of the organism, which emerged
in the sixteenth century and dominated the natural thought of the seventeenth
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and eighteenth centuries, asserted that the forms of adult individuals were pre-
formed in the embryo. The gestation process was only the growing up of traits
and forms already discoverable in the origin of that process. The fact is that
only that hypothesis made possible the idea of an immanent, self-generated de-
velopment. Only the developments produced in the early nineteenth century in
the field of embryology provided a new model of ‘organic’ evolution. Karl Ernst
von Baer (the ‘founding father’ of modern embryology) is the key figure in this
process of conceptual redefinition. According to the theory formulated in his His-
tory of the evolution of animals (1828 and 1837), what would be preformed in the
embryo would no longer be a set of visible traits, but the principle for the forma-
tion of them; that is, a certain logical order of coordinated transformations ori-
ented towards the realization of an immanent purpose (something similar to
what we call a ‘genetic program’). Time, then, would no longer be a circumstance
external to beings but a dimension intrinsic to them. The ‘subject’ would then
come to designate this compound, that which displays a temporality by itself,
placing itself beyond the plane of visible forms as its hidden formative force.
And this explains one of the phenomena that Koselleck points out in relation
to the modern philosophies of history: the idea of the coexistence of plurality
of temporalities. It is here also where Koselleck’s confusion between progress
and evolution becomes more manifest, which leads him to misinterpret Herder’s
expression.
For Koselleck, the idea of the simultaneity of the non-contemporary that he
(erroneously) attributes to Herder arises from the possibility of ordering the va-
riety of realities existing in space in a linear sequence of development. As he af-
firms, the idea of historical progress allows us to identify what comes ‘before’
and what ‘after’. This, in fact, is the premise that lies at the base of the Enlight-
enment notion of the coexistence of pluralities of temporalities—but not of evo-
lutionary thought.When Herder said that “In actuality, every changing thing has
the measure of its own time within itself… [and that therefore] no two worldly
things have the same measure of time”⁵, he was precisely denying the possibility
of establishing any absolute temporal criterion—an objective parameter that al-
lowed distinguishing the former from the later. The plurality of temporalities de-
rived from the fact that, for him, there was not an empty becoming; a purely ob-
jective temporality, independent of something (a subject) that evolves. Time
becomes a dimension intrinsic to the subject; it is something that ‘comes to be-
ings from within’, to put it in Foucault’s words—a function of the differential evo-
 Herder, J. G. (1955): Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 68; quoted in Koselleck 1985,
p. 247.
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lutionary process of organisms. In short, there is not a single (objective) tempo-
rality, but as many temporalities as existing beings.We find here the nucleus of
the historicist concept. History thus becomes a reflexive concept; an in- and for-
itself; that is, a ‘Subject’ (which is no longer ‘Substance’, according to Hegel).
As we can see, within the period that Koselleck designates as Sattlezeit, two
very different views of time coexist. Yet, there is a third concept of it that be-
comes collapsed under the brand of ‘modern time’. The definition of the idea
of the ’constructability’ of history that then arises has a very different meaning
from that which Koselleck believes to find there. This leads us to introduce a sec-
ond historical precision. His view of the relativity of time actually emerged later,
and corresponds to a subsequent moment in intellectual history. Here too, Kosel-
leck’s dichotomous interpretative scheme pays its price, since it again leads him
to confuse another very different concept of historical temporality, besides the
two mentioned above, grouping all three of them under the common category
of ‘modernity’. Actually, within his perspective, we cannot think of the possible
existence of conceptual changes in the modes of experiencing historical tempo-
rality, except in terms of the antinomy premodern/modern. In fact, the funda-
mental law which, for him, governs the whole conceptual history of the modern
age—the ‘law of acceleration of time’—allows us to perceive only quantitative dif-
ferences; it would be only a matter of degree: what changed between the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries would be the measure of the interval of time in
which change occurs, and the same between the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies, and so on. However, unlike the previous historical precision (between the
ideas of ‘progress’ and ‘evolution’), Foucault no longer serves as a guide to un-
derstand how this new break occurred at the end of the nineteenth century.
The end of the ‘Age of History’
and the ‘Death of the Subject’
In the concept of History that arose in the nineteenth century (which is the one
that Koselleck analyzes), change and permanence are combined in a particular
way. Although for nineteenth-century evolutionary thought every fact was abso-
lutely singular (that is, unlike historia magistrate vitae, history now never repeats
itself), it did not mean that the future was not somehow contained in germ form
in the present as an immanent telos. It was thought that, in the same way as the
present is born out of the past, the future must also be somehow already con-
tained in it as one of its potential alternatives of development. This imposed
strict limits to the ‘constructability’ of history. That the subject ‘constructs’ His-
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tory does not mean that its action does not obey, in turn, a more general evolu-
tionary logic that encompasses it. This is precisely what paved the way in the
nineteenth century to the thinking of History as a system (and led Hegel to
speak of ‘the work of history’). It would be even more appropriate to say that,
within this concept, it is History that makes man, rather than the other way
around. A ‘stronger’ view of temporality founded on the assumption of subjec-
tive agency involved the absolute contingency of historical development; that
is, the radical constructivism of history. This view only emerged at the end of
the nineteenth century, with the break of the evolutionary pattern that dominat-
ed the preceding century. The emergence of this new view of time marked a con-
ceptual rupture no less profound than that produced in the period that Koselleck
called Sattelzeit.
Ultimately, Koselleck incurs a conceptual anachronism: just as Heidegger
projects onto the sixteenth century a concept of the subject that only emerges
in the nineteenth century, Koselleck projects onto the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury a concept of historical temporality that actually emerged later, in the twen-
tieth century. Koselleck’s idea of historical thinking as referring to an empty
structure of temporality is the result of the break of the evolutionary concept
of history. The idea of the radical contingency of evolutionary processes then per-
meates the entirety of Western thinking, crossing through the ‘great divide’ be-
tween natural and social sciences. We see here the horizon of thought from
which Koselleck’s very historical perspective emerged—and that he projects
back in time to the nineteenth century.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the view of systems as containing with-
in them an immanent purpose—the unity between system and end—had broken,
and only thus the idea of the radical indeterminacy of history was born, and its
cognate concept of the agency of the subject along with it. The conceptual crisis
produced at the end of the nineteenth century thus offers the ultimate frame-
work for understanding the meaning of the intellectual project around which Ko-
selleck’s own work unfolds. Here too, the reference to a series of developments
produced in the field of natural sciences reveals the emergence of that new para-
digm of temporality.
A then-newly emerged discipline, electrodynamics, is indicative of the trans-
formations occurred in the modes of thinking the historicity of physical, and, by
extension, social systems. In the theory developed by Maxwell and Faraday,
magnetic fields are no longer mere aggregates of elements, but sets of relations
that form integrated systems of interacting forces. These systems appear as con-
stellations of elements whose composition and recomposition are spontaneous
and sudden, without obeying any genetic pattern of progressive formation. The
notion of totality (structure) was then detached from that of purpose (function),
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thus dissociating diachrony from synchrony, the evolutionary processes from the
inherent dynamics of systems, which would be oriented solely towards their self-
reproduction, the perpetuation of their own internal balance or homeostasis.
A convergent path was followed by different disciplines, like biology. In
1900, Hugo de Vries gave the final blow to the nineteenth-century holistic-func-
tionalist conceptions of evolution, paving the way to the formulation of the theo-
ry of the ‘Great Synthesis’. For de Vries, evolutionary phenomena at the phylo-
genetic level result from sudden transformations or random global mutations.
In this way, mutations (change) are reduced to unpredictable, internally generat-
ed occurrences, but with no perceivable goal or purpose: even though they serve
an adaptive process of the species to their environment, selection occurs only a
posteriori, without any immediate impact on genetic processes themselves.
These developments, as mentioned, contributed the rise of a new paradigm
of time. Non-teleologically ordered processes, insofar as they involve the occur-
rence of the sudden recombination of elements, break the linearity of the devel-
opments of matter. Each discreet moment in the sequence of the transformations
operated in a system introduces a real novelty; that is, it entails the total recon-
figuration, according to a new and peculiar arrangement, of its constituent ele-
ments. Only then does the problem of the agential character of the historical sub-
ject emerge.
From the moment that systems lose any inner teleological impulse, any prin-
ciple to their self-transformation, change, or contingency could only come from
an instance transcendent to them; it would be the emanation of a Being that pre-
exists them, and allegedly institutes them. We thus get Koselleck’s claim that:
“there always occurs in history more or less than that contained in the given con-
ditions. Behind that ‘more or less’ are to be found men” (Koselleck 1985, p. 212).
The subject’s action, which until then had served as the guaranteed for the ra-
tionality of the sequential order of historical transformations, now appeared,
on the contrary, as introducing an element of ‘irrationality’ that breaks the lin-
earity of properly ‘historical’ processes—a concept that now, but only now, be-
came associated with the idea of radical contingency. The ambiguous relation-
ship between Koselleck’s idea of modernity and that of his master, Heidegger,
is particularly significant in this respect.
The claim that behind all historical change lies intentional action would be,
in principle, taking on the Heideggerian notion of modernity as the era in which
man becomes the subjectum. However, if we look closely at Koselleck’s claim, the
‘modern’ subject to whom he refers no longer has anything in common with the
one of which Heidegger spoke. It rather meant its complete reversal. The self is
no longer a subjectum, the unitary substrate that underlies the changes of form
that are imposed upon it, but, on the contrary, the origin and source of contin-
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gency in history. In short, within the new episteme that was born at the end of
the nineteenth century, in whose framework there emerged the concept of sub-
jectivity that Koselleck retrospectively attributes to modernity as a whole, the
transcendental subject (intentional action) is no longer a guarantee of order,
and becomes the one that destroys all identity in history, which breaks the lin-
earity of evolutionary processes and makes the radically new to emerge—that
which cannot be thought from the present ‘space of experience’. In sum, it
gave rise to that which was unthinkable not only within the frameworks of the
Enlightenment’s idea of ‘progress’, but also of nineteenth-century’s evolutionary
concept: the radical contingency of historical developments.⁶
As we see, Koselleck’s account fails to avoid relapsing into the kind of
anachronisms that he attempted to prevent. This inevitably has consequences
in his historical recreation of the origins of modernity. On the one hand, it
leads, as we have observed, to establishing a too drastic distance between the
first modern philosophies of history and the Ciceronian pedagogical ideal of
it; and, on the other hand, it confuses very divergent social and historical imag-
inaries, placing them all under one common category (that of modernity). In
fact, as I have already pointed out, its fundamental law for understanding mod-
ern temporality—that of ‘acceleration of time’—makes inconceivable the possible
emergence of other ways of experiencing temporality that are qualitatively differ-
ent to that which is at the basis of the concept of History that emerged in the late
eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries.
However, it is clear that these historical-conceptual precisions are only pos-
sible within the horizon opened by Koselleck’s own historical-conceptual proj-
ect. Ultimately, the point toward which the history of concepts and the archeol-
ogy of knowledge converge (and of which that requirement of conceptual rigor is
only a by-product) consists in the fact that they introduce a displacement of the
locus of reflection. They cease to be philosophies of history, different to the rest
but placed on their very same terrain, and become meta-philosophies of history;
their emergence represents a turn to a second-order level of historical conscious-
ness,which no longer seeks to discover a meaning in history, but rather to under-
stand what were the precise historical-epistemological conditions that led to
imagining such a project—the historical-conceptual conditions for the inception
of the very philosophies of history; in short, to recreate the underlying substrate
of thinking upon which they were historically based, and how the particular con-
cept of temporality implicit in them eventually became undermined.
 On the difference between the concepts of time in the philosophies of history of Romanticism
and Neokantianism, see: Palti 1977.
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These theories can no longer be considered as philosophies of history, and
indeed render it no longer possible to think of them. From the moment in which
they seek to disclose the fact that philosophies of history are situated within a
particular regime of knowledge, and therefore lack meaning if they are detached
from it, they move reflection to a plane already completely alien to that which
was proper to them. In short, they mark a turning point that renders impossible
a regression to the kind of idealizations on the basis of which philosophies of
history rested, and which currently have lost their symbolic ground. Doing so
today would entail a kind of historical naivety, or, more precisely, a certain his-
torical-conceptual blindness to the epistemic conditions on which the historical-
philosophical discourse itself is founded; the contingent nature of the regime of
knowledge within—and only within—which they became meaningful. Once it
has become undermined, they lose any substantive sense, in historical-concep-
tual terms.
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Where is History Heading?
Concerning the Idea of Progress
Abstract: In recent times, the question of the sense of history, the future and
what is to come seems to have become an obsolete issue. The aim of this
paper is to assess, in light of a series of considerations about the idea of ‘prog-
ress’, the possibilities of restoring this question in the context of discussions in
the field of the philosophy of history, which have relegated these kinds of issues
to the background and have confined specialists to the area of the epistemology
of history or literary theory.
Introduction
The collapse of the idea of ‘progress’ at the beginning of the twentieth century
precipitated a serious crisis in the field of what can be called ‘speculative philos-
ophy of history’¹; that is, of the theories about the course of time. In that context,
history studies swerved towards the area of research methodology or literary
theory, setting aside the questions of its sense, its future, utopias, etc. Lately,
however, as indicated by Chris Lorenz, ontological and political questions
seem to have gained a certain strength in the field of historical theory, as the re-
sult of developments regarding the topics of ‘memory’, ‘trauma’ and ‘presence’
(Lorenz 2012, p. 21).
In this context, the aim of this paper is to assess whether the question of
progress in the area of history—an issue that has been deemed obsolete several
times in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries—can still be restored. I am re-
solved to prove that the idea of progress can still be supported in the field of his-
tory studies in two ways: methodologically and normatively.
The framework of this paper is as follows: firstly (i), I will reconstruct the
criticisms of the idea of progress that occurred throughout the twentieth century,
and which seem to have turned the concept into a museum piece; secondly (ii), I
will demonstrate that the idea of progress is not a univocal term, and argue that
 According to William Henry Walsh’s famous distinctions between ‘speculative philosophy of
history’ and ‘critical philosophy of history’. (Walsh 1983, p. 9)
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the criticisms made of it are insufficient or, at most, only apply to some of its as-
pects; finally (iii), I will evaluate the current possibilities of restoring the concept
at hand.
The closure of the future
The idea of ‘progress’, which first appeared in the seventeenth century² and
reached its peak in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the works of Con-
dorcet, Kant, Hegel and Marx, among others, faced a crisis in the twentieth cen-
tury, particularly after World War I. In fact, the traumatic events of the twentieth
century (wars, crises, and the failure of ‘real socialism’) marked the end of this
concept in the eyes of many authors. Critical theorists Max Horkheimer and The-
odor Adorno denounced the connection between the idea of progress and the
traumatic events of the twentieth century; that is to say, the negative consequen-
ces of progress, the ‘dialectic of Enlightenment’:
The Enlightenment, in its fullest sense as thought in continuous progress, has always
aimed at freeing men from fear and making them their own masters. But the fully enlight-
ened earth radiates disaster triumphant. (Horkheimer / Adorno 2006, p. 59)
According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the Enlightenment aimed to elevate men
above the shadows, but finally fell into darkness, into a new kind of ‘barbarism’
(Horkheimer / Adorno 2006, p. 59). The school of analytic philosophy, on the
other hand, argued that a thesis on the evolution of humankind is best suited
for the field of ‘prophecy’, and therefore does not have any scientific character
(Popper 1959, pp. 276–284; Danto 1965, p. 42). It was considered that a law
about the sense of history could not be extracted from events; that is to say,
that when historians make teleological statements (of any kind), they are step-
ping out of their field of competence. In the area of hermeneutics, Gianni Vattimo
and Karl Löwith referred to the idea as a ‘metaphysical illusion’ derived from
Christian and Jewish eschatology (Löwith 1968, p.10; Vattimo 2000, p. 16); and
poststructuralist Jean-François Lyotard alluded negatively to the concept, calling
it a ‘metanarrative’—a totaling and homogenizing discourse (Lyotard 1979,
p. 63).³
 Some specialists believe, however, that there was already an idea of progress in Antiquity
(Dodds 1973; Guthrie 1957; Mondolfo 1955).
 For in-depth analyses of the history of the idea of progress and the criticisms it has endured,
see: Taguieff 2004; Schlobach 1997.
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In light of this, it does not seem strange that some people have stated that
the idea of progress was an ‘obsolete’ category or, even more, a ‘dead idea’
(Pfaff 1996, p. 385):
The great moral promise that accompanied progressive ideology hasn’t been kept. On the
contrary, not only have we gone back to barbarism, which invalidates Condorcet’s predic-
tion at once, but this regression has taken place in a country which had reached a high
level of civilizing development. […] Since then, the “religion of progress” is dead. (Julliard
1996, p. 4)
Pierre Taguieff similarly refers to the crisis of the concept as a ‘crumbling’ or
‘sinking’ of the idea of progress (Taguieff 2004, p. 26).
As a consequence of this questioning, a generalized skepticism emerged not
only regarding the idea of progress, but also the scope and value of the consid-
erations about the ‘speculative philosophy of history’ in general. This is how his-
tory theory left the area of questions about the sense and the motivating forces of
history—about progress or decadence, and about the future—and stuck to meth-
odological and epistemological discussions, as well as literary and psychological
ones about the range and limits of historical knowledge.⁴
The future was no longer a concern for historians, who, in the context of
what Andreas Huyssen calls a ‘turn to the past’ (Huyssen 2007, p. 13), became
obsessed with what had been: memory, commemorations, museums. Manuel
Cruz refers to this obsession with the past (in a recent paper that continues
the work of historian Peter Novick) as a ‘civil religion’:
[…] a religion with its commandments (the duty of memory) and its sins (forgetting), with its
holidays (commemorations, anniversaries) and its martyrs (the ones who died in the Hol-
ocaust), with its faith (human rights, democracy), with its sacred places (monuments, mu-
seums) and its priests. (Cruz 2013, p. 181)
He asserts in this way how empty the present is, and how ‘volatile every idea of a
project or a future’ is as well (Cruz 2013, p. 181).
It may seem foolish to pose the question of the validity of the notion of prog-
ress after such criticisms. However, as I will endeavor to prove, critics have cre-
ated a ‘scarecrow’ that has nothing to do with the concept or, at most, concerns
only some of its aspects.
 Regarding debate in the area of the philosophy of history in the last few years, see: Brauer
2009, pp. 19–39; Lorenz 2012.
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The idea of progress: a troublesome concept
The idea of ‘progress’ (and its equivalents in other languages: progrès, For-
tschritt, progreso, progresso) can be traced back to the Latin verb progredior,
which means ‘to go forward, to advance’. The notion in its modern sense
comes from a metaphorical use of that Latin root. The concept dates back to
the seventeenth century, to the works of Francis Bacon, and reaches its peak
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. After this high, it entered a crisis
in the twentieth century. Having said this, of what do we speak when employing
the notion of progress? The detractors of the concept, despite the differences that
their questionings expose, suppose a univocal idea of progress—a teleology that
would trace the steps of mankind, and would take it to a state of moral and ma-
terial development. Based on this assumption, it seems rightful that they would
speak of a ‘prophecy’, of a ‘metaphysical illusion’, or, in light of the traumatic
events of the twentieth century, of a ‘failure’.
In any case, I believe this is a simplistic interpretation in that it overlooks the
semantic undertones of the concept. The idea of progress can be interpreted in
three different senses: the concept can refer (i) to advances in the knowledge
of an area—a methodological approach; (ii) to the necessary course of history
—an ontological characteristic; or (iii) to a regulatory ideal—a normative aspect.
Firstly (i), the concept was used initially by Francis Bacon in Augmentis Sci-
entiarium (1623) and Novum organum (1620). In the latter, Bacon proposes the
idea of a ‘progress of knowledge’ (Bacon 1984, p. 54) and notes the causes
that hindered it in his time: the admiration for Antiquity and the respect for au-
thority. Bacon believed, in light of the new empiricist epistemology, in the advan-
ces of science and technology, and in a dynamic conception of knowledge. It
would not be until authors like Turgot and Voltaire that ‘progress’ would be ex-
tended to apply to areas like the one concerning traditions and arts. Further-
more, the concept of progress did not yet involve a sense of history, but only re-
ferred to methodological aspects.
Secondly (ii), the notion was employed by thinkers such as Fontenelle, Con-
dorcet, Turgot, Hegel and Marx, among others, to present the course to which
human actions were necessarily prescribed; that is to say, it was an aspect of
the structure of reality. Thus the classic image that associated time with corrup-
tion and decadence was left behind. Turgot, for instance, pointed out that “nat-
ural phenomena are subdued to constant laws and are locked in a circle of rev-
olutions that are always the same […] the succession of men offers, on the other
hand, an ever-changing show” (Turgot 1808, p. 52). Mankind, like an individual,
he claims, “has his infancy and his progresses” (Turgot 1808, p. 53) but, unlike
426 Adrián Ratto
the biological life of men, does not have a declining phase. Mankind, he con-
cludes, “is always going towards a greater perfection” (Turgot 1808, p. 54).
Now, we should make a distinction within this interpretation between those
who considered that progress was continual, and those who believed it was a
process with constant ups and downs. While Turgot perceived a progressive im-
provement of history even in periods of apparent regression like the Middle Ages
(“in the midst of destruction, traditions soften and the human spirit is uplifted,”
he claims [Turgot 1808, p. 53]), another advocate for the concept, Condorcet, did
not hesitate to describe the Middle Ages in his Esquisse d’un tableau historique
des progrès de l’esprit humain (1795), as a dark period—a time of ignorance, su-
perstition and bigotry. Just like Turgot, he believed that progress was something
irreversible,⁵ but he set himself apart from him by denying that it was continual:
In this disastrous period [Middle Ages] we shall see how the human spirit falls rapidly from
the height to which it had been elevated, and how ignorance comes with, in this case, fe-
rocity, in others, a refined cruelty, and always corruption and treachery. (Condorcet 1847,
p. 109)
Europe, he points out, fell back into ‘a dark night’, in which ‘teleological fanta-
sies’, ‘superstitions’, ‘intolerance’ and ‘despotism’ were always lurking. Further-
more, when he talks about the progresses of the human spirit in the first lines of
Esquisse, he is sure to mention the existence of “general mistakes which have
more or less set them back or suspended them and which, frequently, have
made man go back to ignorance” (Condorcet 1847, p. 21).
On the other hand, among those who saw the key to the development of hu-
mankind in the idea of progress, we should separate those who considered that
history was heading towards the development of science and technology but not
necessarily of the moral values and legal standards (Rousseau, Diderot, etc.),
from those who considered that this development would be material as well
as spiritual (Voltaire, Condorcet, etc.). In Discours sur les sciences et les arts
(1750), Rousseau proposes the famous thesis according to which the develop-
ment of the sciences and arts has been inversely proportional to spiritual devel-
opment: “Our souls have been corrupted just as our sciences and our arts have
progressed” (Rousseau 1964, p. 9). According to Condorcet, however, material
advances are key to reaching the time in which “the sun will shine but on free
men, who won’t answer to any master but their own reason” (Condorcet 1847,
p. 244).
 “Traditions are sweetened […] by the slow but sure effect of the general progress of enlight-
enment.” (Condorcet 1847, p. 174)
Where is History Heading? Concerning the Idea of Progress 427
Finally (iii), the concept of progress was used as a normative principle by au-
thors such as Immanuel Kant and, at times,Voltaire. In his famous Idee zu einer
allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784), Kant presents history
as the result of an ‘intention’ or ‘plan of nature’, and sets himself the task of dis-
covering the ‘guiding thread’ able to order the apparently chaotic life of men
(Kant 2013, p. 41). He shows that history consists of the slow and hard formation
of a ‘cosmopolitan state’, an environment in which reason can germinate, and a
natural disposition of men destined to fully develop at some point (Kant 2013,
p. 61). As we know, Kant finds in men’s ‘unsocial sociability’ the medium
through which nature carries on this plan that would take humankind ‘from
coarseness to culture’, which to Kant means the development of talents, of
taste, and the transformation from people’s original coarseness into morality
(Kant 2013, p. 46). Kant believes that, like in Bernard Mandeville’s The Fable
of the Bees (1714), where vices are the driving force of prosperity, it is war—the
antagonism of inclinations—that brings about progress. Without that dynamic
brought about by selfish pretensions, he claims that ‘talents would stay forever
hidden’ (Kant 2013, p. 47). Having said that, it is not Kant’s intention to describe
an inevitable process, but to simply present an idea, a kind of hypothesis about
the course of history (Kant 2013, p. 63). This idea also works as a utopian horizon
or regulative ideal. Kant calls it a ‘future-shaping perspective’ (Kant 2013, p. 63)
that could be used as a guideline for the actions of men.
The different questionings to the idea of progress mentioned in the previous
section assume, as I have pointed out, a unitary, teleological idea of progress
that overlooks the differences here shown. They may touch upon the second
sense of the concept, but seem to neglect the first and the third ones. Regarding
the last one in particular (progress as a normative principle), it could be stated
that this does not imply an ontological or prophetic aspect and that, further-
more, as a practical project it can neither be proved nor rejected empirically.
As Daniel Brauer postulates regarding Kant’s historical theory, “the moments
in which everything seems to be lost are not enough to reject an ideal” (Brauer
2005a, p. 104).
The fragility of the past and the future
The forbidding that prevents historians from discussing the future stems from
the attempt at making history a scientific discipline. This agenda is rooted, as
we know, in the epistemological separation in the field of historiography that
took place between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which dis-
tanced history from the belles lettres and the moral, turning it into an independ-
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ent discipline (Dufays 1990, pp. 15– 16; Pomian 1975, pp. 937–938). History, like
physics and biology, gradually became, in its effort to define itself as a professio-
nal discipline, an objective sphere of knowledge, and the historian became a
neutral, aseptic researcher. The past became a distant object—otherness for the
historian—due to its distance and difference from the present, and the future be-
came something to which the historian could not refer without risking the neu-
trality that defined him as such.
Meanwhile, as Karl Popper stated some time ago, the ‘selective character’ of
history is inevitable given the “endless richness and variety of the aspects of the
facts of the world that surround us” (Popper 1995, p. 151). This means that the
historian cannot help but to introduce a ‘point of view’ in his own material (Pop-
per 1995, p. 151). If the events to describe are endless, then our description will
always be incomplete, forming a mere selection of the data that we were able to
collect.
From this we can assert that the historian cannot avoid including in their
work some idea about the future (if they were to try, as Popper puts it, they
would only succeed in fooling themselves by uncritically applying an irrespon-
sible point of view [Popper 1995, p. 150]). Indeed, the historian can never be a
mere narrator of events ‘exactly like they occurred’, nor an ‘ideal chronicler’,
as Arthur Danto proved (Danto 1965, p. 149– 150). The point of view they offer
will depend on their stance on current problems, such as war, inequality, reli-
gion clashes, etc. The past is delivered, then, according to that point of view
about the present, which always carries an idea of what the future ought to
be. In the words of Concha Roldán, we can only revisit the past by the light of
the problems of the present and with our sights set on the future (Roldán
2006, p. 544).
Both the past and the future are fragile. No history can narrate the past ex-
actly as it happened, nor anticipate where history is going. The future is unwrit-
ten and the past is unsealed. The discovery of new data, the appearance of new
theories and the shifting of problems that concern historians (each generation
has its own problems and difficulties and, subsequently, its own interests and
points of view) generate a reordering of events and the possibility of new per-
spectives for the future, by which I mean that they modify the way history is in-
terpreted.
According to Popper, ‘individual events have got no meaning’. Meaning is
given to them by historians’ ‘decisions’ and points of view, which permeate his-
tory, whether consciously or unconsciously (Popper 1995, p. 172).⁶ However, the
 Popper criticizes those who overlook this dualism of ‘events’ and ‘decisions’, since it is pre-
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fact that events have no meaning on their own does not imply that they are not
relevant, since they are the ones to determine how fertile historians’ theories are.
The best history will be the one that manages to connect, and thus explain, the
most events without contradicting the already established connections of events
to that date. In this sense, we could talk about the ‘progress’ of a theory over an-
other one from an epistemological-methodological point of view (Martin 1998).
According to Daniel Brauer, the fact that the ‘framework’ of the events is re-
touched and modified by historians over and over again should not necessarily
lead to a skeptical conclusion about the status of historical knowledge (Brauer
2005b, p. 52). To say that it is the historian’s job to give a sense to history is
not to imply (as do narrativist theorists, who replace a naive realism with an
even more naive idealism) that the historian shapes the past, but rather that
they place in their writings certain empirical data, theoretical terms, interpreta-
tive models, etc.
In this context, the distinction between a speculative philosophy of history
and a critical one—or, as Johannes Rohbeck puts it, between a ‘material’ philos-
ophy of history, focused on the problem of the sense of history, and a ‘formal’
one, attaining to epistemological issues (Rohbeck 2014, p. 161)—is pointless,
given that form needs a material or content. Although that material is changea-
ble and fragile, it is always present. In other words, writing about history implies
expressing interests and points of view, and making decisions about which way
history should go; that is, according to Rohbeck, it implies material aspects that
can be more or less explicit. In The Content of the Form. Narrative Discourse and
Historical Representation (1987), Hayden White claims that, in historical dis-
course, ‘form’ implies ontological choices (White 1992, p. 12)—in other words,
that historical narration is not neutral because it is responsible for the forming
of historical reality. Form, he says, always has a content (White 1992, p. 13). How-
ever, this is not what I believe to be the connection between material and from. I
believe, based on what has already been shown, that content and form are not
inseparable because form dictates reality, as is White’s conviction, but rather be-
cause every history requires empirical data, methodological tools, theoretical
terms, models of interpretation, etc. The answer to a naive realism should not
necessarily be, as I have already pointed out, a radical constructionism that
is, perhaps, even more naive.
cisely there that he finds the origin of ‘historicist’ interpretations, which neglect the responsibil-
ity the author has when writing history (Popper 1995, p. 173).
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Conclusion
As Concha Roldán claims, historians can no longer work as ‘prophets or meteor-
ologists’. The teleological vision of history is discarded since, as I have shown,
no sense emanates from events; empirical data does not speak for itself. Howev-
er, Roldán agrees that they cannot work as mere literary critics either, because
this would confuse reality and fiction, as well as neglect the different dimensions
of history (Roldán 2006, p. 539).
Meanwhile, the impossibility of continuing to pursue a teleological vision of
history does not mean that every discussion about the future—about what is to
come—should be taken off historians’ tables. On the contrary, I have shown that
it is only in light of the present and with a glimpse of the future that historians
can reconstruct the twists and turns of the past.
Following this, we can conclude that historians cannot help but to depict in
their writings an image of what the future should be. Many specialists from the
fields of history and historiography, committed to the ideal of scientific objective-
ness, react negatively when they perceive discussions of a practical nature in his-
torical pieces of writing. Morals, however, belong in the realm of history. They
can be more or less explicit, but they cannot be absent (Cotkin 2008, p. 294; Lor-
enz 2014, p. 60). If the idea of progress is placed within this context, and not
within the framework of a teleological vision of history, it can still be restored.
In other words, it seems viable provided that it is accepted as a ‘point of view’
from which historians can orient their work, and not as the inevitable fate of hu-
mankind. (It would be pertinent to ask if it is desirable to maintain this idea, but
that is not the purpose of this present work.) Finally, as can be observed in the
previous section, it seems possible to talk of progress in history in terms of an
evolution of historical writing that stems from the effectiveness of the arguments
that they encompass.
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Francisco Naishtat
The Crisis of Historical Time at the
Beginning of the Twentieth Century:
An Early Counterpoint Between
Benjamin and Heidegger
as a Crucial Issue for Thinking Modernity,
Globalization and its Historical Space
Abstract: In this article, I intend first to clarify the controversy over the concept
of time between the early Heidegger and the young Benjamin, referring to a sem-
inar given by Heinrich Rickert in the summer of 1913 in Freiburg and attended by
both young thinkers. Secondly, I intend to indicate further developments of this
first constellation through the texts of 1915 and 1916 on time. Finally, after estab-
lishing resulting derivations in later fundamental texts of both philosophers, I
will conclude by considering their differentiated perspectives on modernity
and on the pre-phenomenon of globalization.
I
We may say that it would be bold and adventurous to connect Martin Heidegger
with Walter Benjamin, whose thoughts (and lives), in spite of belonging to the
same generation of German intellectuals, show such different profiles and
with such acute contrasts. The rift is explicitly declared in Walter Benjamin’s cor-
respondence, where a considerable number of letters, which range from frank
discretion to the harshest criticism, speak of an undeniable distance, expressed
throughout the timeframe between his early commentaries on Heidegger in 1916
up to the end of the 1930s.¹ The gap is reinforced by the fact that Heidegger, on
 Letter to Gershom Scholem of November 11, 1916, (BR I, p. 344); letter to Gershom Scholem of
December 1, 1920, (BR II, p. 108); letter of January 20, 1930, (BR III, p. 503). Lastly, though this
does not exhaust a long list of references, we should mention a letter of Benjamin to Scholem of
April 25, 1930, where Benjamin tells his friend that “[in association with Brecht] We were plan-
ning to annihilate Heidegger (“Heidegger zu zertrümmern”) here in the summer in the context of
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his side, never mentions Benjamin— except in his letter of August 10th, 1967, in
which he writes to Hannah Arendt about a quotation by Benjamin on Mallarmé,
some weeks after attending Arendt’s speech in Freiburg on Benjamin (Arendt /
Heidegger 1999). Nevertheless, in spite of these strong first impressions favoring
an apparent total abyss between both thinkers, it is possible to discover a secret
and silent constellation, which is worth exhibiting and exhuming.
Several commentators, whose number has increased in recent years, favor
the idea of a deep complementarity between both German philosophers, at
least around some polarities, such as the discontinuity of time, ruin, technology,
the work of art, tradition and destruction. To begin with, we must mention here
Hannah Arendt, who was among the first readers to emphasize the connection of
both thinkers.² Ten years later, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben—who
attended the Le Thor Seminar given by Heidegger in Provence in 1969, and
whose philological and philosophical contributions to the studies on Benjamin’s
work are universally recognized—specifically emphasized the articulations be-
tween Benjamin and Heidegger on the issue of the discontinuity of time and
some other central topics (Agamben 1978, III.8). During the last three decades,
the contingent of scholars and prominent specialists that have paid attention
to some aspects of the relations between Benjamin and Heidegger has expanded
considerably.³
However, there is one remarkable piece of information that only in the past
five years has been attentively noticed (Fenves 2013; Giuliani 2014, pp. 45– 164;
Eiland / Jennings 2014, pp. 32–75; Lavelle 2013, pp. 373–383). It takes us back to
the years 1912– 1913. In the summer of 1913, Heidegger and Benjamin attended
together, at the Albert Ludwig University in Freiburg im Brisgau, a lecture
given by the Neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert on the idea of ‘the perfected/accom-
plished life’ (vollendete Leben). If in 1913 Heidegger was already an advanced
a very close-knit critical circle of readers led by Brecht and me” (BR III, p. 522; Benjamin 1994,
p. 193).
 In her introduction to the famous American edition of Benjamin’s Illuminations (1969), Arendt
already pointed to this unapparent connection between Heidegger and Benjamin, using the sug-
gestive figure of the ‘pearl diver’: “Without realizing it, Benjamin actually had more in common
with Heidegger’s remarkable sense for living eyes and living bones that had sea-changed into
pearls and coral, and as such could be saved and lifted into the present only by doing violence
to their context in interpreting them with ‘the deadly impact’ of new thoughts, than he did with
the dialectical subtleties of his Marxist friends” (Arendt 1969, p. 46).
 Here I mention, chronologically, only those most relevant to our topic of time: Fabrizio Desid-
eri (Desideri 1983); Howard Caygill (Caygill 1994); Andrew Benjamin (Benjamin, A. 1994); Marc
Sagnol (Sagnol 2003); Peter Fenves (Fenves 2011); Hans Ruin (Ruin 2012); Mathias Giuliani (Giu-
liani 2014); Andrew Benjamin and Dimitris Vardoulakis (Benjamin / Vardoulakis 2015).
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student, working under the direction of Rickert,⁴ Benjamin, three years younger
than Heidegger, was a newly arrived student in Freiburg. Indeed, in April 1912,
the 20-year-old Benjamin, having completed high school at the Kaiser-Friedrich
Schule in Berlin-Charlottenburg, began his university studies at the above-men-
tioned prestigious university in Freiburg (Eiland / Jennings 2014, pp. 12–31;Witte
2012, pp. 17–30). He matriculated at the department of philology in view of lit-
erary studies, but early on began attending the university’s most renowned phil-
osophical and historiographical seminars, such as those lectured by Heinrich
Rickert and Friedrich Meinecke (Eiland / Jennings, 2014, pp. 32–33).⁵ It was
above all in that seminar of Rickert on the notion of ‘perfected life’, together
with Rickert’s parallel lectures on Bergson (attended by Benjamin and Heideg-
ger), that both young thinkers were introduced to the novel Rickertian categories
of Voll-Endung and Un-Vollendung through Rickert’s fresh system of values,⁶ as
formulated in Logos (a magazine founded by Rickert) in 1912– 1913 (Rickert
1911/12; Rickert 1913; Rickert 2007, pp. 133– 171; Rickert 2013).
We can resume his central idea of Voll-Endung, through what Rickert called
“the three stages of our [tendency to] full-completion” (Voll-Endung), or “the ten-
dency of every meaningful behavior, oriented to the effective realization of val-
ues” (Rickert 2007, p. 140). Firstly, we obtain a dominium of goods that will be
designated as the ‘uncompleted totality’ (Un-endliche Totalität), as an incom-
pleteness or absence of actual end, opposed to the full completion (Rickert
2007, p. 141). This is the first plan of Rickert’s axiological stages, modeled after
the figure of evolution, and corresponding to the masculine dimension of life
(Rickert 2013, pp. 375–379). In terms of time, it falls under the future (Zukunft),
 The relation between the young Heidegger and Rickert was already well established, especial-
ly since Heidegger’s 1915 Habilitation Dissertation titled “On the doctrine of categories and sig-
nification in Duns Scotus” (Heidegger 1916), written under the direction of Rickert; furthermore,
Heidegger’s Conference (Vortrag) of 1915 in Freiburg for his Venia Legendi finished with an ex-
plicit reference to Rickert’s notion of Wertbeziehung—‘value relevance’ (Heidegger 1978,
p. 433). Finally, the recently published correspondence between Heidegger and Rickert of the pe-
riod 1912–1933, together with the edition of a number of previously unpublished documents
written by Heidegger on different aspects of Rickert’s philosophy, also attest to this early relation
(Heidegger / Rickert 2002).
 “I am after all studying philosophy” Benjamin says in letter to Carla Seligson of June 5th, 1913
(Benjamin 1994, p. 29; BR I, p. 108).
 See also Benjamin’s correspondence of that period, mostly addressed to his young friend Her-
bert Blumenthal, but also to Carla Seligson and to Gustav Wyneken: especially his letters to Blu-
menthal of Jun 7th 1913 (BR I, pp. 111– 112) and Jun 23rd 1913 (BR I, pp. 122– 129); to Carla Seligson
of September 15th 1913 (BR I, pp. 174–176); and to Gustav Wyneken of Jun 19th 1913 (BR I, pp. 115–
119).
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and the privileged models corresponding to this first plan are those of science
and education, as infinite evolution processes. The second plan of axiological
goods defines a dominium that may be characterized as ‘fully completed partic-
ularity’ (Voll-endliche Partikularität) (Rickert 2007, p. 142). The examples corre-
sponding to this plan are related to the present dimension (Gegenwart), and
are composed of the figures of love and art. Rickert modeled it after the pole
of woman, which he fits typically with an achieved life (Rickert 2013, pp. 375–
379). Thirdly, the Baden philosopher presents a dominium of goods that is de-
fined by the plan of a totality that at the same time is fully completed (Voll-end-
liche Totalität): “in it, we have the final goal that may be set by an aspiration to
the effective realization of values”. This third figure corresponds to the religious
sphere. Its temporal dimension, says Rickert, is timeless: it is not in the present,
nor in the future, but in eternity (Ewigkeit) or in the ‘eternal goods’ (Ewigkeitsgüt-
er) dimension (Rickert 2013, pp. 379–381). Lastly (although he recognizes it from
a strictly formal and combinatory point of view), Rickert considers a fourth plan,
namely one of the ‘un-completed particularity’ (Un-endliche Partikularität)—but
he immediately discards this form: he cannot conceive the possibility of a partic-
ularity that is unachieved, in the way that he cannot conceive the idea of the past
dimension of time as actual incompleteness (Rickert 2007, p. 142).
The abovementioned seminar on the idea of Voll-Endung may have provided
a conceptual frame for a first Benjaminian sketch on the idea of time through the
polarities of ‘(un)fulfillment’ (Un-vollendung, unerfüllt) and ‘messianic comple-
tion’ (Voll-Endung, Erfüllen). Nevertheless, Benjamin developed his own view,
in dissidence with Rickert, specifically through his affirmation of an ‘unachieved
and unfulfilled past’, which was not admitted in Rickert’s system of values. Ac-
tually, there is a group of Benjamin’s texts of the period 1913– 1915, mostly un-
published during his lifetime, in which appears a first outline of both the mes-
sianic and the failed secular time. It is worth indicating here that this first
version of Benjaminian messianism predates the ulterior connection of Benjamin
with the other side of German neo-Kantianism (namely the so called ‘Marburg
School’ founded by Hermann Cohen), with which it is customary to associate
Benjamin’s main trends of messianism.⁷
To begin with, Benjamin wrote a brief dialogue on love in 1913, titled
Gespräch über die Liebe and published posthumously for the first time in 1989
(GS VII.1, pp. 15– 19), which was clearly influenced by Rickert’s seminar (Giuliani
2014, pp. 85–88). Nevertheless, it is already clear here that love seems not only
 This is valid also for the consideration of the influence of Gershom Scholem, actually not en-
countered by Benjamin until July 1915 (Scholem 1981, p. 14).
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related (as in Rickert) to a plan of particularity (GS VII.1, p. 16), but also to a plan
of profane or immanent eternity (GS VII.1, p. 18), which contradicts Rickert, and
seems to connect Benjamin with Kierkegaard.⁸ That is to say, love is understood
as a particularity, which is clearly distinguished from the figure of universally ori-
ented aspiration, such as a love of humanity. Through the voices of Vincent and
Sophia (who undoubtedly incarnate the voices of wisdom in Benjamin’s Ge-
spräch), in contrast with Agathon (whose positions seem affected by misjudg-
ment), Benjamin says that an abstract universal concept like humanity may mo-
bilize ‘aspiration’ (Ziel), but fails to mobilize desire (Sehnen), which is
constitutive of love (GS VII.1, p. 16). Love, at the same time, reaches through ‘dec-
laration’ (Äußerung) an eternal ‘immanent’ plan (GS VII.1, pp. 17–19) that can
neither be increased nor weakened, as Sophia says at the end of the Gespräch
(GS VII.1, p. 18). This particular crossroads between particularity and eternity
functions as a messianic comprehension of time that draws Benjamin nearer
to Kierkegaard, who connects the idea of eternity (Evige) with the notions of Pau-
linian Kairos and of a ‘redemptive instant’ (Ojeblik, in Danish) (Kierkegaard 1935,
pp. 87–96).⁹ I mention Kierkegaard here because in 1916, in Trauerspiel und
Tragödie, Benjamin writes of erfüllt and unerfüllt, in relation to time: erfüllen cor-
responds in Benjamin to the idea of consummation, which is the sense of the
term Fylde in Kierkegaard (GS II.1, pp. 133– 137; SW I, pp. 55–58). Therefore, in
1916 Benjamin achieved a juxtaposition of the ideas of Vollendung from Rickert
and of Fylde from Kierkegaard. However, at the same time Benjamin admitted a
figure that Rickert did not: the unachieved or unconsummated particularity (un-
erfüllt). This figure corresponds in Benjamin to the experience of frustration and
failure, which became a fundamental plan in his understanding of baroque
time.¹⁰
 Benjamin’s early reading of Kierkegaard is clearly attested through in his correspondence from
Freiburg of 1912– 1913: in his letter to Carla Seligson of April 30th 1913, he recounts the lecture on
Kierkegaard’s Either/Or (Entweder-Oder) (Benjamin 1994, p. 20; BR.I, p. 92); and in his letter to
Herbert Blumenthal of July 17th of 1913, Benjamin accounts for the reception of Kierkegaard’s
Concept of Anxiety (Begriff der Angst) (Benjamin 1994, p. 44; BR I, p. 148).
 On the other hand, Kierkegaard elaborates the idea of completion according to the Danish
term Fylde, which corresponds to the German word Füllen. He thus creates the idea of Tide-
nsfylde, which in Danish means ‘time fullness’, and is implied in his notion of instant (Ojeblik-
ket). Kierkegaard also notes the antecedents for the notion of instant in I, Corinthians, 15,52, in
which Paul writes that ‘in the twinkling of an eye’ (an instant—Exaifnes), the dead shall be
raised (Kierkegaard 1935, pp. 87– 115).
 Actually, in his Goethe’s Elective Affinities (Goethes Wahlverwandschaften), Benjamin not
only admits the consecrated love, but also the unconsummated love, which allows him to
admit the unachieved particularity (unerfüllt Partikularität, or unvollendete Partikularität). He
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In Gedanken über Gerhart Hauptmanns Festspiel, published by Benjamin
under the provocative pseudonym ‘Ardor’ in the Magazine Der Anfang (Berlin:
August, 4th 1913) during his stay in Freiburg (GS II.1, pp. 57–59), Benjamin intro-
duces in the first section of his article the term ‘Illumination’ (Erleuchtung),
which had a central role in his subsequent work of the 1930s, but referred
here to ‘historical meaning’: “solche Erleuchtung als historischen Sinn zu bezeich-
nen” (GS II.1, p. 57). Benjamin declares that in fact, the meaning (Sinn) of Festiv-
ity (Festes) and of fight (Kampfes) is actually the same (GS II.1, p. 60). In the first
section there is a programmatic emphasis on the notion of ‘task’ (Aufgabe),
under a ‘vanguardist’ concept of youth and its historical fight for scholarly re-
form, and in connection with the precedent article Experience (Erfahrung), pub-
lished by Benjamin in Der Anfang earlier in 1913 (GS, II.1, pp. 54–56). In the next
section, Benjamin introduces his notion of ‘Idea’ (Idee) through its historical
function as the only principle that can gather the historical as such, preannounc-
ing his article Trauerspiel und Tragödie of 1916. The third section of the text,
under the suggestive title of Die Jugend und die Geschichte (Youth and History),
underlines not the fight for specific values, but the fight for ‘the possibility of val-
ues’ (GS II.1, p. 59). At the end of his article, Benjamin affirms the in-actuality of
the present (GS II.1, p. 59), which prefigures the main affirmation of Trauerspiel
und Tragödie two years later.
“The Life of Students”, an article written by Benjamin in 1914– 1915 and
published in Der neue Merkur in 1915, before being published in the Gesammelte
Schriften (GS II.1, pp. 75–87), mentioned for the first time in any of his published
texts the word ‘messianic’—and it is expressed not in connection with a religious
or theological discussion, but in a totally secular and profane tone, confronting
the idea of teleological progress:
There is a view of history that puts its faith in the infinite extent of time and thus concerns
itself only with the speed, or lack of it, with which people and epochs advance along the
path of progress. This corresponds to a certain absence of coherence and rigor in the de-
mands it makes on the present. The following remarks, in contrast, delineate a particular
condition in which history appears to be concentrated in a single focal point (Brennpunkt),
spent his life obsessed with the problem of failure. As Giuliani observed (2014, p. 52), Benjamin
once regarded with some admiration Kant’s Philosophy of History as one that emphasized fail-
ure, by separating the meanings of History and causal effectiveness. I believe that the well-
known paragraph of the second section of Kant’s Streit der Fakultäten, on the French Revolution
as a symbol of a moral disposition of humanity beyond its effectiveness in terms of success or
failure, is a fundamental example of this issue. For the ‘Elective Affinities’ and the subject of
love in Benjamin, I owe to Caroline Sauter some crucial insights (Sauter, Caroline: “Love, Mar-
riage and Experience: Elective Affinities between Benjamin, Kant and Goethe”, unpublished).
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like those that have traditionally been found in the utopian images of the philosophers (…).
The historical task (geschichtliche Aufgabe) is to disclose this immanent state of perfection
(immanenten Zustand der Vollkommenheit) and make it absolute, to make it visible and
dominant in the present (…) the task is to grasp its metaphysical structure, as with the mes-
sianic domain (wie das messianische Reich) or the idea of the French Revolution (französi-
sche Revolutionsidee). (SW I, pp. 37–38; GS II.1, pp. 75–76)
We can appreciate here how the idea of crisis (Krisis) in terms of a ‘mutilated
form’ of the present and a ‘deformation of life’ already leads the young Benjamin
to a new understanding of time itself through the messianic, something that here
evokes ‘the idea of the French Revolution’. In connection with this article, it is
relevant to mention here two subsequent texts, both unpublished in Benjamin’s
lifetime: Metaphysik der Jugend (The metaphysics of youth) of 1913– 1914 (GS II.1,
p. 91–104); and Dialog über die Religiosität der Gegenwart (Dialogue on the reli-
giosity of the present) of 1912– 13 (GS II.1, p. 16–35),which is absent from the Eng-
lish edition of the Selected Writings of Benjamin. Both texts accept that modern-
ity has broken up the old religions, but nevertheless consider that the present
circumstances do not permit to celebrate it without trouble; indeed, a new reli-
giosity is preconized as capable of confronting positivism and the lack of deter-
mined feelings for the youth.
II
Heidegger elaborates the notion of time in his Vortrag of 1915, a lecture for his
Venia Legendi in Freiburg. Initially, we can notice some distance from Rickert’s
ideas: Rickert spoke, as we saw above, of the ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ in re-
lation to human goals, also understood as ‘particularity’ and ‘totality’; Heideg-
ger, however, clears the notion of ‘time’ implied in the pursuit of goals, and
problematizes the notion of historical past, which is implied in historical knowl-
edge. Heidegger’s first step is to separate the time of mechanics and the time of
history. Concerning the function of time in mechanics, he asserts that it is the
quantitative measurement of movement. On the contrary, the function of time
in history, according to Heidegger, is not a measurement, but a fully qualitative
notion, which shall be understood through the idea of meaning, since the time of
history allows carving out an event as a meaningful historical individuality.
When we inscribe an event on a certain date, we are not measuring, but rather
placing that event in a unit of meaning in relation to a ‘before’ and an ‘after’. To
this comment, Heidegger adds yet another more radical observation through
which he shows his particular approach:
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The historical object, as historical, is always past: in the strict sense it no longer exists. A
temporal divide [Zeitferne] separates the historian from the past. The past has its meaning
always and only when seen from the present. When viewed from our standpoint, the past
not only no longer is; it also was something other than we and our present-day context of
life are. This much has already become clear: time has a completely original meaning in
history. Only when this qualitative otherness between past times and the present moment
breaks into consciousness does the historical sense awaken. (Heidegger 2011, pp. 68–69;
Heidegger 1978, p. 427).
Heidegger extracts from this premise two fundamental conclusions: (i) the past
has meaning only in the present; (ii) this past is not for us what it was ‘for itself ’
(Heidegger 1978, p. 427). He thus asserts that: (iii) therefore, there is a temporal
distance (Zeitferne)—even an abyss (Kluft)—between the historian and the past,
which can only be covered by means of the values (Werte) of the present and a
resolution of existence mediated by value-relevance (Wertbeziehung) in the pres-
ent; in the same way that Heinrich Rickert had presented since 1902 the selection
and knowledge of the historiographical object (Rickert 1986; Heidegger 1978,
p. 433).
Thus, Heidegger encounters a temporal abyss between past and present;
since 1915 he starts from a radical ontological gap concerning the past. In addi-
tion, he wonders how historians mind and fulfill this gap. His answer in 1915,
already moving towards the idea of temporalization in Sein und Zeit (1927), is
that it is through the future—namely by means of our present value-orientation
allowing historiographical selection—that it is possible to cover the historical
gap between present and past.
Benjamin, in his letter to Gershom Scholem of November 11, 1916, comment-
ing on Heidegger’s Vortrag, points out (without mentioning or quoting), that the
Conference “documents precisely how this subject should not be treated” (BR I,
p. 344; Benjamin 1994, p. 82 [emphasis in original]). This brings us back to Ben-
jamin’s Trauerspiel und Tragödie (1916), unpublished during his lifetime. Al-
though setting the issue of historical time as his focal point, Benjamin neverthe-
less refers to the consideration of death in Tragedy and death in Trauerspiel
(‘mourning play’). These forms therefore lead to two dramatic genres, in which
the aforementioned notions of Un-Vollendung and Voll-Endung fulfill a central
function.
Here, Benjamin recognizes that “to obtain a deeper understanding of the
tragic, we should perhaps look not just at art but also at history” (SW I, p. 55).
Indeed, this could also be interpreted the other way around: to obtain a deeper
understanding of historical time, we should perhaps look not just at historiogra-
phy but also at the tragic. In fact, Benjamin recognizes that the trajectories of
tragedy and of historical time intersect—something that is grounded in the ac-
442 Francisco Naishtat
tions of heroes (SW I, p. 55). But here follows a consideration that will complete-
ly take another turn: observing that “Historical time is infinite (unendlich) in
every direction (in jeder Richtung) and unfulfilled (unerfüllt) at every moment
(in jedem Augenblick)” (SW I, p. 55; GS II.1 p. 134), Benjamin radically distin-
guishes two sorts of time-fulfillment—namely individual heroic time, and mes-
sianic historical fulfillment. Only the latter could properly lead to historical
time. Therefore, despite the above affirmation concerning the tragic genre, no in-
dividual fulfillment of time could by itself determine historical meaning, which
instead could only be constituted through messianic fulfillment. This is why Ben-
jamin says here that:
This feature naturally changes the meaning of fulfillment completely, and it is this that dis-
tinguishes tragic time from messianic time. Tragic time is related to the latter in the same
way that an individually fulfilled time (relates to a divinely fulfilled one. (Benjamin 2015,
p. 134)
So we have here two forms of time—the tragic and the messianic—that for Ben-
jamin fit with two forms of fulfillment: the individual and the divine respectively.
It seems as if the tragic, restricted to the individual plan of the hero, could nei-
ther achieve nor fulfill the historic, whose fulfillment relates to the messianic.
Benjamin complicates this first sketch with the introduction, in the second
part of his text, of a third form—the mourning play, or Trauerspiel—as a transi-
tional device: “the mourning play is in every respect a hybrid form” (SW I, p. 57).
The specification of this form is obtained through the contrast between two fig-
ures of death, the ‘tragic’ and the Trauerspiel’s ‘figure of death’.While the former
is governed by the law of fate and corresponds to the individual fulfillment of
time by the hero’s death (SW I, p. 56), the latter is governed by the law of repe-
tition, where death is only the spectral transition to a form of continuity mediat-
ed by a mirror image, defined by Benjamin with Aristotle’s ‘Metabasis of life’ (Eis
allo genos)—transformation into another type or sort (SW I, pp. 56–57). This de-
fines Trauerspiel’s ‘death’ as a non-conclusive death. It means that Trauerspiel
corresponds to a form of expansion and dissemination (SW I, p. 57) that is typ-
ical not only of baroque time, but of modern time, as one which lacks meaning
and conclusiveness, and as a time of desolation and dissolution (Caygill 1994;
Sagnol 2003). It is as if the messianic, from then on, remained for Benjamin a
joker card, used since his earliest phases until the latest context of his Thesis
on history (1940), in order to counterbalance, through a plan of immanence,
the complete vanishing of meaningful individual heroes, as well as the lack of
future-oriented subjectivity.
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III
Heidegger did not publish anything between 1916 and 1927. In the latter year’s
Sein und Zeit (Time and Being), the second section is dedicated to the tempora-
lization of Dasein, and here he reformulates his approach to historical time, fur-
ther distancing himself from the epistemological context of his work of 1915. In
Sein und Zeit, Heidegger distinguishes the past as ‘ontic’, meaning a time that
would simply be a ‘succession of nows’ (Jetzfolge), from a past that Heidegger
calls ‘ontological’, meaning one kept in the present of oneself, in the process
of having-been, as a past that is being for a self that temporalizes himself,
into the projection that Heidegger called Ekstasis—being at the same time its
own past and anticipating its future, but in a way that being projected (Entwurf)
is the possibility of gathering its own time. Here, Heidegger takes from Wilhelm
Dilthey the expression ‘connection of a life’, (Zusammenhang des Leben) for this
continuance of the past in the present under the possibility of projection.
As Agamben comments (1978), Heidegger’s originality is to propose histori-
cal time from the assumption of the temporalization of Dasein, and this latter
through the figures of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) and instant (Ekstasis), as
attached to the same being of Dasein. Then, the figures of Zeitigung and En-
tschlossenheit are linked to the care (Sorge) and authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) of
the figure of being-towards-death (Sein zum Tode), which is the keystone to
the projectivity of Dasein. We exist towards death, and that allows us to live
our past as being from birth to death within the structure of finitude. Death is
not an event: it is a phenomenon that must be understood existentially (SuZ,
p. 251). The issue of death lies at the center of temporalization, and therefore,
of Heideggerian historicality—something that Adorno noticed in his famous
The Jargon of Authenticity. Being-towards-death is inherent to the Geworfenheit,
of our being thrown and our finitude as facticity. The authentic choices of Dasein
projected in a singular destiny (Schicksal) are interwoven in order to form the fate
(Geschick) of a people (Volk). The coincident interweaving of fates finds its locus
in the generation (Generation). Some scholars agree nevertheless that there is a
vagueness and incompleteness in the term ‘generation’ as used by Heidegger
(Barash 2003, pp. 170– 173).
But here we ask ourselves: isn’t there an abyss when we go from the level of
individual identity to something like a collective identity, precisely in relation to
matters such as past, future, and even the idea of death? Actually, the collective
level seems to generate an ontological asymmetry in relation to the existential
dimension of death. There is a tale by Kafka (included in the stories that com-
pose The Great Wall of China) that Benjamin selected during his radio shows
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on the Czech writer, in which a messenger is summoned to the Chinese emper-
or’s deathbed. The prominent court men around the emperor open his way and
the emperor tells him a secret in his ear—words that no one else hears—and asks
him to transmit those very same words to someone else, who awaits the message
on the other side of the empire. After saying these words, the emperor dies. The
Chinese messenger’s dread is proportional to the immensity of his urgent task,
since just to leave the capital of the empire he must go through countless
human barriers composed of the subjects of the crown, cramming to be with
the emperor during his last breath. The difficulty multiplies as the messenger
tries to open his way, and he rapidly realizes that he will never be able to person-
ally deliver the message to the recipient.
Concerning this story, we could also think about the problem that has often
been disregarded by hermeneutic tradition, which is no longer the problem of
interpretation, but the problem of the mere material transmission of the mes-
sage. The problem concerning the break of the transmission may be presented
focusing on the subject of survival (as opposite to death at the level of personal
existence) and on the matter of collective identity, considered as a way of under-
standing tradition—not as derived from personal experience in the form of a
present that takes over the past, but as inherent to a union of experiences
that are heterogeneous, yet at the same time articulated or scattered in a mesh
of experiences in time that relate not so much to the survival of oneself, but
to the translation of different languages, the survival of different strata of
time, or of different disposals and ruins from the past.
This is the way in which Benjamin pursued his research during the years
after that initial period: trying to think a decentralized notion of experience
based on transmission rather than on self-consciousness; on languages and
translation rather than on authenticity and selfhood; and on materials and
ruins under danger, rather than on meaning and the meaningful horizon of
the world. Heidegger, after the Kehre (U-Turn) of 1935, nevertheless approached
a linguistic turn and a spatiality-turn, in such a way that space and language in-
tertwined with our common world, making it possible to reformulate the task of
philosophy—perhaps in a way that bridges this last period of Heidegger’s think-
ing with Benjamin’s own thinking on modernity and the global world.
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Rosa E. Belvedresi
A Philosophical Inquiry into the Future
as a Category of Historical Time
Abstract: The significance of future as a category of historical time necessarily
refers to the classical Koselleck′s study about the origins of history as Ge-
schichte. Indeed, history proper is only possible when the time is released
from the divine power, then history appears as the result of the human actions.
This idea reformulates a Kantian thesis about the plan of history. As it is known,
according to Kant history has a meaning and a direction but this cannot put at
risk the freedom of humans as moral agents. The future plays here a main role
because it allows thinking about the progress of mankind as a regulative
ideal. The concept of hope is its necessarily counterpart. In the realm of practical
reason the hope works as the basis for our belief in a better world caused by our
collaboration (when the good and the virtue go together). In history, this hope is
expressed through the expectation of perpetual peace. It is obvious that the fu-
ture cannot be an object of history because to talk about it would be to make
prophecies (as Danto says). But it can be said that without future there is not his-
tory in its proper sense. Our aim here is to analyze the role of future as a com-
ponent of historical consciousness and consequently to show its importance to
understand why the human groups build their memories as a legacy for the
next generations. In order to do this I intend to identify the political aspects
of the hope displayed when the communities seek to conform and keep their col-
lective memory as a heritage to leave for future generations.
Introduction
Every community relies on the future as a temporal dimension that organizes its
present and, at the same time, gives meaning to its past. Human communities,
whose expectations are often related to a better future for those to come, trans-
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mit to ‘the newcomers’ a stock of accumulated knowledge that will prove useful
in the further advancement of their lives (Arendt 1968).Within this social dynam-
ic, the past and future function as indispensable temporal dimensions. New gen-
erations represent the future in the here and now, and they are the ones who en-
sure the continuing survival of the group in time.What they deem important and
choose to transmit to other new generations constitutes a set of skills, meanings
and worldviews, preserved from an earlier time (past) with the hope that it will
be passed on to the future.
We shouldn’t conclude from these statements that such communities are ho-
mogeneous; it is possible for that which they deem important to transmit to be
composed of heterogeneous sets of the ‘goods’, which different groups value dif-
ferently, which are not organized in a hierarchical manner and which are not
consistent with each other. Nor should it be assumed that the transmission of
what is considered significant happens ‘democratically’. The goods to be trans-
mitted are, in the end, symbolical and cultural resources, which, like any other
resource, are unequally distributed. We will return to this issue below.
What I am concerned with analyzing here is the availability of the future as a
dimension of historical consciousness, in relation to the ways in which social
communities choose to conserve that which they wish to transmit to coming gen-
erations. I am referring to what I denominate, in general terms, ‘inheritance’. By
this, I understand that which is transmitted from generation to generation and
constitutes the common backdrop that enables the group to conserve its identity
and strengthen the sense of belonging of its members. I believe that, in this man-
ner, it will be possible to recover the concept of hope in a political and historical
sense, stripped of its religious connotations (insofar as it remits to the theolog-
ical virtue).
It’s clear that since the eighties we have been living in a world immersed in
what is referred to as the ‘memory boom’. This situation has been critically an-
alyzed by such authors as A. Huyssen and F. Hartog, who think that the empha-
sis on memory in current Western societies doesn’t shed sufficient light on the
complex ways that symbolic constructions (which communities pass on as
their inheritance) are constituted. Huyssen has established connections between
the excess of memory and a certain risk of amnesia, whereas Hartog has identi-
fied the oppressive danger in the current attempt to turn everything into some-
thing worth remembering. Having said that, what interests me here is the possi-
bility of understanding the current state of collective memory as a symptom of
modes of conceptualizing the future, for which the aforementioned notion of ‘in-
heritance’ will prove useful.
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Future and history
The future is a temporal dimension that remits to that which could occur in a
moment that hasn’t yet transpired. It is a characteristic specific to the human
consciousness of time; for Kant it is the anticipation of the future that distin-
guishes human beings from other species. This anticipation does not only in-
clude the more or less specific prediction of what is to come, but it is also mold-
ed by an important degree of uncertainty. (Later, we will return to this dual
character of the future.)
The association of the future with history is nothing new. A. Danto (1985)
had already pointed this out when he critiqued the prophetic aspect of specula-
tive philosophies; in other words, he criticized them for concerning themselves
with that which is outside of the scope of history, namely that which has yet
to occur. Danto dealt the last blow to the aspirations of historical teleologies
by formulating the following ‘puzzle’: “If I can do something about the future,
the future cannot be known; and if it can be known, we can do nothing about
it” (1985, p. 11). While it’s true that he rejects the idea of formulating historical
prophecies, on the other hand he gives the future a positive meaning within his-
torical comprehension. Firstly, he exposes the uselessness of the ‘Ideal Chroni-
cler’ who, lacking perspective on the future, is incapable, strictly speaking, of ac-
counting for what happens. Thus, he reaches the following conclusion: “not
being witness to the event is not so bad a thing if our interests are historical”
(1985, pp. 152–3), since without this perspective on the future it is impossible
to comprehend what it is that happened. Secondly and related to the first, not
only do we not know the future, but we don’t even know which history will
be written of the moment that we are living, because the selection, description
and interpretation of the events that are considered historical are dependent
upon interests that we ignore. The historians of the future will have to be the
ones who relate these events to others that haven’t yet happened (1985, p. 169).
In this way, Danto considers that the thesis that history is constantly being
re-written is justifiable, which enables us to assert that historicism, in a certain
sense, is trivially true. His analysis also enables us to account for something that
is often underestimated in the study of collective memory, such as the fact that
the distinction between events that are ‘worthy of remembering’ and those con-
sidered unworthy doesn’t have to do with any fixed aspect or inherent condition,
but rather with the ways in which they are deemed meaningful by those who
evaluate them.
So far, we can identify a double valuation of the future. As a perspective on
predictions concerning the actions we are currently involved in, it is necessary to
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depend on the future in order to make descriptions that correspond to what we
are doing in the present.Without a minimum prediction of what would occur as
the result of our present actions, it wouldn’t be possible to account for the set of
movements of which they are comprised. But, secondly, the future is also open
and unpredictable, and any attempt to delimit it or to speak about it causes us to
run the risk of reverting to prophecy.
Koselleck, for his part, identifies different ways in which the future can be
accounted for in the comprehension of history. It no longer has only to do
with the distance between expectation and experience—as in his celebrated the-
sis about modernity—but rather with the degree to which we can speak reason-
ably about the future, about that which is to come. That capacity, which he de-
nominates ‘prognosis’, is a part of history as a discipline, since it is history’s job
to study why some of these prognoses have come true and others have not. In
order to do this, he appeals to his theory of the strata of time, since it enables
him to determine what possibility a prognosis has of being fulfilled. The more
levels a prediction encompasses vertically, the higher its probability of being ac-
curate. He identifies different types of prognosis, according to the range of future
alternatives they offer to the historical agents. There are those that he describes
as ‘wishful prognoses’, which is to say those that are the product of the optimism
(or pessimism) of an agent, without taking the pertinent factors adequately into
account; then, there are those that he characterizes as ‘compulsory prognoses’,
which present only one possible course of action and exclude any alternative;
and, finally, come the ‘alternative conditional prognoses’ that contain instruc-
tions for a course of action for the purpose of avoiding certain results (such as
the repetition of a war).
Desire—which is to say the expectation that events pan out in the way that
the agent wants—is an important component of each of these, but what differen-
tiate the three prognoses are the relationships that they have with previous his-
torical experiences. The third type of prognosis is the one that seems to make the
best use of historical experiences, insofar as it is able to present a future state of
affairs that should be avoided, such as the (possible but not inevitable) repeti-
tion of a past that it would be desirable to overcome. When certain past events
have been damaging to a social group, this type of prognosis attempts to extrap-
olate them to the future by presenting them as an outcome that can be avoided if
the correct courses of action are taken (Koselleck 2002b). This observation is ac-
curate and Koselleck expressed it in other terms in reference to the way in which
social groups interpret their experiences and rewrite their history once they have
been defeated. As he states in “Transformation of Experience and Methodologi-
cal Change: A Historical-Anthropological Essay”: “the experience of being van-
quished contains an epistemological potential that transcends its cause, espe-
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cially when the vanquished are required to rewrite general history in conjunction
with their own” (2002a, p. 77).
As I pointed out earlier, the factor that Koselleck stresses, in order to gauge
the precision of the prognoses, is the temporal strata that they encompass. Here,
he is referring to the different structures, processes and factors that constitute
historical reality, which have varying rates of change and don’t respond to
human action in a uniform manner.While long term factors don’t directly or im-
mediately depend upon human action, there are other short or medium term ac-
tions that can indeed be affected by it, which is why historical agents can include
their modifications, to a certain degree, in the prediction of the outcomes of their
actions.
I’m not going to focus on the characteristics of each of the different strata
that Koselleck identifies, because what interests me here is something else.
What is important is their relationship to human actions, because this is what
leads to historical contingence, which is a central factor in conceiving the future
in non-prophetic terms. All historical events are more or less new,which is to say
more or less unpredictable, but what is important for historical comprehension
is to grasp the contingent nature of their relationship to the events that came be-
fore them. It is in relation to historical contingency that the gap between predic-
tion (the imaginable future) and its actual fulfillment can best be approached.
Historical contingence enables us to conserve intact the two characteristics of fu-
ture as historical time: its open condition and the degree of uncertainty that nec-
essarily comes with it (inseparable from its availability); and, on the other hand,
the fact that it is restricted to a set of options that are in a certain sense pre-de-
termined, since that which occurs is always the product of a set of conditions,
imprecise and complex, that preceded it.
As I said earlier, Koselleck is interested in how the future can be an object of
study for historians, as ‘future past’, but some observations can be found in his
analysis that in general allow us to think of the future in terms of historical time.
Human beings think about the past extrapolating their experiences, but not all
historical experiences are equally valuable in predicting the future. There are
some, Koselleck says, that possess ‘prognostic power’ (2002b, p. 148)’ which
he calls ‘meta-historical’ (even if they aren’t timeless). These seem to be general
references to the characteristics of human action and, although they are derived
from experience, they have a supra-historical value. He includes in this group
what could be described as ‘popular knowledge’, or ‘folk wisdom’, often ex-
pressed through proverbs. But, these types of extrapolation from past situations
to future ones possess a high level of vagueness. A prognosis with a greater pos-
sibility of turning out to be accurate will be that which includes the highest num-
ber of strata of time, which is to say that which includes a vertical temporal grad-
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uation and therefore possesses a higher number of precise references to the con-
texts in which the action had taken place.
This analysis should be put alongside Koselleck’s thesis that in history there
are processes and structures that repeat themselves, which enables him to pos-
tulate ‘the formal repeatability of history’. Once again, this permits us to see to
what degree the future presupposes a conjunction between novelty and repeti-
tion. The human capacity for predicting the future through prognosis requires
an accurate assessment of how both factors (the new and the repeated) interact
and, in addition, the capacity of the agent involved to bring about the conditions
necessary for the predicted future to come to pass. It is inevitable at this point to
bring Kant back into the discussion, since for him the possibility of a prophetic
history necessarily implied that the person who made the prophecy was also in-
volved in the conditions of making it come true (which doesn’t seem so far-fetch-
ed if we think of the world of finance and international politics).
I’m interested in the relationship between the new and the repeated because
it enables us to analyze to what degree the thought future is a dimension that is
relevant for understanding how human agents and societies, in developing
means to achieve what they desire, interpret available historical experiences.
In the end, Koselleck concludes that in our current conditions, the variety of fac-
tors that influence our actions (as well as an increase in the rate at which those
factors change) makes it difficult to formulate prognoses (2002b, p. 148). There is
an interesting asymmetry here. As a historian, Koselleck is capable of accounting
for future past, which is to say the way past actors were able to predict with
greater or lesser precision and greater or lesser success that which would hap-
pen. As a historical actor, however, Koselleck finds himself in complete uncer-
tainty. This asymmetry expresses, once again, the dual value of the future: as
prediction and as risk.
One of the ways to evaluate the role of the future in human groups is to an-
alyze their ways of conserving the past. In fact, the conservation of the past is
necessarily related to its transmission, which is why every strategy for conserving
the past takes the future into consideration. This, once again, implies a dual val-
uation: in first place, as risk—what is yet to come is unknown and can therefore
threaten that which we treasure; and secondly, as hope—that which is to come in
the future will permit us to keep the past alive. In what follows, I will continue to
analyze the past in relation to these two sides of the future: as that which ena-
bles us to conserve the past, but at the same time represents the threat of losing
it.
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Future and memory: the past as inheritance
The relationship between future and memory becomes clear if collective memory
is conceived of as an attempt to transmit that which has been valued as a mem-
ory to new (which is to say future) generations. The origin of this line of analysis
can be traced back to M. Halbwachs’s studies of the ‘social frameworks’ of mem-
ory. The transmission of collective memory, determined by the different groups to
which the individuals belong, implies an operation of bequeathing, in the sense
of leaving something so that another may have access to it in the future. In this
way, memory, the trace in the present of an absence and that which is ‘from the
past’ (to use the terminology of Ricoeur 2000), contains within its structure an
intention that is oriented towards the future. This is where the principal chal-
lenge of memory resides: in transmitting an experience to those who haven’t
had it (Vezzetti 2002, p.19). Collective memory implies a set of practices that
are related to the consolidation of cultural identities that strengthen the tie be-
tween individual and community. This tie places the tension between the preten-
sion of truthfulness (which distinguishes it from mere imagination) and loyalty
to the group (without which there would be no collective memory) at the very
center of collective memory. It is a practice that is consolidated through storytell-
ing and communally shared meanings that have already been established by the
time new subjects are born.¹
Following this line of argumentation, the connection between the concepts
of memory and inheritance starts to become visible. Inheritance, as a social
mode of transferring material and cultural assets, is in itself a historiographical
object of study. (Here, I dismiss inheritance in the biological sense, to the extent
that what is transmitted is done so without our consent or even being aware of it,
a point I will elaborate on later.) The ways in which the transferences are execut-
ed and what it is that is being transferred force us to consider the social and cul-
tural context in which they were produced. This is why, for example, if we under-
stand inheritance to be the practice of land transferal, Thompson points out the
risk of assuming that we are dealing with a ‘historical constant’, when in reality
what is being inherited is not only property (land in this case) but also a web of
social relationships (Thompson 2000, p. 45). Cultural anthropology studies in-
 “‘Being part of ’ requires a narrative in which we locate ourselves and are located in. These
narratives, which are seldom of our own making, are constituted through representations and
performance, conveying not only who we are but also who we will come to be.” (Somers
1994), quoted from: (Anico & Peralta 2009, p. 1)
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heritance as the transmission of objects (relics and remains) and of meanings
(traditions).²
In addition to these historiographical and anthropological resonances, in-
heritance can be conceived of as Koselleck’s experiential space, that is, as a cul-
tural reserve that one generation attempts to transfer to another. Even when ex-
periences crystallize into a ‘space’, the availability of that space is not
synonymous with its actual use. In a similar fashion, inheritance contains within
it uncertainty regarding its own future. One generation may leave a memorial
legacy, but is faced with the uncertainty of not knowing whether or not the
next generation will accept it. As Hassoun indicates, the ‘adventure’ of the trans-
mission of an inheritance is the product of the difference between our ancestors
and ourselves, a dynamic that will then be repeated between us and our de-
scendants, which means that there is never ‘an eternal return’ of the legacy to
be transmitted and that a considerable part of it is composed of oversights
and annexes (Hassoun 1996). In complex societies like our own, in which tradi-
tions come into conflict and it becomes impossible to integrate past events into a
singular social narrative, inheritance is a symbolic and cultural space where
identities in contention within the common space are put into question.³ More
than a fixed and closed repertoire of shared meanings, inheritance should be
thought of in this manner—as an attempt to solidify identities and meanings
that are unstable and fragmentary (Betts & Rose 2015, p. 2). The construction
of collective memory, as with all forms of social inheritance, is also riddled
with conflicts and threatened by a proliferation of contents and formats that con-
 In the introduction of the issue of the publication “Past and Present” with monographs about
relics and remains, it is stated that the essays presented in the issue “explore the political, eco-
nomic and social dimensions of the identification, preservation and fabrication of relics and re-
mains, and their meaning and function in the spheres of memory, history and heritage” (Wal-
sham 2010, p. 10, italics added). The supplement corresponding to July of 2015 of the same
publication is dedicated to inheritance in the modern world and, while it focuses on the
study of historical preservation, its origins and re-significations throughout time, a quick look
at the table of contents is enough to see the close relationship that exists between inheritance
and collective memory (Betts & Rose 2015).
 In the case of Argentina, think of the debates concerning the monuments to Julio A. Roca, the
general who headed the ‘desert campaign’—which in reality consisted of the extermination of
the indigenous populations that had inhabited Patagonia during the nineteenth century.
Today, there are many efforts to remove the monuments that commemorate Roca in different cit-
ies throughout the country, a movement that cancels the idea that our country was established
peacefully upon an enormous, uninhabited territory—an idea created and strengthened by tradi-
tional historiography.
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tribute to its consecration or banalization (Todorov 2002—in particular, chapter
3).
(Preliminary) conclusions
The concept of ‘inheritance’ contains various meanings, but it essentially implies
something that people take with themselves and which comes from others before
them, their ancestors. The construction of an inheritance implies the hope that
the temporal and generational gap can be bridged and that it is possible to be
able to use today that which has been passed on to us.⁴
Inheritance also refers to that which human beings carry within themselves
without being conscious of it. Oakeshott, for example, refers to genetic inheri-
tance, the information coded in our DNA, which has accumulated throughout
centuries of evolution and which we haven’t done anything to receive nor
made an effort to preserve. It’s just there, available to us without our even know-
ing (Oakeshott 1999). This notion of biological inheritance does not apply to his-
tory. Another form of inheritance would have to be postulated, understood in,
say, ‘biographical’ terms. I’m referring to an inheritance which includes an enor-
mous number of conducts, valuations, meaning constructs, etc. that people ac-
quire throughout a long learning process that begins at birth and continues
all throughout life.
There is a third form of inheritance, which is the one that I would like to an-
alyze here and which has to do with everything that subjects receive through
their social and community context. Understood in this way, inheritance is prop-
erly historical, and it is composed of a great variety of what we can call ‘goods’,
which historical agents are able to apprehend more or less consciously and
whose meanings are more or less explicit to them. The historical inheritance
that I’m referring to here implies capital that is composed of dissimilar goods
being passed from one generation to another. It is important to stress that social
actors can be beneficiaries of more than one inheritance, as long as there are, in
our society, different groups to belong to, with varying degrees of intimacy or dis-
tance (Halbwachs classifies ‘belonging groups’ as the near, the dear and the far).
This historical inheritance,which is close to different manifestations of collective
memory, operates with varying degrees of opaqueness. In the same way as genet-
ic inheritance, this historical memory is also handed down to new generations
without their consent but, in contrast to genetic inheritance, it requires some
 I owe some of these ideas about inheritance to Prof. Estanislao Antelo.
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level of acceptance on behalf of the recipients in order to be put into action. It is
an offer available to new subjects that would then have to be activated by them.
In all historical inheritance, there are those who bequeath and those who
receive the legacy. This inheritance demands a particular attitude from both par-
ties to ensure that its reception takes place. There are cases of legacies lovingly
prepared by one generation for the next that nonetheless sink into oblivion. But
there are also cases in which the successors lay claim to a legacy that their an-
cestors did not make available to them. There could be many reasons why these
kinds of cases might happen, from the fact that the inheritance is rendered use-
less or embarrassing in its new context to the fact that the present raises new
questions concerning the past from which the inheritance comes. The questions
we have to ask ourselves, then, are about how shared inheritances are constitut-
ed, how they are composed and how available they are to those who intend to
use them.
As I already mentioned while discussing A. Danto’s thesis concerning histor-
ians (we can’t know what history will be written in the future because we don’t
know which interests will guide coming historians nor which questions they will
address), we can also approach historical inheritance in this same way. Societies
can more or less consciously use symbolic constructs, examples, moral tales, lin-
eages, etc. to compose the heritage that they wish to transmit to coming gener-
ations. They cannot predict, however, the course that these inheritances will take
in the future; it isn’t possible to predict in detail how future generations will use
them, if they even use them at all. It is in historical inheritance that the way in
which communities attempt to deal with the future in its dual aspect, as risk as
well as prediction, can be observed. In the first case, the future may bring the
loss of value, a fall into disuse or the distortion of an inheritance. In the second
case, the future becomes a necessary condition for the possibility of the trans-
mission of that which is being preserved. The words that R. Kent, an Auschwitz
survivor, spoke in January of 2015 are worth remembering here: “we do not want
our past to be our children’s future”. He is referring to an inheritance, that of
hardships suffered, trying to be preserved for the future (in order to prevent it
from being repeated) but that, in addition, acknowledges the open character
of the future, since that which is to come may or may not do justice to that in-
heritance.⁵
 In the manner of Koselleck’s aforementioned ‘alternative conditional prognosis’. R. Kent’s
speech was given on 25th January, 2015 and is available at: http://www.auschwitz.info/en/es
sentials/essential-speeches/2015-roman-kent.html, date of register: 09/09/15
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While it’s true that the historical inheritance presented here bears resem-
blance to collective memory, it is important to point out some of the differences.
The latter, generally speaking, is the product of the effort of a community, or
even a state, to constitute shared symbolic assets and through which several
more or less successful mechanics of transmission can be identified (especially
through, but not limited to, the educational system). As such, the features of
what I am calling historical inheritance aren’t as defined and its modes of trans-
mission aren’t as lineal. Its constitution and regulation consolidate the genera-
tional and intergenerational bond, and the possibility of its transmission implies
challenging the ever-present risk of being forgotten. Historical inheritances are
formally instituted in order to be handed down through established mechanisms
of construction and, even more importantly, of transmission and conservation.
At the same time, though, they can be re-created (re-signified) with each new
generation, who will take from this inheritance what they deem useful.
It seems to me that the idea of historical inheritance that I am presenting
here sets a limit to the uses of the concept of collective memory. Actually, the lat-
ter always runs the risk of being substantialized, of losing sight of its polemic
and plural character, and at the same time it has a complex relationship with
official memory. Historical inheritance, on the other hand, displays several char-
acteristics that I think would be revealing to explore:
1. it is shared by social groups of varying size, within which the intensity of the
bonds that hold them together range from subtle to close, in the same way
that the bond can either be explicitly sustained or not;
2. it has a potential value that can either be activated or not according to the
contexts within which it is advocated; and
3. it possesses an open meaning whose future re-significations are impossible
to determine a priori.
In other words, inheritance is defined not only by its relationship to the past that
it seeks to preserve and transmit, but also by its orientation towards the future,
since this is what characterizes every inheritance, that is to say its future avail-
ability. What defines inheritance is the fact that it is made available to others,
those of the future, with whom those who compiled it intend to share it. Yet,
at the same time that it offers the possibility of historical comprehension, like
a bridge between two temporal (generational) moments, it also exposes its lim-
its. The open condition expressed in the meaning of inheritance prevents us from
being certain that it will be used towards the same end for which it was intend-
ed.What’s more, it prevents us from being certain that it will even be useful at all
in the future. In this manner, the construction of a historical inheritance that in-
tends to be shared implies the instituting gesture of the giver while it, inevitably,
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leaves the decision regarding its use and pertinence in the hands of the receiver.
The construction of an inheritance in itself presupposes and at the same time
problematizes the temporal continuity expressed through generational continu-
ity.
But there is another characteristic that I wish to point out. Historical inher-
itance, in contrast to other, ‘legal’ inheritances, cannot avoid being appropriated
by those who feign (or truly believe), to be its heirs, without being the originally
intended recipients. Historical inheritance contains an aporia: it is the result of
the conscious and deliberate effort of previous generations to pass on to others a
body of specific symbol capital without being able to guarantee who its actual
heirs will be. Even further, they cannot even guarantee that the inheritance
handed down will be transmitted in the way it had been intended, given that
younger generations are capable of constructing new, contingently defined ties
to the past—ties, in other words, that are neither authorized by nor contained
in the original meaning intended to be associated with that inheritance. This
idea of the past as inheritance enables us to characterize the relationship that
social communities establish with their past, while simultaneously helping us
to avoid thinking of the past only in terms of its ontological or referential persis-
tence (which I don’t dispute).
As a result, I would like to conclude by claiming that the past exists in the
form of an inheritance that is reclaimed by those who were not its contempora-
ries. Since this reclamation cannot be controlled a priori, it is impossible to de-
fine the past a priori, independent of the meanings by which it becomes opera-
tive. Rather than an object in an attic or a territory to be explored, the past
emerges as symbolic capital to be inherited (accepting or disputing its meaning).
In other words, the past will be that which the future allows it to be.
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